

JOHN McDOWELL

THE ENGAGED INTELLECT

John McDowell

The Engaged Intellect

Philosophical Essays

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 2009

wkoo-yn4-gxQ1-yrighted material

Copyright © 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publicanen Data

McDowell, John Henry.

The engaged intellect : philosophical essays / John McDuwell p. cm.

L. Philosophy. E. Titie.

BD21.M229 2009

190-dc22 2008013845

Contents

	Preface vii
I_A	nclent Philosophy
1	Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato's Sephia 3
7	Endatmonism and Realism in Aristotle's Fibics 23
3	Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle's Ethics 41
3	Incontinence and Practical Wisdom in Aristoile 59
	sues in Wittgenstein
	Are Meaning, Understanding, etc., Definite States? 79
9	Brandom's Wittgenstein 96
III Iss	sues in Davidson
3	Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism 115
<u> </u>	Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism 134
9	Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective 152

ΙV	Ref	erence, Objectivity, and Knowledge
	10	Evans's Frege 163
	11	Referring to Oneself 186
	12	Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity 204
	13	The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument 225
<u>y</u>	The	mes from Mind and World Revisited
	14	Experiencing the World 243
	15	Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind 257
VI	Res	ponses to Brandom and Dreyfus
	16	Knowledge and the Internal Revisited 279
	17	Motivating Inferentialism: Comments on Chapter 2 of
		Making It Explicit 288
	18	What Myth? 308
	19	Response to Dreylus 324

Bibliography 337 Credits 339

Index 341

Preface

The title of this volume works in two ways.

An intellect—a writer's or a reader's—may be engaged in a certain task, the thinking that goes into writing or reading philosophy. Taken like this, the title fits, in a general way, the activity of philosophizing, whatever the particular topic, and it can embrace all the essays in this somewhat miscellaneous collection.

But I also intend the title to capture a theme that runs through some of the essays. In them I resist a rationalistic conception of the intellect, in this sense: a conception that disengages reason, which is special to rational animals, from aspects of their make-up that they share with other animals. The engaged intellect, on this interpretation, is the intellect conceived as integrally bound up with the animal nature of the rational animal. In the case of the practical intellect, the disengagement to be opposed is a disengagement from motivational propensities associated with feelings, and also from animal capacities for physical intervention in the world. Resisting this disengagement ensures that we do not fall into philosophical difficulties that reflect a distancing of the intentional agent from its bodily nature. In the case of the theoretical intellect, the disengagement to be opposed is a disengagement from what figures in Kant as sensibility, sensory responsiveness to features of the environment. Resisting this disengagement ensures that we are not vulnerable to familiar supposed problems about the possibility of empirical knowledge.

Essays 2, 3, and 4 belong, in part, in the second category. They elaborate various aspects and implications of a non-rationalistic reading of Aristotle on the excellence of the practical intellect that, as he sees things, is, or is a central element in, ethical virtue. Essay 1 fits with these essays only in that

its topic is also ancient; in this essay I build on and modify G. E. L. Owen's reading of Plato's Sophist as a document from the dawn (at least so far as the Western philosophical tradition is concerned) of what we now call "philosophy of language".

Essay 5 centres on a sketch for a reading of the concluding sections in Part I of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. In my view that material often exerts insufficient pressure on how commentators understand Wittgenstein's conception of meaning and understanding, and—in association with them—such states as intention and expectation. In Essay 6, which obviously might just as well have been placed in the final part, I use Robert Brandom's interpretation of Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following as a foil, to bring out by contrast how I think those passages ought to be understood.

I have put the third group of essays together because Donald Davidson is prominent in them. But the division of these essays from those in the fifth group is not sharp. Davidson is prominently present in Essay 14 too, and a central topic there, as in Essays 7 and 9, is the opposition I expressed in Mind and World against a rationalistic conception of theoretical reason, in its guise as governing intellectual activity directed towards empirical knowledge. On the view I oppose, which Davidson takes to be the only possible view, reason is at most triggered into operation by episodes of sensibility; whereas on the view I recommend, reason enters into the very constitution of episodes of sensibility as they are enjoyed by rational animals. In Essay 8 I make a comparison between Davidson and Gadamer, in partial response to the objection that the view I recommend has unpalatably idealistic consequences.

In Essay 10 I suggest, among other things, that the interest of Evans's reading of Frege lies in its allowing us to see Frege's treatment of singular reference as a contribution to opposing the disengagement of the intellect—to insisting that the rationality of understanding must not be separated from animal situatedness in the world. Essay 11 urges, among other things, that a central element in self-consciousness is self-awareness in intentional bodily action. In Essay 12, I argue that Richard Rorty goes too far when he takes it that just any philosophical concern with objectivity falls into what he rightly sees as the misguided obsessions of modern philosophy. Essay 13 discusses an epistemological exploitation of the roughly Selfarsian conception of perceptual experience I have been recommending since Mind and World.

Essay 14 constitutes a kind of introduction to the themes of Mina and World. And in Essay 15 I elaborate the treatment of the idea of the natural that I sketched there, and draw out its implications for the philosophy of mind.

Essays 16 and 17 take issue with Brandom's monvation for inferentialism the thesis that we should understand the significance of ling asic performances and the content of interinonal states in terms of the location of languistic performances in a complex of inferential proprieties, and with his application of interentialism in his reading of my essay "Knowledge and the Interna," In Essays 18 and 19, which are my side of an exchange with Hulbert Dreyt is, the theme of the engaged intellect is central. Dreyfus finds an objectionable intellectual small the way I describe the perceptual expenience of rational animals, and their intentional action. I respond that trings seem that way to Dreyfus only because he reads my conceptions is terms of the idea that the intellect is disengaged from anything shared between rational animals and other animals. And much of the point of the conceptions he objects to Les precisely in opposition to such a picture.

I have cited works by author's name and title leaving details of publication to the Bibliography at the end of the volume.

Many people helped with these essays, and I am sorry the specific acknowledgments that fig. re in some of them are so sparse and madequate. Here I would like to express special graphfule to fames Conant for his help with the selection and arrangement.

THE ENGAGED INTELLECT

PART I

Ancient Philosophy

ESSAY 1

Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist'

I For me G. F. I. Owen's "Plato on Not Being" radically improved the prospects for a confident overall view of its topic. Hotherto passage after passage had generated reasonable disagreement over Plato's in enhous and the displates were not subject to control by a satisfying picture of his large-scale strategy so that the general impression as one read the Sophial was one of diffuseness and argenty of purpose. By locusing discussion on the distinction between otherness and contrariety (257b) (cd.) Owen showed how at a stroke a mass of confusing exceptical alternatives could be swept away and the dialogue's treatment of not-being revealed as a sustained and tightly organized assault on a single error. In what follows, I take Owen's locusing of the issue for granted, and I accept many (1 his detailed conclusions. Where I diverge from Owen—in participat over the nature of the difficulty about faisehood that Plato tackles in the Sophial \$85 and 6 below)—it is mainly to press further in the direction he indicated in the interest of a conviction that the locus can and should be made even sharper.

2 By 256e5-6 the E eatic Stranger (ES) can say "In the case of each of the forms, then, what is is mo tiple and what is not is sudefur to in number". Yet it is only at 258b6-7 that Theaeretus is allowed to amnounce the availability at last, of the application for "what is not, that was needed in order to flush the sophist from his refuge. Why was it not available already at 256e5-6. What is the relation between the application for "what is not" vindicated in the earlier passage and the application yindicated in the later passage."

We can make the question more pressing. What was needed in order to capture the sophist was a non-paradoxical characterization of the sort of

[.] This essay was written for a Pestschrift for G. E. L. Owen.

unreality a semblance has, and of talsehood (236d9-237a9-239c9-240c6-240c7-24.b3). Ultimately the first task is merged into the second (264c10-d5). Now when the E5 tackles the second task the backward reference (263b11-12) with which he seeks to justify his use of the expression "what is not" is to 256c5-6, the *earner* of our two passages, not the one in which Theaetetus notes the participants acquisition of the equipment necessary for their project of participants acquisition of the equipment necessary for their project of participants down the sophist. But if the project required the E5 to go beyond 256e5-6, how can the reference back to the car her passage be appropriate in its execution?

I shall deal with this composite difficulty by dividing it. First: 63 below) I shall consider the relation between the passages in which 256e5-6 and 258b6-7 arc embedded, in abstract on from the question how cution is related to the final characterization of labeliand. Then (64 below) I shall return to the latter question.

3 256.5-6 expresses a generalization of the results of 25568-256d10. So its employment of "what is not" most be warranted by the fact that each form or kind is not indefinitely many others, as change is not rest (255e14), the same (256a5) inder (256c8), being (256d8), that is, that it is other than—non-identical with reach of them. If, then, we were to consider the expression "(s) not beau. Iof" within the framework constructed in this passage, we would find ourse ves understanding it so as to be trial of anything other than the form or kind beautiful no less true, then, of Helen or Aphtodite than of (he sin, b) osed 50crates, and haroly a placisible reading for day to day uses of the expression (cf. 257d20). So is would be ansarphising to find the ES moving beyond 255c8–257a7, where we are supposed to have been made comfortable with the use of "is not" at statements of negative predication. And I believe to at 8 indeed what we are meant to find in the passage that starts at 257b. 4

² See Owen, "Plato on Not Being", pp. 250, 259.

³ Sec I dward N. Lee: Plato on Negation and Not Being in the Sophis at p. 299 (1.53). The delices of is more serious dran Lee allows the treatment of talse nood as not plat lower. [Platos] major and vive problems, but the very problem alloyed to at 25866.7 platters P. Kirstman. False Logos and Not being in Platois Sophia. acknowledges, hat is cannot explain the reference to 25665–6 (pp. 197–210, n. 11).

^{4.} A layear sylven I write as I shall of the is not of non-identity and the "is nor of negative predication. I do not mean to note with Plato arms to discuss of shares of the out" wild currespondingly of the index Owen. Plato on Not Being", pp. 257-8.

Not that the enterprise of 257b1 ff is to be conceived as disconnected from that of 255c8–257a7. Together the two passages constitute a careful step wise response to Eleatic doubts about "is not". The first does not merely assume that "is not" is acceptable in statements of non-identity, but painstakingly works for that conclusion. And the second in arguing that "is not" is acceptable in statements of negative predication, employs a strategy essentially involving the materials that have proved useful in the first

(1) It has been accepted that the nature of the other is all pervasive (254d4-e7). The ES begins the first passage with particular exemplifications of that conclusion not obtazenly) statements like "Change is not rest" the negative particle is ostentabously attricted by word order whose effect I have tried ocapitate by hyphetiating, to the name of the kind than which change is being said to be other not to the verb). We may be hard pressed to see a real distriction here. But it was the negating of the verb "to be" in particular, not negation in general that Parmetades found turningligible. The 15 is starting with something that should be uncontentious, something against which, as it stands no Parmenidean strictures apply. The tipshot indeed will be that the puzzling distinction marks no real difference, but in the dialectical circumstances this needs to be argued not assumed.

The ES proceeds innoceptly through a series of examples of the form presumed abcordentions. "Change is not-rest" (255e14). "Change is not the same" (256a5, "Change is not other" (256c8). Then he unsheathes his knafe. Being was one of the five kinds of which it was agreed a 254d4-255e2, that each is other than all the others, so anyone who has allowed the first three examples to pass, as true in surface of the facilithat change is other than rest, the same, and other, has no ground for protest. when in virtue of the structurally indistings viable fact that change is other than being, we justst on what is in fact another example of the same form "Change is not-being" (256d8). Moreover, the same can be said of any other kind cother than being itselft (256d11 e2). It is clear now that we must abandon any hope of accepting the negative statements that constitute the natural expression for the pervasiveness of or reguess, while divesting them of counter Eleanic significance by insisting that being is not what is negated, and the ES now takes himself to be ensitled to resocate the "not" in statements of non-identity like the first three examplesstatements other than those in which one term is being uself. The puzzling distinction vanishes, shown up as empty, and, on the strength of 255e3-7.

the ES can conclude that each kind or form is not all of the indefinitely many others.5

(2) The second passage also attacks (on a less restricted from) a Parmentdean refusal to make sense of "is not". The ES diagnoses the refusal as based on a mistake about negation, that of supposing that the addition of "not" yields an expression for the contrary of what was meant by the original expression (257b1+c4). In the case of say, "not beautiful,", the mistake does not have the effect of depriving the negative expression of meaning a together. The meaning of "ugly" is a perfectly good meaning, even though it is wrong to assign it to "not beautiful." But in the case of "is not," the initiake is destructive. An expression that meant the commany of what "is," means would mean, if it means anything, the same as what would be meant if anything could be by "in no way is," and this is an expression for which no use (as distinct from merition, can be found even at attempts to formulate in the maternal mode the thought that it has no application (237b7+239c8, on "in no way being" recalled in terms of "contrary of being", at 258e1-259a5.

The E5 works up to the destructive form of the mistake from a consideration of the non-destructive form. What makes it possible to say significantly of something that it is not beautiful—what ensures that the express on thou beautiful it is not condemned, whenever unered to fly but vairly into a word so much empty chatter, as not tas the erroneous view might have it that is outdoor express on would strike home against the subject's being unit (for such statements can be true even though their subjects are not ugly), but rather that the negative expression. If aftered in a true statement, would strike home against some attribute other than beautiful, possessed by the subject (257d10-c), (it is not that the

^{5.} C. Owch. Plan on Not Being pp. 233.4 — 23. The both and "construction is strained in Cwears or istrual of 156c11. 2 and he strain is in accessary given the evident intelligibility of the line of thought I have seriour.

[•] See Owen "Placo in Not Being" passing rigg pp 231-2 (fisce is perverse take 25701 c4 as any bug bit an attroduction, no doubt partiy promissory to what follows of the Plat on Negation and Not Boding pp 268-9 and, differently Frank A Lewis, "Plato on Net.", an pp. 111-12, n. 191

erroneous view appared to "not beautiful" generates a worry about idle chatter that it does not is precisely what is meant by describing this application of the view as non-destructive. But an adherent of the view would be saddled thereby with an account of why admittedly "safe" examples of riegative expressions are safe, as "not beautiful" is, which could not \$1.4 make "is not" problematic.)

Fintend the phrase "strike home against" as a counterpart, coloured in the interest of conveying a feeling for what I take to be the ES's John Tor drabber. terms that Plato uses, "maicate" (relating expressions and things, 257610) and "utter" of (relating utterers expressions and things 257d)(0). We should not. I believe comput Plain to the view that the relation in question. between negative expressions and things (specifically, sometring, ice attribii es) other than these meant by the words negated, is in any street sense a semantic or meaning determining relation * Compare the tolerance of physics like "true at virtue of". Sometimes we would decline to fel the gap, in- Socrates is not beganned as true at surface of the warranger at weed dis not coopt as displaying the sense of the quoted sentence. But this does not mean that we necessarily reject for all purposes such gains as this Socrates is not beautiful, is true in virtue of Socrates, being smab-nosed. and it is at least not wrong to say that the form or kind, sinde need is other than the form or kind, beam ful. Of course such remarks do not beg if to lock like a determination of the sense of "not beautiful".

If can be tempting to a aborate them min such a determination, or ther resconstruing fother than as "incompatible with" and analysing "Sociates is not beaut full" as "Sociates has some attribute incompatible with being beautiful," or leaving fother than "incaming what it does in 255c8-257a12, and using a universal quarither. "All Sociates attributes are non-identical with being beautiful. In Commentators have not been realisable to succumb to these temptations on Plato's behalf. But an interest in eather sort of elaboration is, to say the least not obviously present in the text. Incompatibility figures in accounts of the *Sophiat* only because its proponents cannot see how Plato can achieve his purpose without it, and I think the same goes for the on versal quantifier imported by those who rightly it at an unannounced shift in the sense of "other than", but take the same view of the purpose of This uncontern with any visioned not seem a defect of we see the ES's project as what it

⁸ For this cracial point see Lewis Plato in Not 19, 132 no. 7.

⁹ See Lewis, "Plato on 'Not' " pp. 105-6, 113, n. 40.

s not o give an account of the sense of phrases like "not beautiful" that rather to scotch a mistake about what entitles us to our confidence that they are not idle chatter that they do indeed have the precise sense that we take them to have (No need in executing this protect to produce any substantive theory about what that sense is). The mistake is worth scotching here not for its own sake, but because if it is adoved to pass in this case it can be carried over to undermine our confidence in the intedigit this of "is not".

We might put the ES's point about "not beautiful" thus "not beautiful" is to be understood, not in terms of the contrary of beautiful but in terms of that part of the nature of otherness that is set over against 1. My suggestion is that "understood in terms of" (at least in the affirmative of importance) of this thesis) is best not taken as promising an analysis. "Not beautiful" means exactly what it does namely met beautiful the role of the not into other ness is in an explanation at a sub-semantical level, of why we do not need to fear that such a semantical remark is condemned to vacuity.

O An astribulus as the other than because without being over appropriately include and as that to virtue or which something is not beauthal in order or grazing, that what is rue in virtue of some fact expressible in terms of otherness of that something is not be a situal. Plane would need the continentations exittat apparts us. But he does not need extra apparatus for its different purpose this point is this what the authories had an only and in the order apparatus for its different purpose this point is that they are more than beauthy. See given "Planton but" is that they are more than beauthy. See given "Planton but" is that threate is the interest which is what threate is the interest apparatus of its not. This is not to be point to object had sometime who is e.g. Jung hadre has an attribute other than beauths, but is not necessarily on beautiful on that account. This commaddes no thesis of Planes of Lavid Waggins, "Semence Meaning Negation, and Plane's Problem of Non-Being" at pp. 291–294.)

1. Figure 5 diverge from Lee's theses that other sessiplacs a nove. "Constitutive" releia-257c5 f. What seems correct is the 255c8-257a12 sie its not ning that could be called "The rapide of the not beariaf I on the sense which that passage could can tenance the not near the eight be at notice and reserves rightly so called, and by strage of by ownnative builty will be if pariaking in the letter of otherness of 25564-6, whereas 257651 is concerned with something of which in can be said that its har reas being not beautiful 258b8-c4). But Lee's "er istabilitie" role for otherness seems proble have the expid do it. in remarks like this. The determinate sense if a silint all all also precisely but lies en-Erely in saying that talks what ris not. Plate on Negation and Not Being" p. 295, but Los works scarce y cartacy account Polymenides. It seems preferable to relocate Line's dis-I return 25568-25 and equips its to understand a supervention ride and 25565 ff a cigst verole for the potition of being not becaute the notion of otherness plays a seman tion tole in the letter passage and a sub-semantical role in the latter office in ysemantical thesis suggested by the second passage is to the effect, hat "not beauting," incor's not beautiful. The sever this captures in semantical forms the point of the highest Fresis chat the nature of the not beautiful is not being beautiful

The ES proceeds to the case of negating being by generalizing his point about "not beautiful" (258a1 2 4-5, 7 9), and then representing the case of "is not" as a further instance of the generalization (258all b3). But the inference by instanuation can be understood also as a matter of reformulating the generalization 4.258a11-b3 introduces the idea inot of a part of the nature of otherness contrasted with being as such twhatever that might mean) but of a part of the nature of otherness contrasted with being ce g. with being beautiful). We can capture the movement of thought as follows. The thesis from which the ES generalizes—that not beautiful is to be "understood in terms of" (see above) otherwess than beautifut—co. ld bewritten thus (being, not beautiful is to be "understood in terms of" otherness than (being) beautiful. When the FS instantiates the generalization with respect to being, what happens is, in effect, that "nor" shifts back to the hitherto Implicit verb, and the complement recedes out of focas. The point becomes this not being (e.g. beautifiel) is to be "understood in terms of" oth-mistake about contrariety. -which has been adequately related by the discussion of the case, presumed uncontentions, in which "not" does not gowith the verb "to be" "could make a seem that the change in the placing of "not" makes a difference

4 If I am right, the not-being welcomed at 258b6-7, as what was needed an order to pin down the sophist is the not being that figures in *negative* predications like "Socrates is not beautiful". (That statement attributes not being to Socrates in that it says that he is not—beautiful.) When the sophist sescape is blocked (cf. 264b9-d9) by the production of a non-paradoxical characterization of a sebood, the point in the example chosen is exiden by that a false affirmative predication attributes what is not to its subject (263b9). Part of our composite problem (§2 above) was to explain why pinning down the sophist requires the materials of 258b6-7, not just those of

¹² See Lee, "Plant on 'Not' ", p. 282, n. 21.

^{13.} Owen d'Piato on Not Being' pi 239 et 33 inbjects to supplying part of work "the nature of being" at 258b1 on the ground that it implies the reductive theses of a large tence in detaching "not from the verb "to be." Owen ppi 236-47. By if the notion of a part of the nature of being were established as applying to such items as being beautifue, the reading Owen objects to considerable the point in any text precisely with itempoying the reductive thesis. A better reason against part of its hat the notion or parts if the nature of being has not been established used Lee. "Plato on Negation and Not Being", pp. 283-4.

256e5–6. So we need to explain how the E5's description of a false affirmative predication in 263b, can be seen as an application of the conceptual equipment established in the discussion of negative predication.

This component of the problem is easily solved if we understand the "s not" of 263b as arrived at by a "converse" reformulation of the "is not" of 258b6-7. The earlier passage signals vind cation of the legitimacy of "is not" in statements, the "Socrates is not beautiful", that statement can be reformulated as claiming that beautiful is not at relation to Socrates, and now we have the term nology of 263b (capturing the fatsity of "Socrates is beautiful"). This answers the question why we have to wait until 258b6-7 before being told we have with a needed for pinning down the sophist what 263b requires is the "converse" version of) the "is not" of negative predication, which is not yet available at 256e5-6.

The other component of our composite problem was to explain why it is apprepriate for the treatment of labschood to refer back to 256c5-6, even though the conceptual equipment it needs was not yet established in that passage. We can now see at least the outline of a sole ton to this problem too. The FS's vindication of the 1's not" of negative predication in his lds essentially on the fact that invitates er attribute one takes, there are plenty of afterbutes of or than t—the negative part of what was said at 256c5-6. If the use of "is not at 26 th is nothing but a transformation a derivative of the "is not" of negative predication, the ES's entitlement to the latter Solit is exactly to the point for 26 to 1-12 to hark back, past the treatment of negative predication. To the foundation on which that treatment oulds."

There is a complication, resulting from the usual way of anderstanding 263b11-12 and 256c5-6. What we find at 263b11-12 is this "For we said that in the case of each admosphere are many ofbings) that are and many that are not "On the assal view, this relates to its centext as follows."

14. On the "converse indionitisee Michael Fiede "Pradikation and rioden australe pp. 52-5-80-94-5. Owen "Phatolog Not Being" e.g., pp. 23-8. As well emerge Tilizans there is less of this autom in the Sophial than is commonly thought.

- 5. No doubt the equipment of 25665-6 world serve for a lace upon if falsity in identity statements. But it would not be generalizable is cover false predications whereas the account of false predications out of be applied to identity statements. "The same as secrates is not about Theaeterius").
- 6 To fact as we standsee 256e5–6 is more straightforwardly relevant to be "converse use of its not" than this outline explanation suggests not just obliquely relevant through its bearing on the non-converse, basis of the transformation.

Universal instantiation of its negative part, with respect to Theactefus, is supposed to yield, as something the ES could address to Theacterus, "There are many (things) that are not in relation to (1) the case of 'you'." Then "In flight is not in relation to you" (26369) with "in relation to you". supplied from 263b4-5. 11. the ES's account of the faisity of "Theaetetus is in flight" is an exemp ification, it cites one of the many such things that the instantiation assures as there are. On this view, then, 26351, 12 is taken to contain "converse" uses of "is" and "is not", with the a liversal, quantifier "each (thing)" binding what would be in the subject place in a more straig afforward formulation. The force is in the case of everything ancholog Theaetetast, there are many things that it is eeig is caled) and many that it is not ceig. [8:11 ght]. Since 263b(1): 12 purports simply to repeat 256c5 6 ("we said" 263b12 the standard view imposes a str. ctural paralle in the interpretation of 256e5-6 again "converse" cses of "is" and "Is not", with the universal quant fier londing what would be in the subject place in a more straightforward formulation. Here, then, the force, is in the case of each form, there are many things that it is and an in tellnite migiber that it is not othat is—this is all shat 255e8 ff, has accused an indefinite number with which it is now oderated a

These interpretations evidently raise and themes about two said" at 263b12. On this reading, 263b11-12 does not saiply restate what was said at 256c5-6 it makes two fact modifications—modifications that in view of its bland claim to be a repetation, we would be constrained to regard as surreptitious. First, the range of the activersal quantifier is extended from forms to everything unclaiding Theacterius). Second, the negative part of the generalization is extended from demals of identity to cover negative predications as well.

Can these mod fications be incorporated into an overall interpretation that solves our problem, that is, one that gives 257b1 ff, the sort of importance in the final characterization of falsehood (bar 258b6-7 would lead its to expect, and accounts for the fact that 263b11-12 refers back to 256e5-62. It could be claimed, plausibly chough, that the modifications are beensed by 257b1 ff, given that that passage extends the scope for acceptance uses of "is not" precisely from statements of non-identity between kinds or forms to statements like "Socrates is not beaut, full" (§3 above). But the surrept tious ness is still a mystery. It constitutes, in effect, a pretence that nothing if

¹⁷ See e.g. Owrn, "Ploto on Not Being" p. 235

importance for the project of 263b has happened since 256e5-6. Thus, even if we can see 257b1 if playing the role we have been led to expect, we find *Piato* unaccountably refusing to admowledge it. ¹⁰

Is it possible, then, to eliminate the facit modifications, to understand 263b. If 12 as nothing but a repetition of 256e5-6?

This requires as to suppose that "in the case of each (thing)" at 263b12 can be glassed, from 256c5, as "in the case of each of the forms", and that the negative part of 263b12-12 arrolyes nothing but statements of non-identity. It would follow that the retainon between "There are many (things) that are not about in the case of each (thing)", whe negative part of 263b11-12—

8 Owen ('Plato on Not Being in 200) conspictionsly fans to appear to 25761 ff in explaining he ac modelications. What Owen explains sinol the extension in the later passage and he restriction to non-identity a the eather. The idea seems to be as follows Plate wat is to be able or say of am a tribute total it is not on mianon to some subjects. 3.230) this desideration can be men for pervasive forms like being, identity, and differchice only the is not as additional as that of non-identity hence had a what I guess in 25665 of Bit 1 > Why the purative desideration? Not for 263to Plan would hardly be at points to see also that "in the little is not about Theartet is a should seem an example of a genctal kind of turb levalt pies of twherb hold about a flor os on, adong the pervasive ones. when the move record to or astrocathe general kind of the handerstanding due his part. as the of not adeal so servally traditis problema is the status of the exemple figuring? a which the fix your is precisely not to be so understoods. 2. The prijative desideral in-Is not or iniciated by 25665, 6 as Oswi himotopic with he takes 25665, 636 say, not 4 at appy a tribute is all a relation to something, but that an indefinite number of a tributes are put into atom, levery form. Of course the most interpretable in any case, will be a little a tribucks after than be copic form useff and ling the pervasors ones. But we have us case to suppose Place maters to be after to say, an instellable number, because he amount wards to be objected say all the include the persuasive lemms) and amequently has a miderso and is not in (come of non-identity, rather than that he finds himself able to say "anreletter ein movert er fall i if he had beh tike in beganse he is omnog understandige is not" at this stage in terms of non-identity. If it is not the restriction to non-identity in 256e5-6 that needs explaining II we do not believe that Plano amardonably helps in rise to all argument to a new constituat of fother casive should not. Owen, "Plate on Not-Being ip 232 in 19) we must regard non-identity as fundamental in his acted beatif. strategy. What more natural, then that the should begin on "is not" by making room. or is see a statements of nor identity? As for what does need explaining against Parmenules, takes more than the more observation that remain, in flight, etc. are nonpervisive kinds in listify group beyond 25665-6 so as to allow oneself the use of "is not". of negative predications, or "converse to independ onerest. Owen's suggestion that the observation is chough to explain the "tacit extension, leaves no more for 25.7b) If the durstone as a careful defence of the use of 5s por 10 negative predications

and "In flight is not about (in relation to: Theaetetus"—the ES's account of the falsity of "Theaetetus is in flight"—cannot be one of exemplification. However, so long as "about each (thing)—in the generalization, is under stood as supplementing "converse" uses of "is" and "is not". It seems impossible to see what else the relation could be and the facil modifications seem unavoidable. The key to an alternative reading is the possibility that the "about" phrases function differently. As before: "about Theaetetus" supplements a "converse" use of "is not" in "In thight is not about Theaetetus" but we can take "about each (thing)—at 263b12 to constitute a simple quantifier phrase dike "concerning everything" in at least logician's English) binding what the subjects of non-"centerse" uses of "is" and "is not" are said to be and not to be, and summarly with "about each of the forms" at 256e5. "

The force of 256c5–6, on this alternative reading, will be as follows in the case of each of the terms, what is (it) is multiple and what is not (it) is indefinite in number. There is no problem about understanding this as a concursion from what precedes it, so long as we see that the generalization ("each (it)") picks up, not the role of change in the preceding demonstrations, but the role of, for instance, the same. In the case of the form, the same change both is 1 (256a7–8) and is not it (256a5 "is not it" convertible oil should find after 256d8–9. §3 above) in Just so in the case of every form, there are many things (or at any rate many forms, forms are all that the ES's variables have so far ranged over) that are it and an indefinite number that are not it?

The proposition "peri" governs different cases in 2635st Land 2635st and loc same case in 2635s2 and 256e5.

²⁰ We are likely to suppose that "is" functions differently on is two occurrently out. Plato seems to suggest raid or that the difference of function is in what replaces "if". 256a.0~ 2) See Owen "Plato on Sor Being" p. 258 p. 63 out in 4 above.

^{2. 8. 5. 8%} ack. Phate's Sophia, p. 158, considers taking 256-5-6, his way round, but rejects it on the ground that an this interpretation the passage does not have the got inferential relation to 256d 11-63. But as regards the negative part, whatever we can say to expirate the inferential relation which, taken one way round to bears to 256d 163. Curbetter 25568-256c4)—and 81ack says something pp. 158.95 will serve equally we for the inverted reading, and the positive part on entirely view needs generalizing beyond anything said in 256c11-63, only view makes it a perfectly intedigible extension of the resolution of 255c8-d101. Two firsteet possible objections. If II 256c5-6 said (as Owen and established on Not-Being) pp. 235–254) that about each form what is not is more comercial than what is it would be at objection that taking the passage my way thus would be laise of pervasive forms. A little forms that are not the same are the same—in the relevant senses—and there is one more form that as the same vize the same lises. But "many does in the same and there is one more form that as the same vize the same lises. But "many does in the same are the same been said there is one more form that as the same vize the same lises.

The meat of the remark in the context of Plato's and Eleatic project lies in its negative component, and of course I do not pretend that it makes any doctrinal difference whether we suppose the ES to say that in the case of each form it is not an indefinite number of others or that in the case of each form an indefinite number of others are not it. The point of the second reading is not that the substance is different but that it permits us to extract an appropriate sense from the text without understanding "to the case of each of the forms" as supplementing "converse" uses of its and "is not". This way we can take 263b11-12 to say as it purports to, the very same thing, without threatening the line lighbour of its relation to the calim that in flight is not in relation to Theaetetus.

The claim that the form in flight is not in relation to Theaeteras is a claim on whose availability to capture the falsity of "Theaeterns is in figur" the FS r sists. He needs to defend the claim against an Eleano object on to the effect that its use of "is not" makes a undernune itself of tering so to speak to deprove itself of a top it. Not at all says the ES. That which is not in the relevant sense is not that which utterly is not oong since distinct but that which is not form.

notes add to the attaining another and the extremes it specified in some cases the many may be more than the indefinite number. Do distinction is adequately explained by the action with a propersystem, but us the respect exert sit attains of a line component. In the case of such form what sit is at least made pleasant what should since us and "is not employed as a subset such as some sites and exert pleasant being sittle subject to its and "is not carried to the associated some sites and its not discussion of the generalization of 25665 6 where the quantities bands what follows "is and its tot. The attempt seepart of 25 adds the ignorial subject backet or at sites where the attempt seepart booked or at sites who in the attempt seepart follows or instantiation for 25665 6 according to statements of non-independent part follows or instantiation for 25665 6 according to the respective way or ad-

Negation and Plane's Problem of Non-Beong op 205 he renders the relevant sentence that "ice it says! things which are but different things which are from he things which are respecting Theaetet is and he takes are as so untymous with are "in Theaetetts is though the kind Files s' because trapplies. "Ame finance on fin does not apply. Theaetetts is in this foundation that Wiggons bases the idea that Plato "persons in seeing Sociates being able to purpoint that Fishing is respecting Theaeterus as explained in their being such a sense as Fishing trather han vine versal of 208, there being such a sense being for Plan. Wiggons thinks a matter of its having an extension of about 287. But where Weiggons has Plate depotably consisting that he meaningfaltness of "Theaetet as is a flight" requires that in flight be minimized, what Plato in fact mosts is that in flight is other to han What is a tetation to Theaetetus. Our is not Wiggons's dobinous condition for the statement to be meaningful, but a perfectly correct condition for it to be false.

the subject) ²⁵ And the "is" I have stressed, which emphasizes that the claim does not deprive itself of a topic cannot now be quened; for a has been accepted, at 256e5-6, that for every form there are plenty of forms that are not (because they are other than) it. This fills out our outline answer to the second component of our composite question, it shows how it can be that, abliquigh 263b uses "is not" in a way that is established only in the course of 257b1 ff., it is nevertheless entirely appropriate for it to usufy its doing so by a restatement (just that not a surrept tious improvement) of 256e5-6.45

5 It may seem back to from to broach only now the question what puzzle about falsehood the sophist is supposed to nide behind. But this way we can let our interpretation of the problem be influenced by the desirability of finding Plate saying something to the point in response to it.

Many commentators suppose that the puzzle about falschood is no these lines, the fastity of a false behelf or statement would have to collisist in the fact that the situation or state of altains it represents is an utter in mer. By something totally devoid of being, but there is no coherent way to express such a "fact" (237b7–239c8), so no coherent way to horizonate a characterization of falsebood made incocapable by a correct understanding of what Ia schood would be of there were any such thango. "However, when the ES comes to use the dangerous phrase "what is not" in the characterization of Ia schood, his point, as we have seen seems to be that the falsity of "Theaetetus is in flight" consists in its attributing what is not to its subject in that in flight is not in relation to Theaetetus. And if the pozzle was the one about situations or states of allairs onlined above, this response ton its own.

^{23.} This would ranscate forces—per son at 263644. The forces is very distriction favour at the manuscripts—ones—see Frede Phalakatam and resonance stage—pp. 57-8. Even so it is natural to supply four oncord to have the ign that are interview theretain and "periods."

²⁴ Owen. Plan on Not Bung. p. 260) gives a clear's a chieff of he relevance of non-adentity between attributes to the just beation of the include of "converse" degative predication, but does not see that this removes the need to line pred 263b11. 2 as mor living 256c5-6.

²⁵ See especially Wiggars. "Schience Meaning, Negation, and Platos Problem of Nor-Being". For a variant, Owen, "Plato of Not Being" in 245 he also the word "situation" but what he has in frond, as missing from reality when the statemen. "Theaetet is is in light is talse as the flight of which the statement accuses Theaetet is (This North account of *Theaetetus* 18869-18969. But the difference on which Owen misists up 243, he tween that passage and the *Sephisi's* pozzic has not in the orman of the puzzle but rather in Plato's attende to its materials.)

at least) seems irrelevant. The sophist might reasonably object. "Attributes, the in flight are not the sort of thing that I thought a description of false bood in be lefs and statements would have to represent as not being. And it was not in the sense we exploit anot being in relation to something—but in precisely the sense you agree is problematic—not being anything at all—that I thought a description of falsehood would have to represent my different items, situations or states of affairs, as not being. You have not shown that the description of falsehood I found problemanc is not compal sory dictated by the nature of the concept of falsehood, and you have certainly not shown that it is not problemanc."

Some commentators are sensitive to the vulnerability of 263b, considered. as a response to the puzzle about sit rations, and they shift attention to the passage (26%6-262c2) that leads up to the explicit discussion of truth and falsity in statements. There the ES distinguishes on effects between a kindof sentence constituent whose function is to make dear what is being talked about and a kind of sentence constituent whose function. Cto make clear what is being said about it. The commentators draw the obvious mora, a seatence cone of the sample kind Plato considers, at any rate, gets ty purchase on reality through its possession of a sentence-coust tuent of the first kind. And they suggest that any inclination to profest against 263b. on the buck envisaged above, would stem from a fadure to grasp this peint. Werrying about the apparently total absence from reality of states of affairs answering to false statements, or of what would be components of sichstates of allairs, answering to the predicates of take statements, well din anfest a lack of engintenment about the local zation, within sentences, of the telation that gives them their bearing cn the world. 46

But the puzzle about situations is a deeper prizzle, and the objection to 263b, considered as a response to it is a better objection, than Plate's strategy on this view of it gives them credit for being. The puzzle turns on the thought that the falsity of "Theactetus is in flight" should consist in the act that the state of affairs that the sentence offers to represent, or perhaps the flight in which an afterer of the sentence would accuse Theactetus of being engaged, is nothing at all. And that thought properly understood is absolutely correct it needs no support from a half baked conception of how speech has its bearing on reality, such as would be undermined by the distinction drawn at 261c6-262e2. In conjunction with 237b7-239c8, the

thought threatens to undermine the possibility of falsehood what we would need in order to neutralize this destructive effect is, not the consider ations of 261c6–262e2 (which are poweriess for this purpose) but something to show us why a description such as "dealing in thought or speech with what is in fact nothing at all" (which might figure in a characterization of falsehood on the lines of what this puzzie represents as problematic) does not incoherently represent the thought or speech at applies to as ignitiate thought or speech, but) possessing no subject matter. And the Sephist contains no trace of the necessary distinction. Of course it is possible that Plata simply fails to deal adequately with the difficulty he tack es—fails to see its full depth, but Charity recommends that we credit him if possible with better success at a different project.

261c6-262e2 does indeed, obliquely and mexplicitly undernung a paradoxical argument for the impossibility of laisebood. But it is an argument distinct both from the commentators, puzzle about situations and from the difficulty about fa school that is the Sophist's main concern.

What the passage's differentiation of functions would correct is a position indifferent to, or ignorant of the distinction between ment ining some thing and saying something, and such a position does make appearances elsewhere. The idea might be expressed on these lines, the anit move in the language game of the matter discourse toccupying a position and ogous to that which we might ascribe to statements, but that term carries a burden of logical theory that includes at least the missing distinction is the patting mio words of some thing. A dom perception that the minimal informative performance must have some complexity (the point of which 261c6-262e2 evinces a clear if partial perception) can be the absence of the distinction yield only the requirement that the thing put into words must be consti-

²⁷ For the distinct on see Wiggors "Sentence Meaning Negation and Place's Problem of Non-Being" pp. 274-5. Given suggests: "Plato on Not Being" p. 246. (pa. in the Sophila Plate does not want to deny that "we can speak of invitical centains or obtinence flights" such tems are not wholly devoid of being since we can say what they are 185 on Owen's own account p. 229 the manague contains to direct evidence of hispitality to the Phimerica. And there is dothing in the Sophila for in Paramindes 160b6-161a5 also cited by Owen to show how the acceptable of deference to the Chimerica. In the ground hat its target is not devoid of being, might be reconciled with the hough. Sortely acceptable of some construate that such "tiems as the flight of which Theateters is falsely accused are in fact nothing at a . So long as this houghs is not disarmed in miss remain a avoicar how 237b7-239c8 can fail to have its lots destructive effect.

mance by virtue of consisting in the successive mentioning of the parts. This position would undermine the possibility of contradicting another purson's remark, the best one could hope to achieve would be a change of subject. Equady it would undermine the possibility of speaking falsely. Failure to put a certain thing into words cannot constitute laise speech, or traffer one will have put a different thing into words, and so spoker truly though with a different topic) or else one will have failed to put anything into words, which is the nearest we can come in the terminology. I have adopted to express the post on that lacks the crucial distinction to the conclusion that one will not have said anything at all.

This or, do position makes no explicit appearance in the Sophist." But 201cb 202c2 says exactly what is needed to correct it. And it seems plausible that some terminological apparatus, introduced at 202c5 au floscid at 263a5. a9-20. c5. c7 is meant to signal Plato's awareness of the bearing of 264c6-262c2 on the crude position. The cride position leads itself to a slogan on these lines. "A thing can be put into words only by its own form of words." This slogan encapsulates the destructive effect of it and two or relival, to disting ish mentioning and saying any after pit to firm late, he troton of a term of words that is erroneous succeeds in describing only reflection of a term of words that is erroneous succeeds in describing. Having drawn the necessary distriction. Plato continues to use the possessive to express the fabous relation now safety localized, between owhat we can now without risk of musicading describe as) statements and things (263a5 a9-10, "about me" and "mine" are interchangeable). The terminology irresistion y suggests an ection of the oid slogan, verbafly almost in a tered, but

²⁸ Sec. Scientific 26, 48-20265 of Aristotic 5, april a 1124526 1025a

²⁹ Cl. Eurinofenno 285d7-286b8

³⁰ Cl. Entirolemas 283e7-284c6

If Anniapparent's Owin Planton's it Beng p 241 cauning that 23767 e2 is a version of the air or parados. To act as Oven introductly concedes that passage does not purport to underto he be turner at alsohood. There is no reason to acc. as accessing a tything except the 120% is question how is a possible in member in speak if 1000 (say) what is not?

^{\$2.} See insaction 2:12a6-8 of Minaph vis 1024b32-3. "Form in winds as a represent to aspect the train augment to be again." Ordinarily nessed glatine ransaged to an open and says bit as again, here expresses the notion, shadding loss of mentioning and saying that their remaining is put into words. This altern summarily free it as wanted theoretical computations for "loss".)

. 9

now rendered quite innocuous. "A thing can be talked about only by a statement of its own."

The puzzle about falschood thus obliquely disarmed by 261c6–262e2 is perceptibly less sophisticated than the difficulty about situations or states of affairs outlined above. The notion of a state of affairs is the notion of some thing with a complexity of a different kind from that of a mere composite thing, it is the notion of a chunk of reality with a structure such as to mirror that of the proposition or statement it would render true. Anyone who could genuinely be credited with this notion would already have advanced beyond a stage at which he could be instructed by 261c6–262e2. And, as I urged above, this would not immunize him against a worry, should be conceive it, about the utter absence from reality of the states of affairs represented by false statements or beliefs. Something similar holds for the notion of a component of a state of affairs answering to the predicate of a statement (the crude position precisely lacks the equipment to effect any such singing out), and for a worry about the total absence of such an item from reality when a statement or belief is false.

Although the difficulty about falsehood generated by the crude position unlike the puzzle involving situations or states of affairs) is cogently answered in the course of the Sophiit, the crude position cannot easily be read. Into the passage in which the dialogue's official problem about (a sethood is se, but in Jetai. (240c7-241b3). Not being figures in the crude position's difficulty at that one of the candidate descriptions of fa sebood it suggests and portrays as problematic (the other being prelevantly for present purposes, in terms of change of subject) is a form of words such that what it puts geto words is not (is nothing at all). The problem about this is that m the attempt to characterize the form of words as false we undermine its bearing on reality. Now the Sephist's paradox is directed against both of two distinguished kinds of faisthood, both falseboods that represent what is not as being (240e) 4, understanding "doxagem" at e3) and falseboods that represent what is as not being (240e5-9). The threat to the former of these if this were all that we had to consider anight perhaps be assimilated to the problem posed by the crude position. But this will hardly do for the latter. where the fact that what is represented (as not being) is what is ensures that whatever difficulty there is about the falsehood's purchase on reality goes. not arise in a comparable way. No doubt the fact that what is is represented. as not being generates a difficulty that could be expressed as our about the falsehood's hold on reality. It remains the case, however, that the Sophist's

problem evidently arises in rather different ways for affirmative and negative falsehoods, there is a complexity here for which the crude position has no counterpart ³⁵

6 What, then is the Sophist's difficulty?

Bearing in in nd the destrability of flading something to the point in 263b, we should understand the distinctive characterization of falsebood at 240c7, 241b3 in terms of attributes. This are example of the kind of false hood that represents what is as not being nught be "Theaeterits is not seated" aftered when Theaeterits is scated. This represents *seated* which is, as not being that description correctly captures the statement's falsity if we take "is" as a "port being" as "converse" uses and supply "in relation to Theaeter's. The other kind of falsebood is illustrated by the example actually discussed in 263b. "Theaeteres is an flight." This represents at flight, which is not as being again that description correctly captures the statement's falls by if we take "is not" and "being as converse" uses and supply "in relation to Theaeteris."

Why she lid the sophist find these characterizations of fa seb and problem after so that their pilitative absolute required affords from a liding place? Because the makes the mistake we have seen that the 65 devotes himself to confecting: le carizot see how "is not" could be anything but a sync lyin for "bas the contrary of being" of "otterly is not" enote how these latter expressions figure as the problem setting passage 240d6 le2 le51 and he can find no coherer tisign beauce for a under that interpretation (237b7, 239c8). So I seems in this transfer that when the fairly of "Theartetis is in light" by saying toat it represents in thint, which is not in relation to

B) tweens conact. Place on Not Being, p. 2651. False wood had a new ed an abortive attempt to mention something, appears in this only complex in Lam as ngirt that 2560 237a9 anti-onices without precise detail the difficultes about inages and la sebine species and in 23909-24066 and 2400° 241b3 (237a4-4 might be taken to mply a simple paradox to many on the idea that a talsehood iself-so, the content of a false belief-somet Burial that the lines say is that we are committed. The being it what not writen we came that falsehood occurs all one begins of the being it what a policy with we came that falsehood occurs all one begins of Repatron and Place's Problem all Non-Bedge, who excurs a puzzle in which Ower incomark would be appropriate from the earlier passage together with 23 bile cell in 32 above, ignoring the complexity of the area passage op 268-solid Mix rembre. An Examination of Plane's Oxionist volume 2 who suggests op 505-7 that the later passage in roduces a new and spurious) difficulty.

Theaetetus; given the mistake the addition does not help "as being we must be talking nonsense, and when we try to capture the falsity of "Theaetetus is not scated" by saying that it represents scated which is can relation to Theaetetus) as not being, we describe the statement as talking non-sense, and hence contradict ourselves if we also describe it as significant

This paradox is latterly disarmed by the ES's painstaking demonition of the Eleatic mistake about negation. Once the mistake has been corrected in suffices simply to restate the characterization of falsehood that had seemed problematic this time carefully avoiding the erroneous equation between "not being" on the one hand, and "opposite of being" or "in no way being" on the other."

If we understand the Sophist's problem about Jaisebood on These lines, we can see Plate's response to it as an unqualified success. (Contrast the interpretation in terms of situations or states of allians, \$5 above a What makes this possible is that—to stick to the less complicated case of allimnative falsehoods—we regard the sheer unavailability of anything a iswering to the words "att flight", in the false statement "Theaeteris is in flight", not as a prepuse in an argument purporting to show that a description that captures the statement's faisity is anotherent (an independently about 8 reform, latom that is, of the car in that the statement is false), but rather as an inference. from the claim (which does, in fact introduces by capture the statements tall sity) that what answers to the words is not the relation to Theactetis). The former problematic inavanability (the unavailability of the flight of which the statement accuses Theaeterns) is indeed a concomitant of the statement is talsity, and it is not something Plate shows us how to cope with itsec 45. above. The latter unavailabout (the squavailably of the attrib ite or kindin flight, is yimgly a mistake, and one that Plato define vely corrects

It may seem a cost of this reading that it separates Plato's concern in the Sophist from the deep philosoph call difficulty raised by Wittgenstein when the writes. "How can one think what is not the case? If I think that King's College is on fire when it is not the fact of its being on fire does not exist. Then how can I think it?" But it is surely not a cost but a gain that we find in the Sophist to it an unconvincing attempt on that interesting difficulty but a woolly successful solution to a different one.

^{14.} See n. 7 above

^{35.} This is activally done only for the affirmative kind of facility and once the diagnosise point is clear the other kind can be left as an exercise for the reader.

^{16.} The Bine and Brown Books, p. 31

It is true that we cannot easily find the different difficulty pressing. Indeed, there may be an inclination to protest, how could anyone suppose. that the Gaim "In flight is not in relation to Theaetetus", by trying to describe its subject as not being, incoherently represents itself as tacking a subject altogether? Is a not obvious that not being (for instance not being in relation to Theaetetus) is not the same as utterly not being? But the fact is that if was not obvious to Parmenides, if Plato's diagnosis is correct. According to Plato's suggestion, it was precisely by equating "not being" with "being inno way" that Parmenides excluded plurality, qualitative diversity, and change. from what can sensibly be affirmed to be the case. The Sophist's puzzle, onthe present interpretation, applies the same method in order to cast doubt on the concept of fa schood, an integring employment of Parmenides, destructive elenchus at a metaling astic level, which would impose limitations flot instance, on the strictures available to Parmenides himself against fails tires to take his point. But what the puzzie elects from Plato is a movewhich by destroying the foundation, has the effect of dismantang the enttre Eleatic position.

Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle's Ethics

I Aristotle evidently holds that all, or nearly all mature human belogs at least those who are proper subjects for ethical assessment organize their lives in the light of a conception of eudamonia. Sugmachean Ednes 1102a2=3). A conception of eudamonia is a concept on of eu pratient doing well (1095a, 8–20). The relevant idea of acting with a view to eudamonia is the idea of acting in a certain way because that is what doing well comes to a the idea of acting in a certain way because that is what doing well comes to a that occurrence of "well" signals a distinctive sort of point or worthwhile-ness, that one takes oneself to see in acting like that I think Aristo leaines to explain what this distinctive sort of perceived worthwhileness is when he in effect glosses the "well" in "doing well" as "in accordance with virtue (1098a16=18).

Now it is clear that Aristotle tounks some such perceptions are correct and others not. That is this attitude towards the question whether some action has that kind of worthwhiteness is realistic in some sense. At least to begin with we can leave it open whether the sense is one to at implies anything seriously metaphysical.) Aristotle's thought is that there is a right answer.

- Fudemum Fittes: 2, 406-52 may leave foom for some who do not farmark of much fully. Aristotic says that is why I put for nearly all. I matched data ons hence into will be from the NE. My parer thesis is meant to register Aristotic's well-known views about women staves, and so forth. Having mentioned the point once I shall ghote from here on, this embarrassing feature of Aristotic's the iking is irrelevant to the philosophical issues that I want to consider
- 2. No doubt one can act for the sake of doing well without conceiving what one does as "self-constructing doing well. One is purpose at acting for the sake of doing well may be instrumentate to get oneself into a position in which one can act an the sort of way line sees as doing well. But this sort of action is not revelations of character in the same direct way as action undertaken because it is seen as exemptifying doing well as opposed to non-curive to at I think it is the latter that is Aristotle's concern

and wrong answers to the question what doing well consists in. And his usual remark about rightness on this kind of question is that the right view is the view of the person of excellence (the *speudaios*) of the person of practical wisdom (the phronimos).

It is often thought that this Aristotelian readsin points to an extra-efficabasis for reflection about what cuda mental cursists in. The idea is that in Aratorde's view it is possible to certify that a virtuous person's conception of endamenta is genuincely correct. (that the actions it singles out are really worth indertaking in the way it represents them as being i by showing that a the organized in the light of that conception would be recognizately worth. aving anyway, that is, worth itsing by standards that are prior to the disincrive values acquired in what Aristotle concernes as a proper apbringing These progrestandards would be standards for worthwhileness or objective r le tess, hat any human being just as such could accept, independently of any acquired values and the more varional dispositions that are associated with them. So the idea is this. Aristotic thinks he can authenticate the dismetice values that are imparted by what he concerves as a proper up ir figurg, and establish that that is indeed how people ought to be bringer. up, on the basis of the thought that a life that plats those values into practice is one that is worth going in for anyway, for a human being just as such 3 On I is view, when Aristotle says that I is the excellent person who gets timgs right the ethical assessment expressed by "excellent" is not a stopping-point for his thinking about getting thingsing, it. That the relevant kind of person, sireally excellent, and that he is really fig. I also, I what is wor'n going in for lare together grounded on an extra ethical basis

I do not be igve there is any sign of this supposed external validation in Aris obeystex. On the contrary trying to read at not onit disrupts our independing of things he actually says. The external validation is an invention on the part of mixiern readers. I shall spend some time trying to make this plausible, and then ofter some reflections on what at deries the invention on what makes modern readers tend to suppose that Anstelle needs

³ Section assumed in a solletent context. This is 16. Comment and more than people assumes that a misome sense the correct can option of endangenal fluiding is the flux stire. But it has been are sold aspeak impedied instances of what excellen people are per not assumed a weak minimized to consider their separately or as a comment waimple to the thesis that Aristotle comes at rightness in the conception through the confidence of aspectant.

^{4.} This task of yar less is no doubt anachronistic, by if think harmlessly,

external validation to sustain his realism. I hope this will suggest some general conclusions about the prospects for ethical realism, independently of issues in the exegesis of Anstorle.

2. The supposed external validation involves a part cutar interpretation of the claim that the good life is the life that is really worth living for human beings, the assessment expressed in "really worth living" has to be prior to anything specifically ethical. People who take Abstore to think like this credit him with an idea of the choiceworthy life that is related in some suit able way to the idea of an optimal combination of component goods. I shall distinguish some options for interpreting "related in some suitable way" in a moment, but first I want to put into place the appropriate, dea of an optimal combination of component goods.

For the purposes of readings of this sort, the goodness of the component goods has to be established without presupposing the distinctive conception of worthwhileness in action that is inculcated when someone is brought up into the virtues. Only so could an external validation be forthcoming. Inteadings of this sort, the requirement is supposed to be met like this, the goodness of the component goods is revealed by the fact that they appeal to motivat onal forces—needs or aspirations—that are confining to the human or ganism as such. The goodness implicit in the idea of optimality, as characterizing the combination of component goods, has to be handled similarly. We need not go into detail about what the component goods, or the specific values involved in assessing, combinations of them, might be in a specific view of this kind, the point I want to make is about the shape of the posit on

The samplest version of the kind of reading I am considering takes it that for Aristotle the good life, the life of endamonia were its in such an optimal combination of component goods, independently certified as such. (This can be encouraged if we translate "endamonia" with "happiness" as we almost have to if we translate stat all alternatives like "flowtishing" make no difference on this point.) But in this form at its very hard to make the reading cohere with a central Aristote ian claim about endamonia, that what it consists in its activity in accordance with virtue. (See 1098a16-18, a passage I have already cited. The explicit claim there is that the good for man is activity in accordance with virtue, but the claim is offered in the course of spelling out further an equation between the good for man and endamonia 1097b22-4.)

Of course it is not impossible to make sense of a conception of the good ife as make up of component goods, shown to be good by the fact that they appeal to metivations bust into the human organism as such. But the idea of components has to work rather differently if we conceive the good iffe in the way the central claim indicates, as made up of actions. It nuglit be natural to suppose that an optimal combination of goods is if all goes well-brought about by the actions that in this different sense make up the life. But then if we say that the optimal combination of component goods is what endamenta is, we cannot also respect the central claim, and say that endamenta is the actions that if all goes well, bring about the optimal combination of goods.

Consider also a remark that Aristotle makes in the course of a discussion of now the intellect is involved in tho ce (provinsa), " what is made is now an end without qualibeation, but only at relation to something and of so, chang, but what is done (to prakton) is for doing well, ingraval, is an end, and the desire (so the desire that is preatress) is for that "(1139b2-4). When one acts with a view to doing well there cupratual the abstract noun is obviously equivalent to the verbal phrase "ru prattern", which we are find a equivalent to "cudamination" by comment agreement, 1595a, 8-20), what the does to prakton is usefulfile end with a view to which one acts. Doing well does not a gare fiere as something brought about by the actions under taken for the sake of it it figures simply as what those actions are."

This recommends a more sophisticated version of the reading. In this version, we are to respect Aristotle's equation of customorem with cuspration doing well (1095a18-2d), we are to take "doing" there to mean doing, and we are to respect the central claim's interpretation of the "well" in "doing well" as "in accordance with virtue". So customore consists in virtuous actions and arother for their even sake it is not something brought about by such actions if a lighes well. An optimal combination of independent goods cannot now be what customental is. But in this reading the notion of an optimal combination of independent goods still figures in an extra-ethical certification of the correctness of one rather than another conception of cuida montal. This is in his context of one rather than another conception

⁵ Compare T. H., rwin. Some Rational Aspects of Incommence. All p. 65 fewer represents. Recision " (b) stendering of products in as involving thought about what promote the agent's "happiness". *cudamonals*. That firs this first version of the kind or reading Lans considering If we take doing well to lighter in a product as what is promoted by the action it fixes in, we use our grip on how doing well can be what the action is

of which states of character are virtues. The idea is this, by appealing to the idea of an optimal combination of independent goods, we can show that the states of character that Aristotle identifies as virtues, and this allides to when he says that endamona is activity in accordance with them, are worth cultivating anyway, independently of the distinctive habits of valuation of modes of conduct that one acquires when one has the virtues installed it to one. Virtuous activity for its own sake is what endamona is, not some sopposed optimal result of lifting one's life with such activity. But it is worth be conting the sort of person who lives like that because such a life is likeliest to be satisfactory by it dependent standards. Jikeliest to secure an optimal combination of component goods whose goodness is independently established.⁶

This version of the reading does not flatly ignore the central claim. But it still has difficulty in giving what Aristotle says there, together with his claim that the action that mainlests virtue is undertaken for its own sake (1105a31-2), full, weight. Arist it elevidently wants the point of a bit of virtuous behaviour to be intrinsic to it, and it is hard to make this centere with the idea that the worthwhichess that a virtuous agent sees it, such behaviour is to be authenticated in this external way, that is, by arguing that it is a good plan to calify ate the states of character that such behaviour weight mainfest, on the ground that acting out those states of character is likely to see, re a life that would come out best by standards that are independent of a specific ethical optiook.

We can make the difficulty vivid by considering cases of virtuous behaviour that series sly threaten the agent's prospects of achieving an optima combination of independent goods on any plausible interpretation of that idea. Take a case of corrageous behaviour as Aristotic conceives it. Or instance standing one's ground in the lace of the dangers of battle. Suppose the result is, as is sorely not unlikely, that one is manned or cut off before one's life has had a chance to exempt fy to the full the combination of independent goods, whatever they are that thus reading takes to under it the chanceworthiness of a life of virtuous activity. Surely that should not every seem to reveal that the point a contageous person toning it he saw in the action was if usory. But how can we prevent it from seeming to have that effect if we conceive the point of cultivating virtue as derivative from the

⁶ For this version of the reading, see John M. Coopet, Rev. in 2nd Bioman Good in Arn. Intelle pp. 124–5.

attractiveness of a life conceived in terms of its procuring those independent goods. That is a kind of life that any courageous action is likely to deprive one of the chance to live, and that this particular courageous action ex live pothess makes unattainable. This would be a case where acting out a virtue undermines the supposed point of having it in the first place. How can to at not have the effect of making the action's value at least open to question?

On this reading Anstotte stately ought to have a problem about the value of this kind of action. But he shows no sign of disquet anywhere in the vicinity of this issue. The closest he comes is when he says that if things go badly enough in respect of "external goods", that can spoil blessedness (1099b2-6). But what he is getting at there need be no more than the sen sible concession that in such cases the distinctive point of doing well that is, of acting in accordance with virtue, can intelligibly lose its mot varional pill. There is no suggestion that the distinctive point of doing well is rat or ady derivative from the motivational public goods that are independently recognizable as such.

3. If Aristoile thought he could establish from first principles, that a possessor of the varties as he conceives there is thereby equipped to get things right on the question which actions really have the distinctive kind of choicewort mess's gnalled by the concept of *endamenta*, we won'd surely expect him to make much of it. But any such argument is surely conspicuous by its absence from the ethical texts.

Par'y in the Nacinaclean Filias he notes that he is addressing only people who have been properly brought up (1095b4-6). Ebelieve this impactly excludes from discussion issoes, raised from outside, about whether their perceptions of challes with ness in action are correct. Substantive ethical questions are not under discussion in the Filias. This is borne out by a feature of Aristotle's practice that I have already had occasion to mention. Where the topic of right and wrong views about this or that comes up, one hight expect an all, sion to an external validation of the right view if he thought be had one at his disposal, but he always disappoints any such expectation. As I remarked at the beginning, his standard move is simply to say that the correct view is that of the virtuous person or the practically wise person. See for instance, 1107a1-2, 1139a29-31, 1144a34.)

When Aristotic makes his identification of the good life for human beings with a life of activity in accordance with virtue (1098a16–18), he bases it on a train of thought that connects what doing well is, for a thing of a given lond

with the *argen* or "function" of things of that kind (1097b24–1098a15. It is sometimes thought that in thus invoking the idea that human beings have an *argen*. Aristotle is pointing to a special view of human nature, as something that would enable us to locate human beings in a teleologically organized account of nature at large. Then the details of this teleologically organized account of nature at large. Then the details of this teleological view of human nature would be available for validating Anstotle's specific conception of the good life without presupposing the habits of evaluation and motivation that he assumes his audience shares with him. The idea would be that acquiring just these dispositions of conduct and feeling, the ones that correspond to the virtues as Anstotle conceives them, sets a human being on a pattern of life that would conferm to some "inner misis" built into human nature so that it comes naturally to a human being to live a life of activity in accordance with just these dispositions of character, in something analogous to the sense in which fall ing comes naturally to a heavy body."

However, even if we beauty that Aristotle's talk of the *ergin* of a human being points at this sort of direction, the passage does very little towards bringing the supposed external validation back, into the ethical texts. The most we could suppose is that the passage directs us elsewhere, for a validation for the conception of the good life that Aristotle assumes to be correct (Elsewhere, where exactly?) If we take Aristotle to believe he can just by the specifics of his picture of the good life from liftst principles, a should stall seem surprising that he should be so unforthcoming about the details of the just fication in the ethical works themselves. (And Kheness un orthcoming anywhere else?)

In any case, there is no warrant for taking talk of the *ergan* of a human being as an allusion to a general teleology. The notion of the *ergan* of an X is just the notion of what it befits an X to do. Exploiting the thought that X s have a place in a grand teleological scheme might be one way to cash out the notion of what it befits an X to do. But the more word "*ergan*" is no in dication that that is what Anstotle has it maid here. If he were asked to tell

^{7.} If ake the phrase functions is from Berna d Willia, is Filia and the Limits of Philosophy p. 44. In Anstotle's teleotogical inviverse, every boman being (or at least every nondelective male who is not a natural slave) has a kind of invier risk is towards a life of at least civil virtue. If The suggestion is only that there is an analogy. There is room for a disanatogy as well that in this case it takes habituation to get an individual on a pair of behaviour on which—according to this interpretation of Anstotle's chinking—it follows its natural bent. So this readility cannot be quickly disposed, on the ground of the distinction. Aristotle draws between truthan beings and stones at NF i 103a, 8-23.

his what it is that it befits a human being to do, there is no reason to silppose he would offer anything except the sort of thing he offers on similar questions elsewhere always disappointing those who think he promises to validate his ethical our look from hist principles, he would say that these things are the way a virtuous person of a possessor of practical wisdom takes them to be if

What Aristotle achieves by invoking the argon of a human being is only this, he enables himself to represent his thesis that the good far man is activity in accordance with homan virtue as a specific case of a general connect in hetween good and virtue, or excellence. What he exploits is a conceptual link between ar X s being such as 1) act as it befus an X to act and its having the excellence that is proper to X s. The conceptual 10% is trust cland i leaves critically open what sort of evaluative or normalize background hives a substance for applications of the notions of argon and excellence in any particular exemplification of the general connection.

4. Lam objecting to the view that Aristone thinks he has an external validanort for a conception of worthwhileness, it action that he takes for granted mihis audience, the conceytion characteristic of someone who possesses the virtues. The view Fair objecting to be ongs with a reading of tel darmar is unhat casts it as a general theory of reasons for action, fo such a context, the hesis that enda moma consists in acting in accordance with a certain specific set of characterid spositions would have to be read as saying that the concepfrom of reasons for acting of the coworthmess in action, that is characteristic of a possession of abose character, dispositions is correct, because it matches upto the deliverances of a correct general account of which acrons are choice. withby Just because it was general, this envisaged account would give no special position () districtively ethical reasons for acting. Indeed, endarmension on this understanding would hold out a prospect that of entempts ethical theorisis, that distinctively ethical reasons for acting inight be authe lineal ed by representing them as derivative from perhaps less contempous rot and considerations. The envisaged external validation that I have been considering world be an instance of this kind of thing

I think this is a misconception of eudain obusin as a context for educal reflection. The idea of endaintonism is indeed the idea that alide of virtuits

^{8.} On the appeal to the *cryon* of a human being, see my essay. The lote of *Englandina* of Arise the's Ethics".

activity is a life worth living, a choiceworth, life. But the relevant application of the notion of choiceworthiness need not be given its substance independently of the distinctive values that are instilled into someone who acquires the virtues.

From Aristotle's detailed discussion of the virtues, it emerges that we can summarily capture those values under the concept of the noble (see for instance, (120a23-4). In acquiring the virtues of character, a person is taught to admire and delight in actions as exemplifying the value of nobility. Coming to value the noble integrally includes an aderation in one's motivational make up, in what one finds attractive in shapes one's conception of what is worth going in for It is true that eudaimon sin aftributes. Choiceworthiness to a afe of virtuous activity. But the relevant choiceworthiness can be a choiceworthiness that such a life is rightly seen as having when, and because it is seen as made up of actions that exemplify it e value of nobility. It is not that "It would be noble to act thus and so" is certified as giving a genuine reason for acting on the ground that a life of such actions would meet independent standards for being worth going in for-The choiceworth ness of a noble action is simply a reflect on of the action's being rightly seen to exemplify the value of nobility. It is because the value is authentic that the choseworthness is geniend, not the other way around

The concept of endamonia is indeed the concept of a kind of the coworthiness, but it is not choicewort siness in general, something present wherever there is a reason for acting of whatever sort. There are many differentiations on which we can assess choiceworthiness in general. The concept of endamonia, as Aristotle uses it marks out just one of the dimensions, one that he tries to delineate for us an ageneral way, when he connects the idea of endamonia with the idea of how it befits a human being to act and the idea of human excellence (in £7). It is obvious that not just any reason for acting can be sensibly glossed in those terms.

This may seem hard to reconcile with the passage (1097b6-20) in which Aristotic says that endamonia is self-sufficient. He explains the self-sufficient (1097b14-15), as "that which on its own makes deepursuit-worthy and lacking in nothing". And he goes on to say (1097b16-17) that endamonia is "most pursuit-worthy of not counted in with other things of it were so counted, clearly it would be more pursuit worthy with the addition of the smallest of goods". Thus can seem to support the idea that endamorusm is a general theory of reasons for acting, since it is easy to suppose that according

to this passage leado monta embraces anything whose presence would in any way make a life more desirable.

B it I do not be ieve Aristotle means the scope of endamonia to include just any centr button to the destrability of a life. There are places where he seems to be trying to myst that cudamenta is an agent's own achievement. rather than a g ft of chance? Not that mere effort for good willing ou some. to ghly Kantian construal) is by itself or high to ensure endamonia. Factors outside an agent's control can make it impossible to live the life of a virtuous person rever if they leave isolated bits of virtuous behaviour still feasible, as perhaps in cases, the that of Priam (1100a5) 92. But chance goods can surely make a life more desirable in some obvious sense, otherwise than through their effection what it is possible for the agent to achieve by his iwn efforts, and the ranking of lives as more or less desirable that is operative here ought not to be relevant to their assessment in terms of endagmone. On these, mes we are required to discount at least scare scars of destrability when we try to understand what Aristone nears by saying that endomonal is self-sufficient. On a suitable restricted reading, what the passage says is that radiamenta is self-sufficient precisely on the dimens in of desirability that is connected with the idea of human excellence and how it behas a himan being to live. Endamiona is self-sufficient with respect to the kind of desiza. Ity that Aristotle thinks is correctly captured by rightly applying the concept of the noble.

The point of saying that cidamienia is revealed as "most pursal tworthy if not coented in with other things is a lithink the same as the point of its being the good with which radamienia is equated. This latter claim does to say that radamenia embraces all possible reasons for acting tail goods in one obvious sense see 1094a1-3). The point is that the relevant dimension of desirability is not just one dimension among others. Checeworthiness along the relevant dimension. The choiceworthiness that act inside rightly see its liaving when they are seen as noble in the trained percept on of a

See Cooper Reason and Human Good pp. 123-4: he cites Politics 1323b24-9. Et.
 1215a12-49 NE 1099b18-25

Of There are difficult issues at this area about what visitor something to be a person's deflieve near. But Ar stotic resistor is immine to the emphation fainth as a modern proposition of discount anything for which there are conditions that are not themselves with a the person's control, with the result that one's achievement is restricted to some thing, one the disposal consequently against the disposal consequently nature!

virt lous person—is choiceworthiness par excitence. If a consideration of the relevant type bears on an agent's practical predicament, someone who has earned to appreciate such considerations will rightly take it that nothing else matters for the question what shape his life should take here and now even if the result of choosing the noble is as it surely may be a life that is less destrable along other dimensions than it might have been. If the result is a life that is more destrable along other dimensions, that is in the nature of a bonus. It is irrelevant to the point Aristoric is making when he says that endamonia is self-sufficient.

At one point. 1102a2. 3) Anstotle says "it is for the sake of this *jeudamional*; that we all do everything eise that we do". Taken at face value, this bray seem to make *eudamionia* embrace all reasons for action, of whatever kind. But we know anyway that Aristotle does not think all findian behaviour is a med at *eudamionia*, for histance, incontinent behaviour is precisely not aimed at *eudamionia*. We could discount this remark as merely casua. Alternatively, we can read it so as to be consistent with what Aristotle says elsewhere, by taking it to employ a special, quasi technical concept of "doing" *(pratient in the remark, also pratie)* to be understood precisely so that doings, in the relevant sense, are bits of behaviour undertaken as falling under a conception of *eudamionia* of deing well. This way, the passage does not undertain in my thesis that the concept of *eudamionia* marks out a special category of reasons for acting.

5. Aristotle's habat of citing the judgment of the virtuous person as the standard of correctness, together with his insistence that only people wito have been properly breught up are a suitable audience for his ethical lectures, may make at seem that on the substantive questions of ethics his stance is one of smugly accepting the outlook of a particular social group. Presumably he would say that what determines whether someone has been properly brought up is the judgment of the virtuous person. It is easy to want to company that his thinking moves in a tight circle.

No doubt there is something right about this accusation of dognatism. But we should not lerger that when he puts his restrict on on his audience. Aristotle says (1095b4-9). Those who are going to be adequate listeners about what is not eight about in general about political matters, must have been not y brought up in respect of their habits. For the starting point

Lelaborate such a reading in "The Role of From more in Aristorie's Ethics.

In the immediate context, the point is that there is no need to have the because of one is to be a suitable member of Aristotic's audience. But it is a so true I think, that one does not need the because in order to shape one silfe as one should, if one's grasp on the that is correct, and one acts on it, one will be I ving in accordance with virtue. However, Aristotle here registers at least the possibility of graduating from having only the that to having the because as well. He leaves from for a transition to a comprehending acceptance of a scheme of values, and thus connects himself to a tradition that stands precisely in opposition to dogmatism, a tradition, that he ades Socrates commendation of the examined life.

What shape would the transmon to having the because take? Obviously one possible answer takes us back to the style of interpretation I have been considering. The that is a piecemeal correctness occasion by occasion about what act ons are worth undertaking in the distinctive way that the concept of endamional signals, or perhaps about what leatures of situations require in that way what sorts of actions. The because on this reading is the story I have been one acting, which could easily be cast as a story about why the actions that someone who possesses the that sees as choiceworthy are in deed choiceworthy the idea is that acting in the light of such percept ons of choiceworth ness makes up a life that is desirable anyway, for a trainan being as such

But that is not the only possible interpretation for the idea of a transition to the because Or a different reading, a comprehending acceptance of a scheme of values would not differ from an uncomprehending acceptance of it like that with the comprehending view setting the accepted values on a foci dation, so that the because would not only explain the that not also validate it from outside. Rather, in acquiring the because one would not be adding new materia, to what one acquired when one took possession of the that, but coming to comprehend the that, by appreciating how one's hitherto separate perceptions of what situations call for hang toget, et so that act ing on them can be seen as putting into practice a coherent scheme for a site.

We can pict, to the intellectual activity that would be involved in moving to the because on this view in terms of a version of Neurath's image of the

² See M. F. Buruveat. "Affstone on Learning to be Good" espenally p. 81. (B), Think it is quite impiants ble shat Aristotic concernes the Nicenachean. This uself as "set ing air the because of virtuous actions" as Barnycat there suggests.

sallor who has to keep his boat in good order while at sea. In this version of the image, the fact that the boat cannot be put ashore for overhaul stands for the fact that when one reflectively moves from mere possession of the that to possession of the because as well one has no material to explicit except the initially intreflective perceptions of the that from which the reflection starts. One reflects on one's inherited scheme of values, or the perceptions of choiceworthiness in action in which that scheme of values expresses itself, from inside the ethical way of thinking that one finds oneself with not by contemplating it from the external standpoint of a theory about motivations built into human beings as such

Not everything at this Neurathian conception his Aristotle's own approach. A feature of the Neurathian image that does not correspond to any thing in Aristotle is this reflection on a collection of purative perceptions of the that from within directed at seeing how they bang together mans a risk of recommending the conclusion that they do not bang together at all, or at least that they do not hang together very well. If that happens, it should put the perceptions in question. Neurath's sailor may need to tinker with the boat. Reflection air ied at the because puts what has higherto passed as the that at risk, and there is no sign that Aristotle recognizes this. It is partly for this reason that I did not simply dismiss the charge that he is dogination has confidence about the particular ethical views he embraces.

In one way it makes an enormous difference to Aristotle's ethical outlook if we require it to open itself to the risk of revision, as a result of Neurathian reflection. But its another way the reform is quite easy. In particular, it does not disrupt Aristotle's reason. On the contrary, it suggests a shape for a defence of an Aristotlehan realism, without either dogmatism or an appeal to an external validation. Reflection aimed at the because makes a collection of putative perceptions of the that vulnerable to being unmasked as it is sory on the ground that they do not liang together so as to be recognizable as expressing a coherent scheme for a life. In that case, it a collection of putative perceptions of the that has run that risk and passed muster, that is surely some reason to suppose that the perceptions are vendical. In deed, wherever the Neurathian image is the right image for reflection (which might be argued to be everywhere), that is the only kind of reason there can be for supposing that some putative sense of how things are is correct.

So on this kind of reading as well as on the kind of reading that I have been opposing, reflection towards the because can after all be seen as yielding a validation of the conception of the that from which it starts. The

difference is that on this reading the validation is not from outside. It belongs with that difference that in this case we cannot aspire to a validation that is better than provisional.

Possession of the that is what or imparted by the mounting of ethical charactor that Aristoric describes in Book II of the Nizima bean Ethias, Fed. Nowapossession of the boarise would presumably be the me lectual virtue pracical wisdom, that he discusses more particularly in Book VI. There is a tendency for commer tators to overs as this distinction. The idea is that Book II. 3 about the acquisition of motivational propensities that relate to reason only by sway of obedærice to its dictates (compare 1102b30-1), they prepare the agent to act in a way that conforms to prescriptions issued by the rife fect ia, excellence, practical wisdom, which is going to come, into view only after in Aristotle's rext. But Book II uself contains the Gaim that actions that namifes wirthe of character must be chosen (1105a31-2). And Ar stotic mks the idea of choice to the idea of deliberation (1112a, 5-16, 1113a9, 2). and thereby to the excenences of the interfect. So it is a ready populous in Book II hat the virtue of character that a dealt with there represented as the product of habitianich, includes an intedectual excellence. A siare of a person arom which changes issue is uself a source of prescriptions, not a ist a motivat small prevaredness to obey prescriptions whose source is e sewhere.

In undergrang the moulding of character that is the topic of Bock II a person as ares a way of broiging behaviour under concepts. he conceptual scheme that we can summarily capture an terms of the idea of the noole and the disgraceful. A possessor of the that is already seyond, in comprehending babit, he is already summe distance into the realm of the salterectual excellences. He has acquired apparatus for those ig and real

^{13.} Sections M. Chopky: Some Remarks on Arrange's Moral Asserborage's

The first of the first signs of an institute manifest of the interaction in the nor essage the first on the missance as 111 and 22. In case, which with the high netween choice and religious first section in health be train that all actions that manifest one religious are chosen, then who has to give here is the our action between concepts in a substitute as a define at one Note 1 at 111 and 2 or most has are a read as saving that an agent this is spuriod be mornious and so not define and courageous actions. This week note in that is if a 1 condition of the mornious are not regarded by no more nor an at actions makes occasions are sprong on one are not regarded chosen. The norm of the last the way the agent is minded, a kind of shape, that recomes explain that the way the agent is minded, a kind of shape, that recomes explain that that course occasions are spring on the agent is minded, a kind of shape, that recomes explain that that course occasions of deliberation.

soning, and he is thereby equipped for reflection, he has the material for a transition to a full fledged possession of the because. Aristotle's own presentation is delective in that it falls to register the possibility that reflect on may undermine its starting-points. But that is no reason to hold Aristotle to a clear-out separation of having the because from having the that, which would be congenia, to the idea that a transition to the because requires a shift of viewpoint. On the contrary. Book if indicates that a possessor of the that is already not devoid of the because. He can say "Because it is noble." Moving to a more complete possession of the believe one sufficient to amount to full blown possession of the relevant intellectual virtue needs no more than internal reflection from the model of what one already has.

6. I have been larging a Neurathian picture of reflection on an ethical out. Look. One benefit of this is that a points to a way of noderstanding why it is so te apting for modern readers to credit Aristotle with a different picture of the sort of validation are efficial outlook needs, a picture in which, to modify the image, the bijat is put asbore for a cert fication of its scaw inthiness. An istofle seems happy to assume that his outlook is simply correct. The tempting thought is that we cannot make sense of that in terms of no more than the prospect that als octains would pass muster in Neurally an refertion, a prospect that, on the view Lam suggesting, he assumes without even noticing that he is doing so. Neurathian reflection about an ethical oct once would be indertaken from within it. The tempting thought is that one could not act leve all usinfed conviction that a set of views about anything is objectively correct, by reflecting from within something as historically contingen as an inherited way of thinking, except perhaps by safer accidentobjective correctness would require breaking out of a specific cultural inher tance into an undistorted contact with the real

Intelligible though it is I believe this lane of thought as foreign to Aristotic Here I do not mean merely to repeat what I have been largalig. that he expresses his "real sm" quite casually—he gives no sign that he thinks be needs to license it even by anticipating a favourable unicome for Neuralbian reliection on his ethical outlook, let alone by making a grand metaphysical gest are. I mean something more than that Making historical contingency and collural specificity into a metaphysical issue is distinctively modern. It is anachrot (suc to read into Aristotic as an underpinning for his

cas ia. realism" a line of thought that makes sense only as a response to a kind of anxiety to which he is immune. 5

That might leave it looking as if we do Aristotle a favor r if we equip him with a response to that kind of anxiety—even if he is too philosophically primitive to feel the anxiety himself. But that presupposes that susceptibility to this kind of anxiety marks an intellect to advance over Aristotle's immulative to it and that is open to dispute. On the contrary, we might say organizing our metaphysics around the idea of transcending historicity is profoundly suspect. Its true effect is to undertuine the very idea of getting things right. We can conceal that from ourseives only if we think we can make sense of the idea of a mode of inquiry that transcends historicity. In our modern quature, natural science tends, quite intelligibly, to be cast in that role, but any such conception of science is an illusion.

Inquiry is an intellectual activity in which we aim to make our thricking, about whatever subject matter responsive to reasons for thinking one thing rather than another. The anxiety four considering is one possible reaction to a thought that we can put like this we have only our own lights to go on in trying to ensure that the considerations that we are responsive to are really reasons for thinking one thing rather than another. But that thought is simply correct. It is no less correct about so entitle inquiry than about any other kind of inquiry. That the concepts employed in laying out a scientific picture of the world are not anthropocentric—that they are in that sense "absolute", to use Bernard Wilsamis's term—makes no difference to this point. It is still true that how the concepts are taken to hang together

15. What about the theme of nones and nines in ancient chought? (Robert Heinaman raiser this question.) That is a large topic obvious a carmot deal with a properly here I back it is revealing that the theme so faces in the NE may in connection with justice (V.7), and is there discussed in such a way that it is reasonable to connect nemer with the English "convertity and "There is no sign of the general organistical a priety that are all integral. More general ethical sceptic son is of course a Greek phenomenous tevels into take this general registry social form. The Callichan astack on ordinary ethical views does not so aple to exploit evaluative concepts for assauce the concept of the stay shows so personasive force highly tool to be open to question if the point were to express a the aphysical ordinary about what is culturally specific or his orientally conlingent.

16 On absolute' see War aris. Emist p. 39 For Withams's use of this notion in the reading of Anstoric see p. 52. "Anstoric saw a certain kind of ethical cultural and added political de as a harmomous columnation of human potentianies, recoverable from an absolute understanding of nature."

rationally—what considerations are taken to be reasons for what conclusions of inquiry—is the product of the historical evolution of a particular human institution

This is not to cast doubt on the idea that science is progressively revealing. reality as it is. The moral is leather, that we should learn not to see a inteat. in this thought, we have only our own lights to go on, and they are formed. by our particular position in the history of inquiry. That should not seem to put in question our prospects for geiting things right. The prospects are I vein scientific anguity (indeed, we have more than just prospects there), not because scientific inquiry transcends historical determit anch of as lights. but because its lights stand up to reflective scruting. Our conception of how to conduct scientific inquiry or more exactly, the conception that is acted on by practitioners of scientific inquiry, is continually self-correcting. But if that is how we should neutralize the potentially disquieting effect of attending to our historicity in the case of science, our paradigm of inquiry directed as an "absolute" conception of how things are, the same thought can work directly for inquaries that do not aim at Tabsolute1 results. A frea istic1. attitude to such inquiries does not need a different kind of warrant, with any conviction that we are getting things right needing to be grounded in a relation to the result of an "absolute" inquiry

We can express the role of habituation into virtue of character in Aristotle's thinking by saying that possession of the that, the propensity to admore and delight in actions as noble its second nature to those when lave been properly habituated. And I have suggested that someone who possesses the that is not devoid of the because full-brown possess on at the because, the intellects all virtue of practical wisdom, is no more than possess on of the that in a reflectively adjusted form. Now something that we can appropriately conceive as second nature surely cannot be in all respects autonomous with respect to first nature, so to speak, that is, the sort of thing that migh, be the topic of an investigation whose questions are framed in "absolute" or at any rate extra ethical terms. If there are motivational tendencies that are built into human beings as such, they must put limits on what is possible in the way of habituation into an ethical outlook. So I amnot ruling out explanatory connections between an ethical outlook and a pre ethical account of human nature. But this is quite dis inci from the idea. that the perceptions that are characteristic of a specific second nature can count as correct only if they can be displayed as rationally derivative from truths about first nature

I think that is exactly how not to be an ethical realist. Understanding the philosophical temptation to read such a position into Aristotic, and seeing hiologic the post-Aristotelian philosophical ideas that underbe the temptation is a good way of coming to appreciate the advantages of the different—less metaphysical—approach to ethical realism that Aristotle's thinking actually exemplifies.

Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle's Ethics

I In this essay. I shall try to set out an understanding of a distinct very othical application that Anstotic evidently wants to make of the notion of deliberation (bouleusis). The main obstacle in the path of the reading I want to recommend is to e temptation to give an overly "notel ect, abstic" cast, o the idea of a correct conception of doing well—the concept in that is par into practice in actions that in manifesting excellences of character in the strict sense manifest the intellectual excellence of practical wisdom a think Aristotle's view is that it is the moral development effected by appringing that parts as in a poytion to indertake ethical deliberation. His account of the habituation that sets up states of character already contains enough to disp by states of character as having the intellectual aspect that he my six on. If the content of a correct conception of doing well is fixed by proper upbringing, that renders it superfluous to credit that role to an autonomous operation of the practical aftel ect. or to look to the intellect for a foundation for the caim that this rather than that conception of doing well is correct. I think those ideas figure in interpretations of Aristotle only because he is read in a modern, and hence alien, framework, fromically eneugh of we clear those ideas away, and egipp ourselves with a different understanding of the sense in which practical wisdom is an intellectual excellence, we make it possible to see a certain convergence on a context of undernable devergence, between Aristotle and Kant

2 Niomachean Ethics III 3 discusses de iberation in general. The topic is thinking that starts from a proposed end and when successful arrives at something the agent can simply do with a view to that end—a project that he can put into effect without further thought. The idea is that it is only across a gap that the end-as proposed, casts a favoura—original original.

something in particular, and it takes an exercise of the intellect to bridge the gap.

This schema fits most straightforwardly where the thinking needed to bridge the gap between end and action is instrumental or technical. In diskind of case, there is no problem about what it would be for the end to have been achieved say, for the agent to possess a winter covering. But proposing an end to onese for such terms does not by itself single out an immediately practicable course of action. So a task is set for the intellect to arrive at a course of action such that maderiaking it will if alogies well result in achieving the end proposed. Perhaps there are several such actions, in that case comparisons in terms of efficacy, and perhaps other dimensions of destrability, come into play, to select between the competing options.

Now Ar stelle uses the concept of deliberation when he characterizes an intellect at excellence that is specifically clinical. He says excellence in deliberation with a view to living well in general is characteristic of the person who possesses practical wisdom (the pio nomes). 1140a25-8. Practical wisdom is operative at act of sithat display the excellences of character—contage temperance, and so forth. It is the involvement of practical wisdom that distinguishes the excellences of character, strictly so called, from mindless behavioural propersities that might operhaps only roughly) correspond with them in behavioural output (VI-13),

Here we have a different sort of gap between an end and act on undertaken with a view to it. The end is I ving well or doing well, which Aristonie te is us is the saine as endameneur (1095a18-20). Here we can not say it is Cear in a part colar practical pred cament, what it would be for the end to have been achieved. In fact, it seems plausible that (hat is exactly the problem for thought directed at bridging this kind of gap between end and action. The agent has to determine which (perhaps we should add "I any") from among the actions that he can directly set about performing, would here and now in these circumstances amount to doing we I

What might an exercise of the intellect directed at this other kind of practical question sook ake? And what is the content of the dea of deliberating excellently in this kind of case? Reflecting on technical or instrumental deliberation does not bein with these questions. Where the problem is technical or instrumental, we can understand deliberation as

I At 1112b1 "ham stall seems to moreate a ranking by something other than efficacy.

(An references will be so the Niconachem Ethica)

working towards something immediately practicable of necessary through intermediate means, with what figures at each stage singled but by the intelect as conducive to what figures at the preceding stage. And for these cases, we can begin to explain the idea that one person deliberates better than another by saving that good deliberation is such as to be effective acting on its deliverances tends to achieve the proposed end. But in the kind of deliberation that displays practical wisdom, the problem is precisely that at a not clear what it would be to have achieved the proposed end. We cannot exploit the idea of effectiveness to explain excellence of deliberation of this kind.

Some commentators have supposed Aristotle hoped to use teeth valide liberation to east 1ght on this other kind of desberation, at least when he write Book till? I have been urgaing that this idea is unipromising. And there is really no reason to saidle Aristotle with it. When he talks about deaberation in general, he is not addressing the question what it is for exercises of the practical intellect to be correct. It is an in fiction of this that even when his discussion suggests a focus on the technical case, he shows no special concern with efficacy, as opposed to other sorts of desirability, a action. What the general account of desiberation is supposed to give as a just the idea of using the intellect to bridge a gap between proposed end and action. It is it at that technical problems provide the east still usitations of this idea. But that by itself heaves Aristotle's options open, when he comes to consider cases where the gap between end and action is of a different kind.

- 3. In the kind of deliceration excellence at which is characteristic of practical wisdom, the question addressed is "What action acre and now would
- 2. This is not the vehicle of an explanation. Stein as to laid fields to accordinedate the fact that good feels wall deliberation may fail and had deliberate. Succeed by lack B if we would still need to complicate for story in it has beauty according to the other or mensions of destrability in solutions over and above efficacy. (See him)
- 3. For a version of this suggestion icoupled with the oldar has Block VI in fodices a new doctrine. In which currectness a mon-tesh usal deabeta-rou is a matter of bringing cases under foles used the essays by D. J. Allan. Aris sides Account of the Origin of Motal Procliples" and "The Practical Sylfogisth". See the discussion by David Woggins. "Decheration and Practical Reason."
- 4 In chapter 4 of titus, with Area is Sarah Broadie seems a me to make more assether is warranted about dangers posed she. It also for Anstotic's conception of craital leliberation by the role of mates in his thanking about do beration in general.

be doing well?" The end proposed—doing well—as, logically speaking, a universal, and the problem is to arrive at an instance. That can suggest that del betation of this sort requires arriving at or otherwise availing oneself of a placer of in inversal terms, for doing well, and applying it to the circumstances at hand. This has perhaps been the main afternative in modern readings of Aristotle, to the idea that he hopes to illuminate this kind of defiberation somehow by exploiting a technical moder.

But it is increasingly familiar that this picture does not fit Aristotle. He repeatedly demes that ethical truth can be stated in universal terms. See for instance 1094b11 27 1(09b12 23 among many similar passages.) And there is a connected point about how he conceives bringing the universal. end doing well to bear on the details of a situation. If one had a blueprint for aoing well, applying it should be straightforward, perhaps even mechanica. The bareprant would suit act ons to types of situation, and applying it would require scanning the oreumstances to see if they bring the struction under one of the specified types. That might be laborious, but it would not call for anything special in the way of an excellence of the practical intellect. On this picture, having one's practical intellect in good order, in the relevant. respect, would be a matter of having the right blueprint, applying the bareprint would require only general capacities for gathering information, and the capacity for logical inference. But this is difficult to square with a strong suggestion in various passages, that practical wisdom, excellence at the relevant kind of del beration, at least the udes, and perhaps is even to be identifies with a proper responsiveness to the details of situations—something Aris offers willing to conceive as like, and even as a kind of perception. (See especially 1142a23-30, 1143a5-65).

The idea of the "butepoint" picture is that the content of a conception of the universal doing well is in principle available, and assessible for correctness, in abstraction from the judgments of actions, in particular circumstances, that we want to see as applications of it. We could make the universal explicit in context independent words, they would pin down its content in a way that should in principle be intelligible from outside the

^{5.} No doubt the end of doing well can also figure in practical problems of a broadly technical kind. It may be that an action is undertaken time as an instance of doing webbut as required to other to plat the open in a position to engage to other actions, that who be instances of doing well. See G. E. M. Anscombe. Thought and Action in Aristotic."

See, e.g., Allan, "The Practical Syllogism".

actualizations, in particular incumstances of a propensity to make just such judgments or engage in just such actions (a propensity that would be possessed only by someone who had the corresponding end as his own). Whether some particular judgment or action was a correct application of the universal would be a question of what followed from the universal's content together with the facts of the situation. So the question whether some conception of doing well was correctly applied in some particular case would be separable from the question whether doing well so conceived was the right end to pursue. Correctness of application would be recognizable in principle. Irom a stance that was neutral with respect to the corresponding end. And for a deliberator to be getting things right, armying at what really is an instance of doing well, both conception and application would need to be correct.

But when Aristotic stresses discernment of the specifics of a situation, he seems to be pointing to a different way of keeping in place the notion of getting things right. A discerning view of a situation is one that reads the significance of the situation's features correctly. If we can get correctness into the picture on these lates, that might leave the idea that we must conceive application in terms of deduction, and must see questions about the correctness of applications as presupposing a separately established correctness in the timeversal conception of the end that is applied looking like a mere prejudice—we might call to "rational stic"—about the nature of this kind of exercise of rationality, perhaps reflecting a prejudice about rationality as such

4. We are considering deliberation with a view to doing well. Early in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle explains that "well" in that specification of an end, is to be understood as "in accordance with excellence" (1098a.6–18. That is the pretext for the discussion of excellence and the particular excellences that starts at the end of Book I (1102a5-6). Aristotle deads with the excellences of character mostly by giving character sketches of their possessors, and one thing he achieves thereby is to put into place in his lectures a somewhat determinate picture of the content of the end that is constituted by doing well in general, as correctly conceived (by its Eghts, of course)." Doing well is acting in the sort of way that is characteristic of people such as

^{7.} I shall ignore the exercise of the excellence of the theoremial orellect which turns are in Book X to be in some senses, he highest and of doing well flam concerned will the kind of doing well in which pharmal wisdom is operative.

he describes. This indirection is just what we ought to expect. The thinks the content of a correct concept on of doing well cannot be captured in a deductively applicable blueprint for a life.

Aristotle evidently does not mean into be possibly contentious as be tween him and his audience, that the excelences are just the states of coaracter that he lasts, or that the possessors of the particular excelences are just the sorts of people he describes to his character sketches. The ethical substance time content of the conception of doing well that he puts into a deeply going through the particular excelences, is meant to be a ready shared between him and the audience because they have been properly frought tip. 1095b4 6. They have been habit lated into a propensity to admite and delight in the actions that are characteristic of the excellences. They see those he into as Fire or nothe (kakin), the concept of the hobic organizes the evaluative outlook of a possessor of excellence. See for instance 1120a23-4.)

This picture of habi dation in which it institutes a conceptual capacity. possession of the concept of the noble—or the course of shaping motivatoms is be pital in bringing our how arriving at what really are ans ances of doing well, less not be inderst old as applying a blueprint. There is nothing wrong with saying that a possessor of excellence grasps the content of the universal, doing well. But we need not cooceive that grasp as separable. even in principle, from the state, one aspect of which is a motivational probensity, that results from having been properly brought up. Some one who as been properly brought no has been habituated into seeing the acpriori ate actions as worth going in for in the specific way that is expressed by bringing them under the concept of the noble. According to the "blue" print" pict, by the concept of the correct conception of foring well can be abstracted away from this psychological state, the result of habituating evaluarrycland motivational propensities into shape. The idea is that the content of practical wisdom's universal end could to principle be grasped in an act of pare into lect. But if we hextapose Abstone's stress on disceroment with laspicture of how the correct conception of doing well is acquired, we have the essentials of a contrasting picture in which the content of the end cannot be pinned down in abstraction from the ability to gat it into practice in recogn zing specific occasions for action. In this contrasting picture, there is nothing for grasp of the content of the universal end to be except a capacity. to read the details of sacations in the light of a way of valuing actions into which proper upbringing has habituated one

5. Even commentators who see that the "blueprint" picture is not Aristotle's can be influenced by the idea that applying a practical universal would have to conform to a deductive model. There is an instructive example of this in Sarah Broadie's teading of Aristotle's ethics.

Rightly in my view Broadie rejects the "blueprint" picture which she calls "the Grand End theory" as a reading of Aristotic " But she concludes that deliberation that displays practical wisdom cannot an Aristotic's view be thinking directed at bridging a version of the gap between end at discion that figures in the account of deliberation in general with doing well as the end. In her reading, deliberation that displays practical wisdom must be directed not towards doing well in general as its end, but towards this or that particular end, for instance the safety of one's polis or the well-being of one's friends. This is because she cannot find anything but the "blineprint" picture in the idea of doing well as an end needing to be brought to bear on action in a way that would fit Aristotle's general picture of deliberation.

Some commentators try to register Aristotle's hosting to the leading idea of the "Grand End theory", the idea that the shape of the good alc can be specified in universal terms, while retaining the idea that the deliberation characteristic of practical wisdom is deliberation with a view to doing web. Broadie hears this combination as keeping the Grand End in play, and merely deriving that it is, and perhaps that it coold be explicit in the minds of agents. As she understands this combination, just because there is supposed to be deliberation towards the end of doing well, that end must have the logical character envisaged in the "blueprint" picture. It is just that the universal that is applied in this kind of deliberation, which more very novements of thought that could be made explicit in ded, choics is only in piction the mind of the deliberator.

I think this reflects a deduct vistic projudice about the very idea of applying a universal. Broadie does not see the possibility I have been a ging that grasp of the universal that forms the content of a correct conception of doing well need not be isolable, even in principle, as a component in the propensity to put that end into practice in specific situations, so that exercises of the propensity could be reconstructed as deductive steps from an autonomous object of the practical intellect, whether explicitly or only implicitly in view. We can suppose that grasp of the aniversal is not thus

^{8.} Ethics with Aristotle, chapter 5.

⁹ Ethics with Aristotle p. 236.

isolable and such have grasp of the universal in our picture. We can still conceive exercises of the propensity as applications of a universal, and we can still conceive the resulting actions as products of debberation with a view to doing well. That need not be bound up to the idea of a Grand End.

Broadie is surely not wrong to insist that on particular occasions on which practical wisdom is operative, the agent will be pursuing ends that are narrower than doing well in general-ends such as the well-being of a brend or the safety of one's point. But we would not have a satisfactory picture of practical wesdom if we left it at that, without providing for any conception of how these pursuings of narrower ends hang together. Action directed at the well being of a friend may display practical wisdom on an occasion, but there may be other occasions on which the well being of a friend could be prireacd (the situation alfords that opportunity), but that is not what a possessor of practical wisdom would do the right reading of the salaation would focus on an opportunity it presents to pursue a different particular end. Why would that different reading of the situation be the right one. There must be room for an answer on these bags. "Because a correct conception of doing we'l, as brought to bear on this situation, diclates acting with a view to the different particular end. Although actions of the type, acting with a view to the well being of a friend, can amount to doing weld, and although an action of that type is available as an option in these circumstances, that is not what doing well would amount to here and now. Right readings of situations are not isolated from one another. They are such that the actinus that result from them are all indeed instances of a universal, doing we'll

It can be tempting to suppose we cannot have a thought like that consistently with the inouplicity of the more specific ends that may be pursued in acting in right readings of situations, unless we take the content of the linversal trienbody principles that rank the various particular ends that might be pursued on the relevant occasions, perhaps the rankings would be relative to different sorts of situation. If This is , ist a version of the "blueprint" picture, and I thank Broadie is right to set ber face against I at But when we discard the "blueprint" picture, we do not discard all

¹⁰ See John M. Cropper Reason and Hamanic is an Argonic pp. 94-6. For the idea that a conception of reasonable transcended a decision procedure on pain of leaving out the analytic the succession of actions that constitute acting it out see T. 3. Irwin, Place's Moral Theory, pp. 264-5.

forms of the thought that we can find a unity in actions that involve a multiplicity of particular ends by seeing them as ad undertaken with a view to doing well. It is just that the unity would not be discernif to any more than the rightness of a particular action is, apart from the specifics of particular situations.

Of course it would be implausible to suppose that a person of practical wisdom arrives at immediately practical contentions by proposing a general end, doing well add looking around for an action that might constitute doing that. But this is not damaging. It is anyway questionable to what extent Aris offe thanks the actions (ba) mainfest excellence—even excellence in the strict sense, which requires practical wordoms issue from actual. coarses of thinking, the sort of thing one singlificall "de iberation". He remarks that appropriate actions are better indicators of on rage if they are produced in emergencies, when there is no time to work out what to do (1117a17-22) The point surely generalizes, actions that manifest excellence, and so display practical wisdom in operation, need not result from actual courses of del berative thought. However, even when a possessor of excellence does not work out what to do, starting from an explicitly proposed. end of doing well. his choice and act on reveal a correct reading of the situsation, one that centres on its being an opportunity for this action rather. than any of the other actions for which it might be taken to present an occasion. My suggestion has been that there is nothing for a correct concepton of doing we I to be apart from this capacity to read situations correctly. We might gloss freading situations correctly has seeing them in the light of the correct conception of doing well. The conceptual apparatus of appearsal. end and application to the circumstances at hand soll bits, even in the absence of any course of thinking that constitutes arriving at the application. So the structure of deliberation as Aristotic conceives it althought that bridges a gap between end and action. Can get a purchase in our understanding of an action, even if there is no train of thinking that actually moves from universal end to application. Actions can reveal the shape of a

This possage is most naturally read as saying that when a ripicasing for a citic agents across its spring on him, a contrageor's person bases. The citic ageous across in accordance with his character father than as a result of calculation. This need not conflict with HTTD9-10 there the point is only that acrs whose occasions are spring in only are not at governal chosen. Choice of ostrologies the main point of contact he ween Aristotle's discessions of the excellences of character and practical visidom, the associated an effectival excessions of the excellences of character and practical visidom, the associated an effectival excessions excessed the excellences of character and practical visidom, the associated an effectival calculations are springly and accordance of an effective calculations.

way of seeing sit ianions in the light of the end. It is precisely by doing that that they display the character of their agent.

6 Thave been urging that we should not try to see having the right conception of the end as separable from a capacity to read predicaments correctly—the intelligible upshot of being habituated into delighting in the sorts of actions that exemplify the excellences of character.

There may seem to be a problem for this reading in Anstotle's distinction between excellences of character and intellectual excellences. When he embarks on the topic of excellence and the excellences, he singles out the excellences of character as the results of habituation, and postpones the intellectual excellence for later treatment. Practical wisdom is an intellectual excellence. It may seem that in history, its othical content, the universal end I pursues, so closely to the intelligible upshot of habituation. I aim not separating it sharply enough from the excellences of character.

This is ect of lats a picture is which the ethical content of practical wisdom is established independently of habitination, by an autonomous exercise of the practical intellect. On this view habituation yields only non-rational motivational propensities. Habituation sees to it that the non-rational elements is the perfected ethical agent are obediently receptive to independent prescriptions, issued by his practical intellect. A consequence that makes the shape of the picture vivid is that a reflective ethical agent has a double motivation for an action that displays an excellence of character, one motivation issuing from a near trational metivational propensity, a result of habituation, and another motivation independently generated by an exercise of the Intellect.

Bit must the intelectual excellences in general be so sharply separated from the excellences of character? I do not think this is required by the way Aristotic organizes his treatment of the excellences.

He introduces the distinction between intellectual excellences and excellences of character in terms of a partitioning of the soul. The main division is into a rational part, the seat of the intellectual excellences, and a desiderative part, the orekinen. We are given to understand that the orekinen is the

2 For a clear formulation of a picture of this tond, see John M. Cooper "Some Remarks on Aristotic's Moral Psychology." T. H., riven suggests a substantiview in "Some Rational Aspects of Incontinence. See especially p. 83, where he concludes "Not cognitive training is necessary... because we need some non-cognitive preparation if we are to be able to isten carefully and without distortion or distraction to what practical reason tells is

seat of the excellences of character, and Aristotle says that it is not rational in the sense of being capable of issuing directives, but it is not atterly non-rational, in that it is capable of being persuaded (see 1102b31, 4). Now this seems quite consistent with supposing, as I have urged, that the directively rational excellence, practical wisdom, is not separable from the product of habituating the *orektikan*—that the content of that intellectual state is formed by moulding the *orektikan*.

Aristotle says that the desiderative element is not directively rational. Well, of course the desiderative element is such is not directively rational if it were, then, for instance, mere animal appetites swould be directively rational. But this leaves it open that some region, as it were, of the desiderative element is nevertheless the seat of directive rationality.

The claim that the desiderative element is capable of being persuaded might seem to suggest the picture I am questioning in which excellence of character is a state of the desiderative element, by virtue of which the agent's non-rational inclinations are obedient to the autonomously generated prescript out of his practical intellect. But when Aristotle talks of persuasion, he need not be alluding to the structure of a *formed* state of character and intellect. The persuasion be is talking about can be what takes place not in the generation of action that displays a certain formed state of character with an independently shaped practical one lect persuading the agent's non-rational inclinations, but in the *formation* of states of character. Here is an alternative gloss on the claim that the *crektiken* is open to persuasion, a directive issuing state can be constituted thy "persuasion", out of psychic materials that prior to the formation of character are not a source of rational prescriptions.

Aristotic is strikingly casual about the precise significance of the partitioning of the soul that structures his treatment of the excellences (see 1102a28-32). The division into excellences of character and intellectual excellences looks like a mere expository convenience. There is no reason not to suppose he means a more complex picture of the relation between character and intellect to emerge as his account takes shape. By the time practical wisdom is promittently on the scene of its clear that the excellences of character in a strict sense that can now be made exposit involve the intellectual state that is practical wisdom, not a mere non-rational desiderative propensity (see VLT3). And we need not take the articlectual and desideralive aspects of excellence of character in the strict sense, to be even notionally separable components of a composite state, as they are in the picture I

an disputing. Already in Books II 4V where the division of excellences of character from intellectual excellences is as much in force as it ever is and discussion of the intellectual excellences is still officially postported to a later point to the exposition in its clear that the habituation that produces excellences of character is not supposed to produce mot vational propensities that are merely obedient to an extraneous exercise of reason, like those of a trained anima. The relevant habituation includes the imparting of conceptual apparatus, centrally the concept of the noble. That concept crysta fixes the pleasure that an agent has learned to take in certain actio is into the form of a reason for undertaking them. The ability to see actions as noble is already a perhaps primitive form of the prescriptive intellect a lexicolence, practical wisdom, with its content intelligibly put in place by habituation.

7. Task of respot siveness to the specifies of saturations in the reading of Aristotla Utan Urging Teoretions aistead of a certain kind of general ty that modern commentators tend to banker after to an account of how debberation with a view to doing well in ght work, perhaps something modeled on the role of a rechveness in a general account of histramental deliberation, or something on the lines of the "blueprint" picture. I think it is a strength of Aristotle's thought or these matters that he says so title in general terms about the workings of deliberation with a view to doing well. It shows his infinitely to the temptation to suppose there ought to be something on the lines of a method for arriving at right answers to deliberative questions of the inferesting kind.

No that more could not be said in a quote Aristoneaux sont. The co-cept of the noble comes into play when deliberation of their eresting **k**, diffusived its goal but other concepts most be operative *en route* to the goal, in capturing the potential significance of leatures of situations for what to do and so bringing those leatures into view for the exercise of discernment. Some of the concepts that figure in Aristotle's character sketches of possessors of the particular excellences can be seen as playing this role, and this would be the place for some of those more explicitly ethical concepts that have figured in recent discussion under the head of "thick" ethical concepts. Elaborating a battery of concepts of this kind could be according to the place of an ethical ontlook a conception of doing well.

¹³ See Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophia

This elaboration might include registering an estical direction in which such a concept generally points by saving such things as this. "Other things being equal, an unpaid debt (say) should be paid." What that says is that if a situation has no other potentially significant feature, the presence of an unpaid debt is decisive for deliberation. I think it is harmless to acknowledge the availability of truths with that shape, so long as we are clear that the acknowledgment is no concession to the idea of a method—since, obviously enough) whether other things are equal will always depend on whether there are other potentially significant leatures, and if there are what importance they should be accorded in the case at hand.

8 In the "bineprint" picture, there is nothing in the way one arrives at instances of the aniversal doing well, that looks as if it might be special to the practical interlect. So if we want something interesting for the practical interlect to do in this area, it is natural to credit it rather than proper upbringing, with establishing the content of the universal. This is another bas so deeper than Aristotle's expository division of intellectual excellences from excellences of character, for the idea that in his view, good appropriating merely institutes a propensity to obey prescriptions that originate in reason, conceived as external to a well-shaped character.

A closely related thought is that if it is habitation that determines the content of a correct conception of doing well day Aristotic's lights), that leaves it mysterious how the notion of correctness can be in place at all—since other modes of upbringing would presumably assue in different correspions of doing well. This can suggest that the lote lect must play a grounding role. The idea is that the interlect must be able to stand outside the ethical outside, Aristotle takes for granted in his audience, the result of their having been well brought up (by his lights), and produce a justification of the outside K. (That would justify the claim that being brought up into that outlook is being well brought up.)

How is this to be done? Many commentators credit Aristotle with the idea that a justification of his ethical outlook can be based on goods whose status as such is indisputable even while the ethical options is an suspense. The justification would validate the oot ook's districtive conception of doing well on the ground that it amounts to a plan for a life toat would be optimal by the lights of such independent goods. * Presamably the idea is that the

^{14.} For a version of this idea, see Cooper, Reason and Human, seed in Apstotte, up. 124-5.

justificatory argument can be given in a general way in abstraction from particular circumstances to which one applies the conception of doing well that it justifies. So the envisaged target of the just ficatory argument would be a blueprint for doing well in something like the sense I have been considering.

Now it is striking that Aristone seems to be immune to the sort of anxiety that might be alleviated by this kind of external validation. He simply assumes that in being brought up into the ethical outlook that he sketches by giving his inventory of excellences of character, the members of his audience have been brought up as they should be. There is no sign that he thinks this consistion of correctness stands in need of grounding from outside.

And it would be wrong to suggest that this leaves the conviction of correctness, looking merely mysterious, unless an external grounding is available. As I invisted, Aristetle does not see the product of habituation aftothe excedences of character as a collection of mindless behavioural ten-Jenuies. The result of habitination, sta motivational tendency, but one with a concept all and hence rational aspect. People with a properly formed character have learned to see certain actions as worth undertaking on the ground that they are nobte, they have acquired that reason giving concept in a way that is inextricably bound up with acquiring the propensity to be motivated by thoughts in which it is applied. The question at correciness is the 4, estion whether the actions they see as worth going in for in that specific way are really worth going in for its that way. We can reserve it rate a series of precential questions, whether this or that action is correctly seem as noble. And these piecemeal questions arise within the conceptual and motivational outlook that according to Aristotle, ethical upbringing imparts. They can be perfectly adequately settled from that standnoant

It is undertable that to many modern readers, there seems to be a question of correctness that such an approach cannot address, precisely because the approach does not seek a foundation for the optlook as a whole But I think the very idea of such a question reflects a kind of anxiety that is distinctively modern. In that case, it is anachromstic to suppose Ar stotle thinks he has an abswer to it. Moreover, it is disputable whether the question is anything but confissed. If the question is confused, we do Anstotle no favour by reading a foundational thought into him—any if ore than we do by crediting him with the deductivistic prejudice about the very idea of applying a universal that we are now equipped to see as partly stistained in this application, by the wish for a foundation for ethical thinking.

Aristotle says that the end of the deliberation that is characteristic of practical wisdom is aving well ar general, and that may seem to point to the sort. of thing Lam rejecting an exercise of the intellect that might serve a valdating function, starting from some totality of andisputable goods and reasoning towards a conception of a way of Lying that combines them optimally But this would be a misreading. The formulation "bying well in general" merely contrasts the relevant kind of deliberation with deliberation directed at a narrower end than a life plan (such as health, 1140a27) The presence of the phrase "in general" does not dislodge the earlier glossing. of "wel." in a summar formination of "the" end, as "an accordance with exceænce" (2098a16-18). Aristotle is not talking about an "all things considered". kind of reasoning, in which some weight is given to all the independent goods that are in the offing, and a verticitiv reached that somehow consbines all their claims. What he calls "deliberation with a view to living welin general" is controded by the value of nobility, the value that goides acnon in accordance with excellence at is not deflected by the carmy of other goods. (It is worth remarking that the Greek word, "betterons", does not have the link to the idea of weighing possessed by the English "deliberation". which is the best we can do for an equivalent to

9 I said that the result of habituation, properly conceived, can be seen to be arready a perhaps primitive form of practical wisdom. Why primitive Because Aristotic depicts the ethical thinking of members of his audience at least to begin with as an unquestioning acceptance of the ethical outlook for its preceiveal deliverances) that they find the inselves with because of their upbringing. They have the that but not the because (see 109584-9) Moving to the because would presumably come with reflection.

If would naturally belong with the conception I am questioning to take it that the belative is the supposed external foundation for the ethical outlook. But nothing in Aristotle requires this reading, and it I am right in a actually

⁴⁵ do not mean to suggest that the goodness of other goods is orieteral. For a shape taken by a correct conception of The Good (4.5% er. I do not mean or cred). Arise the with a "Stoiczing" deva again of the goodness of other goods (Bo) there can be true value without the sort of randoal derivativeness that would be required for a relation of grounding.

excluded on pain of anachronism. It is not as if there is nothing else he could mean by the difference between the that and the because. Here is an atternative moving beyond the that to the because is moving from unreflective satisfaction with pieceincal applications of the outlook to a concern with how they hang toge her so that into Lg billy accrues to the parts from their linkage into a whole

As far as that goes, moving beyond the that to the because might leave the that andisturbed. In fact I do not believe Aristotic suggests otherwise. He proceeds as if the content of a conception of doing well, s fixed once and for all in the minds of the sort of people he assumes his audience to be by their upbringing: as if moral development for such a person is over and done with at the point when his parents send him out min the world to make his own life. There is no suggestion that an increase in reflectiveness and explicitness will after the substance of the conception. Even so, there is nothing to prevent us from secung the result of habitoation as a genuinely intellectual excellence leven if only in a primitive form so long as the concept of the nobic is applied unreflectively.

However, even if it is not explicitly part of Aristotic's own picture, it seems consistent with the spirit of Aristotichan ethics to allow for further moral development. It is upon to os to suppose that reflect in towards the be assertanced at an accrual of interligibility from seeing how corners of the mat hang together ought issue in a reasoned modification of an intersected outlook. Plements of what has bether to passed for the that anglit not hang together satisfactority on reflective consideration in which one tries to in ingrate them so as to equip them with a because. And situations in glit turn up that one cannot read with one's present repertone of thick concepts as warranting any satisfying judgment as to what to do—satisfying in that one can see how it could be integrated with other such judgments, to place up a plurality of expressions of what one can regard as a coherent concept of cliding west." One way or another setting out to apply a conception of doing west in One way or another setting out to apply a conception of doing west in a reflective way can throw up reasons—according to the conception's own more or less inchoate lights—to modify its content,

¹⁶ Perhaps he case is a tragicione and no avaitable action can count as doing well by the lights of one's conception of doing well. (There is no reason to saddle Aristotic With thinking practical wisdom can find an instance of doing well in any predication, whatever of the problem is in the situation if a her than the ethical outbook, there is no need to modify the outbook. But the judgment that the problem is in the situation rather than the outbook would uself have to stand up to critical reflection.

even to the extent of forming new thick concepts for dealing with nove, kinds of predicament.¹⁷

This makes it even less problematic to combine the conviction of correctness (at least in the main, we would now have to say with not envisaging an external grounding for an ethical outlook. Reflection towards the *because* can put what has hitherto passed for grasp of the *that* at risk. In that case, if some putative grasp of the *that* survives the test, that is some ground for supposing that it is correct.

10 There is an Aristi teltan idea that we can capture misleadingly but appropriately for purposes of comparison with Kant, by saying that good willing has a value that is unconditioned. Of course Aristotle has nothing like a Kantian conception of the will. For Aristotle, what has the inconditioned value I want to point to is doing well, and that is not something that is in place independently of what happens in the objective world. Aristicile's analogue to the unconditioned value of the good will is not something that is actual no matter what favours are allorded to an agent by stepmotherly. nature. Nevertheless, there is a point of resemblance to Kannan thinking, and that is what I want to bring our by saying that the value of doing well is unconditioned. In Aristotle's thinking, the goodness of doing well is selfstanding, it is not clived to the goodness of some other goods, in a relation of dependence that would be traced by the sort of external validation of Aristotle's own conception of doing well that I have been ringing that Aristetle. does not envisage. We might say that when one sees an action as an instance of doing well, one takes it to be dictated by an imperative that is not hypothetica.

This stands in opposition to a common reading of Aristotle according to which it is a task for the intellect to ground the correctness of one specific conception of the end, and the intellect can execute that task by exploiting the idea of an optimal combination of goods, with their goodness, and the goodness implicit in "optimal" available aidependently of any specifically ethical convictions. I have suggested that such readings are partly more vated by a distinct very modern thought, that ethical thinking stands in need of a

27. Barbata Herman suggests that the place of audition of an Aristoteaan ethic precludes this joind of flexibility but Usec no ground for that the Sec. Making Room for Character" is think it is a deep truth that all thinking that as such its anchored in traditions. Reflection has nothing to go on, anywhere but a parative grasp of the that would at least to begin with its merely inherited. This cannot condemn reflection to inflexibility.

foundation. If the very idea of this kind of foundation is distinctively modern it sout of place in a reading of Aristotle.

There is an arony here. Reading Aristotle in the tramework of a modern. anxiety, an airxiety that he cannot have left if I am right, blots out a similarity between his ethical thinking and Kanus. This is not to play down the dissimilarities. In the context of what I have been urging in this essay, the main divergence can be put like this about Austorie it cannot even be a question as a notoriously is about Karit, whether his ethical thinking cargen, mely make provision for substantive content. Aristotle has an arkling of the sucal hat one might squeeze content out of formal conditions for there to be such a thoug as the good will. For Aristotle, substantive edirealcoptent is in place already, the product of habituation, before phinosophical ethics begins. Pilical reflection is controlled by substantive convictions that predate it and shape, is course, reflection brings them into a lestion entypiecemeal, and when the is questioned, that is only it a the pasis of others. The very a carol ethical theory takes on a different fook in this context. But I we frame the contrast correctly, we can hold on to the idea that categorteal imperatives, or something like them, are not alien to Aristote ian ethics,

Incontinence and Practical Wisdom in Aristotle¹

1. David Waggins has wratten important and deepty schoole works in an ampressive array of fields. In this essay, I short try to show my admiration and affection for this best of teachers and colleagues by airing one of my few disagreements with him. I hope this will not seem strange. It should not seem strange to anyone who knows how philosophy proceeds.

Wiggars has wraten. I tim natiogly on Abstotic's an ierstanding of practical thinking, and although only a couple of his papers deal directly with Aristotelian texts, an Aristotelian spirit informs his own conception of practical teason. But although Woggins appeared and exposits Aristotle's reflect uons about the in electual excellence that is operative when excellence of character is put into practice the sees just about nothing to be said for Aristotle's treatment of cases where there is an approximation to the thought is not realized in action, cases of akrasia uncontinence or "weakness of will") of in Wiggins's view, this is a missed opportunity for a sai stying or impletion of the Aristotedan picture. Aristotle is equipped to be aware that we can acknowledge our rationality without playing down the possibly recalcitrant elements in our make up as rational animals, but here he lapses into a primitive "Socratic" faith in the controlling power of the intellect.

I think this criticism rests on a rare failure of charity. We can find Anstotle's picture of akrasia attractive without losing the insights that drive Wiggins's negative estimate of it

- 2. When we consider thinking directed at what to do in general and its expression in behaviour realism dictates a healthy sense of how human beings.
 - This essay was written for a Festschrift for David Wiggins.
 - 2 See "Weakness of Will. Commensurability, and the Objects of Jetiberasion and Desire".

can fail to live up to the results of their practical intelligence. This is where Wiggins begins his discussion of "weakness of with".

The first aim of practical thought is to equip a prospective agent with a focused awareness of which considerations speak rationally for or against the options he contemplates, and with what force. Practical thought may or may not resolve the reasons that come to its notice into a conclusion to the effect that one thang rather than another is, all things considered, the thing to do. But even when practical intelligence cannot effect such a resolution, it aims at a decision to do something that is backed by a reason for doing that

Now even when practical thought does arrive at a view of how the balance of the reasons points at is another question whether the agent will act on that verdict. No doubt the very idea of lively awareness that reason speaks in favour of scale action would lose its intell gibility if we tried to an stract it away from the idea of a propensity, at least 10 be motivationally swayed by that (bought, Batt why should we expect a goarantee that when different mon val onal propensities are in the offing, associated with reasons that point it different directions, thought's resolution of the competing reasons into a jedgment as to where the weight of the reasons lies-if thought manages such a thing - will ensure that a corresponding mot sat onal force beats our ail competitors for control of the agent's behaviour? Still less does it seem realishe to expect decision, the product of practical thought, to e-mimate the possibility that a competing motivation might control action in the other sort of case, where thought has to settle for a decision to follow one set of rational of a derations rather than others without managing an "all things considered judgment. Thus, even though the very idea of thought directed at action requires more than inerely external connection to motvarional susceptibilities, it shows a strange confidence in the intellect's capacity to control the life of an interbigent an mal-of which much else is true besides that it is intelligent, all someone supposes that the internal connecfor as are perfectly rigid, so that an agent's best judgment as to how the reassensilie, or his decision in the absence of such a judgment to follow one set. clireasons rather than another its sure to reach expression in action.

All this is simply accentisated if there is a temporal gap between decision and action. Considerations that shone vividis for prior thought may lose mot varional efficacy when the time comes to put a decision into effect

It seems common sense then to suppose that even the perfect operation of a perfectly timed practical intelligence is not enough to ensure that action

will accord with its results. If an agent is to act in accordance with his own best judgment, or to execute a reasoned decision made in the absence of a best judgment, he needs executive virtues like firmoess of will. (That is to be distinguished from pigheadedness in the face of possible grounds for rethinking one's decision.)

Now consider Aristotle's characterization of akrasia in Nicemachean Filies VB 3. As he remarks (1147b13-17), it concedes a great deal to Socrates, reported doctrine that there can be no such phenomenon. Aristotle allows for incontinence only where something has gone wrong with the agent's practical thanking. He does not acknowledge cases where the thinking is in good order, but there is a failure of executive excellence between the thinking and the action it endorses. Indeed the opposite condition, continence (enkrateia). Figures in Aristotle not as an executive virtue that anyone needs, however excellent the disposition and activity of his practical intellect, but like incontinence, as a fall og short of true virtue, that is, a falling short of temperance, for the paradigmatic cases of continence, and incontinence. So far from needing what Aristotle discusses under the head of continence, a temperate person does not have the bad appetites that a continent person has to strain to keep unsatisfied (1151b32-1152a3).

Aristotle makes great contributions to our understanding of practical reasoning. But he does not complete his reflections by explicitly noting the space between thought and action, and the consequent need for executive virtues to ensure that excellent deliberation finds expression in behaviour. This is the ground for Wiggins's disappointment with what Aristotle says about incontinence.

3. In the account of incontinence that bigures at the central sections (1 VII 3 (1174a24-b5)). Aristotle seems to be aiming to represent a state of motiva tional conflict. The conflict lies in the opposition between a practical sylogism not acted on scapturing the thought that would be operative in the behaviour of a temperate person placed as the incontinent person is, and the appenter embodying a motivationally active thought of pleasure, that is actually operative in the behaviour of the incontinent person (1,47a35-b3).

But Wiggins reads the remarks with which Aristotle introduces this passage in such a way that they rule out such conflict, the result is that Aristotle looks seriously confused. Wiggins finds in the introductory remarks a claim that when the premises of a behaviour-d rected syllogism are put together in the mind, the action they enjoin follows of necessity. If this were

62 Ancient Philosophy

Ar stiffe's view he would be committed to supposing that since the action abstention) that would be characteristic of a temperate person is not forth-coming from a person who displays incontinence, the thought (the practical syllogizing) that would be characteristic of a temperate person cannot be in the person's mind either. The premises can be there, but only separately not understood together in their rational bearing on what the agent is to do As Wiggins remarks ("Weakness of Will" p. 250), this would about the struggic that Aristorle elsewhere associates with incommence.

In Wiggins's "translation-cum-paraphrase", the relevant lines (1,47a25-8), go fixe this (pp. 248–9).

The oral premise [the major] is aniversal, the order premise is concerned with the particular facts, which are the kind of thing to fall within the province of perception. When a single proposition results from the two premises, their can the case of scientific or deductive reasoning, the sour must of necessity affirm the conclusion; while in the practical sphere it must of necessity act.

But as the brackets signal, the allasion to scientific or dedictive reasoning is an importance, and 'in the practical sphere' may be a mistransiation

What Aristotle actually says in the second sentence here paraphrased is this

When a single opinion results from them, there is a necessity that the souling medical classe for perhaps, at once I affirm the conclusion, and its crecase of prentises concerned with production, that it immediately act

Wiggins's reading finds here a contrast between theoretical reasoning, where the result is an affirmation by the soil and practical reasoning, where the result is an action. But there is no explicit allusion to theoretical reasoning

• Sir David Ross. The Vicentainment the of Color or randates femble ment by far time type of case, and glosses this as an albision to scient factersoning. This manches Wigg his surfer pretautor. The suggestion that fentilal means as once involve of Archony Reil is in "The Practical Syllogism and I from hence, and again to Arosana a factor of time will properly in the critical to decide between these constants on what Kenny implies, we can take the same time with Ross as be in one kind of case. In another Kind of case. If without saddling starse was with what Kenny wants to as aid, an inverse and contrast between theoretical and practical reasoning. On Ross's translation of fembla, coerything time on what the contrast between the two kinds of case is supposed in be, and Aristotle's specification, if the second case casts doubt on the Ross Wiggens gloss on the first (see the text below).

and particular premises, and Anstotle's official account of theoretical reasoning does not even accommodate this structure.) Moreover "in the case of premises concerned with production" (en de tais poetikais, not praktikais) is strange wording for practical reasoning in a general sense, ochaviour-directed thinking of any kind, set in contrast with theoretical reasoning. This wording might do main informal and context-free mention of practical as opposed to theoretical thinking. But here, soon after 1139b1/4 and 1140b6-7 (it is more naturally taken as a reminder of the contrast within the sphere of the practical on a general sense, between production (poisis), and action in a strict sense (practs). In that case the passage restricts the claim that action (in the general sense) must ensue to one kind of behaviour directed thinking, the productive, and allows other cases of behaviour directed thinking where the most that is necessary if the premises are put together is an affir mation.

Though directed towards production posits are end that as instrumentally remote from anything the agent can do here and now, and seeks a pleans. It may select among means that are merely practicable, on the basis of case or achievement and other desiderata (1112b16-17). No doubt practical thinking can solve a problem of this kind without issuing in the action that constitutes the sounce. But this can happen only if the agent decides after a linot topursue the posited end. Perhaps he revises his view of its desirability when he realizes what it will cost to achieve it. This decision revokes the major atemise of the reasoning, that such and such is to be achieved. If, however, the elements of the reasoning stay in place, then the agent's motivational prientaflow for purposes of this reasoning is simply defined by the posited end. Inthat case, barrong phenomena ake paralysis or forcibic prevention, the completion of a piece of practical thinking of this kind cannot but lead to real zation in action. If what happens is under the sway of the agent's motivations at all, it will be controlled by the nisus towards the posited end, if considerations. that appeal to some other monvation are allowed any relevance, besides the subordinate one of selecting among different ways of satisfying the primary. motivation, that rust means that the terms of the agent is practical problem are not as given by the elements of the productive deliberation §

^{4.} Admittedly the example Asistone offers, to thistrate his caum about the case in which action must follow. E147a29-3 it is do say the least inot a clear case of a salio-gism of production. But the point of singling sol production here is sail hat the posited.

64 Ancient Philosophy

On this reading of what Aristotic means when he says that certain completed reasonings is ac of necessity in action, the remark reflects no general prejudice about the efficacy of practical intelligence. Aristotic does not claim implausibly that when any behav our-directed thought is brought to completion, it necessarily finds realization in action. His thesis simply regis ters, innocuously that in debberation directed to a problem of production the very terms in which the predicament is conceived caminate all motivations other than pursuit of the posited end.

But it is not problems of production that are solved by the interlectual exce lence operative in acts of virtue. For this case, ad that Aristone's remark in sists on is that if the premises of the syllogism that a virtuous person would act on are put together in an agent's mind, there must be an affirmation of the conclusion. This precisely leaves room for the premises to be put together. without issuing in appropriate action. And Aristotle exploits this later in the central passage of VII 3. In setting out the opposition between the syllogism of temperance and the incontinently fed appetite, he says (1147a34). The former says to avoid this, but the appetite drives." Strictly speaking, "the former" should refer to the ansversal premise that prevents tasting, mentioned at 1147a31-2. But a universal premise can say to avoid the" only if what it says is mediated by a minor premise, directing the universal prohibition at a particular object. So it is ready the whole syllogism that Aristotic turist mean to describe as "saying to avoid this". Contrary to Wiggais's reaching, we can see the point of the introductory remarks as being precisely to make room for syllogisms that do such saying endisch requires that the premises are present and put together but get no further than that towards tealization in action

4 Bat this reinterpretation at most removes what looks in Wiggans's picture of Aristotic like a blemah of exposition in does not address the central

end is estrainer ally as apposed a specificatority remote from what the agent can produce which but rather that the practical problem is of the productive kind, the agent's more area and stance for the problem's purposes, is defined by the posited end. What mat ers is not the mode of remoteness of the end from the agent's immediate possible test action, but the fact that the major premise can appropriately contain the site whereas it a major premise says merely that something is good, we do not need to regard it as remoted if the agent ends up pursuing some different good. The point about production is that product we de heration by its mode of focus on an end defines a de berative sit is upon misach a way that a "mist" is appropriate in the major premise. That is exempt field in Aristotle's saustrative example.

issue. Given this reading, Wiggins is wrong to suppose Aristotle commits. himself to a doctrine that practical thought of necessity achieves realization. in action, a doctrine that would have the effect of eliminating any possibility. of weak akrasia (as opposed to the rather uninteresting impetuous variety) 1150b19-22) Still. Aristotle does take it that if the premises of the syllogism of temperance are put together in the mind of an agent who nevertheless pursues some pleasure that he should not pursue, that calls for special, explanation. The drift of VII 3 seems to be that something must have gone. wrong with the agent's parchase on the minor premise of virtue's syllogism, so that although the agent in a way sees things as a temperate personwould, the match between the relevant part of his practical thought and that of a temperate person is imperfect. If the match in thought were perfect, there would also be a march in behaviour. We need not saddle Aristotie. with a doctrine that would commit him to concluding, from the failure of match in behaviour, that the premises of the syllogism of temperance can be present only in blank separation from one another, so that there is no room even for an approximation to a match in respect of the practical conclusion that a temperate person would draw. But Aristotle still amplies that In cases of weakness there can be at most an approximation to such a match, and in Wiggins's view this is evidently an insufficient acknowledge ment of the poss brities of fadure to put thought also practice.

The Noomachean Ethics—describes, elucidates, and amplifies the actual concerns of Euman life, and makes transparent to theory the way in which these concerns necessitate, where they do necessitate, the actions or decistons in which they issue. Those who find that this is enough in practice to retain their interest in the subject will absence that they can drop Aristotle's doctrine of the akrates, ignorance of the minor premise——c'Weakness of Will', p. 261.)

"Ignorance of the mittor premise" may need to be innanced, if we are to avoid all risk of overstating what Aristotle envisages. (Aristotle indeed speaks of ignorance for instance at 1147b6 but it is clear that he is straining to avoid alleging an oratight failure of grasp.) But no toping down, so long as it leaves in place the basic idea that there is some break down in the incontinent person's practical thinking, will help to meet Wiggins's point. Wiggins thinks Aristotle ought to have allowed that even perfectly executed practical thinking may need executive virtues if it is to show itself in action, the thought alone does not suffice. In that case it

cannot be correct to infer a defectiveness in thinking, whether we call it * g-norance" of noti from a detectiveness in behaviour

I think it is quite wreing to object to Aristotte on these grounds, and the materials for seeing that it is wrong are all in Wiggins's paper

5. The essential thing is to realize that Aristotle's a in in connection with altrostal is to characterize a person whose practical thought comes as close as possible consistently with a failure of action, to matching the practical thought not of a possessor of just any kind of practically or ented intedectual excetlence, but specifically of a person who has "practical wisdom" tphronesis. Aristotle's conception of the relations between practical wisdom continuate and incommence reflects a deeply attractive view of the efficacy of a quite specific kind of practical thinking, when present in its perfect or ideal form. There is no emplication that practical deliberation generally regardless of its type flows smoothly into action without any need for executive virtues, that is no inprealistic consistion of the power of practical thought in general to eliminate recalc fram monitorious and colutor action. This undercars the basis for Wiggins's disappointment.

Practical wisdom is the interlectual excellence that is operative in the behavior riof a fully-fledged possessor of varioe of character, a possessor of varioe of character, a possessor of varioe of character a possessor of varioe of character a possessor of varioe of character in the strict sense (see VLT3). It is a correct conception of the end of human action (1)42l(31) 31. Aristotle does not be evention such a conception can be specified out in general rules of conduct (1094b11-27-1109b12-23). We cannot encapsulate the content of practical wisdom in a general formula that could be abstracted away from the concrete details of the A correct conception of the end is accordingly inseparable from a kind of perception (1,42a23-30, 1143a5-b5), which Wiggons he plud yight sees as 1s to alional appreciation. In a capacity to discern which of the potentially action-inviting features of a situation is the one that should be allowed to cab into operation one of the standing concerns whose being put into practice on the appropriate occasions constitutes bying out a correct conception of the sort of life a human being should live

Now consider a situation that calls for the most striking sort of exercise of temperance, namely abstaining from an available but excessive bodily pleasure.

⁵ See Deliberation and Practical Report* at p. 231. My sketch of how pract all westoon should be convex disself lemons a sat beautiful essay a warr or bring our now easy vit can be separated from what Wiggins, akes to be its natural commutation, his negative evaluation of Anstotle's treatment of akhinga.

sure. That the pleasure is available is within the awareness of a temperate person notices than anyone else. And facts of that shape, that there is an opportunity for pleasure, can engage a motivational suscept binly that is one of the standing concerns of a virtuous person. (Too little interest in the pleasures of appetite is a defect of character see AF III 11.) But on this occasion what matters about the situation, as the practically wase person cor rectly sees it is not that the pleasure is there to be had, but whatever it is that marks out this potential pleasure as excessive.

By separating temperance from continence as he does. Aristotle implies a picture on these lines, on an occasion like this, what is characteristic of a practically wise person, which a possessor of temperance in the strict sense. must be as not samply that he counts as irrelevant to the quest on what to do an instance of a kind of consideration (the potential for pleasure) that is resevant to that question in other circumstances, but that his counting it as trrelevant is completely realized in how his more attorial make up responds. to the simulation. It shows in his feeling no appenitive pull towards the potential pleasure. So he stands in sharp contrast with people who are confinent or (weakly) incontinent. Such people in such a situat in would in a way share the practically wise person's view of the stat is of the opportunity. for pleasure as a candidate reason for acting, namely that it counts for nothing in the face of the fact that the picasure is excessive. But an them the opportunity for pleasure would trigger an appetite, which would need to be overcome to vield continent behaviour, and would issue in incontinen, behaviour if not overcome. Fully fledged practical wisdom is a "situational appreciation" that not only singles out just the right one of the potentially action-inviting features of a predicament, but does so in such a way that none of the agent's motivational energy is entitled into operation by any of the others he has be errain unpulses that threaten to lead him astray so that he would be at best continent even if he managed to avoid being sed astray. His "situational appreciation" is such as to insulate the attract ons of compeling courses of action from generating actual arges to pursue them.

This picture simply requires the thesis that a person who is comment or incomment can achieve at most an imperfect approximation to the "situational appreciation" of a person who is temperate in the sinct sense, in a situation where temperative requires retraining from an opportunity for pleasure. The picture is that full achievement of that "situational appreciation" would prevent the attractions of competing courses from actually exerting any motivational force. If the attractions of competing courses do exert a motivational force as they do in cases of incontinence or continence if

follows that the "situational appreciation" that is characteristic of fully-fledged practical wisdom cannot have been fully achieved. The most we can find in such cases is something less, something that yields a similar selection of what matters about the situation, but without the singleness of norwall on that fully-fledged practical wisdom would achieve

There need be no implication that the attractive less of the competing course goes dun in the view of the situation that the practically wise person achieves. The pleasure is there to be had, by the practically wise person to less than by anyone else. He can be completely aware of the attractiveness of the competing course of its just that he is not attracted by it.

If the course that is not to be followed retains its attractiveness, there is nothing surprising in the fact that ordinarily, good, people are habie to feel an appetitive autraction towards it, so that their action well be continent at best. This is especially ansorprising in the young, there must be stages in ethical upbringing at which it is too soon to hope that a correct conception of how to ave can have been perfectly ingrained into someone's motivation, makesup, in the way that is characteristic of finity fledged practical wisdom.

The picture leaves this kind of lapse looking only hat are. No thesis of Arstotie's clashes with a common sense recognition that most people do not achieve the singleness of monsational focus that figures in his picture of the

6. At 3.5 b 14-7152a2 3. Aristone since. Bor 3. by continent person and the real person. person are such as an dominthing could are so the socious account of bodify please exchutope or him has and the other does not have bod appeares, and the latter is such as not to be pleased contrally to the least ownereas the true envisc hias to be pleased but intisach. as to be led " Physiast cause restates the claim criam the competition person, it alike the nonprices, persons lacks the had appet tes that respond to appoint arries for sleas he that are not be pursued. He canks are ractive inconsistion that troops by graffied by pursuing sucqa preasure is so there is not ling to make a true that he would take preasure in the lacable. But his is surely consistent with suminsing that he physical pleasures of such action are There he had for him as reach as fire an your of seems reductions to suppose that a tellpera e persur is such as supply not to fee, the physical pleasures of, say illimises. There is as the ite abor to ag more in engaging it such activity and half sa way of planing Arstotle spoir facts. But if we discove to imagine that what we consemplate is a pessiolewithing a which he reels those pleasures. Though in doubt he is not pleased in be doing so. David Prars offers a different reading of this passage in "Ansiotle's Analysis of Courage". on six assistined connection between potential feelings of physical pleasure and awareness of appoint intes for physical pleasure, on the line hand, and felt appetites, on the otherideal. What he insists is that where such singleness of motivational focus is not achieved, there cannot be a perfect cognitive match with the ideal case. But this leaves plenty of room for approximations to the ideal, falling short of the anobstructed transition to action that the ideal would guarantee cases in which the undimmed attractiveness of the course that with his approximation to practical wisdom, the agent sees is not to be followed generates a felt temptation to follow: U. Aristotle's picture leaves plenty of room for cases where continence might figure not exactly as an executive virtue but as an executive disposition that is required if the agent is to act as an a way, he realizes he should, thus realization being, from the terms of the case, less perfectly meshed with his motivational susceptibilities than in the ideal case.

6. Wiggins appreciates the beauty of this conception of practical wisdom. As the pots at someone who fully appreciated the end that practical wisdom has in view would find the associated reasons for acting "distinctically compeding" ("Weakness of Wid" p. 254). It would be impossible to make sense of someone's fally possessary a practical understanding so conceived, and grasping what it dictates in a particular situation, but never teless a lowing himself to be moved by the attractiveness of some different course or action.

But this special comped iigness figures in Wiggins's freat nent of Aris offerably by way of diagnos's of a supposed faiture on Aristotle's part to leave any room for gaps between fully achieved results of practical thinking and act on in accordance with those results. Wiggins's Aristotle extrapolates from the distinctive compellingness of the considerations that appeal to practical wisdom in particular to the idea that am fully achieved conclus on of practical thought must flow smoothly into action to their amy need for executive virtues.

But there is no need to saddle Anstotle with this extrapolation. Aristotle's point about akrasia need not be anything over and above a corollary of the fact that he credits the conclusions of practical wisdom in particular with that distinctive compellingness. This leaves had no option by the soppose that if sometine in a way achieves one of those conclusions but does not act accordingly what he achieves can be at most a flawed approximation to the conclusion. But that implies nothing to the determent of the picture that Wiggins gives and supposes that Aristotic is committed to rejecting of the gaps between practical thought in general and action. Aristotle does not botch the general case, as opposed to the special case of practical wisdom, as Wiggins suggests. The general case is simply off stage as far as Aristotle is

concerned his interest is in the special case and there is no particular reason for him to bother with the general case at all.

In "De (beration and Practical Reason", Wiggins extracts a convincing picture of practical reason in general, at least outside its merely technical employment from things Aristotle says about the operation of practical wisdom. Here extrapolation to the general case vields treasure. But that should not make as forget that it is extrapolation. Aristotle's chief concernat least at the Ethics is -as is appropriate there—with the deliberation that is characteristic of practical wisdom, he is interested in other manifestations. of behaviour-d rected intelligence only in order to differentiate them from practical wisdom, or perhaps, in the case of technical deliberation, in order to get as much as he can out of modelling the operations of practical Wisdom on it. We are bound to do him an in ustice. I we forget the restrict. editiess of his topic, and read his insistence, for that special case, that tailures in action in ist betray flaws in thought to unply a denial that there is a role in the explanation of action for anything besides the way the agent this ks-ademail of any role for factors like fronness of resolve, in an account of how practical thought in general flows into action

That is just how Wiggins reads Aristotle. This shows when he writes ("Weakness of Will" p. 251) of "the distinct on that Aristotic is obliged toposta are between the combinent man's and the inconfinent man's knowedge and perception of a situation." Reasonably enough. Wiggins is seeptical of such a distinction. "How can it be maintained even in the face of all the phenomenological findings, that the continent and incontinent man see different things, or must see things differently?" But the supposed obligation to postulate this difference is a product of not a lowing Aristotle b s restricted topic. From Aristotle's insistence, for the special case, of practical wordern, that a clear seeing of a situation in the light in which practical wisdom casts it leaves no room for defective action. Wigg is has inferred a doctrine that the quality of an agent's vision is always a climplete explanation of how he acts. This issues a continent person and an acontinent person act differently, there must be a difference in how they see things. But there is no such doctrine, and no obligation to invent a cognitive difference between the continent and the incontinent person-The city cognitive difference that Aristotle is obliged to postulate is a difference between on the one hand, a possessor of practical wisdom and, on the other and flerently, a continent or an incontinent person, who are alike shown not to see things exactly as the practically wise person does by

the fact that they feel an appetitive pull towards action other than what as they in a way realize virtue requires. Once we have in view the lapse in vision that allows conflicting motivations to be felt, so that the best that can be achieved is continence, it is quite another matter, on which Aristotle leaves his options open, what determines whether the agent acts continently or incontinently.

7 The end of human action of which practical wisdom is a correct concept. tion, is what Aristotle also refers to as "the good and the chief good". (1094a22) and identifies in Book J of Niconachean Ethics, with endamonia that is living well and doing well (1095a14-20). Modern commentators often suppose that Aristotle conceives this end of avery well in terms of the optimal combination of a bundle of intrinsic goods, marked out as such by their natural appeal to homan beings. This style of reading is parily sustained by Anstotic's claub that endomonia is self-sufficient (1097b6-20), in the sense that form its own it makes life worthy of goal gipt for and lacking in nothing" (1097b14-15), this is read as saving that nothing that human beings are naturally disposed to find worth pursuing can be missing from a life. of endamenta. It is also partly sustained by a wish to equip Anstolle with a way to establish the pursuit worthings of a life of virtue from first principles, by claiming that it optimally secures what human beings are anyway. bound to regard as worth securing, without any need for this justification of virtue to exploit the tendencies to delight in virtuous act viry as such that the members of Ar stotle's audience have acquired in their oblical education. (see 1104h3-13, 1095h4-6)

On this sort of reading, the thosis that endamonia is self is afticient would risk making it especially difficult to inderstand how someone could act contrary to what he sees that endamonia requires, in order to enjoy plays cal pleasure. This would be to parsue something that would have to be an element in the bundle of goods that is supposedly all that can make ble worth living at a libut at the known expense of a better arrangement of that very bundle of goods. The conception of practical reason that is operative here risks looking like a less crude version of the conception that in the closing pages of Plate's Prolagoras, serves to obliterate the very possibility of acting contrary to knowledge of how the reasons for acting it.

But we should not take the claim of self-sufficiency like this. No doubt the valuations of actions that are characteristic of the propensity to delight in virtuous activity for its own sake cannot simply cut loose from dispositions.

72 Ancient Philosophy

to find things worth pursuing that human beings have anyway. Independently of ethical upbringing. That would make a mystery of how ethical upbringing, whose prospects must be conditioned by the prior nature of its recopients, can impart such a scheme of values. But it does not follow that the scheme of values that is characteristic of delighting in virtuous activity. Or its own sake must be a construct out of the idea of an optimal combination of goods that naturally appeal to human beings as such so that the genuine pursuit worth ness of such activity can be defended as conducive to the bes arrangemen of those goods. These acquired values can have a sort of autonomy with respect to what naturally appeals to human beings. And the claim that endamnoma is seed sufficient can be read in terms of standards for pursuit-worth less set by these acquired values. So as Wiggens puts it ("Weakness of Will", p. 260)

In the detriation of self-sufficiency, we need not take "lacking a morning" to mean lacking in nothing at all that would be found valuable by advhody prisoning what ever course" only "lacking in nothing that a man evho had chosen the great goods bendamining would regard as worth bothern is sette".

This akes is completely away from the idea that the attractive essible course that the incontinent person pursues is merely an inferior quantity of some single kind of attractiveness, of which the virtural action possesses also perfer quality. It allows us to see that the incontinent person can be tempted by a "pecial at or distinctive charge in the course he follows some thing that cannot be regarded as merely a smaller amount of the very same Kind of worthwhileness that he demes hunself when he declines he virturous action. This rejection of what Wiggins calls the principle of competitious action for kind," application is essential if we are no make room for a common sense picture of incontinence, a picture that is immune to the difficulties concocted in the *Protagenas* passage."

^{7.} Wiggos suggests. Weakness of W = p_200. Fat Arota le non-tave son entrasional sught tendency to believe something rather like the protespect decompensation to k all that this signal actors Northing like the protesple is needed in index to make sense or A fatotie's taking the line he does about incommence. The Aristone iablibesis section intance De Aroma 433bbs—or that levely the puters preast rable appears to is under the aspect of good. Which Woggats etter as perhaps residue in the principle simply says rightly that pleasurableness appears as a reason for acting something to be said in favour of courses of action that promise if the idea of apparent goods no more implies the sort in reamogeneity that the principle albitros than does the ofea of reasons. In acting

But this leaves untouched the thesis that incontinence is possible only on the basis of a flawed approximation to the view of a situation that practical wisdom would achieve. What dictates that thesis is the distinctive compellingness of the verdicts of practical wisdom, the argument needs no help from the principle of compensation in kind. Wiggins suggests that when we see our way past the difficulties that the *Protigoras* passage extracts from an unrealistically monolithic conception of reasons for acting, we thereby see how we can "drop Aristotie's doctrine of the akrates ignorance of the minor premise" (p. 261) already quoted above). But if we allow Aristotle the restricted scope of his doctrine. This rebrike stands revealed as misplaced.

8. Wiggins is admirably hospite inwards pictures of practical reasoning in terms of weighing quantities of a honogeneously conceived worthwhile-ness. But I think he understates the distance between this sort of thing and Aristotle's conception of deliberation with a view to *etidiamonia*. He takes Aristotle to hold that "wherever a man has to act the can substance the question at issue under the question of eudamonia and discern which course of act on is better from that point of view? c"Weakness of Will" p. 258). Be bases this on *De Anima* 434a5–10, which he paraphrases like this

Sensory imagination is found in other animals but debecative imagination only in those which have reason. For whether one shall do this thing or dethat thing it is the work of reason to decide. And such reason necessarily implies the power of measurement by a single standard. For what one parsues is the greater good. So a rational an mall slope with the power to it is trate between diverse appearances of what is good and integrate the findings into a unitary practical conception.

But there are two things wrong with this as a basis for the attribution

First the passage does not say that a rational amina can always integrate its conceptions of the apparent good in a given situation into a unified practical verdict, but just that rational animals can do that (perhaps only in some cases) whereas non-rational animals cannot. The passage is consistent with supposing that some situations may deleaf the integrative efforts of practical reason. This is a good thing. As Wiggins reads him. Anistotic would here be casting doubt on the very possibility of tragic predicaments.

Second the passage does not mention endamonia, and I doubt that that is its topic. This passage is about practical rationality in general, and I have already suggested that we should distance that from the Kind of susceptibility.

74 Ancient Philosophy

to reasons that is characteristic of practical wisdom in particular. When a sit altern calling for temperance is seen in terms of doing well, the agent's decision what to do does not supervene on a judgment that sets one apparent good, seen as greater, against another, seen as smaller. The pleasure promised by the course that the agent realizes is not to be pursued is recognized, indeed as an instance of something that is in general a good. But the prospect of pleasure is not taken to be here and now a good, on the dimension of goodness marked our by the idea of endamental but a smaller one than the virt lous action; it is not taken to tell in favour of pursuing the pleasure, by the lights of endamental but more weakly than the reasons for abstention. Rather, by the lights of endamental the prospect of pleasure does not speak at all in layour of pursuing thin these circumstances.

If we conceive the correct practical verdict on which the accontinent person fads to act as based on allowing the apparent good constituted by the promise of a casure to tell in favour of pursing the pleas are but not as strongly as the considerations that speak in favour of abstention, we make it harder to comprehend incontinence. On this picture, the attractiveness of the promised pleasure is allowed to count towards the agent's practical judgment in its simply outweighted. On the different picture I am origing that attractiveness is not conceded any resevance to the question what to do, and it becomes easier to understand how denied any bearing on the question of reason it should insist on making itself felt by traggeting an appetite

9 As 1—ive remarked. Aristotic notes a convergence between the view of the neutron that he is sed to and the view that Socrates took. 1147b14-- 5). This convergence encapsistates Wiggins's complaint of Weakness of Will's p. 251). "When what I might a most venture to call a more Aristotichan account than Aristotic's promises to be possible. — why did Aristotic gives who a Socratic account of the phenomena of weakness?" Calling Aristotic's account, "Socratic" means that it is too optain stic about the power of practical thought to endy motivational direction, and about the control of practical thought over what people do

Thave arged, however, that Anstotle's concern in a is discussion of akhisial structure view th a special kind of action-directed thought, whose perfect operation Aristotle has good reasons for associating with a perfection of non-ded character that leaves no room for the agent to be pulled by confineding motivations. There is no slighting the way reasons for acting, in

general can resist resolution by thought into an overall verdict as to how one should act, and no slighting the way motivational propensities can resist control by thought. Even when endamonia bixes the nature of the practical attention that an agent directs at a situation, there is no assurance that his practical thinking can resolve the relevant considerations into an overall verdict, no assurance that an action is available that will count as doing well centification. That is, endamonem. And even where a correct conception of endamonia does yield a clear identification of one action as doing well total allows for cases where an agent approximates to such thinking without acting accordingly. There is no naive intellectualism here.

This raises the question whether we can exploit the corocidence with Sociates the other way round to begin on a rehabilitation of Sociates from the common charge of appealistic interlectualism.

It is at worst a salutary exaggeration to say that all we really know about Socrates—apart perhaps from something about his method is that he proposanded the famous pluzzbing theses, that virtue is knowledge, that no one does wrong "voluntarily", and that virtue is one. Our best sources, the early dialogues of Plato, do not lay down slabs of moral theory, they come across rather, as undoctrina re explorations of those evidently dark sayings, and of obviously cognate, issues such as whether and how virtue can be faught and an what sense one has a reason for right conduct.

Many modern commentators have connect the closing argument of the Protagorus as authentically Sociatic not on the basis of any compelling text tall ground. But rather because it fits a philosophical reconstruction, this is supposed to be the sort of thing Sociates *must* have thought If he was to connect knowledge with virtuous action as he seems to have done. The resuit is to saddle Sociates with a patibully unreadistic picture of the connection between reason and motivation? But if I am right about Ar storle, who notes his own convergence with Sociates, there is no "must" about it

In that case, what is going on in the Pretageras argument?

The apparently Socratic idea that virtue is a kind of knowledge that ensures bying well can be interpreted in two contrasting ways. The first we

8 In Terence Irwin's version Plan Mara Prom the picture purports a depict bankar beings as they are in Mariba C. Sussbounds variable. The brain in of conducts in the picture depicts how human beings should a mito be in order allow reason a prospect occurrying their safely through life. Nossbounds Socrates as the blue option facts as the nix Socrates is the Both versions leave Ansitotle's "Socraticism" quite mystenous.

76 Ancient Philosophy

can associate with the sophists (at least as Plato pictures them). According to this interpretation, the advantages that virtue brings are recognizable as such independently of the special propensities to value and disvalue courses of conduct that are acquired in ethical upbringing, so that a diam to be able to teach virtue holds out a promise of something that anyone will ether virtuous or not will count as being well. The second is the one that I believe we should associate with Socrates. According to this interpretation, the attractions of a virtuous life are real, but recognizable only from within a commitment to that ale. What we find in the *Protagoras* is a version of the hist of these. At the end of the dialogue, Socrates suggests that he and Protagoras have changed places, we can take this to tell us, almost in so many words, that the position propounded in the countil argument is not the authentic Socratic view, but a sophistic travesty of 1.5.

Perhaps what Aristotle does in his discussion of practical wisdom and its express on in action is simply to recapture what Sociates was really driving at If cam right about Aristotle, this can liberate Sociatic moral psychology from the strange want of realism that much recent commentary has found in it.

6. This antifereurs Gregory Vlasios is suggestion (Paacia Preragoral) plickly cited by bossibility up out prid5 a diantific argument is like so oberathering a processor source mangines is a Sociatic conclusion. It is questionable whether the conclusion is Sociatic over though the words that express it an absociatic express a Sociatic though.

PART II

Issues in Wittgenstein

Are Meaning, Understanding, etc., Definite States?

I In his essay "Wittgenstein on Understanding". Warren Goldfarb writes "Wittgenstein's treatments in the *Philosophical Investigations* of the cognitive or intentional mental notions are evidently meant to persuade as that in some sense, anderstanding, believing, remembering, thinking, and the like are not particular or definite states or processes, or of this is to say anything different) that there are no particular states or processes that constitute the understanding, remembering, etc.*!

To be fair to Goldfarb, I should stress how be bedges the thought he attributes to Witigensiein with "in some sense". And he immediately goes on to say "Such a dark point desperately needs carofication if it is not to deny the understanding, or of thought processes surely when one understands—understands a word, a sentence or the principle of a series—one is in a particular state, namely the state of understanding the word, sentence or principle."

But that is the only appearance of such admittedly undernable points in Godfarh's essay. He devotes the rest of a to elaborating how he reads the passages in which Wittgenstein discourages as from thinking in terms of definite or particular states and processes. The acknowledged sense in which Wittgenstein had better have nothing against such talk gets no further attention.

In this essay I want to try to redress the balance somewhat. I think we can learn something from Wittgenstein about how to picture understanding and so forth as definite or particular states without having the picture reflect a confusion.

This quotation and the next are from p. 109.

80 Issues in Wittgenstein

Bit first on §§ 2-3 and 4). I shall say something about the strand in Wingenstein that Goldfarb focuses on which deals with a way of being confused by such a picture.

2. There are certainly passages in *Philosophical Investigations*: that point in the direction Grindarb and cates. Perhaps most explicitly, at §154 Wittge, stein says. "Try not to think of understanding as a mental process at a l—For that is the expression that confuses you."

Why is at thanking of understanding as a "mental process" (or perhaps "occurrence" [conjung]) rather than as a "mental state" that Wit genster discourages here? In this region of the rext, he is considering exclamations like "Now I know thow to go one?" or "Now I understand," (§151). Here understanding is apparently "something that makes its appearance in a moment" (bid). One grasps the meating of a word "m a flash", §138). It is these onsets of understanding at deby ite moments that at §154. Witgenstein is a firsting as to try not to conceive as mental occurrences. But the advice that taily carries over to states its counterpart would be advising us to try not to tail what sets in at those moments as mental states.

In the context of this passage. Writgenstein is considering a temptation to conceive say indepstanding a number series or known girs principle as "a state of a cherital apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of which we explain to emandestations of that knowledge" (§149) here the the ight is appeted to knowing the ABC). This figures as a gloss one is tempted to put on this thought. "To have got the system on again to understand it) can't consist in communing the series up to this or that number that is only apylying one's understanding. The cuit derstanding the first state which is the source of the correct use." (§146)

About this idea. Wittgenstein remarks (still at §746). "What is one thinking of) cre? Iso tone thinking of the demonstron of a series from its al-

^{2.} Cramor's herceforta will be from this work unless otherwise indicated

[•] I knowing the ABC is as good an example for the point Wingeristein wants for make as the examples by dying number series we can conclude that the point sinot as continuous nations sometimes make it seet. Essentially connected with the fact that there is no approached not the idea of getting at the child of extending a manble series. There is such a thing as getting to the end of reciting the ABC. Wingeristem's point is not about infinity it is about the relation between knowing the ABC or understanding the principle of a neither series in the one hand and the actions one performs in texting the ABC of extending the number series, on the other.

gebraic formula? Or at least of something analogous?—But this is where we were before. The point is, we can think of more than one application of an algebraic formula, and every type of application can in turn be formulated algebraically but naturally this does not get us any further. The application is still a criterion of understanding."

The suggestion is that when one thinks of the understanding of a number series as a state from which the correct use flows, one is picturing the state as an embodingent (or perhaps we should say "engindment", of an algebraic formula. Considered as a nure piece of notation, a formula-"stands there like a sign post" (§85). That is, like a thing that is in fact a sign-post, but considered in abstraction from what it means in people's use. of it in abstract or frontits pointing the way, perhaps considered merely as a board of a certain configuration fixed on a post. Like a sign post so considered, a formissa so considered is normatively mert. These stems do not themselves sort behaviour into what accords with them-writing down the right numbers in the right order, going in the direction the sign post points in-and what does not. Suppose now that one tries to conceive understanding the series as an embodiment of a formula in some suitable medium. the brain't. Given the normative permess of the formula it self, that ensures that over and above the state one is picturing, therewould need to be something that selects a specific interpretation of the formula that the state embodies, from among several that it is capable of bearing ("we can think of more than encapolication of an algebraic for mula") if we are to have to view something in the light of which what the person whose state it is does, purporte fly extending the series, is correct of incorrect. An embodiment of a formula, conceived on these bijes, could not contain within stell resources to determine which numbers it is correct to write down. I one is to extend the series of whose principle the state is supposed to constitute an understanding. This is made vivid in our context, by Witigenstein's remark that the enterior for the presence of the prefared apparatus of ght to be "a knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does? (§149). If we conceive the pictured state like this, it cannot be the state itself—what was supposed to be the person's understanding of the series—in the light or which the numbers. the person writes down are correct or not

3 There is already enough here to indicate that something is going wrong.
The state we are picturing does not stand to the performances we want to

be able to see as manifestations of the person's understanding in the relation in which the person's understanding would need to stand to those performances. The relation of being something they accord with or not if there is in stake, deception, or whatever. If we are to conceive understanding the principle of a series as a state, it should be the state, itself, not the state reinforced with one from among many possible interpretations of the formula it embodies. In the light of which the performances are assessed as correct or not. But this does not exhaust the trouble we fall into if we try to conceive understanding on the lines Wittgenstein is considering.

The idea of following a rule or acting on a principle, for instance the principle of a series, can be spelled out in terms of the idea that what one does accords with the rate or principle. If we fall into supposing that this concept of accord can be in play only thanks to an appeal to the concept of interpretation, we put pressure on the very idea of following a rule or acting an an understanding. (This is now farmuar, in discussions of Wilder) stein, though I think the significance of his moves, in this area is still often. not properly appreciated tiWe start with say a statement of a rule perhaps an algebraic formula, giving the rule for extending a number series, and we suppose that someone could follow the rule, act on an arederstanding of what it requires, only by putting an interpretation on the statement of it. But if the original statement of the ride and behaviour aimed at come roung to the tuse's recontenients are related only across a gap, which would seem to need to be biodged by an interpretation, then exactly the same goes for the interpretation that we hoped would bridge the gap of can only be another statement, or at any rate another expression of the rule. It is as much in need of interpretation, before the idea of acting in accord with the rule can have determinate or ntent, as the original

⁴ sold art resists making much of this icid of points, that the pictured state does not have "the grammar of understanding" p. 110. Son the basis that it would revolve a tribiting to Wittgenstein are "essentialism, that is out of line with the hospity to "a priorism" expressed in passages like §131. Think this resistance is excessive. Wittgensteins to minasking if a certain soft of preconception about how things must be does not carry over to such thoughts as that understanding, say the series of even numbers is must be if you have something in the light of which may writing "1000" when one gets. "996-998. "would be correct so no state of which that was not true could be a person's inderstanding of the series. But there is certainly more than this to be said against the picture that Wittgenstein is starting to discuss in passages like §146.

statement of the rule was. This is obviously the beginning of a regress. If we cannot find anything wrong with the assumptions that lead is into the regress, we shall be deprived of the very idea of behaviour that accords or not with a rule of a principle of an understanding. And that means we shall be deprived of the very idea of a determinate understanding. (See of course, §201.)

Now it is natural to respond to this threat by saying that that in the light of which one's behaviour in say extending a number series is correct or incorrect is of course not for instance, a formula, considered as a mere piece of notation, but the meaning of the formula, or perhaps the formula as one understands it. And there is ust be a way of taking this response in which it is correct and innocuous.

But there is a risk of being tempted to conceive the meaning of the formula. as it figures in this response as an item of the same character as the interpretations that succeed one another when one embarks on the regress-fone interpretation after another, as if each one contented, is at least for a moment, and we thought of yet another standing behind it." (§201)—except that it is somehow not used susceptible to interpretation. Ordinary interpretations, on reflection, turned out to be themselves susceptible of being interpreted other. wise than as determining the right series. That was what seemed to require another interpretation behind each one we might offer. And that was what ensured that on these lines we can never reach a genuine determination of how the series is to be continued. Each successive interpretation can still be interpreted askew, and proving to another interpretation is just moving to another case of the same predicament. The templation now is to conceive the meaning of the formula as something that allows us to take the first step. b. t. reheves as of the need to take any further steps, in this threatened regress, This conception of meaning as just like an ordinary interpretation, except that It is somehow not itself susceptible to interpretation, is expressed by Wittgenstein in the Blue Book in this passage (p. 34)

What one wants to say is "Every sign is capable. I interpretation, but the meaning must not be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation."

⁵ In the course of the pivotal §201 Witigenstein notes that if there is an inclusion to say every action according to the rule is an interpretation." (So there is no gap the interpretation, is altered on the far side of what threatened in held gap. He responds "But we ought to restrict the term interpretation, to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another."

I said somehow not itself susceptible to interpretation? "Somehow" soul-us a note of mysteriousness, and that is in a way the point. On this conception, a formula's meaning, or perhaps a person's understanding of the for nula or of the principle of a series as an interpretation that terminates the regress. This converts an idea we ought to be able to take in our stride. The idea of writing down, say, numbers in a way that is in accord with an understanding of the principle of a series—into an idea that incorporates a mystery. We have gone through the meticus of giving ourselves a regress-proof. conception of acting on an understanding. But ready all we have equipped ourselves with is a quasi magical conception of how the understanding determ per what we are to do in acting on it. We have replaced the wealof an empodanent, or enrundments of say, an algebraic formula with the idea of an embodament for e-mindment) of something, ust like a formula except. that audice an ordinary formula at mysteriously cannot be inverpreted otherwise that, as reguling just the right numbers at all points in the Octeasion of the series.

The idea of an embodiment of a formula yielded a picture of an arrangement in a dieatal apparatus. The frounce was that such an arrangement could no more be semething in the light of which performances of writing down in others, recorrect and incorrect than a bit of mere algebraic rintation, considered in abstraction from its employment by natile marked practice, could be. The criterion for the presence on a page of a bit or in ere algebraic notation is independent of what it would be correct to do if one were told to extend a series in accordance with the principle, the expresses. Just so the criterion for the presence of a state conceived in the corresponding way is "the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does" (§149) quoted earlier), the presence of the state would be independent of what a would be correct to do in order to act or the understanding that the state is supposed to be. The relation of such a state to the performances that issue from it could be at best brutely causal.

Now when we conceive meaning as the last interpretation, we replace the idea of an embod ment of a mere bit of potation with the idea of some thing conceived as just like an embodiment of a bit of notation except that performances of writing down numbers flow from it in a way that is somehow bound up with its setting determinate standards for which it in bers, it is correct to write down. So we picture a criterion that still relates to the construction of the apparatus, but mysteriously contrives to a corporate standards for correctness and incorrectness an performances. This is a way

into picturing what one acquires, when one grashs a sense as something that "determines the future use" not causally at any rate not by way of any ordinary causation, but at a quasi-magical way has something in which "in a quasi-way, the use itself is in some sense present" (§195).

This brings out how the confusions Wittgenstein considers in this context in connection with following a rise or acting in the light of an understanding, lead naturally into a version of the idea that phenomena of meaning and understanding involve states and happenings in the mind with the mind conceived as "a queer kind of niedburn" (Blue Book p. 3). This conception of the nund as the mysterious scal or origin of meaningfulness is encouraged in a general way by the thought that words or other signs considered in themselves, are more "dead" solutes or marks (see Blue Book thad). Breathing ale into otherwise dead signs is pict red as an occult feat of which only something as special as the mind could be capable. See §454 on the question how it is that a schematic arrow points in a certain direction. Writigenstein captures a superstitious conception of what makes if the case that the arrow points with the words "a fisicus poens which can be performed only by the soul" (**)

What we now have before its is a particular version of this picture, it is not just that mean lighal signs are conceived as infused with lide by motions in the mind, but also that soccessive performances in the course of say, extending a mamber series reflect a quasi imagical efficacy exerted by a configuration in the same mysterious medium. The occub medium of the build is pictured as the locas of configurations from which performances that manifest understanding flow, in a way that is like the way events flow from states of regular mechanisms or bits of apparatus except that this mach nery its mysteriously capable of placing its output in the normal verlight constituted by the output's being correct or incorrect in the fight of the configuration from which it flows.

Near the start of these reliections of Witigenstein's the conception he is corcerted with shows up in the guise of an idea of "a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain)" (§149) quoted earber? We can now see that that can be at best a provisional attempt at expressing the concept in. Once it is clear that nothing but a configuration in an occult medium could seem

⁶ On the temptation to conceive the initial as the origin of beam ight ness and stray a "queer" or "occult medicity see the open og pages of Batry Strond. Mord Meaning, and Practice" and also his. Witegerstein on Meaning, anderstanding, and Commitmes.

86 Issues in Wittgenstein

to meet the requirements we are tempted to place on a state of understanding the idea that the brain might serve as the locus of the required configurations must surely emerge as unsatisfactory. The brain is no doubt very remarkable, but not in a way that amounts to its being capable of quasi-magical feats ("hocus-pocus").

Go diarb's main focus is on what he calls "the scientific objection". An expression of "the scientific objection" comes when, after failing to find a state that conforms to the requirements we are putting on a state of under standing (or in a related case, the ability to read), we are led to respond on hese lines. "But is: I that only because of our too sight acquaintance with what goes out in the brain and the nervous system?" (§158). And of course it is undertable that Wittgenstein finds: I worthwhile to talkle the inclination to say this. (Though, as Go diarb notes, §158 is the only place in the introductions where Wittgenstein's explicit topic is the idea that knowing more about the brain and the nervous system might help.) But once it is evident that only sometaing occidi could even seem to meet the supposed need. It is car that it would be merely point missing to suppose neuroscience, say might be plwith the difficulty. It does not seem a good idea to centre our according of what Wittgenstein's doing, as Go diarb does, on lending off "the scientific objection".

4 Exclamations like "Now Funderstand" make it look as if understanding s "something that makes its appearance in a moment" (§15), quoted earlier) "50"—Wittgenstein says—"let us try and see what it is that makes its appearance here" (abid.). Predictably, given what we have seen about the requirements we are shaping up to placing on the pictured state of understanding, nothing that turns up in consciousness at the relevant moments—for instance, a formula's occurring to one—seems to be sufficiently peculiar to satisfy our felt need. At this point we fall into conceiving the events we find when we ask ourselves what makes its appearance in consciousness at the relevant mainents—for instance, a formula's occurring to someone—as accompaniments of the understanding. The understanding itself must be hidden belief these episodes in consciousness, still needing to be looked for But when we give this idea a little further thought it stands revealed as a dead end (§153).

^{7.} At Blue Book p. 5. Wittgenstein remarks. "It was in fact just the occur character of the mental process which you needed for your purposes."

how can the process of understanding have been hidden when I said. "Now I understand" because I understood?" And if I say it is hidden—then how do I know what I have to look for? I am in a middle

It is in this predicament that Wittgenstein issues the advice to stop looking for a "mental process" (§154, quoted earlier). Instead, he suggests (bid.)

ask yourself in what sort of case in what kind of circumstances, do we say. "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to the?"

We are to remain ourselves of how these expressions are used. That will disabuse us of the felt need to look for an occurrence in consciousness that such an atterance can be understood to report.

And when he returns to the main line of his reflections after the interpolated discussion of reading (§§156–78), he suggests a positive alternative to supposing that the exclaniations announce the occurrence of a "mental process", the obset of a mental state. He describes a case in which the only thing that occurs in the mind of a person who says "Now I know how to go on", after being shown an initial segment of a number series, is "a feeling of relief", and the person then goes on with the senes. "And in this case too" Wittgenstein says, "we should say—in currain circumstances—that he did know how to go on" (§179). By this point we are on goard against the temptation to say the onset of the understanding is a happening bidden beshind in this case, the leeling of relief. And now he says (§180)

This is how these words are used it would be quite prosesding to this last case for instance to call the words a description of a mental state." —One in ght rather call them a "signal" and we judge whether it was rightly employed by what he goes on to do.

There is something to the same effect in §123 on a context in which Wittgenstein is again discouraging the question "What happens when a man suddenly understands?" (§321)

"Now I know how to go op" is an exclamation it corresponds to an instrictive sound, a glad start

This is a suggested partial account of what we learn to do with forms of words like "Now I understand". It is clearly intended to be as far away as possible from the idea of describing mental states, saving how things are in an inner region of reality.

88

5 But that is not the whose of the story. I shall now consider pairs of Witigenstein's text to which he shows, in effect, how the picture of meaning, understanding, and so forth as definite states of mind can after all be in nocuo. s.

In the last lew pages of Part I of the Imacinations. Witgenstein returns to sell ascriptions of understanding and meaning or intention, and thoughts, wishes, and so forth, but with a new twist in that his pervasive concern is now with saying, for instance, what one meant at some time in the past for §666 he introduces a case in which one is in pain and simultaneously bothered by the sound of a piano being tuned, and one says "It it soon stop". As he says, "It certainty makes quite a difference whether you mean the pain or the piano tuning!" at §682, this set up, including one's saying "It I soon stop" has receded into the past and the question is "Were you thinking of the noise or or your para?" (Or one might ask "Did you mean the noise or the pain?") Parallel questions arise about the ability to say what one was going to say when one has been interrupted in the midst of saying someting (§633 and §6). And at §660 Wingenstein brings into play as requiring parallel treat ment a past terised counterpart to the exclamation "Now I can go on!"

The gram nar of the expression of was then going to say the size ated to that of the expression "I could then have gone on."

 by the one case I remember an intention in the other a remember having understood

Shifting to a retrospect over the relevant occasions already by itself complicates the picture considerably first netive sounds, gaid starts, surely do toot have past tensed forms. There is no past tense counterpart to a sigh of react. The idea of a signal last a cicar contrast to the idea of describing a state of mind, no longer seems appropriate once we take to be of the fact that se fascriptions of understanting and so forth have past tensed forms.

One main the strof Wargenstein's reflections here is in line with the thir ghi expressed at \$154, that we should be focusing on the circumstances in which the words in question are correctly used, rather than looking for an inner happening that we could as it were point to incredent a explain what the words mean. Thus at \$654 he writes, "Out mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a protophenomenes. That is, where we ought to have said this language game is plant?" This echoes, for instance, \$180, quoted carrier, "This is how these words are used." And again at \$655, he writes, "The question is not one of

explaining a language game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game."

Suppose we ask what state or happening in the mind is alluded to by saying "At that point I intended to say such-and-such" or "At that point I understood the series". If we take such a question as a request for something that would explain the language-game of saving such things, it is no good citing one's intention to say such and such or the onset of one's understanding of a series. Invoking such things would just be making moves within the language game—not stepping outside it, as one would need to do in order to explain it.

Now suppose we hold on to that explanatory aspiration, and search the contents of our memories of the relevant proments for something that is not thus ruled out. What we are allowed to find in our mem ones. I we are not allowed to cite the intention uself or the onset of the anderstanding itself is Incapable of discharging the explanatory need. What happens here is terms discent of what happened when we scarched the contents of our consciousness at the relevant moments, in §151 and as sequel, with—as we can new see—a parallel restriction in force. In those earlier passages, the result was a templation to suppose that the state of understanding itself, or its ouset, was something bidden behind the occurrences to waich our attention was restricted by the explanatory aspiration. Here the reschily a temptation to suppose that if one can answer the question what one was going to say when one was a terrupted (to stay with one of Whigenstein's instances). that is because one interprets the tragmentary materials that are all we care suppose memory yie as, if in saying what memory yie is we are restricted. by the explanatory aspiration. The restriction makes it look as if what memory yields is amitted in a way Wittgension describes like this (6635)

"I was going to say ——You remember various details. But not even all of them together show your intention. It is as if a snayshot of a scene had been taken but only a few scattered details of it were to be seen here a hand, there a bit of a face, or a hand, the rest is dark. And now it is as if we know quite certainly what the whole picture represented. As if I could read the darkness.

Hence the temptation to say that knowing what one was good to say must come from interpreting what one finds in one's memory

In those ear ier passages. Witigenstein unmasks as hopeless the picture in which the understanding is hidden behind the fragmentary phenomena.

that are the most one can limit in the way of occurrences in the mind—if the onset of the understanding itself is excluded, on the ground that citing it would not be a contribution to explaining the language game but would metery exploit the language game. What corresponds to that here is that Witigenstein firmly rejects this picture of what memory yields when the time has receded into the past. Thus (§634):

When I continue the interrupted sentence and say that this was how I had been going to continue it. This is like following out a line of thought from brief notes.

Then don't a ordered the notes? Was only one commutation possible in these circumstances? Of charse not, But I shid not charse between interpretations. I remembered that I was going to say this

As he says at \$660 (quoted earlier). "In the one case I remer her an intention, in the other I remember having understood."

"I remember having anderstood" If we stop restricting what we are allowed to find in memory of the past occurrence to something that we could rate to explain from outside the language game that includes "Now I understand" and its past tensed counterpart, we make it possible to acknowledge that what we recall as having happened at the time and tides not just those fragmentary details—having a form, la occur to one and the like—but the onset of the understanding itself. What we are able to remember having happened at the time depends in part on which language games of a sort that find de provis in for past tensed utterances that gave expression to memory, we are competent in Tearning the language game that includes "Now I understand!" and its past tensed counterpart gaves us a new possibility of saying, straight off without needing to interpret what we can recall, how it was with us on suitable past occasions.

And surely in just the same way the present-tensed regions of the language game can be seen as yielding new possibilities of saying, straight off how it is with us on suitable present occasions. When we say what makes its appearance on an occasion when our command of the language game enables us to say "Now I understand!" we are not restricted to occurrences we could conceive as there in our consciousness anyway, independently of our command of the language game, so that we might hope to appeal to their presence in order to explain what it is for moves in the language-game to be correct. It is no more than an exploitation of the language game to say that what makes its appearance in the moment, on these occasions is the understanding itself. What happens is that the understanding sets in

In a discussion of saying what one meant. Wittgenstein engages with how command of the language game makes a difference to what one has it in one to report. In §682, reverting to the case where one is bothered both by pain and by the noise of piano-tuning (§666), he writes

"You said. It is stop soon. Were you thinking of the noise or of year pain?" If he answers "I was thinking of the piano tuning", as he observing that the connexion existed, or is he making it by means of those words?—Can tu say both? If what he said was true didn't the connexion exist. and is he not for all that making one which did not exist?

"Observing that the connexion existed" is not the best choice of words here It is not by observation that one knows what one means or meant Bit this is irrelevant to the point Wittgenstein really wants to make. The point is that one shaving theart say the piano-tuning can be more than a shadow or reflection of one's saying that that is what one meant a connection one effects by saving that No doubt one does make a connection when one says that one meant the plano tuning—if only that the piano tuning becomes what one has said one meant. But Wittgenstein is auxious that the should not seem to exclude the possibility of its being a fact that one meant the piano-tuning, whether one says so or not \$680 goes in part. The trus

*I am thinking of N * *I am speaking of N *

How do Espeak 9 him. Usas, for instance. Thouse go and see 8 today. But sarely that is not enough? After all when I say. No I impair meal warbus people of this name. "Then there may, surely be a Lather different Contexton between my talk and 5. for otherwise I should still not have meant HIM."

Gerta in v such a connexion exists. Only not as you imagine it mainely by means of a merual mechanism.⁶

If what is in one similed when one says "It II stop soon" or when one speaks of someone as imited to items that might be candidates for *explaining* the language-game of saying what or whom one means or meant. Usen when one considers the connection implied by forms of words like "meaning the plano-turning" or "meaning N one will seem to face a choice between supposing the connection is put in place by one's actually saying what one means, or meant on the one hand and picturing it as an actualization of an occult power of the mind to mental mechanism), on the other, But a space

opens between these options when we realize there need be nothing more to the connection's existing than the fact that no the cases we are envisaging, "I meant the piano turning" and "I mean N" are correct moves in a arguage game in which the protagonist of the examples is competent. It can be true in given cases, that they would be correct moves whether or not they are actually made. So if they are correctly made, we can under stand them to report a connection that exists anyway independently of their being made, though not independently of the subject's being competent in the language game in which such moves are made.

This makes from for a much less hard line on the availability in this kind of context of the idea of describing mental states, than is suggested by the passages we were considering before. In §180 (quoted earlier), about "Now Liknow how to go on". Wittgenstein says it would be "misleading" to use the phrase "description of a mental state". Contrast §662, where about a clearly patalies case (though now in the past tensor), he says.

One can now say that the words "I wanted N to come to me" describe the state of my mind at that time, and again one may not say so

One had better not say so if that is going to lead one to picture the described ware of mind as a set up in an occult mechanism. "Not as you magine it maniely by means of a mental mechanism." But it is now clear that we have a different way of picturing the state of mind that we can after all say the words describe. We can see the state of mind of wanting N to come as no more than what is correctly attributed by moves in a language game that we know how to play. And the same goes for the state of mind of understanding the principle of a series.

6 What I am orging may come into sharper focus if I end by briefly detecting it against a certain tendency in the interpretation of Wittgenstein. I shall consider a very explicit expression of the tendency in the writings of David Pears.

Pears starts from a point he puts, the this "According to Wingenstein, the distinction between following a rule and violating it cannot be woolly independent of the difference between the way we find it natural to develop the series and other ways of developing it." That seems, indeptiable

But what Pears makes of the point is not so straightforward. According to Pears, Wittgenstein's thought is that to follow a rule requires, over and above anything one gets also one's mind when one grasps the rule (perhaps at a moment at which one can correctly say "Now I understand?" a "contribution from the rule follower himself" (p. xx). The rule follower's "mental equipment" what he has at the moment when he says "Now I understand!"—gives only "incomplete glidance" as to what he is to do in the future when he reaches a certain point in extending the series (p. xx.). This incomplete guidance needs to be supplemented, in an "unavoidable leap from language to the world" (p. xx.) by the rule-follower's propersity to find it natural to write one number rather than another at the relevant point in the series. Nothing "gentime y contemporary in his mind" (p. xx.) can determine what he should write at some point in the future. "The correct solutions to his future problems cannot possibly be contained in anything that is in his mind now" (p. xx.)."

The thought that Pears's Wittgenstein's here putting in question is that a present understanding, say of the principle of a number series, already determines what number a is going to be correct to write when one gets to a certain point in extending the series. Now if there were no way to persuade oneself that one could make series of that thought except by picturing the current understanding as a set up in an occult mechanism, a config ration in an occult medium, then we ought indeed to have no truck with the thought. Bringing that out is one of Wittgenstein's many picuts. And if this point required us to give up the dea that one's understanding of the principle of a series is itself sufficient to determine what it is correct to do. It would indeed seem that we would have to resort to something on the lines of Pears's account in which what one finds natural serves as a needed supplementation, over and above the only partial guidance provided by what one acquires when one comes to understand the principle of the series.

But to attribute a thought on these lines to Wittgenstein is to miss the character of his objection to the idea of the occult mechanism. To echo Cora Diamond, it is to read his "enticism of anythology or fantasy as if it

¹⁰ For something similar to Pears's reading consider Crispin Wright's claim, in Wisigenstein's behalf, that "there is nothing for an intention conceived as determining subsequent conformaty and note conformaty to a autonomously and independently of its guithor's indgements on the marker to be? "Witigenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention in 146. See my discussion of Wright in "Intentionality and interfority in Witigenstein" especially at pp. 314–21.

were reject on of the mythology as a fals, notion of how thangs are." If we read Wargenstein axe this, it will seem that the supposedly rejected fase out no needs to be replaced with a true one. And then it will seem that the true notion must have something like the shape of the picture Pears attributes to Witigenstein. But in fact Witigenstein has no objection to supposing that what one acquares when one comes to understand the principle of a series—one schema equipment as it stands at that time—aready suffices to determine what it is going to be correct to write when one gets to some point far on in the development of the series. He objects only if we fall to o mythology, and pacture that contemporary mental equipment as a configuration, it the occult medium of the mind.

§195 (partly quoted earlier) is very suggestive in this contex-

Titue, adon't mean that what I do now on grasping a sense idetermines the Lahare use causaats and as a matter of experience but that in a queer way, the use iself is an some sense present. But of course it is in some sense ! Ready the ordy. Dong wrong with what you say is the expression in a queer way. The rest is all right, and the sentence only seems queer wire, one imagines a different language game for it done the one in which we actually use. I

Suppose I say. "The correct solution to my future problems or extending a series) is contained in something that is in no mond now to amely what I acquared when I grasped the relevant sense;". That is a fairly direct negation. of what Pears says Writigenstein holds. But it is surely a good counterpart to "The Inture use is in some sense present in which Wittgenstein, so far from denying it says is tall right. What Wittgenstein says is not at all what Pears says he holds that it cannot possibly be right to say such things. What Willigenstein says is that if we place saying such things in the righlanguage-game, we can see that they are innocuous. Compare §689. equoted earlier. "Certailly such a connexion exists. Only not as you image eit namely by means of a mental mechanism? There is nothing witchight this saying the connection with the person one means exists, just as there is nothing wrong with saying that how to extend the scries is present. in the anderstar doing that sets in at a moment. The problem is only in supposing that these connections have to be queen. This goes completely massing in Pears sifeading, which proceeds as it such columed ons could not but be queer, and hence need to be rejected.

¹¹ The Realistic Spirit, Wittgenstein Philosophy, and the Mind. p. 6.

Of course it is true that what we find natural primitively and what we can be induced to hild natural by being suitably schooled are an essential element in an account of the language-game in particular of how it is viable at all. But the point is not that our propensities to find things natural help out our understanding, which gives only incomplete guidance, when we need to decide what to do. Rather, our propensities to find things natural are partly constitutive of what it is that we ascribe to ourselves when we say exercising our competence in the language game. Now I under stand! And it is no more than taking the language game serior sly to rephrase that like this our propensities to find things natural are partly constitutive of the identity of the definite state that we come to be an when we come to understand the principle of a series—a state that sets in in its entirety at the retevant in oments, and in the light of which it is completely settled what attribute it is correct to write when one reaches a certain point in extending the series.

ESSAY 6

How Not to Read Philosophical Investigations. Brandom's Wittgenstein¹

I In Making It explicit. Robert Brandom appeals to Wittgenstein's discussions of rule following as part of a motivation for his own treatment of conceptual contentfulness.

Brandom traces to kant the idea that concept involving goings-on must be understood to distinctively normative terms. And he credits Wittgenstein with two master arg, ments that relate to this Kantian idea (p. 28)

One of them gives bite to the insistence that conceptual activity is essentially norm-governed. The target of this argument is regularism, which purports to a acritated norm governed activity in terms of mere regularities in performance. Against this, Brandom's Wittgeostein exploits a possibility Brandom calls "gerrymandering" op 28). For any series of performances there are indefinitely many ways it can be seen as going on doing the same thing. Whatever the performer does next at will continue some regularity that characterizes the previous performances. So whatever one does is contect on a conception of correctness determined by some regularity or other Regularism has no resources for selecting one regularity as the one that is supposed to determine correctness. This objectates the very idea of a determinately correct way of going on.

The other argument attacks required which Brandom says is a feature of Kant's conception of normativity. Regulism identifies norms with rules, and it understands rules as discursively explicit. Brandom's Wittgenstein argues that regulism cannot capture what it is for performances to be governed by norms. Rules need to be applied. So "correctnesses of performance are de-

At eat set version of this essay was given at a Witigeostein conference in Belph.

Greece in this 200°. This version has benefited from comments by Bob Brandom, for which as for much else) I am grateful to him.

97

tion of the rule" (p. 20). If this background correctnesses of application of the rule" (p. 20). If this background correctness itself consists in conformity to rules, it is conformity to rules for applying rules. And given that rules need to be applied to suppose that all correctness is conformity to rules is to begin an interminable regress. The rules for applying rules need to be applied in turn and so on without end. Brandom's Wittgenste it concludes that "norms that are explicit in the form of rules presuppose norms implicit in practice" (p. 20)—that norm governedness is not "rules all the way down" (abid.).

More generally. Brandom takes Wittgenstein to show that "the aurins involved in property understanding what is said by rides, or an properly understanding any explicit saying or thinking, must be construed in terms of practice" (p. 30).

2. This last formulation yields a picture in which below the level at which speech can be described by saving which concepts are made explicit in a lit can be described as yillipect to norms specifiable in terms that do not require an understanding of the idea of explicitly expressing this or that concept. The norms at this more biodamental level are propoetics implicit in linguistic practice.

What Brandom attributes to Wittgenstern is the idea that understanding coplect saying and thinking requires a background of a orans ar pacific. I argustic practice. Brandom's own conception goes beyond this to claim that there is nothing to understanding the normativity toat is constitutive of explicit saying and thinking over and above making those implies a preprieties explicit. For Brandom norms implicit in practice are not just a necessary background for norms explicit as expressed concepts, but constitutive of them. So making implicit proprieties explicit emerges as the central topic for the philosophy of language and the philosophy of thought.

We can bracket this divergence and still identify a way in which Brandon avowedly goes beyond. Wittgenstein as Brandom reads him. Brandom's Wittgenstein argues against regulism in a way that notices the quest in what it is for norms to be implied in practices. Brandom acknowledges of course that Wittgenstein does not address that question. He says "Wittgenstein the principled theoretical quietist does not attempt to provide a theory of practices, nor would be endorse the project of doing so" (p. 29). Brandom himself, however, does offer a theory of norms implied in practice in general, and an account of the impact proprieties that govern to guistic

practice in particular. The suggestion is that this discharges a philosophical need brought into view by Wittgenstein's regress argument, though Wittgenstein's "quietism" prevents him from doing the work himself. And this suggestion does not depend on treating norms impact in practice as more than a necessary background for norms explicit as expressed concepts.

It ank it is open to question whether Brandom's story works on its own terms. But that is not my topic in this essay. Here I want to object to Brandom's exploitation of Witigenstein to motivate these moves, which turns on representing their as further steps in a direction Witigenstein starts in I shall argue that Witigenstein does not even start in the direction of the sort of theory Brandom offers. There is no reason to suppose there must be a level of normalisty be ow the level at which linguistic practice is described in terms of explicitly using this or that concept, and it is no concern of Witigenstein's to suggest that there is Brandom gives his philosophy an illusory cachet by the ming that Witigenstein's thinking about rules opens into it.

It is true that Brandom's master arguments—in particular the regress at gament, which is what is supposed to point to implicit proprieties to be made explicit, can be framed so as to sound roughly Wingensteinad. But that is quite misleading. In Brandom's reading "quietism" is a pretext for not doing constructive work that Wottgenstein reveals as obligatory for others not constrained by his scruples. Though Brandom cally to "prandipled" "quaet sur" so understood looks like an excuse for lazaness. In hink this is a paradigm of how not to read Wittgenstein. And I hope contrasting Brandom's Wittgenstein with Wittgenstein himself will help bring into focus what Wittgenstein is actually doing in his documents of rate following.

3 In an Appendix on "Wittgenstein's Use of Rigid" (pp. 64-6). Brandom distinguishes three ways in which he says Wittgenstein uses the concept of a rule. The first is the use that figures in regulism, according to which a rule is an explicit statement of what is to be done. The second identifies as a rule "whateverig" ides or is consulted by those whose behavior is being assessed, whether or not it is discussively or conceptually articulated" (p. 64). Here rules, or expressions of rules, and ude sign posts, colour tables, and the like In the third use, behaviour counts as mile following if observers subject it to normative assessment, even if it is not undertaken in the light of a conception of what is to be done.

This third conception of rules is not relevant to Witigenstein's regress argument as Brandom understands it. The first two are because and ke the

third they are specifications of the Kantian idea that norm governed action is undertaken in accordance with a *conception* of a norm (p. 30), and as Brandom reads the argument, it shows that regularing is not an acceptable way to spell our that idea.²

To tell against regulasm, the regress argument would need to single out the first of these conceptions of rules. In fact Wittgenstein formulates his regress argument in terms of the second, with expressions of rules including sign-posts. Amazingly enough, this does not deflect Brandom from his account of what Wittgenstein is aiming at the reads it as mere ineptitude on Wittgenstein's part. He says "It should be admitted that Wittgenstein's fer minology it some ways obscures the very point be is after in the regress-of rules argument" (p. 64). But sign posts are a perfectly good case for the point Wittgenstein is after. His practice with the concept of a rule, which Brandom treats as lax, simply shows that the aim of his argument is not to attack regulasm in Brandom's sense. Not that he would accept regulasm in Brandom's sense it is simply irrelevant to what he is doing in his reflections about rule-following.

Witigensiem uses "following a rule" as a gloss on the idea of acting in the light of a conception of correctness. Following a sign-post serves for him—perfectly reasonably—as a case of acting in the light of a concept on of correctness, acting on an understanding of something. Its concern is to free its from a conceptual bind we can easily tall into when we think about acting on an understanding. The thirdat which takes shape as a regress is completely general it does not anso only where what is understood is discursively explicit.

Consider *Philosophical Investigations* §85. "A rule stands there like a significant for "a rule" here, we might substitute "an expression of a rule" in a sense that fits the second of Brandom's three likes a sense in which expressions of rules need not be discursive. For example, we might say "A

² Brandom cites, as exemptalying the third use Philosophical Investigation §54 where Wingenstein speaks of rules that 'an observer can read — off a nor the practice of the game—like a natural law governing the play—But this seems writing. Brandom does not notice Wingenstein's allusion in this context to the behaviour characteristic of correcting a stip of the longue. That makes it clear that what the observer reads off from the practice of the game is a conception of correctness in the light of which the players do what they do. This case is in the scope of the Kannan idea. I doubt that the third use is as prevaien—in Philosophical Investigations as Brandom suggests. But it is the first two uses that matter for my present purposes.

sign post an expression of a rule for following a trail -stands there like a sign post. He would it be wrong to say a sign post stands there like a sign-post? Well the formulation is dangerous because "stands there" suggests a concept or according to which the rule or its expression considered in itself is normatively ment it stands aloof from those who encounter it a mere arrangement of matter not something that as it were speaks to people, telling them which way to go.

That threatens the idea that a sign post points the way to go. One oright hope to preserve the idea of a right way to go-even while conceiving a sign post as something that stands there imute and a oil. By supposing that what tells people which way to go is not a sign-post considered in itse for but a sign post under an interpretation. A sign post under an interpretation sorts responses into those that are correct in the light of 9 and those that are not. But now whatever made it seem right to say a sign post stands there. mute and a soft will equally make it seem og'it to say of anything one might want to conceive as an expression of the interpretation that for a mosment (compare P) §201) seems to get normativity back into the picture, that if stands there like a sign post of consider for histance a positing gesture, or an itterance of the words "Go to the right" i The thing that was supposed to be an express on clain interpretation lapses is to normative, nertness just as the thing that was originally supposed to test us which way to go did. And if we suppose we can recover a nernative sorting by considering the thing that was supposed to be an expression of an interpretation under at interprecation in its turn, we are obviously starting on an infinite regress.

That is Wittgenste it is regress. The temptation to start on it and its disastricus consequences are the same whether we are considering non-discursive expressions of rules such as sign posts or discursive expressions, such as—for the same rule—someone saving "To follow the trail at this point you must go to the right". Regulishin it Brandom's sense is no their here nor there.

4. What do we learn from this regress?

We learn that it is disastrous to suppose there is always a concept, all gap between an expression of a rule and performances that are up for assessment according to whether or not they conform to the rule algapithal is made vivid by saying the expression of the rule stands there on the constitual, have siggested. We must not acquiesce in the idea that an expression of a rule considered in itself, does not sort behaviour, not perfor-

101

mances that follow the rule and performances that do not. Once we start thinking like that, it can seem for a moment that an interpretation can bridge the gap—that adding an interpretation can yield something, the expression of the rule under an interpretation, that does effect the required normative sorting of behaviour. But only for a moment, until we realize that the same thought will be just as plausible about whatever we try to conceive as an expression of the interpretation. If we let the gap open at all it will be unbridgeable. This way, we lose our grip on the idea of an expression of a rule, or an expression of an interpretation, to the end we lose our grip on the idea of an expression of anything.

In a lamous passage. Philosophical Investigations §201). Wittgenstein p. is the lesson of his regress like this. (What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call looeying the rule, and going against it in actual cases.) To paraphrase, we must not suppose that say, a sign post can tell someone which way to go only under an interpretation. We must misst on not being deprived of the thought that a sign post itself points the way, tells people which way to go.

Of course not everyone who encounters a sign post gets told which way to go. Sign-posts do not speak to those who are not party to the relevant conventions. Perhaps Mart ans use things that look like our sign posts to point an the opposite directions. If that is so our sign posts would not point the way to Martians. To be capable of being told what to do by a sign-post one needs to have been antiated into an appropriate practice. One needs to have learned for instance, that one is to go to the right when in following a footpath, one comes across a sign post of a certain familiar configuration. Going to the right in such a situation on the part of some one who is party to the relevant practice, would be an example of "what we call obeying the rule in action cases". It would maintest an understanding a grasp, of the rule—the rule for following a lootpath that the sign post expresses—that is not an interpretation. It would reflect the fact that the subject is such that the sign-post itself, not the sign post under an interpretation, to is her which way to go."

³ It is reported titlat these temarks are about someone who is party to the practice someone who understands sign posts. What is, a question is not a more incomprehending disposition to react to what are in fact sign posts in appropriate, ways See Philosophical Investigations § 298.

5 Brandom quotes §201 as if it supported his idea that Wittgenstein is altacking regul sm (p. 21). But the passage does not say what Brandom would like it to say. It does not say the regress stops at a level below that at which correctness consists in following rules. The idea of a way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation functions at a level at which correctness is still conformity to rules. According to Wittgenstein, the regress shows there must be cases of following rules that are not cases of acting on interpretations. The regress is inescapable if we suppose "acting on an interpretation" always fits where "following a rule" fits. Or "externif we suppose what makes it look as if that must be right—that in any case of rule following, what we follow is in itself, normatively inert, some thing that stands, here the a sign post on the dangerous understanding of that description."

Brandom unplies that the moral of §201 is this. The rule says how to do one thing correctly only on the assumption that one can do somethilig else correctly namely apply the tule" (p. 21). Here he is invoking the two kinds of correctness that figure in his regress argument against regulish. Correctness that can be understood as conform ty to rules, and the background correctness that on pain of regress cannot. But §201 envisages only one kind of correctness. Its point is not that correctness that consists in following a rule presupposes another kind of correctness. Its point is that we must avoid a tegress generating misconception of the one kind of correctness it considers. To owing a rule, sa misconception according to which following a rule is always acting on an interpretation of something

This fits a claim I made earlier, that for Wittgenstein Hollowing a rule" serves as a gloss on the idea of acting in accordance with a concept on of correctness. Nothing in this pivota, text, or—so far as I know—anywhere tise in Wittgenstein's discussions of the topic warrants Brandom's view that for Wittgenstein pormativity is not "rules ali the way down". In fact, in Remarks in the Foundations of Mathematics (VI-28). Wittgenstein says "Following according to the rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language game", and it seems a good paraphrase of that to say the normativity of Englistic practice is precisely rules all the way down.

Brandom is equipped to set aside these points about the texts by appealing to his claim that Wittgenstein's use of "rule" is lax. For Brandom's Wittgenstein normativity is rules all the way down in the sense that it is proprieties, not necessarily explicit all the way down. But the point Wittgelister is supposedly after is that what is fundamental is proprieties.

that are implicit in practice, not explicit in rules in the sense in which regularm understands rules.

However, the texts afford no just fication for discounting Witigenstein's own wording in this way. The thrust of his regress argument is not that what is fundamental is norms implicit in practice, but that what is fundamental is not mediately on an understanding, to act in a way that is not mediated by an interpretation of what is understood. As I have stressed, his point applies in the same way whether or not what is understood and acted on is something discursively expact. For Witigenstein's purposes here, the difference between discursive and non-discursive expressions of rules has no particular significance. Witigenstein's regress has no particular connection with regions in Brandoon's sense.

It is not that Brandom's argument against registion is a special case of Wingenstein's regress argument. That would involve accepting that Winge 1stein argues for two levels of normativity, one at which norms are expressed. and one at which they are note supplied in practice. The stea would be that Brandom's reading goes wrong only in restricting the first level to one at which norms are discursively expressed, whereas the argument also appares where norms are non-discursively expressed, as in the case of sign posts. B at Wittgens ein's arguirient does not add another level of nermanity. Wittgenstears regress shows that acting on an understanding cannot ingeneral acting on an interpretation of what is understood. Wien-Wittgenstein's regress is applied in the case of norms that are discutsively explicit its moral is not that that normal vity presigposes normativity inphen in practice, but that there must be such a thoug as a capacity to act inmediately on an understanding of that normalis is. Brandom's argume it is not even as close to Wittgenstein's as a special case of it would be it is simply different.

6 Brandom's Witagenstein addresses a question with no partien ar context-about what it is for behaviour to be norm; governed. He considers a particular answer regulism, and rejects at its favour of the thesis, supposedly.

⁴ That is why I have had no quartes in speaking of sign posts as reiling one what to be There is an extra layer of metaphor here, over and above what would be involved to speaking of a board assembed "Co to the right" as to sog one what is do. (There would be not inetaphor on speaking of someone who says "Go to the right" as it long one what to do.) But Worgenstein's argonicous indifferent to it's difference.

established by the regress argument, that "the fundamental form of norm" (p. 2.) is norms implicit in practice. At this point the concern to give an account of normativity as such would seem to require an account of what it is for norms to be implicit in practice. But here "quiensm" supposedly kicks in and Brandom has to do the constructive work necessary to Firish the job merely began by Witgenstein's rejection of regulism. As I noted Brandom says Wittgenstein's "quietism" is principled but in this picture it should seem mysterious what its principle might be. As Brandom reaks him. Wittgenstein shows a need for some constructive philosophy but pleads "quietism" as a pretext for leaving the job of providing it to others.

On the reading I have outlined, it is easy to see how it can be simply right. I lat the regress argument does not call for constructive philosophy. And this puls Wittgenstein's "quaetism" (so called) in a different light. Wittgenstein is not trying to give an account of norm governedness as such for its own sake and independently of any specific difficulty about it. He is not trying to supply a theory of norm governedness to replace regulism. He uncovers a conception that can make acting in the light of a cinception of correctness, acting on an understanding, seem mysterious, and he exposes it as a in sconcept in. That dispers the appearance of mysters, and there is nothing further that philosophy needs to do in this connection."

If we conceive say sign posts as in themselves normatively forth so that only under an interpretation could a sign post tell anyone which way to go we lose our hold on the very idea that sign posts can be understood and followed. To avoid this, we need to retrieve a bit of common sense, that people who are party to the relevant practice are told what direction to go in by sign posts themselves, not by sign posts under an interpretation. If there is more work to be dene at is to obsen the grip of the concept on according to which an expression of a rule, for instance a sign post is in itself, normally well ment. To do that, we need to administer what Witgenstein calls free menders." (Philosophical Investigations, §127), not put forward philosophical theses. Theorizing about callerent levels at which practices can be seen as norm-governed would be beside the point.

Witgenstein's invocations of practice in this context serve not as openings into a theoretical pragmatism, but as reminders for this therapeutic

^{5.} Contrast how Brandom, pp. anil savi talks as if normatively is invitenous anyway independently of any particular reason why it should be so that there is a standing philosophical obligation to tender it less so which he undertakes in his book.

purpose. We fall into the bind that concerns him if we abstract sign posts (for instance) from their place in the lives of those who use them. For someone who is party to the relevant practice, a sign post is something that points the way. And that is what a sign-post as such is. It is true that for someone who is not party to the practice, an object that is a sign-post might be merely a board of a certain configuration affixed to a post. But it is disastrous to conclude that what points the way, to someone to whom a sign post does point the way, is such a thing—a board on a post—under an interpretation. On the contrary, what points the way is a sign-post something that is what it is by virtue of its involvement in the relevant practice. And it points the way, to those who are party to the practice, without their needing to put an interpretation on it.

Of course the practice with sign posts is essentially norm involving Going to the right, for instance, is what accords with-what is correct in the light of-sign-posts of a certain configuration. Brandom seizes on this normativity, and takes Wittgenstein's appeals to practice to reveal a concern with a theoretical question what it is for behaviour to be acringoverned Pleading "quietism". Brandom's Witgenstein goes no firther. with this concern than a gesture in the direction of the idea of norms linpBcit in practice. Properly executing the philosophucal task Wittgenstein. supposedly reveals would require a theory about that supposedly fundamenta, level of normativity. But for the actual Writigenstein's porpose incin the is needed than the advice that when we reflect about the capacity of sign-posts to sort behaviour into what accords with them and what does not, we should avoid abstracting the objects themselves from what we do with them. To follow this advice, we need only to remind ourseives of obvious facts about what we do with sign posts. We do not need a theory of normativity

It would reveal a misunderstanding if someone complained here that this makes Wittgenstein uninteresting, because there is nothing surprising or controversial in saying that sign posts or meaningful items in general, need to be conceived in terms of what we do with them. That it is not controversial is just the point. (See Philosophica Investigations §128, "If one tried to advance theses at philosophical investigations §128, "If one tried to advance theses at philosophic it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.") Whitgenstein does not amass philosophical doctrine, or point to areas where it would be a good thing for others to do that, through "quietism" debars him from doing so the uncovers tendencies to forgetfulness, which lead to trouble when we

engage in philosophical reflection, but which can be counteracted by suitable reminders of the obvious

7 If one is wedded to the idea that starts the regress—the idea that a sign post, say, can point the way only under an interpretation, it can be tempting to disarm the threat on these lines. "Admittedly, any expression of the interpretation that I want to credit with bridging the gap will just as appropriately be said to stand there like a sign post, and appealing to such a hing will be elercly taking the first step in an admitteregress. But invitically hat what bridges the gap is the outerpretation uself—not the express on but what the expression expresses. That does not need the repreting before it can tell us what to do. The regress terminates here."

In The Blue Book op 34). Writgenstein puts this thought like this "What one wants to say is fivery sign is capable of interpretation, but the meaning musting occapable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation." If we start with the idea that expressions of rules stand there in the dangerous sense we fall into a regress of this gs that momentarily look as if they bridge the gap but they are toyed of as needly genterpretation in their torus of toat the gap is after all not bridged. The thought is that area large stop the regress. Meanings do not need interpretation.

No doubt, it some contexts, this correct to say that the meaning of an expression of a rule -which will be the same as the meaning of an expression of an interpretation of a of the interpretation is a good one-does not need interpretation. But here the point of saving that is to make it safe to suppose say that a vign post points the way only under an interpretation. The meaning is construed as an interpretation, but one ammine to what dashes the hope that a regular superpretation will budge the gap—the realization. that we have merely shalled our attention to something that, on the principles to at regioned the shift, could itself tell us which way to go only underan incorpretation. This picture of meaning as the last interpretation is the germ of the imagery—a familiar target in Wittgenstein's later work—inwhich inderstancing a meaning is gearing oneself in to a super-rigid mechanism that keeps one's meaning a volving behaviour in The 5 The right thing to say is that a sign post does not need interpretation either. Ther we shall not be resupted to this mythology of meaning. We cannot make it all right to say an expression of a rule does not tell us what to do by

^{6.} See ary discussion at Wangenstein in Following a Rule" at pp. 230-2.

107

saying its meaning does. An expression of a rule does tell us—those will understand it—what to do

Brandom (pp. 13-15) treats. Wittgenstem's engagements with this mythology of meaning as reaffirming Frege's attacks on psychologism. He treats the imagery of super rigid mechanisms as a version of the psychologism that is Frege's target-a reflection of not realizing that to make serise of acting in the light of meanings we need to be thinking in normative as opposed to, say brutely causal terms. But this is exactly wrong, The point of appealing to interpretation in the move that starts the regress, is precisely to preserve the normative distinction between behaviour that accords with a rule and behaviour that does not leven white we are conceiving the expression of the rule as in itself normatively mert. The though, is that atthough considered in itself a sign post, say, does not distinguish correct from accorrect behaviour, the sign post under an interpretation does. What the regressactually shows is that this attempt to keep normanying in the pict ire, by appealing to the idea of a terpretation, does not work. The idea of meaning as the last interpretation, and the imagery that grows out of it are wriging from one in a desperate attempt to avoid that conclusions an attempt to keep normativity in the picture, as the idea of interpretation seemed to do, every in the context of seeing sign posts, and expressions of incaping in general. as normatively mert. If one is tempted by the imagery of super-rigidity, it is because one is on the anti-psychologistic side of Frege's divide

Brandom is in general too ready to find restatements of Frege's attacks on psychologism in this region of Wittgenstein's thatking. The supposed gerry mandering argument against regularism is part of this tendency. In fact the relevant material in Wittgenstein's texts belongs with the regress of interpretations, which Brandom sees as a different master argument with a different target. We start by supposing an expression of a rule could tell its what is do. only under an interpretation. Then we realize that any expression of the inlemmetation that for a moment seemed to bridge the gap would use I on the same principles, stand in need of interpretation before it could bridge the gap. Gerrymandered interpretations, interpretations that would bridge the gap otherwise than as we intended make it vivid that on these lines the gap. cannot be bridged at al. This is a way of capturing the point of the regress argament, which is what Brandom misreads as an attack on regulism. The gerrymandered formulations (say "Add 2 until you get to 1000, then add 4 * see Philosophical Investigations \$185) are not descriptions of different mere regularities that can be found in rule conferring behaviour.

so far but different interpretations of the norm it conforms to which are five candidates to be the norm it conforms to on the assumption that the expression of the rule itself (say "Add 2" or an initial segment of the series) does not tell one what to do. There is only one master argument. And a is not an attack on regulism not a pointer to a supposedly fundamental level of normativity but an enforcement of the point that whether or not what is an derstood is discursively expressed it must be possible to act on an under standing immediately not in a way that is mediated by an interpretation

Of course in refusing to read passages that exploit gerrymandering as arguing against regularism. I am not suggesting that Wittgenstein would have any sympathy with regularism. The point is that in his reflections on rule-following he presupposes, rather than argues for the "Etegean" point that he concept of acting on an understanding involves the concept of correctness and incorrectness. What he does argue is that this required normal vity cannot be captured by myoking the idea of interpretation.

8. I have been orging that Wittgenstein's regress argument does not point to a fundamental level of normativity, norms implicit in practice which it in ght take work on the part of philosophers to uncover and make explicit even if the philosophers are comprehending participants in the practice in question. Consider linguistic practice in participant. Concepts are as the Kant an conception, rules for judging. After the linguistic turn, we can say they are rules for making daims. The contents of these rules for judging and claiming are explicit in speech acts, for instance, in saying that something is a cat. The core at least of the norm that governs the concept of a cat, is that it is a linguit at least so far as truth is concerned, to say or think something is a cat, ust, in case it is a cat. Making that norm explicit is no problem for anyone who understands the word feat. Wittgenstein says nothing to sag gest that speech, and thought are subject to norms, describable be ow the level at which we simply say what concepts are employed.

It does not help to bracket my claim that what Brandom credits to Wit genstein is not Wittgenstein's argument. There is no convincing argument for Brandom's picture in what he purports to find in Wittgenstein, whether it is in Wittgenstein or not.

Brandom's argument against regulism tutus on this claim. "For any particular performance and any rule, there will be ways of applying the fulle so as to lorbid the performance, and ways of applying it so as to permit of require it" (p. 20). But this seems simply wrong, Suppose we found ourselves shaping up to thinking someone who was plainly in the presence of a cat, and not confused, haducinating, or whatever, thought the rule for judging that constitutes the concept of a cat was to be applied here and now so as to forbid judging this is a cat. That would not be recognizable as a way of applying that rule. It would just force us to reconsider the belief that it was that concept—that rule for judging—that was being applied.

In fact Brandom's formulation seems to be merely a version of the paradox generating thought that Wittgenstein argues we must avoid the thought that any rule confronts attempted conformity to it across a gap, which needs to be bridged by a substantive act of application. Brandom's "applying" is a mere variant on "interpreting" in the way of thinking that Wittgenstein so far from making it the basis of an argument against regulism—displays as a disastrons misconception.

9 Brandom says "Rules do not apply themselves" (p. 20). This might be a way of saying the idea of a rule telling someone what to do presupposes that the person can understand the rule, which requires familiarity with a practice. A rule that applied itself would be a rule that guaranteed us own intelligibility, independently of conditions on its addressees—as if words, say could be understood without anyone's needing to tearn a language. Of course that is a fantasy

To say it is a lantasy is not to say correctness that consists in following a rule presupposes correctness that does not. That is how Brandom glosses the remark that rules do not apply themselves. To quote again a passage I quoted before. "The rule says how to do one thing correctly only on the assumption that one can do something else correctly mainely apply the rule" (p. 21). But there is no warrant for this picture of two correctnesses. A rule says how to do something correctly only to someone who understands its expression. She has to be a competent participant in the relevant practice. That is not to say she has to be able to do something else, besides follow the rule, in order to have the rule tell her what to do. The only correctness we need to consider is correctness that consists in following the rule.

The fantasy of rules that suffice of themselves for their own intelligiblity might be described as a fantasy of explicitness. If one is gripped by this conception of what it would be for a rule to be explicit it can seem a deficiency that human means of giving expression to rules make themselves understood only to audiences who satisfy particular cood nois. having learned a language having mastered a practice. This fantastic conception of explicit ess

fits some of the turns in Watgenstein's treatment of the pathologies we fall into in thanking about rule following: consider for instance the image of stopping up all the cracks (*Philosophical bivesugations* §84). But this is not how explicitness figures in Brandom's reading. His regulation avolves explicitness ordinarily understood.

No ride applies itself in this supposed sense to some cases knowing what a rule tells one to do requires discretion or judgment in other cases it is routine. A ternatively two could rework the idea of judgment so that to say following a rule requires judgment is rost another way to say rules do not apply them selves if we use the term this way, we have to say the exercise of judgment can be rotatine, though in other cases people who understand a rule can be better or worse at following it because their judgment is better or worse.

Here we may be remarded of a passage where Kant finds a regress to the deal (lat determining hew to follow a rule is following another rille, and invokes judginent to avoid the regress. Brandom mentions Kant's regress argument "parenthetical v" in an endinore (p. 657). He acknowledges, hat it taises a question about his taking, Widgenstein's regress to correct a Kantian conception. But he nevertheless frames his main text in terms of title fessor Witigenstein has to reach Kanti" on the ground that "very infects made of the point of the regress argument) in the first two Critiques". I think his alea is that to make much of the point would be to do what he does—to offer theory about a tever of normal vity below that at which correctness can be conceived as conformaty to rules. In fact nothing is done in that direction in Witigenstein's texts either (this is the absence Brandom attributes to "qui etism" and that puts Brandom's idea of a lessor from Witigenstein to Kaal on a shaky footing, even given Brandom's account of Witigenstein to Kaal on a shaky footing, even given Brandom's account of Witigenstein.

Anyway. I have been urging that Wittgeostein's regress does not direct our aftent on to another lever of normativity, and I think the same goes for Kant's. Brandom's picture must be that exercising judgment is Kant's candidate for the other archity supposedly presupposed by the amaty to follow rules. But even where the need for judgment is substantial—where it is not routine to know what a rule requires of one here and now lat is surely wrong to conceive the exercise of judgment as subject to a further norm over and above the norm specified by the rule. Judgment as to what a rule requires is better or write according to how well its results accord with what the rule requires. The only relevant norm is the one prescribed by the

rule. A need for non-routine judgment in following a rule shows something about the character of the norm prescribed by the rule. It does not point us to another norm that governs exercises of judgment. It would be absurd to suggest that in this kind of case we could make explicit some supposedly separate norms governing the exercise of discretion, thereby codifying prescriptions for judgment. Judgment in the relevant sense is essentially un codifiable. Kant's regress does not go well with Brandom's controlling theme of making previously implicit norms explicit.

10. Brandom represents his work as emerging from a reading of a tradition whose key ligares are Kant-Frege, and Watgenstein ep. xo. Of course there as precedent for a philosopher's rereading his predecessors to as to depict his own work as the cummation of their efforts. And the scope of Brandom's enter prise and the confidence with which he executes it cannot but be impressive. I think there is a danger that it will give currency to a travesty of his predecessors—for present purposes. Wittgenstein in particular, Brandom acknowledges that his ancestor portraits take unorsual angles on their subjects (p. xor). But the figure who can be seen in firandom's portrait abelled "Wittgenstein" is not Wittgenstein from an odd angre, but someone elses a philosopher, not very it signification these topics, of Brandom's own asyention."

8 Perhaps Brandom's Winguistern is closer to Sollars, see pp. 23 to where Brandom ches allege assumers against reguls or from Sollars's Solite Reflections on Language Games'. So says argument assumes without discussion that the rule for the use of a word would have to be something the could consult to or for to find its thow to use the word so rules such as 'It is regularize to call red though red if are excluded from the start. The effect is that something like Brandom's required parternings of behaviour describable below the level of specifying what concepts are no play, are presupposed at the very beginning if Sollars's argument, not argued for in it.

Sellars's regress argument pagethy diverges from Wildgens eins, to that it is supposed to require going to a level at which behavior it is produced because if its place in a patient, but without the agent envisaging the patient and acting so as to realize it into them, a level at which behaviour is animated by a grasp of a role, as in Wit pensions 14 way if grasping a rule that is not an interpretation."

Seilars a argument may not be as congenial to Brandon as Brandon supposes. Se ars magaries a philosopher casted "Metaphysics." who construes the norths that governanguistic practice as "entities of which their indican take account belong it is able to give them a verbal cooling" (p. 323). Sellars mentions this conception only to discuss at Brandom's revisition of norms implied in practice prior to their explicitation seems to ado a pragmatist variant of this conception to the nominalist and conceptinalist versions Settars considers.

PART III

Issues in Davidson

Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism

I Donald Davidson has credited scheme-content dualism with an anjor-tant role in setting the agenda of modern philosophy. To a large extent this picture of mind and its place in nature has defined the problems modern philosophy has thought it had to solve "That means that to deconstruct the dualism, as Davidson has undertaken to do in a mumber of writings, is potentially to transform philosophy's conception of itself. If we can rid our selves of the dualism, we shall no longer think we have those problems—which is not the same as taking ourselves to have solved them.

I think Davidson is proloundly right in attaching this kind of significance to scheme-content dualism. But in what follows I want to suggest, with help from his own writings, that his diagnosis of the dialism's hold on modern thinking does not quite go to the roots, and hence that his recipe for a transformation of philosophy is not quite the one we need

2. What is the dualism of scheme and content?

I take it that the parties to the dualism are supposed to determ ne the significance of say bodies of benef or theories. The picture can be encapsulated in the familiar Kantian tag. "Thoughts without content are empty into litions without concepts are band." So "scheme" is more tully "conceptual scheme" and "content" is more explicitly "smumons" or sensory littake. The idea is that beliefs or theories are significant, non-empty because of an interaction between the conceptual and the sensory. (Perhaps we should say "empirical beliefs or theories", but it is a central Kantian thesis that this would not be to add anything.)

I "The Myth of the Subjective" p. 161

^{2.} Critique of Piere Reason. A51 B75

Now "dualism" as a term of philosophical cribeism amplies more than just duality. In a dualism of scheme and content, the two plutative determinants of significance are initially separated so far from each other that it becomes a problem how they can come together in the interaction that is supposed to yield significance.

Thus on the scheme side of the dualism concepts are supposed to come anto view in abstraction from any connection with the deliverances of the senses. So considered employments of concepts would indeed be empty just as the Kannan tag says. If we conceive a subject significant in this way, we do not yet have in view anything we conceive on the confideration of determinate stands or communicants as to how things are in the world. (We could say "the emptrical world", but with the same doubt about whether that would be to add anything.)

Similarly on the content side of the disasin sensory intake is supposed to come into view in abstraction from ("without") concepts. And so considered, sensory intake would indeed be blind, just as the Kantian tag says.

If abstracting it from content waves a scheme empty, what can be the point of identifying this side of the dualism as the conceptual? It is not a rotatine idea that concepts and their exercises, considered in themselves, are empty, and it is not obvious why it should seem that we can abstract them away from what makes the embracing of be tels or theories non-empty but still have concepts and their exercises—what they essentially are—in view

In the dealism, the relation between scheme and content is evidently a case of the relation between form and matter. So we can put the question like his, why should iscentingly to equate the formal with the conceptual, given that we are using the idea of form in such a way that form without matter is emply? We can find an answer of this question in two thoughts. First, that the trikages between concepts that constitute the shape, so to speak of a conceptual scheme are binkages that pertain to what is a reason for what Second, that if matter in this application of the form-matter contrast, is supplied by the deliverances of the senses, then the structure of reason must be on the other side of the matter form contrast, and hence the structure of the formal reason is set over against the senses. No doubt exercises of concepts, as we ordinarily conceive them, are not empty since they a ready incorporate content as well as scheme. But if we can see how those two thoughts might be attractive, we can see how it might seem that the conceptual comes into view in a pure form only if we strip content away.

I think the first of those two thoughts, which connects the idea of a conceptual scheme with the idea of reason, need be no more than a determination of the relevant idea of the conceptual. (By use)f without the second thought, this is unnocent of the dualism.) The second thought in which reason is kept pure of contamination by the mere matter yielded by the deliverances of the senses, is more problematic, and I shall return to it. Mean while, perhaps that rephrasing can begin to make a intelligible how the thought could be attractive, and so how one might be induced to take in one's sinde the surprising idea that the conceptual considered in itself is devoid of empirical content.)

3. Why is this dual sm of scheme and content a surable case for deconsiturcion? There are no doubt several things one could say on response to this question, but I shall focus on one glaring problem.

Considered by themselves, employments of elements of a scheme exercises of a conception repertoire—are empty, they are not yet recogn rable as cases of adopting commitments concerning how things are in the world. If we take in only this one side of the dualism, we have not yet enttied ourselves to the idea that employments of concepts are determinately answerable to how things are. We do not yet have the resources to see moves within a scheme as open to favourable assessment. It hings are a certain way and unfavourable assessment otherwise.

Now the other side of the duality is supposed to supply this missing requirement, to crititle as to the idea that a move within a scheme is determinately answerable to the world, and so intelligible as the adoption of a stand about the world. A move within a scheme is answerable to the deliverances of the senses ("the tribunal of experience" in W. V. Quine's phrase) that is supposed to supply the massing requirement, because being answerable to the tribunal of experience is being answerable to the facts that impress themselves on the senses.

But the duausm reflects the idea that the linkages recognized by reason are the linkages that constitute the organization of schemes, and it places the deliverances of the senses outside schemes. And that makes it mechanism

³ If would miss the point to protest that the connection of reason with form limits rational connections to those that would be exploited in inferences whose excellence is awed to their instead form. That is not the application of the concept of form that is to play here.

^{4.} W. Y. Quine, "Two Doginas of Empiricism", p. 41.

1.8 Issues in Davidson

to suppose that sensory intake on this conception, can mediate answerability to the world. If rational relations hold exclusively between elements of schemes of cannot be the case that what it is for something within a scheme to be rationally in good shape, and so worthy of credence is its being related in a certain way to something outside the scheme. "Intuitions without concepts are blind." Kant said. But for present purposes, a more suggestive metaphor for the point would be that intuitions without concepts are mute. They cannot intelligibly constitute a tribunal, something calpable of passing favourable verdicts on some exercises of concepts and unfavourable verdicts on others.

4. Davidson has identified the dualism of scheme and content as "the third dogma of corpir cism", and accordingly he has suggested that when we about on the qualism as we must we are thereby discarding the last vestige of empiricism. By "empiricism" here, he means the thesis that the deliverances of the senses are epistemiologically significant, they stand in relations of ustification or warrant to world views or theories. He writes

Empiricism like other sms, we can define pretty much as we please but I take it to involve not only the paibliclaim that all knowledge or the world comes through the agency of the senses, but also the convictivithat this fact is of prime epistemological significance. The paid did deal merely recognizes the obvious causal tole of the senses in mediating between objects and events in the world and our thoughts and talk about them, empiricism tocates the altimate evidence for those thoughts at this intermediate step.6

This crediting of epistemological significance to sensory intake is exactly what I have represented the dualism as wanting but by the way. I places to among outside the demain of rational lankages, making unavailable.

Suppose we want to go eithe deliverances of the senses an ultimate evidential role. Are we thereby committed to the dualism, with its conception of the deliverances of the senses as "intuitions without concepts"? If that is so, then empiricism in the non-pallid sense Davidson distinguishes

- On the Very Idea of a concept ia Scheme. The allusion is of course to Quine's.
 "Two Dogmas".)
- 6 "Meaning, Truth and Evidence" of quote from the beginning or the essay and Davidson says "This characterization will undergo modification in what follows" but the modification does not matter for any purposes.)

is self-defeating, since the dualism is, and Davidson is right to declare empiricism defunct. I shall come back to this.

5 My sketch of the dualism and my account of why it must be rejected have diverged from what Davidson says about it on a couple of points that I shall mention

First, where I have identified a scheme as one of two parative determinants of say a world view. Davidson (at least sometimes) equates world view and scheme. Quine wrote:⁷

We can investigate the world, and man as a part of it, and thus find out what cues he could have of what goes on around him. Subtracting his cues from his world view, we get man's net contribution as the difference. This difference marks the extent of man's conceptual sovereignty—the domain within which he can revise theory while saving the data.

Davidson quotes this, and remarks. "World view and cues, theory and data these are the scheme and content of which I have been speaking." But on the account of the dual sm that I have given world view or theory would not itself be one side of the dualism, as this remark of Davidson's makes it. World view or theory would be the result of the supposed interaction between the two sides of the dual sm. A scheme would be in it a world view put what is left when content is subtracted from a world view—what Quine speaks of as "man's net contribution" (we night say "reason's net contribution").

By itself this may not seem much of a divergence. All three tems that are present in one version—world view reason's contribution, the contribution of the senses—are equally present in the other. Perhaps it is just a question of taste which pair one picks to figure in what one attacks as a dualism of find it neater to act the parties to the dualism of the two contributions, rather than one of the contributions on the one side and the supposed result of the two contributions on the other.

If this is indeed a neater fit to the idea of a scheme content dualism, that may account for some cross purposes between Davidson and Quine Davidson first cast Quitte as an adherent of scheme content dualism in "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme". In a later essay Davidson writes, "What I had in mind as the scheme was language, with its hultim ontology."

⁷ Word and Object, p. 5

^{8. &}quot;The Myth of the Subjective", p. 162

and theory of the world, the content being suppared by the patterned fring of neurons." In a footnote about Quine's "On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma", he says "to this reply. Quine instakenty took my picture of his duolism of scheme and content to involve a separation of conceptual scheme and language." But perhaps Quine was simply inderstanding the accusation of dualism in the natural way. According to the dualism as it is most naturally understood, we have something with a "built in ontology and theory of the world" only aper content has made its contribution. If conceptual scheme is the other contributor, and language does indeed have a "built in ontology and theory of the world," then conceptual scheme must be distinguishable from language, as "man's net contribution," is distinguishable from the world's ew to which it is a contribution.

The second divergence is more immediately striking. The trouble with the dualism as I have depicted it is that it is *metherent*. The world's impacts on he senses are given the task of making it intelligible that moves within a conseptual scheme, taken to be such that considered in themselves they are empty, can nevertheless be adoptions of stands as to how things are. But there can be so in ach as an appearance that this works only if we call see the worlds impacts on the senses as a tribinal, something capable of passing verdicts on moves within a scheme. Only so can we conceive an answerability to the world's impacts on the senses as a nicidated answerability to the world's impacts on the senses as a nicidated answerability to the world stelf. But when we distance content from scheme, in a way that reflects the idea that rational interrelatedness is confined to elements in schemes, we ensure that we cannot see experience as a thornal. Totung as without concepts, are must they can pass in verdicts.

Contrast the problem Davidson most prominently arges about the dualism. When he finds the dualism in Quine his complaint is not that Quine lapses into accoherence, but rather that Quine makes himself vumerable, ora fair har sort of sceptic sin. Here is a succinct term dation in the thought.

Quite sinatural zed epistemology because it is based on the empire stiprem se that what we mean and what we think is concept ia ly and not nevely calesally four sed on the festimony of the senses is open to standard scentical attack.

^{9 &}quot;Meaning, Truth and Evidence" p. 69

^{10 &}quot;Meaning, Truth and Evidence" p. 78

¹¹ From p. 136 of "Afterthoughts"

This remark blames empiricism for the vulnerability to scepticism that Davidson finds in Quine but given Davidson's identification of scheme-content dualism as "the third dogma of empiricism" that comes to the same as blaming the dualism for it

On the reading of the dualism that I have offered this is a curiously muted objection. (I do not mean to be suggesting that vulnerability to standard scepticism is a comfortable condition.) This objection would fit if an epistemology organized in the terms of the dualism made it intellig ble that the senses tell us something—with the trouble being that it represents them as not telling us enough to warrant our world view. But on my reading, the trouble with the dualism is rather this, the very idea that the senses provide testimony becomes muntelligible. "Intuitions without concepts" are mute. If one nevertheless cannot see how anything but answerability to intumous could ensure that thoughts are not empty one's predicament is more unnerving than any standard scept cisir. Standard scepticism takes for granted that we have a world view, and merely questions whether we are entitled to it. The dual smill on my reading, generates a much more tadical anxiety about whether we are in touch with reality. Within the dualism it becomes unintelligible that we have a world view at all

My claim that the dualism is incoherent depends on the thought that the domain of ranonal interrelatedness is coextensive with the domain of the conceptual. Suppose one wants to conceive the impacts of the world on us as "infutious without concepts", but nevertheless wants those impacts to constitute a tribunal that world views must face. One will then be under pressure to avoid the threat of incoherence by denying that the domain of rational interrelatedness is coextensive with the domain of the conceptual. But the thesis of coextensiveness is a way of putting a fundamental conviction of Davidson's. (He is go to glexpression to it when he claims that "nothing can be a reason for finding a belief except another belief"). The materials for the claim of incoherence come directly from Davidson himself.

^{12.} Note that one is not arready commuted to the thesis of coextensiveness if one accepts the supulation about how to understand the idea of the conceptual that I considered above. That involved no more than that conceptual limbages are included in rational on-nections, and left open the possibility that the inclusion is proper.

^{13 &}quot;A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge", p. 141.

6. If Davidson is right, as I believe in claiming that the dualism has set much of the agenda for modern philosophy, something deep must account for its attraction. What might that be?

Davidson answers this question in a way that belongs with the currensly muted objection. Summarizing a survey of the dualism, the writes. "What matters, then, is—that there should be an ultimate source of evidence whose character can be wholly specified without reference to what it is evidence for "He goes on."

It seasy to remember what prompts this view in is to ought necessary to this date the unimate so trees of evidence from the outside world in order orginarantee the authority of evidence for the subject. Since we cannot be certain what the world outside the mind is like the subjective can keep its virtue, its chastity its certainty for us, only by being protected from confarmination by the world. The familiar ireable is, of course that the disconnection creates a gap no reasoning or construction can possibly bridge. §

Now I would not dream of disputing that Davidson here captures a motivation that is lamiliar in modern philosophy, and remaids us of how the inctivation deleats itself. But do these remarks adequately account for the grip of scheme-content dualism?

This question becomes especially pressing when we make that the survey of scheme-content dual single which these remarks are appended calininates in Davidson's catary Quine as an adherent. This is not the first time I have mentioned this Davidsonian reading of Quine. I do not want to question it on the contrary. I think it is very perceptive. But surely Quine does not belong in the context of the temptation that these diagnostic remarks of Davidson's appeal to, the admittedly familiar temptation to "interiorize", or "subjectivize", the admittedly familiar temptation to "interiorize", or "subjectivize", the admittedly familiar temptation to "interiorize", or "subjectivize", the admittedly familiar temptation to "interiorize", or "subjectivize" the admittedly familiar evidence is supposedly) proof against sceptical challenge. A page further on Davidson writes, summarizing the thought about trying to guarantee the authority of ultimate evidence.

Instead of saying it is the scheme content dicbot any that has dominated and defined the problems of modern philosophy, then, one could as well-

say it is how the dualism of the objective and the subjective has been conceived. For these dualisms have a common origin, a concept of the mindwith its private states and objects.

Surely this concern with privacy or subjectivity does not fit Quine. When Quine espouses his version of scheme content doalism, his concern is to stress the freedom of play that our "cues" leave us when we build or remodel a world view. What Quine wants to bring out is "the extent of man's conceptual sovereignty". There is nothing in Quine's thruking that would lead him to hatiker after a peculiarly solid authority for behels corresponding to the "cues", an authority supposedly achievable by instalating the subject matter of those beliefs from the external world. On the contrary Quine is unperturbed by the lambar epistemological anxiety to which that move is an intelligible, though, as Davidson rightly points out, unsuccessful response.

Davidson's suggested source for scheme content dualism is bound to be unsatisfying if one focuses on the fact that the dual small incoherent in the way it tries to concreve experience as a tribunal while distance gut from the domain of rational interrelatedness. If we to low Davidson's suggestion that the dualism responds to an amorety about our continuent to our world view. the sort of worry that ruight seem to be met by seconing a solid authority for some supposedly basic evidence on which the wor J view is founded, their it becomes mysterious why that should have as its outcome a way of thinking in which the putative ultimate warrants for world views are pushed out of the domain of rational interrelatedness altogether—a move that in fact nakes them incapable of michigibay constituting wal rants at all. This would be a much more radical case of a motivation's defeating itself than the one Davidson considers. In the case Davidson considers, the case of ordinary empericism, we trade informational strength for immunity to sceptica, chalenge, and so secure the authority of the evidence only at the price of a vividly obvious gap between it and what it was supposed to be evidence for The dualism is worse at andernanes the capacity of the supposed evidence to be seen as evidence at all, weak or strong

Of course if the dualism of scheme and content is incoherent if will fail to satisfy any motivation that is operative in embracing it. I am not siggesting we should look for a motivation that the dualism would satisfy as it does not satisfy the one that Davidson offers. The point is that a quest for epistenic security cannot explain why one might be led beyond the mere

failure of orderary empiricistic epistemologies—in which the senses yield news of the right kind to be evidence, and the problem is ust that the evidence falls short of warranting an ordinary world view ordinarily understood—anto the incoherence of scheme-content dualism, in which the deliverances of the senses are simultaneously required to constitute a tribunal and rendered mute. To explain how this incoherence could stay hidden, and how the incoherent way of thinking could seem compulsory, we need something deeper than the motivation that Davidson considers.

7. In order to understand scheme content doalism. I think we need to forget, for a while at least that familiar anxiety about whether we are soft. ciently entided to our world view. If we allow ourselves to fee, that anx etywe simply presuppose that we have a world view. But part of what underbes the dualism is something that lets that presupposition come into questhin. The fell need to conceive expenence as a tribina, derives, not from what Davidsi'n focuses on a concern to give our possession of a world view---which we simply assume it a society warrant, but from an interest in the conditions of its being intelligible that we have a world view for theoties, or beliefo at all. How is it that some moves we can make, moves we would like to think of as exploitings of concepts, are takings of stands as to how things are in the world? This is intelligible only. I we can see the moves as answerable, for their rational acceptability, ultimately to the facts them, serves. And part of what underhes the dualism is the (bought that this re- g red answerability to the world can be realized only as an answerability to: the way the world pets its mark on us, that is, an answerability to the deaverances of our senses.

Once the question "How is a possible that there are world views at a D" is in view, this thought is not easy to dismit will Consider the thesis that responsiveness to reason is part of the content of the idea of expliciting conceptual capacities. I suggested that we can take that thesis simply to define a useful not on of conceptual capacities. Now it is a Kardian idea that responsiveness to reason is a kind of freedom. (The note of freedom sounds in Quine's talk of "the extent of mans conceptual sovereignty".) We cannot goes this freedom in terms of an unlimited absence of constraint, exactly not since it consists in undertaking one's moves in allegiance to—of you'l ke—restrictions, constituted by what is a reason for what. But if these restrictions are conceived as who by formal, in that responsiveness to reason does not extend as far as answerability to impacts the world makes on us, then it becomes a

live question how, in execusing such a freedom, we could be adopting commitments as to how things are in the world. If "man's conceptual sover eighty" has no limits set by the facts themselves, it becomes unrecognizable as what it is meant to be, the power to make up our minds about how things are. And it is open to question whether we enable ourselves to see "man's conceptual sovereighty" as constrained in the right way if the Davidson when he rejects empiricism—we say that impacts from the world exert a causal influence on how the sovereigh power is exercised, but deny that they set rational constraints. If we say that we preclude ourselves from pointing to rational answerability to the world's impacts on our senses as the way in which employments of concepts are ultimately rationally answerable to the world uself, and then it becomes mysterious how these exploitations of freedom can be otherwise than empty just as "thoughts without coment" are in the Kantian tag.

It does not help to say that impacts from the world cause beliefs, which can then serve as a itiounal for world views to face. These be lefs would be just more elements of world views. The question we have allowed to arise is how there can be anything of that kind, if not because some things of that kind are answerable to a tribunal constituted by experience, and it is unresponsive to help corseives to some things of that kind. The causa, accestry we dite for the ones we help ourselves to makes no difference to this.

That is to say that empiricism, even in Davidson's non-pailed sense is not easy to dispuss. This is perfectly consistent with accepting his insistence that an ordinary empiricism, which "interiorizes" the supposed warrants for world views in order to make the warrants sate from sceptical challenge yields a quite unsatisfying picture of our entitlement to our benefs. Empiricism is separable from that "interiorizing" move and the obsession with epistemic security that directly motivates it. We can concur with Davidson in rejecting that kind of epistemology, without threat to this thought empiricism, in the non-pallid sense captures a condition for it to be intelligible that thoughts are otherwise than empty.

Scheme-context dualism is incoherent, because it commines the conviction that world views are rationally answerable to experience—the core thesis of empiricism—with a conception of experience that makes it incapable of passing verdicts, because it removes the deliverances of the senses from the domain of the conceptual. According to the dualism, experience both must and cannot serve as a tribunal. Davidson's treatment of the dualism would resolve this contradiction by rejecting its first limb, its basic empiricism. But I am suggesting that this basic empiricism is not easy to dismiss. What holds it in place is not the concern with emplement that Davidson discusses, but a concern with the very idea of content, which he seems not to consider as a motivation for it

here we can perhaps find a deeper signit cance in the first of the two do vergences I noted between my reading of the dualism and Day dson's. The divergence was that in Davidson's reading what stands over against sensory make in the dual smits already a world view inor as in my reading what Quine casts "man's net contribution". If the other party to the dualism is a ready a world view, before it comes into relation with sensory intake, then t cannot cave its being a world view (at alb to an interaction with sensory mrake moreven according to the dualism on this Davidsonian, dentification of its elements. The idea that the deliverances of the seases might matter for securing non-emphasiss thus goes missing, in this reading of the dualism, they are left with no apparent to a except toe one Davidson comsiders, that of paramely supplying warrants for world's ews, taken to be anyway and independently constituted as such. So perhaps the divergence is not just a matter of taste about how best to organize the triad of world view reason's contribution, and sensory intake. Davidsot sudent heation of so teme with world view belongs with the fact that his discussion of the dialism addresses only the epistemological unsatisfyingness of citic lary enpine sins (which of course Lacknowledge), and never considers empiricisms as a way of not being beset with a mystery over the fact to at toerc are world v-ews at all (5)

I remarked this. Quine is assuming to the sort of anxiety that sends to issue it "interforizing" the warrants for world views, so as to make their safe from sceptical challenge. It would be in the spiral of Davidson's remarks about that sort of epistemology to say that this immunity is desirable since nothing but had pli fosophy results from letting oneself feel the anxiety. What I am saving now is that Davidson is immune to any anxiety about how it is possible that there are world views at all its that not signarly a good way to be? Well certainly I am not suggesting we should take our serves to have the option of deciding that it is not possible that there are

¹⁵ This absence is quite strange, in view of the fact that connect from Tavidso, is tabell for the Jualism. Stat he discusses its plant's an echologic discussion tag. The Kathath lag safely gives content the role of securing the non-emptiness of thoughts not har or supplying a warrant for accepting them.

world views, any more than we should take ourselves to have the option of deciding that we know nothing about the external world. There is no real question whether world views are possible. But that leaves it open that entitlement to this absence of worry may depend on accepting the core thesis of empiricism. If that is so, then someone who rejects empiricism, like Davidson, thereby deprives himself of the right to his immunity to anxiety over the non-empirices of thoughts. In this context, the immunity is not a philosophically desirable condition.

8. In Davidson's treatment, the diagnostic question that the dualism raises is this why is a tempting to suppose that the deliverances of the senses would have to constitute a tribunal for our world views to face. Davidson suggests an answer in terms of the craying for epistemic security. Thave been urging that that answer is unsatisfying, because it falls short of accounting for the temptation to fall into the dualism's incoherence, as opposed to the mere failure of ordinary empiricistic epistemologies. An empiricism with the different motivation I have pointed to cannot be dismissed on the grounds of vulnerability to standard scepticism. Perhaps there is nothing wrong with such an empiricism. In that case the diagnostic question that the dualism raises is rather this, why is it difficult to see how the deliverances of the senses could constitute a tribunal for our world views to face? Why is it tempting to suppose that the world's impacts on us would have to be "inturitions without concepts."?

With the intellectual development that we can sum up as the rise of modern science, there became available a newly sharp conception of the proper goal of the natural sciences as we can (significantly) call their namely an understanding of phenomena as interrelated perhapsical sally but certainly (this becomes a tempting gloss on what it is to see phenomena as causally interrelated) within a framework of laws of nature. This supersedes a pre-modern outlook, which did not sharply differentiate a natural scientific mode of understanding from one that places its objects in rational relations with one another, and so works with categories like meaning. In this pre-modern outlook, it was sensible to look for meaning in phenomena like the movement of the planets—phenomena that we are equipped, with modernity's conception of a special mode of understanding, the natural scientific to see as appropriately brought witchillts scope, and so as exactly not something to look for meaning in In step with the emergence into clarity of this idea of a special mode of understanding.

to be radically contrasted with finding meaning in things it is only to be expected that there was an increasing sense of how special—by comparison with the framework of natural law—are the patterns or structures within which though are placed when they are understood in the contrasting way; how special are the linkages that constitute the domain of rational interrelatedness.

Now the idea of the world making its impact on a sentient being is the dea of a causal transaction an instance of a kind of thing that takes place in nature. And that differentiation of modes of understanding can easily make a seem that income conceive a happening in those terms, we are already thereby conceiving it is a way that is distanced from placement in the domain of rational interrelatedness. Succombing to that appearance, we might say something on these aries. The idea of the world's impacts or like is the idea of something patural. And we moderns now see clearly how the structure of radicial inkages contrasts with the structure of the natural, (or topic of matrial society to condensational interrelatedness), i must be that intuitions as such are without concepts."

That suggests how a familiar feature of modern thinking might explain the idea that the sensory stands opposed to the conceptual as it does for Davidson as well as it the dualism of scheme and content. And it is not that this line of thought uncovers a mistake in the idea that I have soggested an derbes the empiricism that figures inconsistently with the conclusion of this line of the ight in the dualism, the idea that thought can be into hig bly non-empty or by by virtue of answerability to experience. There are two is dependently tempting thoughts here, a thought about the conditions or it to be intelligible that we have world views suggesting that experience most constitute a tribunal and a thought about the naturalness of the idea of an impact of the senses suggesting that experience cannot constitute a tribunal it we can see how these two influences might both shape reflect on we have an explanation of how one might be tempted into the incoherence of scheme-content dualism.

I have suggested that there is no obvious way to avoid the deat at empiricism captures a condition for thought not to be cinpty. (Davidson does not even consider that recommendation for empiricism is Of course it cannot be challed to that incoherently. So if empiricism is compulsory there must be a flaw in the fine of thought I have just rehearsed the one that makes it look as if into none as such are "without concepts".

It is indeed an achievement of modernity to have brought into clear focus the contrast between two modes of understanding one that involves placing phenomena in the framework of natural law, and one that involves placing things in the domain of rational interconnectedness. But to give proper credit () that achievement, we do not need to accept that when we see something as a happening at nature—as the world's making its mark on a sentient creat are would indeed be twe are as inso placing it in the sort of frame that is characteristic of the natural sciences. If that were so then given the contrast, the fact that something is a happening in nature would be a ground for supposing that, at least in useff, viewed as the happening in nature It s-it is "without concepts". But it is not so. We need not accept what might seem to be implied by the label "natural sciences", that phenomena are conceived in terms of their place in nature only when they are conceived in terms of their place in the framework of natural law. If we reject that, we make room for supposing that the world's impacts in us, even considered in themselves as just that the world's impacts on us are not "without concepts". That would allow the tension within scheme content. dualism to be resolved in the opposite direction to the one Davidson suggests in the direction of a concrent empire smi-

9 What Davidson considers ander the head of scheme content disaster's an attempt to achieve security against sceptical challenge for evidence on which world views are putatively founded. This leads to a shrinkage in the informational content of the putative evidence. I have contrasted this with the more tadical fadate that, exploiting argumentative materials supplied by Davidson binise for that in the dualism maniely that it disqualifies what it requires us to conceive as a tribunal from being a tribunal at a low I have acknowledged that the quest for epistemic security to at Davidson's forcises on as fundamental to modern epistemology. I have also said that I think Davidson is profoundly right in placing scheme content dualism at the root of what is unsaustactory about modern phylosophy. How can this hang together? How can what is in fact a disqualification of postative evidence from being evidence at all—with the opshor that it is the context of an empiricism that I suggested is hatd to dismiss, our very possession of a

^{16.} I do not mean this lightning ske chito siggest that this resonation of the tension is easy. I disc as these issues slightly less breathiesis at do eche Davidson. The Myth of the Subjective", p. 162) in *Stand and World*.

world view becomes a mystery. Be at the root of a philosophical tradition, that is, as I acknowledge driven by an obsession with the authority of our evidence for our world views, and takes it for granted that we have a world view and evidence for it?

No doubt the fail story of why modern epistemology takes the course it does as complex, but I think this part of it can be fold quite simply. The dualism is the cutcome of a pair of independently intelligible temptations. It is thre ligible that reflection should be shaped both by the genuine credentia's of empiricism (which are not undertuined by Davidson, since he considers) empiricism only in the context of the quest for security, not in the context of the very idea of a world views, and by the conception of nature that I have depicted as underlying the idea that the world's impacts on us are "intintions without concepts". Now consider someone was as susceptible to both those influences. Such a person is thereby en route, as it were, to a frame of hund in which it is a mystery how shought bears on the world at al. The ourcome of the less arthuence sets a requirement for thought to bear on the world, the outcome of the second is that the regularement cannot be mer. But it is a of to be expected that the destanation would be obvious at alstages to the journey, especially not if the reflection is in fertaken early in the evolution of the conception of nature whose finished product in this context is the idea that experiences are "intrations without concepts". (That the deviluation is not obvious as surely a condition of continuing to let onesel, be subject to both additioners). At a primitive stage in such reflection a sense of where it is headed need not take any clearer shape than somet ling to this effect, thought's hold on the world is coming into quesfrom A to a disquiet that can be expressed like that is just what is responded. t mancetly given this account of its origin, but not at all surprisingly, by the sort of philosophy that is obsessed with the authority of our warrant for our world views, the sort of philosophy on which Davidson focuses without this conception of what underlies it

It is a familiar thought. I have concurred with Davidson, in a form of t—that philosophy in this veil does not succeed in its own explicit aim. Char of reassuring us as to our epistemic security in our world views. I am suggesting another respect in which this sort of philosophy is unsatisfying. It does not even correctly identify the drift of the submerged philosophical anxiety by which it is driven.

Scheme content dualism figures in this picture as the conclusion to which a pair of influences that shape traditional epistemological reflection

would take one if their tendencies achieved expanii formulation together. There is no need to look for outright adherents of the dualism among proponents of the sort of traditional epistemology that Davidson rightly deplores.

We come perhaps as close as possible to an outright adherent of the dualism in Quine, and he is certainly not a proponent of traditional epistemology. He is not vulnerable to the disquiet about thought's hold on the world that I have suggested underlies the anxieties of traditional epistemology, and is ineptly responded to by its characteristic moves. ¿L'exponied that fact when I pointed to a tension between Davidson's account of the source of scheme content dualism and his reading of Quine as an agherent of it.) The pull of empiricism on Quine (in Davidson's interesting, nonpallid, sense of "emparicism") is almost vanishingly small. It is reflected only in his thetoric about "the tribunal of experience", and that is ont of line with the dom nant feature of Ounces epistemological thinking, namely a naturalism that cheerfully casts experience as "intuition's without concepts". and rejects questions about the warrant for world views altogether in favour of questions about their causal on. It is tempting to resolve this tension by discounting the empiricist thetoric. In one way that would do Quine a layour just by eliminating the tension, but if I am right about the credentials of empiricism, at another way it would not since it would involve expunging the vestigial expression of a real philosophical meight. *

10. I suggested that with the modern achievement of clarity about a distinctive sort of understanding—now available to be cited as the defining aim of a distinctive intellectual endeavour, the natural sciences—there comes an appreciation of how special, by companion, is the sort of understanding that involves placing things in rational relations to one another. The sense of special ness is expressed in a genre of philosophical questions that we can sum up, exploiting the connection between reason and freedom. Eke this, how is

17 in Epistemology External red. Davidson clinois that "Quine's hat ratized episte mology while it makes no serious attempt to answer the skeptic is recognizably a fairly conventional form of empiricism (pp. 192-3). But the vestigate empiricism is Quine is very far from conventional just because its motivation has nothing to do so it responding to ordinary sceptical changings. And the empiricism is not an aspect of the mataratized epistemology in its a trace of an insight that cannot get untells find a home in the environment of Quine's naturalism, which removes experience from the category of warrant altogether.

freedom related to the natural world? This wording points to familiar questions about action and responsibility as paradigms of the sort of thing I mean. But the problems posed by the tendency towards a dualism of scheme and content belong in this genre of philosophy too. Underlying the dualism of scheme and content is a dualism of freedom—the freedom of reason—and nature.

In "Mental Events" and kindred writings. Davi ison has indertaken as defuse philosophical and enes of this genre, and enes a jour integrating freedern into the natural world. He endorses the sense of specialness, he puts forward on his own behalf a quasi-Kanitan picture of as we might say the realm of freedom according to which it is organized by a "constitutive deal of rationality", wholfy distinct from the organizing sir cure of the world as viewed by the natural sciences. But he aims to prevent this sense of specialness from generating metaphysical anxiety, by arguing that the distinction between freedom and nature reflects a duanty of conceptual apparatuses and not a duanty of ontological realms."

Now I have case the dualism of scheme and content as crystalizing a cognitive philosophical anxiety, the question "How are world views possible?" is a ferm of the question "flow is freedom possible?" But here Day Ison's way with other forms of the anxiety does not help. Davidson's invocation of a duality it at its concept at and not outological, does not on fermine the thought that the world's ampacts on us are "initial oris without concepts. That is a thought that Davidson accepts. And it is a thought that I have claimed leaves the freedom of "conceptual sovereignty" a mystery.

Day con to sees this because he misidentifies the incipient panosophical anxiety that is crystalized in scheme content dia ismore takes in to be a concern about entitleme. It to world views, and he does not see that the familiar anxiety about freedom, applied in this context, takes shape fully only as a concern about how it is possible that exercises of "conceptual soveroights" are world views at all. This concern rests in part on a recommendation for empricism that does not come anto view in Davidson's thinking as all if we are to defuse the anxiety while respecting this quite different attraction for empricism, something that Davidson does not give or reason in it to want to de-

8 I or because it involves endors up the sense of specialtiess, trus is a reacht aore probasing programme for disarriung the philosophical anciety that the sense of specialness risks generating that the of Richard Rorry as least in Philosophic and the Mirror of Sahire There Rorry poon-pooled the sense of specialness in deliantking the idea of a philosophically significant contrast be seen the Natura stensorianian and the Generalisenschapter

we need to find a way to resist the idea that the impacts of the world on our senses are "antiutions without concepts". And for that we need a more radical counter to the underlying dualism of reason and nature than the one that Davidson supplies. On this view, the sources of what is unsatisfactory about modern philosophy include something that lies deeper than the interiorizing concept in of subjectivity pointed to by Davidson. A more fundamental source as a misconception of the intellectual obligations of naturalism, to which Davidson hanse form his willingness to accept that the deliverances of the senses are "intuitions without concepts"—secons to be subject.

Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism!

I That I might pay a small inbute to Hans-Georg Gadamer by considering the comparison indicated in my title was suggested to me by some remarks of Michael Friedman.³

In my Mind and Berld. Extrole in terms of a conceptually mediated openness to reality, parily constituted by inheritance of a tradition. My invocation of tradition was, as I indicated inspired by Gadamer. The idea of inhertling a tradition helps us to understand what is involved in possessing concept al capacities in a certain demanding sense (apacities of freedom, capacities whose paradigmanic actualization is its cognitive activity that is under its subject's control, centrally padgment. I urged that conceptual capacties can also be drawn afto actualization in operations of sensifility, outside the subject's control. My aim was to a low us to see perceptual experences as events in which, in operations of their sensibility, subjects take in facts-relements of the world, in the sense determined by the opening remark of Witigenstein's Tractatio, the world as everything that is the case. With this conception, we can be dithat operations of our seasibility exert a rational influence on our formation of beset, impinging on our capacities for ridgment from within the conceptual sphere. And since in expensively at any rate when they are not mis ed-perceivers take in elements of the world, experiences a low the world uself to figure in the rational back. ground of the fixation of bekef. I contrasted this with Davidson's picture in which the operations of sensibility make only a brutely causal impact on benef-formation, from outside the conceptual sphere.

E. This essay was written for a collection in honour of Gadamer.

Exorcising the Phaosophical Tradition. Comments on John Mccowell's Mind and World", see especially pp. 464–7.

Priedman thinks this contrast places me close, at least 10 "the traditional idealist doctrine that the world to which our thought relates is a creature of our own conceptualization" (p. 464). And he thinks Davidson is imprime to any such charge just because of the difference between his picture and mine. The occasion for this essay is that Friedman thinks he can reinforce this accusation by exploiting my Gadamerian invocation of tradition. About the accusation in general, I am inclosed to echo Gadamer's remark. "It is a sheer misunderstanding if one appeals against idealism—whether transcendental idealism or ideal stic, philosophy of language—to the being in-tself of the world. This is to miss the methodological significance of idealism, the metaphysical form of which can be regarded, since Kant, as ou moded." We shall see how this misonderstanding shapes Friedman's critique.

As Friedman notes. Davidson exploits the so-called principle of charity to avoid any tareat of inguistic or conceptual relativism. On the ground that I follow Gadamer in insisting that any understanding consciousness is situated in tradition, Friedman suggests I cannot share Davidson's invitingrability to relativism. After citing my Gadamerian claim (Mind and World) p. 155) that flanguages and tradmons can figure not as ternal that would. threaten to make our grip on the world philosophically problematic, but as constitutive of our approblemanc openness to the world" he goes on n. 465). "One might wonder accordingly, how McDowe I himse I would respond to the threat of cultural or briguistic telativism. Are we not faced in particular, with the threat that there is not one space of reasons but many different ones-each adapted to its own cultural tradition and each constituring its own, world?" The implication is that where Davidson, a protected. against relativism. Gadamer's thinking positively exacerbates the threat And the further impacation is that Gadamer thereby soides towards the "traditional idealist" picture of the world as a creature of our conceptual activity. Enedman amplies this when he characterizes his compar son between Davidson and Gadamer on relativism as "further elucidat) ng) the sense in which McDowell's own position is actually more idealistic than Davidson's" (p. 464). The sense he means, as he has already made clear, is the sense in which idealism depicts the world as a creature of our mental activity

In this essay, I shall begin (in §2) by explaining way I to link to is is wrong. In the respects at which it follows Gadamer's my thinking is no doubt more

³ Truth and Method p. 448. p. 84. All subsequent page references to Gaoamet will be this work.

representing the world as a product or reflection of our intellectual activity. Fam sorry to have drawn Friedman's line in Gadamet's direction, and I shall try to deflect the attack, in order to begin a renewed expression of the admiration for Gadamet's work that I mean't to signacin my book. I shall go on this photo consider the contrast between Davidson and Gadamer over the photosophical significance of tradition in its own right, without the supposed connection with idealism in that sense.

Davidson averts the threat of relativism by justifying a refusal to make sense. of a certain su, posed idea, the idea of a repertoire that is meaning-involving and so intelligible, but not intelligible to us ! As he remarks, "a is, empting to take a very short line indeed" (p. 185) with that supposed idea-namely. brankly rejecting it. The principle of chargy is central to a less 5 may treatment. which displays the rejection as warranted. The argument, indermines a concept on of a language, or a conceptual scheme, as something that estables a certain sort of confront thou with the world conceived as some magnetitral and common, but agy outside all schemes" of 1904. Against Cits, Davidson itssists that we en we make play with a conception of languages as confronting the world, we can conceive the world only as the world that we are lensandour own practice to engage with. According vibe says ip 1986 "In giving upthe dealism of [conceptual] scheme and world [this is the world conceived as "something he tral and common that see outside all schemes"), we do not gave up the world, but re establish unmediated contact with the familiar objects whose auties make our sentences and opinions true of lalse **

Now this is perfect vito line with Gadamer's thinking

Davidsor, argues that we are control to rich so to make sense of the idea of a case of intelligibility that is radically inaccessible to us. What matches

^{4.} See "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.

^{5.} This paragraphiguses a compressed sommally of salient points of a rich and complex article. But the is the reliable substantial divergence from Davidson's rectilistical Lague replaced Davidson's specification of his target as the idea of languages. Otransia able this idea is the paragraph of the real size book. This look is naturally action in our ns or languages in methyphic from our standpoint. This look is naturally in the arguatest and this a better fit with Earodson's issual books in over prediction rather than transaction, as a focus for reflection on moets a iding fit a timing sale we supply adopt durious own linguistic epertons our subjects on axis of giving expression to thoughts we have committed to independ in order to say what it is that we have committed to understand them as saying this is hardly transia into

this in Gadamer is his contention that "each [worldview] potentially contains every other one within it—i.e. each worldview can be extended into every other" (p. 448). The "horizon" constituted by a specific situatedness to tradition is not closed. On the contrary it is always open to "fusion" with the horizon constituted by a different specific situatedness." Friedman registers Gadamer's appeal to the possibility of fusion of horizons, but as we shall see, hit does not properly acknowledge its force.

Again. The target of Davidson's argument is a conception of the world as "something neutral and common that hes outside all schenies". What matches this in Gadamer is his contention that the openness of every view of the world to every order "makes the expression, world in use I, problemanca." (p. 447). Gadamer writes (ibid.). "Those views of the world are not relative in the sense that one could oppose them to the world in itself, as if the right view from some possible position outside the human in girst c world could discover at in its being in itself." There is no read visor in saying. we cannot draw a distinction between the world uself and the topic of our world view. As Gadamer says (p. 447). The every worldview, the existence of the world in itself is intended." And the world in itself as it figures in this tonight, is not Davidson's target by title topic of our world view—the familiar world with which Day dsor, says we're establish unmediated contact when we give up the dualism of scheme and something outside all concepts. Our world view precisely because it is qualword view open to every other has as its topic the wor'd itself, not some sopposed, tem co. st tuted by just what we think. (Such an item won, I be at least in part, no. better than notional, since we are certainly wrong about some times, and would differ from the corresponding item associated with a different world.

⁶ On the lasting of horizons, see Traditional Section 2 pp. 3.00—This passage is concerned a particular with historical or kestambing, historical and over one and procursors, and finds context Gadametican use the image of a single bottom. For so its wires the basis up of time. But the idea of horizons being historicans cransposes to any case where the occurrence of understanding involves overcoming an initial alienness.

That the contact is at mediated in the sease Davissor vitends is periestly involved with what I mean by talking of conceptually mediated openness flavidson's point is a rule but mediation by epistemic in a rinediantes on the lines of sease data as after conceived—objects of a direct awareness that violas indirect awareness or hings of the environment. In the picture of perceptual awareness the cotton of the image measures like to a between us and sharps in the environment. Part of the point of the conceptual mediation I task of is precisely that it allows us a picture of experience in which it is environmental brings steems were not stand-instoric them. That are lighten to the senses

view i Our world view includes its own receptiveness to the possibility of correction, not only by efforts at improvement that are internal to our practices of anguity, but also through coming to appreciate insights of other world views in the course of coming to understand them

As I said, on the conception of perceptual expenence that I recommend. experience lets the world itself figure in the rational background of our fixat on of beitef. In experience wor divistates of allairs themselves exert a ranonal influence in be jef formation, working within the conceptual sphere. Lexpressed this in Mind and World (p. 26) by saying we should not picture the world as lying outside an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere. This image which is avowedly idealistic in one sense is part of what prompts Friedrian to accuse me of embracing idealism in the sense of representing the world as a creature of our conceptual activity. He writes p. 462). The Davidson's picture the world that our beliefs and judgments. are about is, at least in principle, characterizable wholly independently of the conceptual psychological domain of buman intentionality. Indeed, the crusal (as opposed to ranonal) relations between our thinking and the world must ust mately be supported by the entirely nonartent onal characerization of the world as the domain of physical natural fact. In this sense, experience relates thought to an independent objective reality across an outer boundary, and it is precisely such a beamdary that McDowe I hauselt s most concerned to crase? But this is a travesty of my image. The boundary Friedman, posits on is not the one I am concerned to erase

Of course the facts that constitute the world, apart from facts about homan intentionality, are characterizable "independently of the conceptibility bythological domain of human intentionality." It would be crazy to hold that characterizing an object as cobic (for instance) requires concepts of intentionality. In the sense not of concepts employed in thought, out of concepts whose satisfiers are the kers or acts of thinking. As Gadamer says up. 447. "No one doubts that the world can exist without man and perhaps will up so. This is part of the meaning in which every human, linguist cally constituted view of the world lives." No one doubts that the world exists for the most part outside a boundary that can be drawn around the domain of intentionality. (For the most part only because of course there are facts to the effect for instance that someone thinks such and such a thought.) But consistently with its being true, as it obviously is, that facts typically do not concept thought, we can understand the world's impacts on belief formation as being a ready within the conceptual sphere, not impacts on belief formation of

side at. The world's impacts on behal-formation are the actualizations of conceptual capacities that constitute experiences.

In sustaining the mere sainty of refusing to picture the world as a creature of that conceptual activity at certainly helps that we can see our thinking as causally influenced by the world we think about. Friedman is wrong to imply that this is unavailable to me as if the rational relation I discern be tween operations of sensibility and be tell formation. It had not a takinal relation between the world uself and our thinking, level dod a causal or nection. My objection to Davidson's picture is not that a takes the impact of sensibility on that thinking, and thereby the impact of the world on our thinking, to be causal, but that it takes the impact to be british causal causal to the exclusion of being rational. That a relation's being rational can cohere with its being causal—that not all causal relatedness is bruiely causal—is of course a doctrine of Davidson's own.

The thought that causal relations "must officiately be supported by a characterization of the world as the domain of physical natital fact", which Friedman's aggests is essential to the way Day dson sustains the world's independence from our intellectual activity is in fact superfluous to the possibility. I are exploiting, the possibility of pointing to a causal connection between thinking and the world in order to disclaim an ideal sin that depicts, he worldas a creature of our conceptualizations. This physicalism about causal relations reflects a scientistic ligacking of the concept of causality, according to which the concept is taken to have its primary role in articulating the partial world view that is characteristic of the physical sciences, so that all other catesal thinking needs to be based on causal relations characterizable numbers ical terms. This might be warranted if there were a reason to credit physicalscience with a proprietary capacity to penetrate to the real connectedness of things. But I follow Gadamer in holding that there is no such reason." And I thank this is Davidson's view too. (bough he slips from it in his conception of causal relations. The thought that causal relations between mental activity and the extra mental world require an ultimate anchorage in priyocal lattice. so far from being necessary for Davidson's common sense realists, as Friedman suggests, is out of free with Davidson's best thanking

⁸ See: Actions Reasons and Causes. Davidsors there discusses reasons for action, our his considerations apply equally well to reasons for belief

⁹ See e.g. Truth and Method p. 449. The truth that science scales is iself relative is a particular world orientation and cannot as all claim to be the whole? See a so the evaluation of this thought at pp. 450-3.

As I said. Encomain concedes (p. 464) that for Gadamer the possibility of a fusion of horizons is supposed to save as from relativism. But he portaposes this concession with saving that for Gadamer, anlike Davidson, the Toutura. and inguistic traditions" that account for the initial positions of horizons "can certainly be conceptually divergent from one another" (bid). I think this contrast is a misreading of Gadamer. When Davidson attacks the very idea of conceptual divergence between languages, his target is the thoughtthat there might be a way of thinking, a conceptual scheme, constituted as such by the fact that its exercises are suitably directed at the world, with this relation to the world conceived as independent of whether the exercises are intelligible to us. (At p. 191 of "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme". he describes the target like this. The idea is that something is a language. and associated with a conceptual scheme, whether we can translate it or not for stands in a certain relation (predicting, organizing, facing, or fitting) to experience (nature reality sensory promptings) to Rejecting this concepion, or supposed conception, is perfectly compatible with acknowledging, as Davidson of course does upp 183-4) that different languages can express different, even strik ngly different, ways of thinking. When Gadanier writes of different "worlds" corresponding to different horizons (e.g. at p. 447) in a passage Friedman quotes). Itis point---precisely because this talk of different "worlds" comes in a context in which Gadamer is insisting that "the multiphoty of these worldviews does not involve any relativization of the world." obid 1. Rannot be more than what Davidson thus acknowledges. This talk of different "worlds" is only vovid magery for the undisputed idea of striking differences between mutually access ble views of the one and only world. There is not the contrast that Enedman draws.

This matters for Eriedman's suggestion that my aligning myself with Gadamer leaves me without a response to a relativistic challenge. With this suggestion Friedman implies that Gadamer's appeal to the possibility of fusing hor zor's cannot as Gadamer supposes, genuinely protect him from problems of relativism. About coming to understand an initially alien thinker. I wrote *Mind and World*, pp. 34–65 in terms that were intended to recall Davidson's conception of the standpoint of a radical interpreter, who takes note of how the alien's object's expressions of thought relate to the world the subject lives an I sounded a Gadamerian note by arging that what the radical interpreter aims at is coming to share a horizon with the other. About this, Friedman writes (p. 466), "In what sense however is the world with which the alien thinker is engaged open to our view? For Davidson—the principle of charity

guarantees that there is only one such world. For McDowell, by contrast the realm of the conceptual is absolutely unbounded If the conceptual contents of an alien thinker's engagements with the world are not yet available to us, therefore, how can the world corresponding to these conceptual. contents be so? Are we not faced-before a fusion of horizons-samply with two different conceptual systems together with two different 'worlds' constltuted by these systems?" This reflects Enedman's misreading of my image of the unboundedness of the conceptual, and his guisreading of Gadamer's talk of different "worlds", as if these bus of imagery made unavailable the commonsense point that there is only one world. The world with which the akenthinker is engaged in a way that is open to our view as samply the worldwhich—this is a point that Davidson and Gadanier share—we cannot distinguish from the topic of our world view. What we are faced with before a fasion of horizons is the world, together with a candidate for being understood. as another way of concessing it, and we have a guarantee. In what confronts us really is another thinsing subjects -that it will be possible to understand the other's engagements with the world as expressive of another view of the world we had in view all along. (Here we see how the idea that horizons canbe fused can be expressed in what amounts to a formulation of the principle. of chanty.) When we come to understand the other's abject, that can involve a change in how we view the world. When the horizons fuse, the horizon, within which we view the world is no longer in the same position. But what is in view, now that the horizon is in its new position, is still the world, everything that is the case, not some supposed item constituted by this particular, new positioning of the honzon-leverything that seems to be the case from within a horizon so positioned. There is no devaluing of reality's independence from thinling here 10

3 My main point so far has been that Davidson's exploitation of the principle of charity (at least in this connection) matches Gadamer's exploitation

10 Priedman in effect refuses to allow Gadamer and me to distinguish a change in our view of the world from a change in the world. See p. 466 in 50 where besides his tensereading of Gadamer's talk of different worlds "the also tries to justify this conflation-from which he concludes that "the possibility of history does nothing to diffuse the liveat of ideasism", by clong from me a remark to the effect that when we are not instead in perception, there is no difference between how we perceive things and how they are B. I that is a trubin. If cannot dislotge me for Gadameri from the thought that every world view has the world it view as everything that is the case. Not as everything that I takes to be the case.

142 Issues in Davidson

of the possibility of fusion of horizons. Fricoman is wrong to suggest that the divergence between them, about whether or not there is ast be something shared language or tradition, in the background of the very idea of an understanding consciousness -reveals a difference in respect of valuetability to a threat of relativism, and thereby to a threat of being unable to pay sufficient respect to the independence of reality. A way to bring this but is to note that Day ason's argument against relativism, in "On the Very adea of a Conceptual Scheme* predates his even raising (at least in print) the squestion whether, diolects or shared lang tages should be primary in our reflecfrom about the meaning of languistic expressions, let alone seiting it in layour of idiolecis.1 Davidson's argument against relativism turns on the though, that to put it at a way that emphasizes the correspondence with Gadamer—any Anguistic practice is life highlic from the standpoint of any other. Put like that, the thought is neutral or we at the primary context for the applicability of inguistic items is a community's language or the linguist's practice of an 15d vidoal. The former singht have seemed to cohere with Davidson's caraylessays on meaning and imderstanding 12 In more recent essays he has urged the latter. The argument against relativishi works equally well either way the divergence Eriedman tries to exploit is simply not relevant to the argument's success.

But the divergence is sarely worth discussing mais own right. Lao not bebove Davids in has addressed considerations of the sort he would need to address. The were to engage with Gadamer on the significance or shared languages and traditions. And I that is right, there is at least a timeompleteness in Davids in sidefence of his attribution of priority to the practice of individuals. In fact I believe Davidson's disparagement of sharing deprives him of a wealth of insight that we can find in Gadamer, then ghall hot be able to substantiate that properly in this essay.

Davidson plays down the significance of shared all guages in the course of reacting against a certain conception of linguistic competence. According to this conception, mastery of a language is "the ability to operate in accord with

II For this latter doctrate of Davidson's see laming other essays. 'A Nice Detailge ment of Epitaphs' and. The Social Aspect of language. It may not be quite accurate to describe basicson's position as giving priority to adolects, see Michael Duzanet. A Nice Derailgement of Epitaphs. Some Comments in Davidson and Backing, lat p. 469. Bid Davidson does not dissent from this characterization, and it is a convenient way to omig out the flavour of his thinking.

¹² See, e.g. "Truth and Meaning"

a precise and specifiable set of syntactic and semantic rules", and "verbal communication depends on speaker and hearer sharing such an ability, and it requires no more than this" ("The Social Aspect of Language" p. 2). Malapropisms (see especially "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs") provide clear counter-examples—cases where understanding is not disrupted by mismatches between speaker and hearer in respect of anything we might see as rules to which they conform their imgrastic behaviour. In what he himself describes as "a leap" ("The Social Aspect of Language", p. 7). Davidson moves to the thesis that there is "no reason, in theory at least, why speakers who anderstand each other ever need to speak, or to have spoken, as anyone elsespeaks, much less as each other speaks" (bid.). Of course he does not deay that we have a use for the idea of languages spoken by several people. But he suggests of the Social Aspect of Language* (p. 3) that this familiar idea can be reconstructed in terms of speakers tending to use the same words to mean. the same thing", and that the definitional transition from and vidual practice to shared language is "a short, urunterestury, step". Mutual understanding is masssively easier if one shares ways of asing words and constructions with one side teriociators. This merely practical utibity is the only importance Davidson is willing to concede to shared anguistic practice. Because sharing makes mutual understanding easier to arrive at people who live together are in practice brought op into conformity with one another in their originstic behaviour, but Davidson singgests that in principle there need not be any such sharing.

By Gadamer's lights. Davidson is surely right to deny that a shared ability to produce linguistic behaviour in conformity to specifiable rules could soffice for annual intelligibility. Even restricted to prophe who as we would ordinarily say speak the same language this is unacceptable. Looking back over his inquiry into what sharing a language might amough to Davidson says ("A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs", p. 445). "We have discovered no learnable common core of consistent behaviour no shared grammar or rules no portable interpreting machine set to grind out the meaning of an arbitrary afterance." And this chimes well with Gadamer. Nothing could be further from the sparit of Gadamer's reflections about hermeneutics than to suppose there could in principle be a method to a flarrily sense for arriving at an understanding of another person's linguistic productions—something that could be followed mechanically or in Davidson's image, a "portable interpreting machine".

Day dson is also surely right that people who understand each other need not share a language with each other in the ordinary sense. Suppose after a

disaster two monog of survivors from widely divergent Englistic communities encountered each other. Surely they could in principle, given sufficient imagination and good will, come to understand each other's anguistic performances. We could correct an extraordinary sense in which, in making sense of each other, they would share a language, one defined by specifying what counts as speaking in the same way in terms of the translation scheme they use for each other's atterances (see "The Social Aspect of Language" p. 7). But as Davidson says obid is "this is not what anyone would call sharing a language, nor what anyone has meant by a common practice or a shared set of rules or conventions".

In this the 4gbt experiment, we envisage mutual understanding between people neather of whom speaks as the other speaks. But Davidson's "leap" goes further, to the casm that understanding does not require anyone everto have spiken as anyone eise speaks. Now we could make "speaking as someone else speaks" imply the conception of a sharing that suffices by itself for understanding, and then it would be simply a way of putting Davidson's main point to say that no one needs ever to have spoken as anyone else speaks in that sense. I have suggested that this coincides with a fundamental thought of Gadamers. Mutual intelligibility is never a matter of the parties having rue malized an interpreting machine, and that holds in parties at for previous aboues of the parties in our thought experiment to come to an understanding with fellow speakers of their divergent mother. Lingues. But this just emphasizes that on a more ordinary interpretation of "speaking as someone clse speaks", our thought experiment as it stands involves people who previously spoke as others did is say one speaks German. and the other speaks Xhosa, and before the disaster they spoke these languages in interacting with others who spoke them too. If Davidson is to sustain his doctrine that shared practice is of no phitosophical interest beyond what derives from its utility in facilitating communication, he must suppose this feature of the thought experiment is messential. Davidson's claims commit him to denying that one needs to learn to speak as others do, in the ordinary sense an order to become a human subject, a potential party to an encounter with another that leads to mutual understanding, at all.

Gadamer says (p. 443) "man's being in the world is primordially linguistic." A follower of Davidson might want to appropriate these words, glossing "linguistic." in terms smiable to Davidson's devaluing of shared languages. But Gadamer is discussing Humboldt's reflections on the differences between languages—languages in the ordinary sense, in which they are shared by their speakers and have histories, languages in the sense that Davidson claims has only practical importance and is devoid of pailosoph ical interest. Gadanier's wording is meant to capture the real significance of Humboldt's doctrine that "languages are worldviews" obid.) The thought is that the being in-the world of any human's ibject is shaped by one or another language in the ordinary sense.

I do not believe Davidson ever considers the thought that shared languages might matter for the constitution of subjects of understanding. If starget is always the conception of a sharing that would suffice of itself for communication. His implied detual that shared languages might matter at another way is ungrounded by argument. Perhaps it is unintentional, and it may seem barsh to hold him to it. But the fact remains that foccoing exclusively on what is required for communication, he draws a conclusion that is generally disparaging to shared practice. He proceeds as if shared practice could be pathosophically interesting only if it were true that it suffices of it self-for mutual understanding between parties to it. This looks like a blind spot for an alternative possibility.

Davidson writes: "The Social Aspect of Language" p. 10): "It me important to emphasize that much successful commaning goes on that does not depend on previously learned common practices, for recog. 7 ng. this helps us appreciate the extent to which understanding, even of the lateral meaning of a speaker's afterances, depends on shared general information as difamiliarity with non-linguistic institutions tall way of life (*). This seems well placed against his standard target, the idea that shared high sticpractice might soffice for mutual anderstanding. But in pointing in the other directions it points in the remark opens the question whether shared languages might be philosophically significant in a different way. A worldview with the same world in view as one's incerlicular has in view ("shared general information"), and familiants with a human way of life. are surely not just aids to arriving at understanding, but conditions for being potential subjects of understanding at a L. And can we make sense of subjects meeting these conditions without having been it mailed into languages. in the ordinary sense, shared linguistic practices?

A human way of the is pervasively shaped by language not just on occasions of verbal behaviour but also in its "non-linguistic institutions". ("Man's being in-the world is primord ally linguistic") A "language game" cannot be confined to bursts of speech. It is a whole in which verbal behaviour is integrated into a form of afe, including practices that if considered on their

own would have to be counted as non-linguistic. In one sense, we might say, there are no non-languistic human institutions. Does it make sense to suppose there could be this pervasive shaping of life by language if everyone's verbal behaviour was completely idiosyncratic? Surely the understanding backs if we are asked to envisage mination into and maintenance of a distinctively human way of life in a context in which there is no social thing as simply hearing the meaning in another's words—in which all communicative interactions require the parties to work at interpreting one another as they would have to if the ordinary idea of a shared language had no application.

Hurebold, considered the differences between human languages in terms. of different forms of a universal faculty. Conceding that such an approachyields insights. Gadamer writes (p. 441). "Nevertheless this concept of an guage constitutes an abstraction that has to be reversed for our purposes. Verbal form and traditionary content cannot be separated in the hermeneutic experience. If every language is a view of the world at is so not primarily because a is a particular type of language into the way that lenguists view language) but because of what is said or handed down in this language." (Gadamer's emphasis) Hamboldt a ready had a thought that Gadamer puts like this p. 443) "language maintains a kind of independent life vis a visitue fildt. vidual member of a languistic community, and as he grows into it, it introduces burn into a particular orientation and relationship to the world as well." But Humboidt inderstood this thought in terms of "the formalism of a faculty". top: 440-442 whereas Gadamer, reversing that abstraction, understands it in terms of "the anity between language and tradition" in 441). Here the very idea of having the world in view is made intelligible. In terms of having grown into a tradition, which is part of what it is to have learned to speak a language in the ordinary sense, In learning to speak all angliage in the ord nary sense, one does not just acquire propensities to respond verbally to aspects of the passing show. One learns what to say, which in the first instance come des with what we say about general features of the world.

³ This is one of the ways in which Williger-stein, see the expression "language gatrie" see Philosophical Investigations §? "I shall also call the whole consisting of language at the actions into which it is woven the language game." See also § 9 "to imagine a language means?" imagine a form of life." Davidson miss mean to sound has Williger-steinal; note with his use of "way of life". Inith and Maxima antedates Gadanner's encounter with Willigeristein, but its conception of the linguistic character of himan is electromates with Willigeristein's later work.

including, importantly the past. Though it can become clear to one that this is what one is learning only when one is already some distance into the development. Can we keep an application for this idea of growing into a tradition while we try to suppose that no two individuals share a way of speaking? (What becomes of, for instance, listening to the stories of the elders, or more sophisticated counterparts to that?, Or can we dispense with the idea of having grown into a tradition and still make sense of possessing a world view? Does it make sense to suppose an individual might acquire a world view by his own efforts of concept-formation and investigation? It cannot help to bring in the efforts of others, if one must already have a world view in order to be able to interpret their attempts to tell one what they have found out

Davidson accepts that the very idea of speaking meaningfully presupposes "the distinction between using words correctly and merely thinking one is using them correctly" ("The Social Aspect of Language" p. 10). He argues against the thesis that the required use of "correctly" involves norms of a shared practice. Instead he urges that the relevant norm is determined by a speaker's intention to be understood in a certain way. A speaker uses words correctly in the only sense that matters, if he is ses them in such a way as to be understood as he intends. Depending on one's audience, it is may involve using words incorrectly by the lights of grammarians of languages in the familiar sense.

Davidson is surely right in this resistance to chosm an our reflections. about ruganing. But without claiming that one can make oneself understood only if one uses some common language in ways that would be approved by a certain soft of authority, we can wonder if the conceptual apparatus that Davidson here helps himself to would be available if there were no such thing as a shared language. The ability to intend some performance. to be understood in one way or attother has to be learned. Eke the ability to intend to trump one's right hand opponent's ace. Such an intention is not a purpose that might simply start to animate a creature's activity in the course. of its anima. He as the purpose of grooming itself can start to govern the behaviour of a cat. Is it only a superficial fact, a reflection of mere practical. mes, that as things are we acquire the ability to have such intentions at all by learning to speak a language in the ordinary sense—by acquiring a repertorre of potential actions that belong to such a practice, much as frumping one's opponent's ace belongs to the practice of certain games? Does it make sense to suppose that the repertoire of actions whose acquisition enables

148 Issues in Davidson

the formation of such intentions in the first place might be specific to an individua? This is not to suggest that in othering a string of words one can mean, and be understood to mean only what the words mean in some shared anguage. But it is one thing to agree with Davidson that that is not so, and quite another to abandon the thought that the primary form of the ability to mean something by verbal behaviour is the ability to mean what one's words mean independently of the particularity of one's communicative situation, that is, what they mean in the language in the ordinary sense, that one is learning to speak

Davidson holds that "verbal behaviour, singlessarily social" ("The Social" Aspect of Language" p. 5). And since he takes language and thought car a certain sense) to be interdependent this necessary sociality embraces shought as well. "there must be an interacting group for meaning—evenpropositional thought I would say -to emerge" ("The Social Aspect of Language" p. 5). Unsurprisingly given how he disparages the significance of shared practice, the sociativitie has in mind a minimal, there must be at east a pair of subjects who interpret each other, and there is no necessary tole for spared practices. When there are more than two parties to a guistic interaction, each encoratter is at protople stantary confuted to its partie. parats, with no need for commissal practices in the background. This is to depict the sociality of sanguage as I their sociality in contrast with thee. sociality, you se terminings, introduced by Robert Brandom 11 Davidson. only sketches an Filter conception of the sociality of language, but drandom undertakes a detailed I thou picture, culminating in provision for making objective purporties, lich, that lunges on the idea that the particle parts in the ranguage game keep some of one another's deonac statuses. their commitments and enottements

If would be impossible to do justice in a few sentences to Brandom's mammoth enterprise which includes far more than just elaborating to's Davidsonian inspiration. But without going into detail we can see that the scepticism in have expressed starting from Gadanierian considerations, about Davidson's conception carries over to Brandom's in the shape of the question whether an I and a thin can be interfigibly in place without a shared language, something that belongs to a we—to enter into consti-

14. Making # Explain Reasoning Removed by and Discount community, see the index under "their row socialist" See in particular p. 659 in 50 for an approving characterist Davidson as taking the socialist of "linguistic practice and therefore intermionality. I obe of the I-thor variety.

tuting them. It is mysterious how the appeal to scorekeeping can help here. How can a pair of items neather of which is on its own intelligible as a perspective on the world-this is why the construction is supposedly necessary somehow become perspectives on the world by means of the inclusion in what they are not on their own intelligible as perspectives on, of stretches of each other's behaviour? There is no such difficulty about the Gadamerian. Fare picture. Here faindlarity with a natural language, in which verbal form and traditionary content are inseparable, constitutes an individual stance that is perfectly into ligibly ad on its own an orientation towards reality. As Godamer can put t to 449). In language the reality beyond every indevidual consciousaiess becomes visible." All on its own, not of course, that a permanently sol tary individual could intelligibly have such an orientancial towards reality—the language that makes the orientation possible is essentially the possession of a new but there is no reason to accept that the way socially underbes the possibility of objective purport is by way of multiple individuals keeping tabs on one another

Brandom suggests that I in pictures are bound to be object trable. A picture of a angle stic practice has to incorporate subjection to nertils, and Brandom suggests that I we pictures, if they undemake this burder is speak of "the community" as acting in norm involving ways in which only persons can intelligibly act, such as assessing the performances of speakers. Thereby such approaches unacceptably treat "the community" as a 5% perfailve individual. ⁴

We should not be in sled bete by a verbal divergence between Brandom and Davidson. The norms involved in this argument of Brandom's are not the expediencies that figore in Davidson's gloss in "correctly", when Davidson undertakes to provide for the distinction between merely thinking one is using words correctly and using them correctly. What Brandom has in mind its ultimatery norms embodied in the very idea of objective purport. ("Ultimately" he has an idiosyncratic conception, which I am by-passing for these purposes, of norms whose form dat on does not involve task of objective purport in terms of which he thinks the possibility of objective purport is to be latterstood.) For instance. The fact that "rent" on my lips has the meaning it has involves its being latter for my to use the word in saying how a thing is only if the thing is red. The normativity this exempt fies makes contact with Davidson's thinking at the point at which he

undertakes to provide for objective purport, a separate point from that at which he acknowledges "norms" put in place by a speaker's intention of being attactstood. Davidson considers the need to distriguish merely thinking one is using words correctly from using them correctly only in connection with being mistaken about what uses of words will get one's meaning across, but the need for a distinction that we can formulate in those terms arises equally at connection with saying how things merely appear to be as opposed to how they are I think it does not indicate any substantive divergence from Brandom that Davidson takes of correctness in the use of words only in connection with successfully expressing one's mind and not in connection with whether the mind one expresses is in line with how hings are "See "The Social Aspect of Language" pp. 10-14 for "nor mat vily" as communicative expediency, and pp. 14-15 for objectivity which Davidson treats in a way that does not involve acknowledging a role for an idea of correctness.)

Brandom y argument against I we conceptions certainly tells against so neph losophical appears to "the community". But there is no super person in the pict re I have been recommending. I have not credited the we who share a racguage with a super personal counterpart to the deonite attitude maing by individuals that is central to Brandom's picture. It might seem that the point of rivoking a we must be to ensure that there is someone—if not other individuals then a soper individual—to bold speakers to the infinis En Brandon's rather than Davidson's sense) of their ling istic practice. But this reflects a metaphysical scraple about the very idea of subjection to norms, a semple that Ends comfort in seeing norms as insuluted by personal activity—if not on the part of ordinary persons, then it is a version of he picture that would certainly be confused on the part of a super-person. And I think the scruple is baseless in If that is right, there is no ground for Brandom's siliggestion that anyone who refuses to reduce the necessary sociality of language to interactions between individuals most make a superperson but of a we Languages are among what Gadamer calls (p. 460) "the suprasubjective powers that dominate history." They give a normalive

^{16.} At p. 661, 0. 64 Brandom mentions without comment citing Heidegger, the kind of considerations that show the scrupic to be baseless. But this does not deter out from earing its effects control his own thinking about normativity. Consider the implication at pp. 506-528, that normativity is "mysterious" arisess seen as instituted by activities on the part of those who are subject to the relevant norms.

15.

shape to our afe-world, in a way that is not to be reduced to the activities of subjects, but saying that is not crediting personal performances to superpersons.

I have barely scratched the surface of Gadamer's thinking about language My pripose in this section has been no more than to urge that its basic orientation stands up well to comparison with the *I thou* orientation of Davidson and Brandom. Thereby I hope to have removed one obstacle that might blind philosophers of "analytic" formation to the riches of the third part of *Truth and Method*.

Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective1

I For several decades now. Donald Davidson has been steadily producing an amazingly rich and—even though it has been presented in self-contained papers. Systematic body of work. In this volume, we have another instalment of his creative output the fruits of his reflections on central topics, it epistemology and inclaphysics, shaped by his distinctive and influential approach to osues in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, it goes without saying, but I shall say it anyway it is a fine thoug to have these vintage essays in easily accessible and portable form, to put beside the first two volumes, with a place of homour reserved on the shelves for the eagerly awasted locath and fifth

But I think the best way to celebrate Davidson's work is not to praise it but to find it controversial. Nobody gets everything exactly right, and what is most frontful in philosophy is work that is worth taking issue with

2. I want to start by raising some questions about themes that are signalized by the tibe of this collection and brought together in the final essay. "Three Varieties of Knowledge". Davidson argues that knowledge of the non-mental world around us, knowledge of the minds of others, and knowledge of our own minds are mutually irreducible but mutually interdependent. To nie that seems exactly right my incertainty is about the details of his picture, not its broad outlines.

To began with Davidson argues that the very idea of the objective is inseparante from the idea of the subjective. Concepts of features of objective

These remarks were written for a symposium that was originally planned to honour Davidson's work in general, but reframed at his request as a discussion of the hird volume of his papers.

153

reality require more than mere differential responsiveness to those features. For a creature to have concepts of the objective, and hence for it to have behels and knowledge about the objective it must be aware that in general there can be a difference between how things objectively are and how things seem to it. For there to be mental states with objective content, their possessor must have the idea of objectivity, which is the idea of that potential gap between how things are and how one takes them to be. That puts in place a dependence of objective knowledge on at least a potential awareness. of the state of one's own mind, how one takes things to be. And if the subjective comes into view in the first instance like that in the gaise of one's own take or perspective on objective real ty, that ensures a dependence in the other direction, of the subjective on the objective. The primary case of the subjective is a subject's take on the objective. (That is not exactly how Davidson secures the connection in this direction, but I think it is Davidsoman in spirit.) So the objective and the subjective are interdependent. So far so good: that seems just right to me-

What aims the package as we have it so far the objective and the subjective, to the intersubjective is the fact that according to Davidson it is language that makes possible the genumely conceptual engagement with the world that requires a subject to have the idea of objectivity and the idea of his own take on the world. And language is essentially public, it is essential to language that it enables us to make ourselves, into ligible to others and to find others intelligible, that it enables us to make our own minds known to others and to know the minds of others. This mutual intelligibility between ourselves and others requires us to conceive objective reality as come in ground between ourselves and our interlocutors, potential and actual

This connection too seems right to me at least at this level of abstractness 1 agree that language is essential for a conceptual engagement with the world, and that language has to be public. I do not want to join those who think against Davidson, that creatures without language have a subjective orientation towards objective reality, at any rate in the interesting sense that gives rise to the familiar problems of epistemialogy. In general 1 f. d. Davidson's human charavimism on this question perfectly congental (Though I wish he would say more about how we should talk about brutes, who are as he concedes upp. 101–2) much more like as than they are like guided missiles. We need more than just the insistence, which I applied that our ways of understanding brutes differ crucially from our ways of understanding ourselves and one another. We need a positive line about our

ways of understanding bruies, and it is not satisfying to suggest that crediting them with intelligent engagements with their environment is fast a convenience, called for only by the fact that we tack detailed knowledge about their internal control machinery.)

What bothers me in this region of Davidson's thinking is the way be aser bes a priority to intersubjectivity in the interconnected triad of subjective. in ersubjective, and objective. It is "through having the concept of intersals." sective truth." Day ason suggests, that we "come to have the belief truth. contrast"—that we "arrive at the concept of an objective trian" p. 105). Certainly given that language conceived as essentially public matters for objectivity in the way Davidson says it does at follows that it is cannot have the concept of an objective troth without at least taking onese fite be able to come to an understanding with others. That is, there cannot be a concept of objective reality without a concept of intersobjective truth. But to say that the concept of mutual understanding is a reside to acquaring the concept of objectivity goes beyond that. And I cannot see how this suggestion of a way. into the circle colleges with the thesis that objective and intersubjective, like any pair of the friad, are mathally interdependent. If they are- which I think is right. Then surely one could not have the concept of intersubjectivity lift, without yet having the concept of object vity. But that x what the idea of a way of acquaring the concept of object vity implies. Surely one has either all or none of the three deas, the dea of subject viry, the idea of abjectivity, and the idea of intersubjectivity. If they are interdependent on eof hem cannot be that through which one arrives at the others

What arche the case before the concept of objectivity is on the scene, and hence granting Davidson's conception of concepts before any concepts at all are in hand, is that one sentient being is linked to another sendent being by the fact that each is differentially responsive to the other's differential responses to some feature of objective reality. That non-conceptual perhaps pre-concept a relatedness to a feature of reality and one another's responses to it is the structure that I think Davidson, isoally has informed when he talks about triangulation (see leigt pp. 117–21). Getting into such relations to others neight be a way to arrive at the concept of objectivity. But as Davidson himself, rosists, being parties to non-conceptual triangulation does not make creatures possessors of the idea of intersubjectivity. I does not even thake their instances of it. So even if we grant that triangulation might be essential for objectivity, that does not warrant the suggestion of a priority for intersubjectivity.

Anyway I am not sure about Davidson's claims for mangination. Davidson arges that the triangular structure of responses to one another's responses to the world is necessary for there to be an answer to the question. what the responses to the world are responses to (see e.g., p. 119). He talks about dogs conditioned to salivate when a bell rings. Are they responding to the be loor to the vibrations in the air or to a pattern of stimulation of nerveendings? We have no natical way to describe the shipid is that eacits the response except in terms of the bell, and Davidson's "ggests that that is one sale of a structure that when it gets to have two sides, provides for determinacy in the identif canon of stumble. Now I am not sure I indepstated the problem to which this is supposed to be a solution. Dogs do not respond to configurations in their own nervous systems, that is not a live candidate. (Their nervous systems do) Dogs do respond to sounds. In the case we are considering, they have been conditioned to expect food at the soul d of the bell. However produced, that yound would trigger the same expectation. That is, the response is to the sound—the bell is merely what usually produces the sound. In thus discounting the bell, and I demotying the stim dusas a certain vibration in the air? That would be a superfacius bit of metaphysics. In fact, if someone said "When you say it doesn't matter that the sound is produced specifically by the belif you're saying that what they respond to is the vibration in the air" it would be a fair. Brough no doubt annoying—as over to say "No. I in saying that what they respond to is the sound*

When I say a I that I am giving expression to a conception of how we make sense of the behaviour of animals. (Here is a point at which as I sing gested if we lid be good to have more to say about that) As far as I can see the classifications we find natural are not to the point. Except of course that if we could not have the conceptual resources to say that what the dogs respond to is the sound. But given that we have the conceptual resources to do so, we say it is the sound they respond to because that is what makes the longs behaviour intelligible. In the distinctive way 1, which we can find ability behaviour intelligible. Making sense of what dogs do is a partial analogue to making sense of what concept possessors do which centrally includes speaking. That is, it is an analogue to or perhaps a simple form of interpretation. Which is the master themse of Davidson's philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, identifying "the" cause. One target, of a response of the response is a bit of animal behaviour is an exercise in interpretation in

a broad sense and we may as well focus on the narrow sense in which the response is informed by conceptual capacities and understanding behaviour is inseparable from interpreting a language. Certainly this connection with interpretation implies that thinking about the largers of responses involves envisaging two perspectives, that of the responder and that of an interpreter. But these are not the same as the base points of Davidson's triangle. Even it we focus on the primary case of making sense, the interpretation of language, surely interpreters do not need to be in communication with the risubjects.

Davidson argives that in the most fundamental cases the meaning of an observational sentence is given by what normally causes the disposition to assent to it (see e.g., p. 151). We might put this thought by saying that the target of a linguistic response is its normal cause. I think that is right, but it tasks being miscarding if it suggests that an interpreter must first identify the cause of a larguistic response of task that, if approached in the abstract linguistic matter that are the basis of having independently settled such questions, declare that cause to be the target. Identifying "the" cause, where the definite description gets its point from Davidson's thought about the meaning of occasion sentences is discalableady an exercise of interpretation, and the identification of larget and cause does not establish that interpretation in general laces questions like the one about the dogs.

In Davidson's picture, subjects "take cognitive advantage" of the triangular situation in p. (20), they "make use of the triangular situation to form judgements about the world" (p. 130). I do not dispute that my having the concept of a table (say)—a condition for my being able to make judgments about tables as such it is atextricably connected with my knowledge that I can make myself intelligible to others, and understand others, as talking about tables. But that is not to say that I somehow use my confidence that I could come to an understanding with others as a means to project my thinking to a determinate place in objective reality when I make a judgment about a particular table. I have to admit that I find this imagery of exploitation (taking advantage making use) a bit mysterious.

I want to end this part of my remarks by mentioning a different connection between the publicity of language and the possibility of coming to a view of the world, which following Davidson—includes a view of onese f and others as oriented to the world. Learning to talk is not just acquiring habits of verbal response to features of the passing show. It is also acquiring

propensities to assett to sentences that might be said to give expression to fundamental propositions about reality, such as that there were things that happened a very long time ago—sentences of a sort that Wittgenstein talks about in *On Certainty*, though because of their status as hunges on which our practices of deciding what to say turn, he tends to suggest we should not suppose utterances of such sentences give expression to propositions at al. At first this element in learning to talk must be just acquiring propensities to vocalize our react to the vocalizations of others in ways that pass in ster with one's elders. None of this proto-linguistic output is understood until a great deal is understood, as Wittgenstein says (§141). "Tight dawns gradually over the whose"

I cannot find any acknowledgment of anything in this area in Davidson, and I think this may not be an accident. Focusing on the requirements for communication between beings that are already full fledged subjects. Davidson is sceptical about whether speaking a language requires deling as others do (see pp. 114-5) and there will be more about this in the fifth volume). I think this scepticism would make it hard for him to acknowledge the importance on acquiring a conception of the world with inceself and others in it of samply learning what to say at that fundamental level, which to begin with—before light has dawned—succey cannot be anything but learning to vocalize in ways that pass muster in a group that one is being initiated into.

3. I am going to end by briefly reopening a conversation about "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge". In his Introduction (pp. xv-xv.) Davidson says that is the essay he would most like to rewrite. He chastises himself for giving the impression that he disallows any role for the senses in "senous commerce between world and mind". For my part I do not see how any reader of that wonderful essay could miss the fact that Davidson credits the senses with a substantial role in our acquisition of knowledge about the world. His claim is, perfectly clearly not that the senses play no role in knowledge-acquisition, but that their role is causal and not evidential. I cannot see how rewriting could make that any clearer.

My problem with "A Coherence Theory" is not that it leaves the senses out of the picture, but precisely that it thus restricts their role to the merely causal. The only sensory episodes that figure in Davidson's picture of perception are sensations, which are the sort of thing Kant must have meant by "intuitions without concepts" when he remarked that into tions without

concepts are band. I thank Davidson is clearly right that such things could be noty causally inour rationally relevant to the formation of belief. That is a way of capturing the point Kant makes when he says they are band. The trouble by my lights is that Davidson's picture has no room for ant mions in the sense in which Kant is talking about anumous by the time we get to the Transcendenta. Deduction in the first Critique repisodes that are them solves cases of our sensory capacities at work, as opposed to being merely caused by operations of our sensory capacities, but which are like be left in being actualizations of conceptual capacities and so able consistently with the basic or negles that undertile Davidson's thinking here to be rationally and not just causally televant to our thinking. Davidson has no room for the availability of facts to subjects in their sensory consciousness itsed.

When we have reached this point is the conversation on earber occasions. Davidson has expressed a puzzlement about what this is that I find missing from his picture. He casms to accommodate perceiving that such and such is the case of the gaise of acquiring the benefit that such and such is the case of a way that is carised, through the operation of the senses by such and such such a clearly being the case (see posets). What more do I want?

Well, I Prink it is wrong to think of the significance of "seeing that isay) as extracisted by the fact that seeing is standardly a mode of sicker acceismon. See lig that P is not the same thing as acquiring the belief that Pircal visita, way illough no doubt isually people who see that Pido acquire. he be jet that P and he do bud that were not so it would not be possible for there to be such a thing as seeing that P. The difference between seeing that Pland Visually acquaring the belief that Plean be brought out by noting that one can realize later that one was seeing that P though one did not know it at the time and so did not at the time acquire the belief that P 11 thought I was aboking at your sweater under one of those lights that make it impossible to tell what colours things are but I now realize I was actually seeing that it was brown." In saying this, one registers that one had, at the relevant, past time, an enattement that one did not then realize one had. One was ina position to acquire a bit of knowledge about the world, but because of a misapprehension about the circumstances, one did not avail oneself of the opport, nity. One did not form the relevant belief, let alone get to know that that was how tougs were. This past entitlement possessed without one's then reading it is a case of the sort of thing I find missing from Davidson's pict ire—the availability of a fact to a subject in an episode or state of sensory consciousness

Davidson's so-called concrentism is encapsulated in the claim that "nothing can count as a reason for holding a besief except another beset". (p. 141). The case I have described violates this dictum, it is a case in which there was an entitlement that was not a belief. Of course it is precisely because the er titlement was not a belief that the subject did not form the belief that the emitlement in fact warranted. But it was an entitlement even so, as the subject later realizes. Taking the modably one way, we mag, I say the subject could cite the entitlement even at the inne—her co. scio as state. was constituted by the presence to her of the relevant fact. Taking the modality another way, she could not cite the entitlement, because her misapprehension about the lighting prevented her freezy recognizing her conscrous state as the entitlement a nevertheless way. Davidson's "coherentist". dictain would be vindicated if it were right to restrict the entitlements a snoject has to those she can rate on this second way of taking the modality. But why should we make this restriction? It amounts to a first person landpresent tenses approach to episternic employment, and at looky out of line with the sympathy Davidson expresses an a different context, for a fresolutely third person approach to epistemology" (p. 124). That remark of mine is merely ad nominion, and there is no time row to address the issue itself. But I thank there is picuty to be said for the idea to at epistemology's topic should be not what subjects know, but what they are in a position to know which is separated from the first topic precisely by cases in which opportunities to know are not taken. cases in which subjects have cutifiements that are not beliefs.

PART IV

Reference, Objectivity, and Knowledge

Evans's Frege!

If thelps to start with Russell, in the Theory of Descriptions, Russell gives an account of the logical form of sentences with definite descriptions in what might intuitively be thought of as subject position—sentences of the form "The F is G". Russell's parsing amounts to "There is exactly one thing that is E and it is G".

This distinguishes the logical form of such sentences from the logical form of sentences with genuinely referring expressions—"logically proper names"—in what in this case really is a bject position.

In Russel's conception, sentences with logically proper names in sobject position express thoughts for propositions; whose availability to be thought or expressed depends on the existence of the objects referred to by the logically proper names.

Suppose someone sets out to express a thought by uttering a sentence containing a definite description. Russell urges that lack of an object that briquely satisfies the description cannot imply absence of a thought expressing powers of sentences to the fact that they are constructed in a familiar way out of independently significant words. Their significance, the that of a specification, should be independent of whether or not there is anything the specification fits.

Admittedly there is a superficial parallel between the form "The F is G" and the form "a is G" (where "a" marks a place for a logically proper name). If there is an object that unsquely satisfies what replaces "E" in an instance of the former, something is true of the description that is also true of the

Thanks to José Bermude? for comments on an earlier version of Tox essay.

² See "On Denoting". The focus on monadic predications is of course messentia.

augually proper name in an instance of the latter. Both determine a certain object as what the thought that is being expressed concerns, in the sense that the tritle of labsity of the thought depends on how it is with that object indeed we could use that formulation to define a certain conception of singular reference.

But it a Russell's view this superficial parallel masks a deep difference. Where absence of a suitable object would require us to find no thought expressed if we assimilated the two logical forms, the Theory of Descriptions finds a thought that is no worse than false. If we focus on this difference, we shall not be incarred to make much of the conception of sing har refere, ce hat groups define e descriptions—though only those that do single out objects—and logically proper names together.)

2. In Rassels conception thoughts expressible with the help of logically proper names—genuinely subject predicate thoughts—are accessible only to the kers who are "acquainted" with the objects in question 4. Are for his official account of acquaintance one is acquainted only with things that figure in one's inunediate consciousness, conceived in a rather Cartesian way bits of the seasors given, bits of what is given with similar inmediacy in recollection, and has long as Russel believes in its notes own self. Outside the range of one's acquaintance, one can direct thoughts at one ects only in he way the Theory of Description's provides for

So the apparatus of the Theory of Descriptions cannot have us application immed to sentences that actually contain definite descriptions. The Theory's characteristic forth comes to figure also in Rassell's according to the thoughts speakers have it maind when they utter sentences containing what would

If you the questioning of the arab aeroal grouping of singular referring expressions for which I valis gives Russell credit in the futiseduction of the arabis of Reference pp. I For his awar part. Evans goes on to argue that Russell's criterion for being referring expressions simply will not some up. p. p. 5.1 oning the treatment of "descriptive names" at pp. 46-5 is seen so pp. 36-8. Accordingly the needs a deferent ground from the excell have rehearsed here eighted be cries as the most important argon. If Russell gave (p. 52) or reb sing to come pure debut to descriptions as referring expressions. For Evans it most sing tall terms need not be "Russelliar". But since I vans argues in a for treat sit guaranter is were "one and all Russe are" p. 4.1 is that suppress his complication here and work with Russell's impulse emerior, which is at any rate a criterion for being a Russellia it referring expression. If Evans is right about Frege, the conception that interface Russellia grouping is the only one that matters for him.

4. See [c.g., "Knowledge by Acquamtance and Knowledge by Description".

proper names. In these cases too we have to suppose that speakers direct their thoughts at objects—if there are objects such that the truth or falsity of the thoughts turns on how it is with them—by exploiting specifications of the objects.

This extension of the apparatus would climic neatly with the original motivation for the Theory of Descriptions. As long as we are confined to objects. of acquaintance on Russeli's official conception, it would be hard to make sense of a risk that someone aught utter a sentence intending to copress a genumely subject predicate thought, but thrill out to have expressed no thought because the benefithat there was a suitable object was motaked. It would be natized to think one cannot be justaken about the existence of what is given at one's immediate consciousness. But outside the range of one's acquarmance, there is room for scepticions, though perhaps only a typerbolic Cartesian scepticism in some cases—about the existence of objects one might want to be able to direct one's thoughts at. Here as mytheoriginal application, extending the Theory of Descriptions would provide thoughts imprime to the fate Russell cannot telerate at the original case, of forming out to be only diusions of thoughts if the benefithat suitable objects exist was mistaken. The worst that could happen is that they would be thoughts all right, but false ones

It has to be acknowledged that this motivation—avoidance of Tusions of thoughts—is not at contrestage when Russell recommends outer ding the apparatus of the Theory of Descriptions to differences in which say ordinary proper names figure. What Russell orges is not that if one tries to frame subject predicate thoughts about objects outside the range of one's acquaintance one runs the risk that the supposed thoughts to most to be false or The attempt to express such thoughts is ruled out directly by the fact that one is not acquainted with their objects. Russell does not appeal to the fact that be refund the existence of their objects is chance.

In fact, though he thinks such thoughts are beyond the reach of our minds. Russell nevertheless exploits them, somewhat strangely on his

⁵ This implies that the way Evans depicts Russe Lat pp. 44-5 peeds qualification.

166

picture of how we communicate with the relevant kinds of sentences. If I say something "about B-smarck" perhaps using that ordinary name, the thin ght in my mind in ist have the sort of shape that the Theory of Descriptions provides for since I am not acquainted with Bismarck. But inspeaking as I do. Russell binds. I "describe" a subject predicate proposition. about Bismarck—one that only Bosnarck himself could get his mindaround, since only Bismarck himself was acquainted with the object in question. Someone other than Bismarck who understands are similarly thinks a descriptive thought, with a similar relation to that singular proposition, which neither of us can actually think. It is because each of us thinks a proposition that "describes" that same singular proposition, not thinkan eby either of its, that we are in communication with each other for

This comports badly with supposing Russell's motivation for extending the Theory of Descriptions so much as includes let alone being constituted. by the wish to avoid invoking thoughts of a kind such that their very existence migh, turn out to be an illusion. If Bismarck is a hoax on the part of historians, the picture Russell thinks I must have of how I can communicate. by talking "about Bismarck" involves my purporting to "describe" a thought. that by Russel's lights would not exist on that hypothesis

However, this fact about Bussell's thinking need not matter for a broadbrash partare of one way it was widely received, which is all that my present purposes require

The Theory of Descriptions makes straightforward sense of a way in which thoughts can be targeted on objects. Many philosophers were capt vated by this. And they took encouragement from Russell in supposing that that way of directing thoughts at objects need not be restricted to cases where the specification by means of which a thought singles but its object is made explicit in the relevant atterances. There was an antelligible rendency. to suppose that the Theory of Descriptions captured the very dea of a thoughts or an atterarice's being directed at an object. Thoughts that single out objects do so by way of specifications."

6 See The Problems of Physicagene p. 31. There is a fine discussion of this part ∈ Russell's bibking in Mark Samsbury, "Russell on Names and Communication,"

For an excellent example of this kind of approach, see John R. Seane's frea ment of proper harnes ("Prope. Names or which is notable for its organisty about how to arrive at The content of the specification that according 6) Seatte displays how a name suigles out. its object. Searle conceives his topic as how ordinary proper haines refer his Russelinspired treatment is not respor sive to the Russesian thought that might be put by saving As I stressed, for Russell himself the idea that a description can single out an object as what a thought concerns, in the sense that the truth or falsity of the thought turns on how it is with that object, marks only a superfictal match with the semantical character of logically proper names. In Russell's view, logically proper names enable the expression of thoughts that are about objects in a deeper sense. It is understandable that this should have tended to be lorgotter, given how Russell's treatment restricts, a most to variishing point, our repertoire of the kind of thought we can express with the help of logically proper names. But it remains the case that the extended Theory of Descriptions does not capture Russell's view of genainely subject-predicate form. In this general "descriptivism", what it is plaus ble to identify as Russell's own conception of singular reference goes missing.

3 How does this Russellian picture relate to Frege's distinction between sense and reference as a applies to singular terms is First we need a quick sketch of the point of Frege's distinction.

What difference does the presence of a singular term make to the capacity of sentences containing it perhaps as uttered on sociable occasions, to express thoughts? Part of the answer is that at least in primary occurrence and at least if it does refer to something, a singular term serves to a deate which object the thought expressed by a sentence concerns in the sease that the truth or fals ty of the thought turns on how it is with that object

But if that were the whole of the answer, we would not be able to distinguish the contributions to the expression of thoughts made by pairs of

that "reference" by specification is not genuine reference, more what can be done by exptoring aggreably proper names. For a conception of this kind applied of the object directedness of thought in general, not restricted to thought expressed to bothe beip of proper names, see Seame's Intertiendate. An Essay of the Physiophy of Mana.

⁸ To this formeration. It have reverted to reference for Frege's Bedeuting". "Meaning" in Evans's exposition following the more recent translations. See Sainsbury's note the form Freque p. 225. I shall most vision with the Germani trin. My form diation is designed to a low for the fact that Frege's distinction applies to meaning to expressions in general, not just singular terms, the application to whose sentences, in particular with come up later.

⁹ The allusion to occasions of litterance is strictly needed to accommodate indexicality and similar phenomena. But my concerns here are as a testel of abstractness at which his can premy much be ignored, and I shall continue to talk often of septences as (capable of expressing thoughts).

singular terms that refer to the same object. We would not be able to disting ash the thoughts expressible by sentences that are abke except in that where one has one such term the other has the other. And Frege's idea is that at least sometimes we ought to want to make such a distinction. There is no need for it if the one term differs from if e other for y as object" that is presumably if they are merely notational variants. there can be cases in which a rational subject who understands both terms. can say believe the thought she understandy as expressed by one sentence from such a pair white dishell eving the thought she understands as expressed by the other. To suppose she both believes and dissolveyes, he same thing would bring her ran-mains into question, though exhipotness her combination of attitudes is consistent with her being rational. We can smocibly maintain the hypothesis of rationality if it is not the same thing that she believes and dishereves. Her understanding of the two sentences. associates the nowith different thoughts. And since the sentences that express the different thoughts are a ike apart from the singular terms they contain to must be the difference in singular terms that accounts for the difference in thought expressed. It must be that though the virginar terrus. have the same Bedeutional they differ in their contributions to the thoughts express blo by sentences that contain them. That is what a difference in sense Soon, is no the part of subsentential expressions. A difference of Sint on the part of whole sentences just is a difference in thoughts expressed a face ghis about the same object can differ as haw the of get his ares in them, how it is presented by singular terms that refer to it it expressions of the thoughts 11

On this account, the controlling a in of Frege's introduction of *Sata* is to provide a conception of thoughts—possible contents of propositional attaitides and speech acts—that in conjunction with a repertoric of concepts of kinds of propositional attaitions part viewplained in terms of rational relations between them (for instance) that rationality proclades believing and disbeaesing or withholding judgment with respect to the same hing yields descriptions of ways in which minds are faid our such that the descriptions put a subjects rationality in question only when the subjects

^{10.} See "On Sense and Reference", p. 57.

This explanation of the point of saying that control ring singular terms can after insease follows Fregue exposition in the tener is not relate that I varieties. The varieties of Reference pp. 14–15 (the "Afta"-"Ateb" case).

rationality is indeed open to question. If we find ourselves shaping up to crediting a subject with, say, believing and disbelieving the same thing, even though we can find no fault with the subject's rationality. If we are to go back and find a way to distinguish what she believes from what she disbelieves. This is what dictates that we find, or posturate a semantically relevant respect in which coreferring singular terms can differ

We might say Frege's introduction of Sinn reflects an idea on these lines the very idea of a configuration in a mind needs to be seen in the context of the concept of ranonality.

It can be illuminating to draw a connection between this way of spelling out what Frege wants to do with the notion of Sum and his attacks on psychologism about logic. His target there is a conception of logical laws as laws of thought, understood on the model of laws of motion. On this conception, the topic of logic is how minds actually proceed in certain transitions from behels to beaefs. (Perhaps how minds normally proceed but psychologism would understand the invocation of normality statistically, not normalityely.) Frege objects that if we conceive our topic as a certain region of facts about how minds work, we shall not get logic into view at all flogic deals with some of the ways in which minds must work, with "must" expressing requirements of reason.

We can put the point here in parallel with the point about the concept of sense. It is not that the concept of deductive inference is alien to the very idea of moves that minds in fact make. The concept of deductive inference is indeed a resource for describing transitions from one layout of mind to an other. But the concept makes sense only in the context of an idea of requirements of reason. Just so with the concept of, say, what someone believes. It is a resource for describing certain configurations of minds. But here too, the

12 Perhaps a facture to bring the two states together for randomal assessment counts as a far are of rationality or which case the proviso excludes such cases, to any case, they are not what we need to consider in order to understand Frege's point. If it dawns no me that I have contradictory beliefs, what dawns on me is precisely that I believe and dispereve the same thing, and now tanonality requires me to make an adjustment. Frege's poter applies to cases where rationality requires no adjustment in attitudes even in a subject who is consciously adverting to both the attitudes in question. If I do not know that Paderewski (the statesman) and Paderewski (the pianist, were the same person, there is nothing traditional about my say regarding it as unlikely that Paderewski (the pianist) ever engaged in potitics, even though I know a bit about Paderewski (the statesman).

13. Compare Donald Davidson's well-known invocation of the idea of "a construtive idea! of rationality" in "Mental Events"

concept makes sense only in the context of the concept of rationality. By virtue of its connection with concepts of propositional attitudes. It seems right to say the concept of sense belongs to psychology. But if we say this, we must conceive psychology otherwise than psychologistically.¹⁴

What I have said so far does no more than locating the notion of Sum in terms of a role it is to play. Thoughts—senses expressible by who e scatenices—are to be propositional attitude contents, andividuated in accordance with what Evans (The Varieties of Reference | pp. 18–19) calls "the Intilitive Criterion of Difference". Senses of subsentential expressions are to be individuated in a way that allows them to be seen as the contributions made by the expressions to the thoughts expressible by sentences they occur in. And of conrise this is not verto say anything specific about what the sense of this or that referring expression might be. But that is nothing to complain about. When we locate the concept of sense in terms of its role we equip ourselves with a general frame in which to place the detailed accounts of the senses of different types of referring express or situal Evans goes on to offer Indeed we need something at this level of abstraction in order to appreciate exactly what those detailed accounts are supposed to be accounts of

4. What we have so far is that singular terms with the same Redefining can differ in sense, and the difference at sense is a difference in how objects figure in the lights expressible by sentences containing the singular terms—a difference in "way of being given" (Artides Cogebensent), mode of presentation."

14. A psych dogistic psychology of propositional actuales could be described as a foreyoungy of the conferstanding? exhoug Karris remark about Locke. *Intigio of Piere Reason* A x 15. As Evans says op. 18). Frego never said much about particular ways of thinking of

16. Salps bury proposes a pared down Pregeamout that docards the idea of none of pre-

objects"

solution as a gloss, in the attribution of Som to singular terms. See Departing from Frege pp. 2-3. Part of his reason is the fact exploited by Lyans, that the idea is hard vireconcile with taking in stride singular terms with Som but no Bedeuting, which is central to Fregean thinking in Somsbory's reading. But whether the thesis, but here can be Som with the factorious metris that centrality is ast what signing he at issue were his oate to see how the basic Fregean conception, as expounded for instance in connection with he "Afla" "Areb" case, could do without an idea of different ways in which an object can

figure in houghts and mode of presentation" raway of being given" need do no more has express that idea in need not encourage the pressure towards reductivism that Sams bury rightly to my mind, resists

In one place Frege i lostrates this idea by suggesting that Aristotic might figure in some thoughts expressible by using the name "Aristotic" as the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander. "The words of Frege's gloss here have the form Russell discusses under the head of definite descriptions. And that may have helped to encourage a widespread assimilation of what Frege is aiming at, when he credits so guiar terms with *Sinn* as well as *Bedeutung*, to the neo Russellan "descriptivism" that I sketched earlier

In this reading, Frege's idea that singular terms have Sam anticipates the Theory of Descriptions in its generalized application. Frege and Russel but, in line with the reception of Russell that I described earlier. Rossell deprived of his conception of genuinely subject-predicate form—figure together for instance, as progenitors of the target of Saul Kripke's influe it all attack on descrip ive conceptions of singular reference.

In the aftermath of the revoit against "descript vism", in which Kripke's work is a landmark much theorizing about singular thought and its expression came to focus on certain contextual relations, typically of a causal character in which objects can stand to episodes of thought and speech. " In a newly dominant conception of how singular reference works, directing thoughts at objects by exploiting such relations replaced targeting thoughts.

^{17 &}quot;On Sense and Reference" 58

¹⁸ Name a and News in Remarks have the one about Anstall, are cellatedy not such them ground for our auting that Firge belongs in known to get area. The mark is about how Aristotle figures in certain thoughts more about how he reference of the name "Aristotle" is fixed. But even this ight is not usuabout reference using a neer not imply that. I Acist it e had died in infancy and someone cise studied with Plan, and taught Alixan dur those very thoughts would still have been thinkable, but won I have had died other person as their topic or that if no one had so find with Plan, and acight Alexan Jer those very the ights would still have been shokable, but we life ave had go one as their topic. Frege's remark, is about a way in what in thanks to certain assumed lacts. Aristotle can figure it some shoughts. It is consistent with supposing that in those envisaged a ternative curvantistances, there could not have been by thoughts we are considering, it inghts in which Aristotle lighters as the student of Sato and reacher if Alexander.

^{9.} Here we should note Evans's chapter 3, where he protess against the way the generalized causas conception of singular retrience was supposed. The encouraged by Kripke's living suggestions about how uses of proper names trace back, through the continuation of practices of using them, to their bearers. But the genesis of the general conception that came to deplace, descriptivism, as the dominant conception of singular bought and speech need not matter for my purposes here.

on objects as those that conform to specifications. This made room for a kind of recovery of the forgotten parts of Russell's thinking. The relations with objects that are prominent in the new thinking about reference take on something like the role of Russell's concept of acquaintance. But gendine subject predicate form does not now need to be subject to the tight restrictions that were imposed by the requirement of acquaintance as Russel applied it. Not that Russell is usually conceived in this way as a forerunner of the newly dominant conception. The forgotten parts of his thinking tend to stay forgotten, and he figures only as a proponent of the "descriptiv sm" that the new thinking aims to supptaint.

With Frege ass milited into the general "descriptivism" that the newly dominant conception defines itself against the new orthodoxy is conceived as rejecting Frege's apparatus of Sum and Bedeuting, or at least as requiring spostantial modification in its employment. This has fateful consequences for how phi osophers conceive the connection between how thought and speech are directed at objects, on the one hand, and rationality which provides the frame within which Frege's notion of Sum functions on the other. At least in the sorts of case that lites the rejection of "descriptivism" vestigial versions of Frege's notion of Sum come to figure if at all only in character zing configurations in minds that in a supposedly required diverges cell from Frege's idea that sum determines Bedeuting—at most partly determine which objects thoughts concern needly, extraneous help in singling out objects from causal relations between thinkers and objects, now conceived as obtaining outside the sphere of a silbject's rationality.

5. Now the main interest of Evans's explication of Frege besim its rejecting this picture.

Rusself form, rates his conception of genuinely subject predicate form by speaking of propositions in which objects their selves figure as constituents. Propositions so conceived would be individuated by their objects so that there could not be two such propositions in which the same property is attributed to the same object. So in Russed's version of the conception, there is no room for Fregean Sinn. If this is what it takes for

^{20.} For a splendic-y clear expression of a view of this kind, keeping the fregean term notings but abandoning the thesis that Some determines Bedruhma, see Colin McGovn. "The Structure of Concept."

thoughts to be object dependent thoughts individuated by Fregran Sonn would not be object-dependent

But Evans points out that what is essential to Frege's notion of Som has no such implication. Frege's controlling idea, as I said is that if a rational subject cart, say, both accept and withhold acceptance from what we would otherwise need to conceive as a single thought, we must find two different thoughts to be the contents of the two attnudes. Nothing prevents this idea from being applied to thoughts that are "Russellian" in the sense of being dependent for their being available to be thought or expressed on the existence of their objects. So far as singular thoughts are concerned, Frege's aim is to provide for thoughts about objects to be individuated more finely than by the objects they are about as in Russel's conception. That formulation uses a neutral notion of a thought's being about an object. Nothing stands in the way of its being applied to thoughts that are about objects in the "Russellian" sense that they depend on the objects for their existence.

From this angre, it looks like a mere mistake on Russell's part to think genuinely subject-predicate propositions alike in their predicative material. must be identical if they concern the same object. This idea may be encouraged, in R isself's own thinking, by the way his doctrine of acquaintance restricts the range of genumely subject-predicate propositions. With a the restricted range at is hard to see how there could be pairs of cases like those Frege exploits to argue that we need a finer individuation of thoughts. B. t. once Russell's restriction is lifted, as in the conception of reference that has supplanted "descriptivism" as the dominant position, it becomes clearer that object-dependence in thoughts is not of itself, alien to the Fregean framework. There is nothing to prevent us from contemplating rational subjects. who combine behels and disbehels in whose content the same predication is made of the same object -the sort of combination that recommends the Fregean apparatus—even though the contents that Fregean considerations require as to differentiate are contents whose being thinkable at all require the existence of the object. A proposition can be object dependent even though its identity is determined not by the Bedeithing but by the Sum of a singular term used in giving expression to it

The Sum of a referring expression is the way its Bedeuting, the object referred to, figures in thoughts expressible by using it—the way one thinks of the object to tainking such a thought. There can be more than one such way of thinking of a single object, even if each such way of thinking could

not be in a thicker's repertoire if the object did not exist. So Fregean brieness of grains imply does not imply object-independence.

This opens the way to a satisfying synthesis, which constitutes the context n which Evans considers, for instance, perceptually demonstrative thoughts. The reaction against "descriptivism" embodies insights about how certain conrextual, in part colar causal, relations between subjects and objects—which of course have to be actual to stand in those relations to subjects-matter for the directedness of thought at objects. And Evans's point shows that these insights. can be after all, fully integrated with a Fregean stress on rationality, as the frame within which thought about thought and its expression belongs, it need ne longer seem that the insights belong with a "Photograph Model" of singular. hought-a conception according to which what determines which object a thought or neems is at least parily external to its subject s rationality. above for cases in which reference is parily constituted by the obtaining of the sorts of contextual relations that figure in the new supposedly anti-Fregean. way of thinking, without after all needing to separate such reference from the Characteristically Fregean Lipic, configurations within the minds of subjects underst and in such a way that the very idea of such configurations belongs in a famework determined by the requirements of rationality

- 22 On the Photograph Model" see Evans, pp. 73-9, and chapter 4.
- 23. The synthesis Evans enables needs to be separated from the response to the fnew hears of reference, exemplified with great cards to Searie, see e.g., internomating

^{2.} Events according to suggest supplied that if we gloss friegels notion of the Sinnion a referig expression, a terms of a way of thinking of an object at as hard, care orgress has except as positively required that such a way of thenking is object. Rependent. And there is some It has no be said for that Gamp, o'Blus is only Sainsbury wants to do in the next in oil houses. presentables, see a 16 above a But the present point regast that nothing of the idea of ways or thinking of objects, conceive has individual ed on Pregea complete, excludes, bein to be object deposition. Can Some can shigeneral be glossed in terms of the local of a way or sinking if the associated Bedenauty? This may seem to be incatened by the ibvious actiful is cannot be a region; built for understanding a semence that the know its initial value. But the "obvious fact" is just that to understand a sentence one need not know that 8 trude waine is rule or that it is laise as the case may be. That does not preven it is from saying har enter airing the some of say, the sentence. Rash report three, impairs as a warto thinking of a traffice as a second fact the graph value true, though one need not know that hat is a correct identification of the milli-value one is thinking of). In entertaining the Some if the servence one is thinking or the troth value as the in this also theres, that Raut wrote three Cranquer For his focultion, see Mon gomery Furth. Two Types if Designation." For the point made without that location, see Evans p. 17, a conduct in discussion of Diameter in n. 17.

Consider uses of demonstrative expressions that single out objects by exploring their salient availability to perception. Describing the topic like that brings out how the determinate directedness at objects of the thoughts that can be expressed with the help of such expressions depends on contextual, and partly causal, relations between subjects and objects. But even so, "thoughts" in that formulation can be understood in Frege's way. Fregean fineness of grain, held in place by considerations involving ration any, does not need to be conceived as confined to some inner realm, con stitutively independent of those real relations to objects. The real relations to objects do not need to be conceived as extra factors, over and above configurations in that supposed inner realm, in the determination of which objects are speken of in such utterances and thought of in understanding them. Demonstrative senses can be fully Fregean senses that precisely be cause they are partly constituted by real relations to actual objects, reach all the way to the objects.

6 As I remarked. Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeiting is not confined to singular terms. He applies it also to predicates, and strikingly to whole sentences. The Som of a sentence, perhaps on an occasion of atterance, is the thought it can express. Its Bedeuting is its truth value, true or false as the case may be

Readers are sometimes surprised at this. Surely, they to this, the Bedeuting of a sentence ought to be a contatenation of the Bedeutingen of its significant parts. That is thought to capture an infutive notion of a state of affairs or situation. So we have a supposed improvement to Frege, in which the Bedeuting of a sentence is a situation—conceived as a concatenation of objects and, perhaps, properties—that is actual or not according to whether or not the sentence could be truly asserted. There is a helpfolis explicit example of

Searle's strategy is to incorporate mention of the causal relations that the new thinking makes much of the specifications by means of which he commutes to argue that singular thought singles out its objects—so that the characteristic concerns if the new thinking are swabowed up into a sophisticated version of descriptivion. In Evans's synthesis, in s—as in the new thinking itself more the concern of those relations that carries thoughts to their objects but the relations themselves. That is the connection with object dependence of there is no object there is no relation. But there is no indeed the suggestion which hearle admirably reacts against that determining which object a thought concerns is at most partly taken care of by how a subject's mind is configured.

this kind of "correction" to Frege in Inn Barwise and John Perry. Smattons and Attitudes 44.

Barwise and Perry assume that "reference" expresses a more or less intuitive semantical idea, and that Frege's use of the concept of Bedeuting is a more or less mept attempt to capture it. What controls the supposedly intuitive idea is a principle of "the Priority of External Sign ficance", which stands opposed to conceptions that find the significance of an expression in its connection to something in subjects, mands. Frege acknowledges that in the Bedeuting of a sentence as he conceives at all specificity is clammated. All true sentences have the same Bedeuting, the truth-value true, and all laise sentences have the same Bedeuting, the truth value false "Barwise and Perry take this as an acknowledgment that Frege's apparaits as he uses it cannot accommodate structure in the external significance of language which they take to be what is supposed to be secured by talk of Bedeuting. Their different account of what is "referred to" by sentences is a apposed to supply sentences with a kind of external significance in which specific structure is not eliminated.

Evidently they assume Frege cannot preserve specific structure in external sign heatice at the level of Som. At the level of Som the specific structure that differentiates the significance of one truc scorence from another or that of one false sentence from another is not lost. Barwise at a Perty must suppose that at the level of Som the external significance of language its directedness at objective reality as no longer in view.

But this is simply wrong about *Sum*. The *Sum* expressed in an assertoric utilitative is what one says in making the utilitative. What one says is schematically that things are thus and so and that things are thus and so is what is the case, if one's assertion is true. And something that is the case, is, in a quite intuitive way of speaking, a state of affairs. So an intil tive notices of states of affairs is perfectly available to Frege, but at the level of *Sum* rather than *Bedevising*. Talking about the significance of sentences at the

^{24.} See expectally pp. 20-6. Properties on any mountive concepts in are no better a futor what Fregue incovers as *Beautingue* of productive expressions than states of alla ts. in this kind or conception, are for what he conceives as the *Beautingen* of semences, and the point is connected. But I shall not elaborate it here.

^{25.} See Situations and Attitudes, p. 42.

^{26. &}quot;On Sense and Reference" 65

^{27.} Something that is the case in lact its something that can be truly said. In thought, to be the case. A fact is a true thought, in the sense in which all hough is the Sum expressible.

level of Smin preserves structural specificity, while in no way retreating from the fact that meaningful utterances are tapart from the special case in which mental realities form the topic) directed at the extra mental world. Barwise and Perry suggest Frege is confused in choosing truth-values over sit land as Bedeutungen of sentences. But the Priority of External 5 golficance yields no ground for this extraordinary suggestion. The purpose for which they think he should have opted for situations as the Bedeutungen of sentences is served by Sinn as Frege conceives it. The point of crediting sentences with Bedeutung lies elsewhere in the needs of a semantical account of logical valuation. And for that purpose truth value is just what is required.

All this can be said without any special attention to singular terms. Advancing from a thought to its truth value, which is what we do in 1 iden out on Frego's account, cannot be a step that starts from a configuration, hat is not world directed and moves to a stance that is world directed, though with a loss of structured significance. A thought is already to the effect that though and so. It does not acquire its bearing on the world when

As a servence perhaps on an accasion. Some may find it writing it can the incention of states of all acts that it are it sisting is available in Liege in little of it may seem less than outside to say that the species's being visible over there it may seem to interack the all little whatever the states of all are instanced according to the Sound of sentences, sable in after the here are fluer granged acts and according to the Sound of sentences, sable in after the here are fluer granged day proponences. This intuition would be the forecast of grant it significance has no rendered to imply that the significance is not enter in. This comes not an according to the grant it is a unsistent with object dependence in their ghts. So even a my breggen states of attains are too fine grantee for some people's tastes, they are noticed to thin, with Baywist and Perry's Principle of External Sign fluence. There is widespread concusion about this and can increase in sepect, but it tan derives the idea that slages of attains would need to be classely and each ared.

28 See Situations and Attitudes, p. 21

29. It is a mistake to approach Frege's general partitle of Bed many in the way darwise and Perty do as extrapolating, to other sorts of expression, an intuitive notion of now serget sat terms relate to the objects they unable us to talk about 11 would be series, start of appreciating the point of identifying the Bedevision of a serie occurring to it in it to varie and it see how what is at fact are approximation to the inconvenience of implies would be wrong to make too much of this—is yielded by a notion of Beautising for seignlar entity that is controlled by the requirements of a story according to which roughly speaking a singular term shaving the Beautising it has consists in the difference of makes to the Bedeu thing of a sentence that contains it. See Worlgang Carl. Freque Thron of Sense and Reference Its Origins and Scope, p. 116.

someone affirms it inwards, in judgment or ontwardly in assertion. And when we do focus on singular terms, it needs no detail of interpretation to see that for Frege, having an object in mind can only be entertaining a thought partly determined by a singular 3mn. There is no need for a further. step-advancing from a thought to a truth value-in order to arrive at a position in which one's mind is directed towards the associated Bedeuting One's mind is aircady directed towards the associated Bedeutung just by virtue of entertaining a thought determined by the relevant Sinn. But the point becomes especially vivid with Evans's insight that, consistently with Frege's basic principles, a singular Sam can actually be object-dependent. Evans's version of Fregeatt thinking makes it especially clear that a movefrom Bedeutung to Sum is not a withdrawal from directedness at extra mental reality.

The point of Fregum 5000 is, as I have said, to provide for a conception of conten's that fits smoothly with a conception of what rationality requires of a thinker. Now it needs to be acknowledged that the considerances that are operative here do not make the Fregean apparatus compulsory. We need finer grained contents if the attitudes we are allowed to work with, in the sorts of case Frege exploits, are restricted to, say, belief, disbelief, and scs. pended judgment. But we can preserve the rationality of the subjects in such cases even if we edup their attitudes with coarse grained contents. contents individuated by the objects they concern as long as we compensate by enriching our inventory of attitudes. Where we find ourse vevshaping up to saying that a rational subject both believes and dishelleves the same thing, we can go on identifying the contents of the two attitudes, and protect the subject's rationality by saying she believes a certain coarsegrained proposition under one guise and disbelieves it under an other. "This might be seen as a sketch for a notational variant of Frege's proposal.

Some people may be tempted to say a cannot be a mere notational variant. It is a substantive improvement, because by allowing us to exploit propositions individuated by the objects that are their topics take Russel one might say "having those objects as constituents"), it respects something on the lines. of Barwise and Perry's propople of the Priority of External Significance. But what I have urged in this section implies that this supposed ground for preference is Tuscry. And this becomes especially clear when we take on board. Evans's point that a singular Sinn can be object dependent.

Fur an elaboration of a position on these lines, see Nathan Salmon, Frete's Piggie.

7 Frege often says expressions can lack *Bedeutung* and still have *Stim*. Singular terms that lack *Bedeutung* are not thereby shown to be without *Stim*. And sentences containing singular terms without *Bedeutung* themselves have no *Bedeutung*, no truth value, though that does not disqualify them from having *Stim*, from expressing thoughts. On the face of it, this is incompatible with supposing genuine's abject-predicate form is Russelaan. And of course Evans does not deny that Frege says those things. He does not claim to find Russellan docume explicitly espoused in Fregean texts, at least after the introduction of *Stim*. The claim is rather that the best way to work out what Frege means by attributing *Soin* to singular terms is to align the Fregean apparatus with Russell's conception of genuine subject predicate form.

This belongs to a genre of readings in which something a philosopher says is set aside on the ground that the result yields a better version of his thinking. In the simplest variety of such readings, the selection of what to discard reflects only the reader's view of what constitutes a philosophica improvement. In this spirit, someone who thought the best account of how thought is directed at objects is given by the "descriptivism" that hi do its inspiration in the Theory of Descriptions might ound from a reading of Russellian thinking about singular reference, the idea of logically proper names and the conception of genianely subject-predicate form that he ongs with it. The only question such a reading of Russell could raise would be whether it really opened atto a superior account of singular reference. There would be an admitted violence to Russell himself, excused on the ground that it ed to better philosophy.

But this is not the sort of ane Evans takes about Frege

Evans insists that Prege's conception of Sum can be understood to fit object-dependent thoughts, and that stands firm independently of speculation about Prege's own attitude to such an idea. This is worth stressing. In the end, this idea of object dependent Sum that matters, not whether it can be attributed to Frege himself. But I want to consider Evans's reading of Frege, and not just the use Evans makes of Frege.

^{31.} In Evans's own view genome subject predicate form is not restricted at sentences containing "Russellian" referring expressions (see Evans. pp. 30-3, 46-5). But he thinks Frege's conception of singular terms is at notion Russellian. See n. 3 above, and the text below.

³² For another assance of a "Fregeamsm" of this general kind, in which we allow our selves to improve on Frege's own presentation of his thought, see Sainsbury's Departing from Proje

The ground for going further, and putting the idea of object dependent singular Sinn into a reading of Frege is not a thesis about genumely subject predicate form that is merely imported from outside Frege's thinking. Evans claims that an spite of Frege's remarks about Sinn without Bedeuting, it is act of object dependence as a mark of genuinely subject predicate thoughts in not alien to Frege's own thinking. There are features of Frege's own thinking that point in this direction.

Before he introduced the idea of *Som* frege expressed a Rasse Lan line about singular thoughts. However, it does not seem to have occurred to him to query the "traditional" classification of singular terms, which in cludes definite descriptions. Russell was going to find the "traditional" classification incompatible with taking singular thoughts to be or ect-dependent and he was going to conclude that definite descriptions do not pelong in a more principled category of singular terms. It is plans ble that the considerations that were going to sway Russell made a uncomfortable for Frege to combine the "traditional" classification with the Russellian view of singular the aghts, as expressed in those early texts. So it will have re-beved a tension when, after the introduction of *Sinn*, he found himself able to countenance thoughts expressed by sentences containing singular terms that have no *Bedeuting*. But I vans suggests that this apparent relief of a reason can have satisfied frege only because he did not completely think through what he was doing.

The idea of a thought without a truth value which this doctrine commits han to is problem and by lights that should have been Frege's now. Judging, in Frege's account is advancing from a thought to the truth value arise. Such advance is correctly undertaken if the thought is true incorrectly if not. That may see it to allow for cases it which a judgment is incorrect because the thought involved fails to be true not by being laise but by having no truth value—because an expression of it would contain an expression without Bedeuting. But can we really recognize what happens in such a case as judging? Judging is judging something to be so. Supposing there is no

³³ See the passages from *Performent* of rumpicated by Evans and Lattice in Coardinate The "Seventieen Rey Sentences" cannot postdate the introduction of sum as in the partial by Schotz that Evans membors as one that would be better for his reading of Erege. Erege's standard line after the introduction of Sinn is the one I am considering, that lack of *Bedeurung* on the partial a singular term does not deprive sen ences of a bring diof Sinn.

condition such that if it is meth of things are indeed so—the judgment is true, how can what we are dealing with be a case of judging? But if there is such a condition, it is a ther methor not hand we are back to thoughts with one or other of the truth values, true or false.

As Frege notes, people can be confused into supposing that an expression such as "the least rapidly convergent series" has a Bedinning ". Such people will endorse sentences containing such expressions. They will take their selves to be able to make judgments expressible by such sentences. But Frege cannot suppose there is a way things might be such that if things were that way such a supposed judgment would be true. If there were there would be no alternative to saving things are not that way so the thought is take. So how does the thought supposedly expressed by such a sentence relate to what such a person is doing when she takes need to be making such a judgment? In this kind of case specifying the supposed thought cannot be saying what the person judges in the sense of specifying how things are if he person is tadging truly. No doubt a person in this situation judges that a certain sentence expresses a true thought. But we cannot get

34 Vag cross might require a coachean on a this fixer would be quite apple adult suggest that on princes in a stogetal term and ross vagaeness in a range set once coptaining it. The lifeth is fair taising at sess in connection with sevences that concatenate empty's uginar terms with non-vague predicates. So we can focus in this case at eignore any extra messings that vagueness might bring

35. Samisbury. Departing from English p. 24. enables by aself to talk of longitudistion violence. thing a be the beater of a same even in a case, a which the name has as beare. Thoraid X. Vulgab refers to V. B. v. is Volego in by complexing a fire ungle in version armin, services. cities with empty har residre labse. That enables but in section a notice of sections of the a little such thanks to be trace of Villean, white he sen, is true if Villean exhibs, he say, as our as sir sy thie incomo from sentences com a ning non-empty parties or be true. By the simove abandons the less swhich is suitely central or England Uniting between ack if Bedentity on the part of a singular term and tack of the ferring on the part of appenix serences convacting it. So not less constituction proceeds a galaxian alemnic sente les collea rung on empty name with a Bears and the math salar talk, legg for whom such servences were without Beachaons come not have defended the asciption of Sont conempty surgular terms, and consequentially an along sensor (significance ing them the significance) See Evans, pp. 44-5, on bow free rogic is alien at Frege's though it is not alien to Exansis. own hought seem 3 above that a discussion of how fixage in gli-circulos free logic in a semantics so table to his conception of referring expressions, see San sbury Free Logical Truth Theory".)

36. "On Sense and Reference", p. 58.

down from that metalinguistic level to a specific thought from which the person advances to the truth-value true.¹⁷

Perhaps the idea would be that some thoughts are judgeable—the ones that do rave truth values—and some not. But what is the turny in the concept of a thought of thoughts are supposed to come in these two varieties—one such that to specify one of its members is to specify how things are according to it the other not? If it does not belong to a thought as such to be judgeable. Frego's conception of judgment as advancing from a thought to a truth-value lacks the sira glitlorwardness it seemed to have. And we still have the difficulty of saying what happens when someone accepts a sentence that, on this way of talking expresses a thought that is not so table for judgment because it lacks a truth value if is not a case of accepting a thought in the sense in which specifying a thought someone accepts is specifying how things are thought by her to be. But surely that is what accepting a thought is, not just one interpretation of "accepting a thought"

We can find a clue to how frege thinks about all this in the fact that he is happy to describe such cases in terms of unwittingly straying into the sphere of become Ol course of "fictions" is just a label for the supposed real in of thoughts that lack truth value this takes as no further. But in one place in the *Nachiass* where Frege talks head on about fiction, he shows himself tempted by a certain conception of say story-telling, which indeed has its attractions. According to this conception, a story-telling makes a use of language modeled.

^{37.} This is a version of Evativ's argument at p. 24. Carl. Freque Theory it Sense and Reference p. 24. Savy Evans identifies thinking with judgit governing a belief. This iosing contact with the indistremsable Eregean idea of something from which one needs to advance to order or ake a adjuncht their also p. 30 in 26 t But what Evan's identifies with forming a belief is of course not merely entertaining a thought, but according one can's criticism rests in a crude most earlief contentaining a thought, but according to a truth in that Erege's mature conception of sudgitions, as an advance from a it hight to a truth value is so twoy requires the dea that sentential Name thoughts, may or may not be associated with sentential Beleatorgen, truth values. See e.g. p. 117. But his seems abstractly twrong. The thought from which one advances, when one judges truly it falsely must a reacy have its truly value, attactor false according to whether the adgment is true or take. It does not acquire its true or false according to whether the adgment is true or take. It does not acquire its truth value by means of the advance is a leads to engage with the difficulty of applying Frege's conception when someone thinks she can make such an advance in connection with a sentence that has no Bedeutong.

³⁸ Sec the passage from Der Gedanke, that I vans quotes a $|p| \ge 8$ This belongs with the fact that Ptege standardly illustrates his Sum-without Bedeutung clauss with examples from fiction, ordinarily so called.

on, and imitative of, the making of factual claims, so as to give the appearance. of making assertions without actually doing so. And Frege suggests that when he talks of expressing thoughts in fictional discourse, that relates to the thoughts that figure in assertions and judgments only as talk of story tellers. as making assertions would relate to assertions that are expressive of judgment.19 The cleanest way to capture what Frege seems to be driving at here is to say that there is really only one kind of thoughts, those such that to specify one is to specify how things are according to it, so that it is true if things are that way ar diffaise otherwise. Where he allows himself to talk as it there is another kind of thought, whose members lack truth value, what he ready has n mind—at least at some level of his thanking, which never quite surfaces nto explicitness—is a kind of case in which someone merely goes through the motions of expressing a thought in the only sense Frege is really committed to, according to which it is part of the very idea of a thought that there is such a thing as how things are according to it. Merely going through the motions is something people do intentionally in hotion, strictly so called, and unintentionally in the sort of case we are considering.*

This suggests that when Frege exploits the separation of Spin from Bedertiong, thought from truth-value, to alleviate the discomfort that will have resulted from combining his early "Russelban" conception of subject predicate form with the "traditional" grouping of singular terms, this is not the complete breach with his early "Russelban" way of thinking that it might seem and perhaps seemed even to Frege biniself. In exploiting the dea of an unwitting lapse into fiction, he has confused biniself. A conception that would be most clearly put by talking of a mere appearance of Spin has presented itself to but as if it allowed a kind of genuine Spin that in connect on with indicative sentences, cuts loose from possession of a truth-value. If we pay

^{39.} See the passage from the Podhimens freitings that Exams ones as p. 29.

⁴⁰ Commentations have made great efforts to resist the drift of this passage from Pregn David Bell. In "How Russelhan was Frego claims up 273) that what Brego calls "Scheingedanken" are thoughts that "only and to convey appearance". Sa usoury Departing from Frego pp. 11–12) acknowledges that Scheingedanken figure here alongside Scheinbe hateptungen, and that Scheinbehauptungen are performances that give the appearance of being assertions. Behauptungen but are not Bat he strains to avoid the paralle inverpretation of "Scheingedanken". He suggests, in effect that the profix "Schein" here means "not to be taken seriously and, wheteas "assertions" that are not to be taken seriously are not ready essertions, thoughts that are not to be taken seriously though a Bas, as against both Bell and Samsbury it seems plain that the lorge of the prefix. Schein" is something like "smerely) apparent".

attention to the details of how Frege thinks about fiction, we can find, even in the places where he explicitly rejects the "Russellian" line, traces of a continting pull towards it, which he may have concealed even from himself

As Evans puts it (p. 30). Frege's remarks about fiction suggest that

we may gloss those passages in which Frege says that a sentence containing an empty singular term may express a thought as follows. Yes, a sentence containing an empty singular term may have a sense in that it does not necessarily have to be fixeded to a sentence containing a notisense word. But no it does not rooth have a sense of the kind possessed by cromary atomic sentences, because it does not function properly in is only as fit frinctions properly. Frege's use of the nonion of hemon wrongly directs cur after ion to past one case in which it is as if a singular term refers to some that glinar telly when we are engaged in a pretence that it does, but there are others, and if we think of them, we might speak of apparent rather han mock or pretend, thoughts.⁴⁰

As Evens acknowledges (p. 28), this reading "does not present Frege in a very good light. That may seem to be the beginning of a principle-of-charity case against it *-

By when Evans suggests that Frege's early "Russell-anisms" is a forverged rather than definitively discarded, by his allowing himself Som without Bederlang it does not constitute a response merely to elaborate the character isnot fregean cap to be conceeded only with sentences usable in "science" of by mireasoning directed at achieving knowledge. "Evans does not noss or

^{41. &}quot;Mack it inglits" is the wording in the translation Evans exces for "apparent a highest typhic does not embody the highestion of preferee would be a perfectly good translation of Prege's "Scheingedanker".

^{42.} For the suggestion that Evans's Erege is not the "profound and powerful think, of he is usually taken to be see Bell. "How "Russellian was Prege?" p. 276

^{43.} That is what start does hope's the intilf senterand Reference passing Bell no axes a version of this the He scores some or trig points against Evans's endency to assumate Erege's semanate interests to those of say Davidson (though it does to it spire of foreign when the substitutes "explicit for amplicit in quoting Evans's claims which that gree is over the top—that Erege's mature conception of reference is too semanates had is implicit in his earlier works in 269). But in the end the credentials of avans's suggestion of a submireged "Russellianus" of are not affected. The alternative picture of Erege's proge more that Bell out does upplicated. The alternative picture of Erege's proge softenant sum without Bellemany doctrine and Evans's suggestion about what or neithes Telefortine coses no plausibility by being put in the context of Bell's more accitate account of Erege's general purposes.

185

gnore that Fregean intention. The trouble he fixes on comes from Frege's proceeding as if a concept for which he gives a proper explanation only in the context of the "scient fic" use of language, the concept of iboughts, is straight forwardly available for talking about cases in which people falsely suppose that sentences are suitable for "scientific" use ¹⁴ And there is 1 is discussion of fiction that Evans exploits, which strongly suggests to at the underlying concept on never brought to explicitness by Frege is that the availability of the concept in those cases is a mere appearance, part of the centent of the false supposition,

If Evans's Frege is Frege of course it would have been better if he had made the submerged ib jugiti expical to binised and to his readers. Evans's Frege is a thinker one of whose insights he himself only gropes at B. Eth's imputation of unclarity about his own thinking caunot tell against the reading, on principle of charmy grounds, unless not making at would put Brege in a better light than crediting him with at least groping towards an Insight. This depends in the magnitude of the insight, and it would be hard to overestimate that I gesti red towards this earlier by saying that Livalis is Frege enables a synthesis between acknowledging that context is relations between subjects, and objects matter for determining the contexts of the ghis, on the one hand, and giving full weight to the idea that the king is an exercise of fationality, out the other. This can be seen as a substantial contribution to a preject that goes back at least to Kant, and that is beset with difficulties in the medical environment of modern philosophy integrating our rational powers with our matural situatedness in the world.

The explanation is that to determine a thought is to determine a concluse for its troth. Defending the idea that song far terms can have somewhout Bedeving. Sursbury (Departing from Projetty 208) suggests that the oath also more part to the idea of log or ning a condition for a sensitive to be time is the idea of determining a middle or for a term to refer—a condition that may or may not be suitabled which it reads it subording a specification of the remains Sum. But a condition for a sensitive or by the is not also night toon for to refer the that you but a condition for a sensitive or part the interpolation of the sentences can have. Moreover, the confrection of sensitive other did not be independently in particular, is appropriate precisely because or he special impaints character of sentences, they enable speech acts whose content is that dimps an thus and so and specifying a constance of that form is specifying, a condition or a sentence—between this of course not to be expected that form is specifying a parallely has for subsented hall expressions. Sanisbury's analogy is not not not real at all.

ESSAY 11

Referring to Oneself

I In an influential passage in *The Blue Book* (pp. 66–7). Witgenstein distinguishes "two different cases in the use of the word. I for my ,", which he calls "the use as object" and "the use as subject." We have the use as object in for instance. "My arm is broken." "I have grown six inches." "I have a bomp on my firehead." we have the use as subject in for instance. "I see such-and such." "I think it will rain." "I have a toothache." Witigenstein explains the distinction like this.

One call point to the difference between these two categories by saying. The cases of the first category tovolve the recognition of a particular person and there is in these cases the possibility of an error or as I should rather point. The possibility of an error has been provided for this possible that say in an accident I should feel a pair in my arm, see a broken arm at my side and think it is mine, when really it is my neighbours. And I could look ng into a mirror mistake a bump on his forehead for one on mine. On the other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have i inhache. To ask fare you since that it is you who have paints? Would be increasingle. And now this way of stating our deal suggests itself, that it is as impossible that in making the statement 'I have toothache' I should have mistaken another person for myse'll as it is to man with pain by inistake having mistaken someone e'se for me

And he suggests a conclusion:

To say "I have pain" is no more a statement about a particular person that moaning is.

That is, "I" as any rate in the use as subject does not serve to refer to a particular person. It is not the case that the role of an afterance of "I" in 186

helping to determine the significance of an utterance of a form of words like "I have toothache", is to analcate that of which the rest of the utterance is predicated—what the rest of the utterance has to be true of if what one says in making the utterance is to be true

2 In "The First Person" G. F. M. Anscombe explicitly argues that "I" is not a referring expression:

Getting bold of the wrong object o excluded, and that makes us thick that getting bold of the right object is guaranteed. But the reason is that there is no getting hold of an object at all. With names, or denoting expressions (in Russel's sense) there are two things to grasp, the kind of use, and what to apply them to from time to time. With "1" there is only the use up. 6.

"It statements have as it were the look of predications with "I" in subject position. And there is indeed a subject of predication, a target of reference in the offing to the case of my "I" statements, the person tolin McDowe I. If I make an "I"-statement, it is true just at case its apparently predicative materia to true of the person tolin McDowell, and in that specification of a truth-condition, we have a proper predication, with an authent consider term denoting the item of which the predication is made (see "The First Person" p. 60). But according to Anscombic it would be wrong to suppose that my "I"-statement it is another way of predicating that material of that same item. "I" said by me is not another way for me to refer to that item.

Anscombe does not alvoke the passage from Wittgenstein or explost the distinction between the use as subject and the use as object. Her thesis scenis to be quite general, an utilization of 1° does not refer in a matter what apparently predicative material at its concatenated with rightage a broken arm? no less than "have a toothache". Wittgenstein's suggest in in constrast scenis to seave at open to us to suppose that at least in the use as object. "It is a referring expression. Still, Anscombe's point that "getting hold of the

I Absorbbe says that a person is a living bankan body in the 1. She means to be a king book from ething that is not still there when someone is dead. By I do not see how the words "living burnan body" can be intelligibly construed otherwise than by taking "living" a lartisbute a property that a human body can live as feet without going out if existence. When there is no tonger de in it my body in "probably "so be there for a white oft may not be but only if the life is smalled but by the body's say being blows to smallhereetis. What will not still be there is the himan being I am sort a billing body though certainly a bodily thing.

188

wrong object is excluded" is surely a descendant of Witigenstem's point that no provision is made for a certain possibility of error."

Her treatment of "1" centres on its role in giving expression to "inmediated conceptions, knowledge or belief, true or false) of states, motions, etc." (p. 62), where the truth or falsity of the "1"-statements turns on whether the states motions, etc. can be truly predicated of (in my case), he person John McDowell. The significance of "immediated" comes our clearly in her exploitation of an anecdote from William lames (pp. 64-5). A person nick named "Baldy" had fallen out of a carriage, he had the idea that someone had fallen out of the carriage, and imbeing told that Baldy had, said "Did Baldy fall out." Poor Baldy!" This indicates a "lapse of self-consciousness" which Anscombe locates in the fact that Baldy's "thought of the happening, falling out of the carriage, was one for which he looked for a sub-cet." (p. 65). An innitediated conception of the falling, in the relevant sense would have been one for which that was not so (compare Wrigenstein's "there is no question of recognizing a person".)

This connects in an obvious way with the fact that "getting hold of the wrong object wexidided". Getting hold of the wrong object wexid be going wrong in sooking for a subject of which to predicate the content of a centerphon. If there is no looking for a subject, there is no going wrong it anoking for a subject.

We need also to deal with the use as object. There Wittgerstein's point in the present terms, is that the conceptions expressed are not comediated, boking for a subject is not excluded. I have a conception of say having a aroken arm, and in Wittgenstein's accident case I need to look for a person of whom the state that my conception is a conception of could be truly predicated. (In another case I might not need to look for a subject for the predication but even so. I know which person it is whose arm is broken in the sort of way in which one knows when one came to know by looking for a subject for predication.) But Anscombe's position is that here too, when I say "I have a broken arm." I am not predicating the state, having a broken arm, of a person to whom I refer by my use of "I". And that seems the right line for her to take

² a.m solating one strand in Absoluble's complex case for her concinsion. I prescond, for instance, from her claim that Frege's notion of sense cannot be made to 6, a construal of 6, intered by a particular person, as a referring expression a believe Frege had a better view of that question, and be does not hestate to speak of the "particular and primitive" mode of presentation under which one can figure only in one's own thoughts. "The Thought A Logica, Inquiry", at pp. 25–6).

"John McDowell has a broken arm" which would be unproblematically a reference concatenated with a predication?" Presumacy the point of using the first-person form is to effect a certain association between my mediated conception of the state having a broken arm, and the animediated conceptions to which I could give expression in what we can think of as the central uses of "I". By saying "I have a broken arm," I indicate that the person whose possession or not of a broken arm is to determine the truth or laisity of my statement is the one whose states, motions, etc. we aid determine the truth or faisity of statements I might make in which the first-person form would give expression to unmediated conceptions of those states, motions, etc. But if we must suppose that in the case of these potential other statements, where the conceptions are namediated, the person in question would not be determined by being referred to, surely we had better suppose that in the associated uses too.

Anso tube says. "The expression self-consciousness can be respectably explained as consciousness that such and such he is of oneself 7 (p. 51). Here "onesed" is the "indirect reflexive", which is intelligible only in terms of the first person. The only explanation of the matic phagua form "conschousness that such and such holds of oneself" is in terms of an oratic rectaform containing an expression of the first person, consciousness whose content is given by "Such and such holds of me. (See pp. 46-7.) Now this account of self-consciousness is indifferent to whether the co-ception expressed in a replacement for "such and such" is mediated or unmediated. But Baidy's lapse of self-consciousness, in Anscombic's account, her in his lack of unmediated conceptions of states, motions, etc. of the person Baldy. p. 65) That is surely right, and that is why expressions of immediated conceptions are the central uses of "I" even though self consciousness on the sense of Anscombe's general account) is exemplified also in uses of "I" that express mediated conceptions. If there are no immediated conceptions, as perhaps in some states of dissociation, then first person talk and thought lapses altogether. But if first person talk and thought is available at all then II—that very thing, and hence self-consciousness—can extend to mediated. conceptions (the use as object) as well-

³ Perhaps I have forgotten my name in the accident Bis then we arrask why say "I " rather than, say, "The person in this bed or whatever other (non-first personal) designation is at my disposal.

3 Anscombe's thinking here starts with an insight it is indeed fundamental to an understanding of first person forms that their central use is in expressing unmediated conceptions. But we can acknowledge that, and nevertheless refuse to accept that "I" is not a referring expression. We can block the inference by giving proper weight to this remark of P. F. Strawson's, which formulates the beginning of wisdom on these questions.

"I" can be used without criteria of subject identity and yet refer to a subject because leven in such a use, the links with those criteria are not in practice, severed."

What Strawson describes as a use of "I" without criteria of subject identity is what Anschibe describes in terms of unmedia edness, the absence of any need to look for a subject. I do not look for a subject for the unmediated conceptions that I express at some of my "I" stalements (the central ones). Strawson's point is that that is no reason out to suppose that by "I" I refer to the person for my case John McDowell) whose having the concept of those conceptions truly predicable of him or not determines the truth or hasdy of the statements (to put the matter in Anscembe viernis)."

As the pess brity of potting it, the that indicates. Ansemble does not simply reject the claim that the anks with criteria of subject identity are not severed. For her too, my, it's statements are semantically a ninected to a particular manarithering something that can be referred to in a way that is governed by criteric of identity. Where Acsombe diverges from 5 rawson is that she thinks this semantical connection cannot be a matter of reference. My "I" statements are indeed true or faise according to how it is with a particular human being, a potential larger for reference that would be governed by criteria of identity, but not according to her because the utterances (1.17) that lighte in what looks like surject position in those statements refer to that human being.

Anscombe thanks that if one did take one's utterances or thoughts of "1" ic be cases of referring, and tried to respect the facts about the use of "1", then the only thing one could find for inventy for one's "1" to refer to world be a

⁴ The Bounds of Sense p 165

^{5.} Jollow Strawson in assuming that the criterial Subject identity are latteast for the subjects we know about in terral to the identity of human beings, that is an inal sof a conain know to this connection. Strawson wrote, in 1966. The tipus of personal identity bas been well case is sed in receive philosophy. I shall take the matter as understood 1. The Bounds of Sanson p. 164. This remark books latter new but those were better days.

Cartesian Ego: "if I is a referring expression, then Descartes was right about what the referent is" (p. 58). She argues for this by imagining herself in a condition of sensory deprivation, telling herself "I won't let this happen again."

If the object meant by "I" is this human being then in these circ in stances it won the present to my senses, and how else can it be "present to" me? But have I tost what I mean by "I"? I have not jost my "se f consciousness" nor can what I mean by "I" be an object no longer present to me.... Nothing but a Carresian Ego will serve

We can consider this as an extreme case of tanne flatedness, where there is not even a possibility of firthing ias a result of tooking for a human being who could be said to have the intention expressed in "I wen't tet this happen again." In less extreme cases, finding a subject of which to predicate the content of one's unniediated conceptions is not an outright impossibility it is just that I one did that one would not be respecting the fact that the conceptions are atmosphated and the resulting udgine is and state ments would not be first-personal.

Auscombe's thought here seems to be something on these lines. If "I" were a referring expression, its character as such would need to be enamely see in able from within its central uses. The unimediatedness of thisse isses then precludes crediting "I" with a referent that is subject to the criteria of ideal ty for human beings, since no such criteria are appealed to in those isses.

For another application of that thought consider the succession of "I"statements that would give expression to a stream of consciousness (selfconsciousness). If "I" refers, how is in that in the course of such a success on
no question arises about whether there has been an immediced substitution
of a new referent for the old." Now suppose one takes it that the resources
for responding to such questions must come from within the stream of consciousness itself. In that case one in ght be tempted to think the answer
must be that the continuing referent of "I" is especially easy to keep track of
there is nothing to its persisting as one and the same thing, over and above
the experienced continuity within the stream.

This temptation is precisely what leads to the idusion of the Cartesian Egoaccording to Strawson's reading of the diagnosis Kant gives in the section of

⁶ See "The First Person" pp. 57-8

⁷ If one is tempted by this answer one high, still to writes about in not ced's itest ions when one picks up one's "1"-thinking after intervals of steep.

the *ranque of Pure Reason* that deals with the Paratogisms of Pure Reason. It is this line of thought to which Strawson responds, on Kant's behalf, with the remark that the links to cruena of subject-identity are not severed, even in thought and talk where there is no appeal to those crueria. Continuous "I" thinking involves no keeping track of a persisting referent but it is neverthelessing involves no keeping track of a persisting reference, to something whose sameness over time involves satisfaction of those criteria—a particular person "I" can refer without giving use to intractable questions about unnoticed substitutions and the like because understanding "I" requires understanding that the first person is also a third person, an element in the objective world "

This claim also his the extreme case of onmediatedness that Anscombetries is exploit. I can trink "I won't let this happen again?" In sensory deprivation only against a background understanding, which I cannot suspend on pain of suspending my ability to think first-personally altogether, that t is first person is also a thard person. It is that third person—who is present. to me in these circumstances, only as the subject of my thinkings, mentions, and so forth-that I mean by "I" even in this condition. Certainly some of the usual materials for bringing that background understanding to bear-for identifying the relevant third person third personally-are not currently at my disposal. But that does not show that my "I" in these circurretances, cannot refer to the person who, on Anscombe's own accounthas those thoughts and forms those intentions. It would show that or ly onthe assumption, that a referring role for "I" would need to be fully account. able or with it my stream of consciousness. And in the light of the point 5 rawson, ands in Karit, that assumptions, which drives Apscombe's argument, looks profoundly Cartesian

Of course Ansombe, sinot tempted to postulate Cartesian Egos to be the referents of our uses of "I". On the contrary, she uses the fact that that would be hopeless in order to argine, by modus ionens, that "I" is not a referring expression. But we can see something Cartesian in the thought that if "I" is a referring expression, its character as such must be able to be wholly provided for from within its use in the amoutation of unmediated conceptions. The unimate Cartesian error is not the postulation of the Ego, but father an idea to this effect, which underlies the postulation of the Ego, the

^{8.} Unit pare At schibe's explanation of why no problem of the community in reider of that on arise" ("The First Person", p. 62).

semantical character of the judgments that articulate a stream of conscious ness is self-contained, able to be completely provided for will in the stream Certainly Anscomine does not embrace that idea in the unqualified form in which I have stated it is he allows indeed insists, that the truth or faisity of my "I" judgments turns on whether their content can be truly predicated of a certain third person, a certain particular element in the objective world. But she identically energy if the Ego requires us to hold that "I" does not refer. Ironically energy given that anni-cartesian motivation, this reflects a vestigual form of the Cartes an idea that a stream of consciousness is semantically self-sufficient, she does not fer her demal that the judgments in question are semantically self-contained extend to the question worther their logical form is that of reference and predication.

I have already quoted something she says about Baidy's lapse of self-consciousness, it lay in the fact that this thought of the happening, falling out of the carriage was one for which he looked for a subject. If In a continuation that I counted Anscombe implicitly equates that with saying that this grasp of it? Was fone which required a subject? (p. 65). This equation encapsulates her the light that the imprediated conceptions (but the central cases of first person talk express must be "subjectless". To give proper weight to Strawson's point is to see that the equation is a mistake. We must indeed insist that the conceptions exclude looking for a subject of we are to keep our field on what is special about the first person. But even so, we can suppose if at the conceptions require to be predicated of a subject, the particular person each of us refers to by "1". Of course one does not sugge out that subject, as if from other candidates, to be what one predicates the conceptions of but it would be a mistake to think reference must always be a matter of sugging out in that sense."

4 Strawson cred to the essential point to Kant, but I think this may be generous to Kant. We should not underestimate Strawson's own creativity in what he offers as a reading of Kant. G do not mean to disjute that his thought is deeply Kantian in spirit.)

As Strawson concedes. Kant "barely ally des" to the fact that we have emprical criteria of identity for persons. Strawson manages, o city on yone

⁹ Satatyson limited encouraged a step in this all ection when he suggested individuals, p. 100) that one singles the right termous as from other candidates at least for others. For a protest, see Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, p. 208.

passage—where Kant says. "Its [the souls] persistence during life is, of course evident perse since the thinking being (as man) is itself likewise an object of the outer senses." ****

And it is not just that a topic that is central to the point Strawson finds in the section on the Paralogisms is scarcely mentioned there. That one remark certainly displays Kant as spiendidly immune to a familiar Cartesian temptation, the temptation to suppose that what does one sith nking is something other than a certain human being "And the main business of the section is certainly to uncover at the foundation of rational psychology a misconstrual of the functioning of "I" in the "I think" that must be able "to accompany all my representations" (B131). "The unity of consciousness, which underlies the categories is here mistaken for an intuition of the subject as object, and the category of substance is then applied to it" (B421). But kant can diagnose the misconstrual of that extra std pary use of "I" without needing to take any view about its ord pary uses. Specifically, the diagnosis does not require him to claim that the human being that does one's thinking is the referent of one's ordinary uses of "I".

What Kant's purpose requires him to say about "1" is just that in the "I think" that can accompany all my representations of does not give expression to "an infuntion of the subject as object. This "1" the "1" that expresses "the unity of consciousness" does not refer the rational psychologists mist inderstanding as precisely to suppose that it refers and invent a referent for it. Empirical uses of "1" in contrast to that transcendental use figure in the section on the Paralogisms only for Kani to stress that they are out of bounds for rational psychology. He has no need to offer a doctrine about how they are to be understood. The remark about "the thinking being (as man)" is not made in the context of offering any such doctrine the thinking being (as man) is not introduced as the referent of its own empirical uses of "1". Anscombe too, of course, has the infinitially anti-Cartesian view that the thinking being (as man) is an object of outer sense. As far as I can see, everything Kant says is compatible with her view that it is not by way of reference that one's empiri-

¹⁰ Critique et Pare Reason. B415 cited in a slightly modified form) by 5-rawson at p-164 of The Bounds of Sense

^{11.} Contrast the topic of the reflections that include the Cartesian *rigite*, which is not be human being. Rene Descarres. See Anscombe's perceptive discussion of this, "The First Person", pp. 45–6.

reading taxes a decisive step beyond what is actually in Kant

5. The Kantan context in which that insight of Strawson's figures threatens, indeed, to have a positively damaging effect on our understanding of an indispensable thought, which Strawson expresses, in individuals, like this (p. 102), "a necessary condition of states of consciousness being ascribed at ali is that they should be ascribed to the very same things as certain or rporteal characteristics, a certain physical situation 6 c."

Strawson's avowedly Kantian treatment of self-reference focuses on that unity of a series of experiences that we can capture by saying that its members "collective y band up or yield, though not all of them contribute to, a picture of a unified objective world through which the expenences their selves collectively constitute a single subjective experiential rome one among other possible subjective routes through the same objective world. He can effect, seeks to preserve the though) I cited from Individuals by its strig to at this conception —the conception of Ta temporally extended rount of view on the world" table , -- does not contain a sufficient condition for the possibility of self-conscionaness. To approach a sufficient condition, we need to make it expitett that the temperally extended point of view is an aspect of the career of an embodied subject of expenence—a human being, in the only case we are familiar with. But about the concept on of a temporally extended point of view on the world, abstracted from the full conditions for the possibility of self-consciousness. Strawson claims on Kant's behalf that since that conception provides for the distinction between how things are and how things are experienced as being, it can be recognized to contain "the basic condition for that possibility" (p. 108). And it is easy to read this as suggesting that the conception does, as it were labrost aif the work, that in order to build up an adequate of ske eta.) understanding of self-consciousness, we need only pix the concept on back into the context from which it is abstracted, stipulating, its accordance with the remark from Individuals) that the experiences that make up a stream of consciousness are to be attributed to a bodily thing

I think any such suggestion would be senously wrong, In order to bring out why I shall adapt and extend a thought experiment of A iscombus

^{12.} It would be wrong to suppose that "the human being one is" already rules or Anscombe's position. She holds, as she must that "I am E. A. said by her his not an identity proposition" see "The First Person" pp. 60–1.

^{13.} The Bounds of Sense p. 104

Anscombe envisages ("The First Person", p. 49).

a society in which everyone is tabelled with two names. One appears of their backs and at the tops of their chests, and these names, which their bearers cannot see are various "B" to "F" let us say. The other "A" is stamped on the inside of their wrists, and is the same for everyone. In making reports on people's actions everyone uses the names on titest chests of backs if he can see these names or is used to seeing them. Everyone a so learns to respond to atterance of the name on his own chest and back in the sort of way and circumstances in which we tend to respond to interance of our own names. Reports on one's own actions, which are given straight off from observation are made is ing the name on the wrist. Such reports are made not on the basis of observation above but also in that of inference and aestimony or other information. B for example, derives exist sions expressed by sentences with "A" as subject. In an other people's statements using "B" as subject.

What I want to exploit from this description is the point that freperts on one's own actions" are made primarily on the basis of observation. The other modes of informational access that Anscor be mentions serve as substitutes for observation is to a central case of a freport on one's ewn actions. By they observes the concluding of a fist easy) with an inscribed "A" visible on the mode of the wrist to which it is attached, and says "A is concluding his fist. This kind of report can be unstaken in that the fist actually belongs to a body other than B's. (Perhaps the report coned have been truly made but only by considerious? B's but was being excluded also is Such a report gives expression to an observationally acquired conception of a bod ly movement and the observation is chades finding a subject of which to predicate the movement. Getta g hold of the wrong object is not excluded. In short, the concept ons expressed in these reports are not inhancediated. And that is easy gb to just fy saying that at least so far the practice does not provide for expressions of self-conscoousness. "A" does not function like "I" "

14. This vitiales the use to which Anscombe pure he case is in warring at the while "A" as a canonate or a way of giving expression to so the inscriptions to be that it is a reletting expression. They she suggests that people who treat I' as a referring expression of their represent. It as to principle no different from the Attacking the difference between "A" and "A" fare and "A travelor consequence" (p. 60). But the difference between "A" and It is already sufficiently in place when we acknowledge that the conceptions expressed in the "A" Janguage are not unmediated, we do not need to say as well than the

In Anscombe's scenario, the bodily thing whose movements one car correctly report using "A" is singled out by the fact that its back and chest are maccess ble to one's vision (ignoring mirrors). The detail depends on the fact that she wants it to be especially clear that the various terms in play function as names, their bearers are actually labelled with them. That is messential for my purposes. In a variation on Anscombe's case, we can leave out the labels but preserve the role of the point of view from which one sees. So "A is concluding his first" is said as before, when one observes a list cienching, and now when one can tell by observation that the first be longs to the body at the front of whose bead is the point from which the conserved scene is seen. (As before, one can short cut observation by relying on testimony inference, and perhaps just guesswork.) The effect is to (larn "A" into an index call expression rather than a label, to that extent, to bring it closer to "!". But the conceptions expressed are still not immediated, so we have still not made provision for self-consciousness.

The "A"-language is introduced only in connection with "reports of actions". One obvious addition would be reports on the posture relation to other objects, and so forth of the singled out bodily thing. (We could hardly countenance "A is cleriching his fist" while refuse gito make sense of "A's fist is cleriched".) Northing essential is altered so long as these reports too are made primarily on the basis of observation. All the reports we are envisinging so far are, we might say, third personal, just because they are fundamentally observational, it makes no difference that one of the petential reference for third-personal talk is singled out in that special way.

Can the "A"-language be extended to psychological predications? We are already contempating reports made on the basis of observation (which we have tability restricted to visual observation). So far we have restricted the topics of observation to the bodily inovements, postures, and so forth of the speakers themselves and others of their kind, but that is surely messential, we can magine that the language provides for observational reports on other aspects of the passing show. Now let us enrich the range of predications with "A" in

refers and the other does not (Anscombe's mostake, which Strawson's mouth allows us expose is exactly that she does not see that these are two different houghts. But at his point I mean to have left Attscombe's mistake behind: I am exploring her thought experiment for my own purposes.)

^{5 &}quot;Thatd-personal" is not completely felicitous, because there is not the compass will first-personal" that that suggests.

198

sulvect position and this, when a speaker is in a position to make an observational report of some state of affairs, that very position equally entities the speaker to produce a statement of a new kind, in which the report of the state of affairs is prefaced by "A sees that..."

This is radically unlike the predications with "A" in subject position that we have so far had in view in that the basis on which these reports are made goes not include identifying an object of which to predicate the rest of the statement. There is no such thing as making sure it is A who sees that such and such is the case, as one might need to make sure it is A who is clenching his fist. These new "A" statements give expression to conceptions that are unmediated.

Does that mean we have brought self-consciousness and the picture? Surely not. These statements attribute seeing that such and such is the case to a bodily thing whose movements, posture, and so forth are still reported only on the basis of observation and surrogates for observation, if it was right to conclude that the original "it" language did not provide for one to think of the thing whose factions" one reported as oneself or direct reflexives how can we have brought self-consciousness into the picture by allowing for describing that thing as something that sees as well as facts"?

We can increase the psychological resources of the "A" language. One obvious addition is a notion of appearance. When one says "A sees that P" on the usual sort of observational basis, and it turns out not to be the case that P let it be correct to say "It seemed to A that P". (This presupposes a capacity for a certain sort of memory.) The present-tensed form, "It seems to A that P" wis be scatable, instead of "A sees that P" in circumstances in which there is some pulpable risk that the latter statement may need to be withdrawn, but we can count it true whenever one has the usual sort of observational entitlement to the less cautious form.

And in stive in the reportable contents of streams of consciousness to percept all expenences? Statements of the form "It seems to A that I" like statements of the form "A sees that II" are made without any need to make sure I is A who enjoys the expenence. Negation yields "It is not the case that I seems to A that III" and that cannot import a new obligation to make sure that it is A of whom the statement is true. Now suppose a speaker of our expanding language suffers complete sensory deprivation. If what we are describing is a mode of intelligible speech in must give expression to a possible mode of thought. So why not suppose this speaker can think something to the effect of "A has no expenence at a lit," so that the

otherwise empty stream of consciousness nevertheless contains occurrent thoughts?

When we introduced "A sees that", we already made room for the thought that "A" refers to something like a subject of experience not something with only corporeal properties. With this fast move, we might wonder. if we have made room for an "A"-speaking philosopher who impressed by the continuing possibility of "A"-thinking in sensory deprovation, or perhaps by the susceptibility to hyperbolical doubt of all buddy predicat our with "A" of subject position, argues like this. "Even in sensory deprivation or white entertaining hyperbolical doubt. A can be certain of A's existence. A thinks, therefore A is. This shows that what A really refers to is not a boddly thing at all, but a thing that thinks—that is, enjoys a mental life. If as normal sensory experience suggests, there is a body through whose eyes A. sees, and so forth, that body is something to which A has a special relation. it is not what A is " And perhaps another philosopher might diagnose this as: a paralogism of pure reason, a result of mistaking the purely formal "A thinks" that can accompany all it's representations for a genuine reference. to a substantial object.

We have apparently at least given the "A" language materials for constructing somethatig like the notion of a temporally extended point of view on the world, including the distinction between how things are and now things are experienced as being, which Strawson songes but as the most fundamental necessary condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. With the last development, we seem even to have made room for an abalogue to the flusion of rational psychology and its diagnosis. And the diagnosis tright cold nue by insisting that although one does not appeal to exterial of identity, when one predicates experiences with "A" in subject position, nevertheless the links to such criterial are not severed, and the target of these references is a bodily thing, so we have the unity of consciousness in the required context, as an aspect of the career of a bodily thing.

But sure y "A" still does not give expression to self-consenishess. In a characteristically Cartesian fashion, our quasi-Cartesian "A"-speaking philosopher focuses on the fact that the not purely psychological aspects of what he conceives as "A's biography" can be obliterated for its vibject, by sensory deprivation, or thought away in hyperbolical doubt, he conceives that the real subject of the biography is something whose properties are excusively psychological. In this case, the composite biography out of which

the quasi-Cartesian pure subject is distilled was attributed to a subject whose "actions" are accessible to everyone only by observation (or substitutes for observation). That still seems to ensure that no one can think of this item as himself (indirect rellexive). How could a fantasy of shedding its boddy aspects turn a way of being that is not that of a self into a case of self-consciousness?

6 Clearly the trouble lies in the way "reports on one's own actions" functioned in the original "A" language, what I have been exploiting is the fact that nothing in the enticliments has made any difference to that. What an "A" speaker is entitled to describe as "A's doings" is just a singled-out collection of what observably happens. It is true that these particular happenings are movements on the part of a body that is the point of acquisition of the sensory basis on which the speaker speaks. But they are known about only observationally (and by way of substitutes for observation), not through intention, and that means that for all their intimate connection to the speaker's point of view on the world, they cannot be conceived as one's doing things. These reports are not reports on actions, one's own or anyone's, except in the sense in which one might report the action of water on a stone.

The behaviour of the singled out bodily thing, not known through intention is not a case of anyone's exercising agency. Trying to imagine oneses in the "A" practice one might be tempted to picture those merely observable happenings as the result in the impersonal objective world of something else that really is one's doing. Lact in some inner sphere and thereby somethow bring about those observable motions on the part of the bodily thing that and bly calls itself "A". But nothing in the "A" language provides for this concept on of the inner I who is a genuine agent, manipulating the bodily thing called "A" lake a pappeteer. And in any case, if we separate the real agent, ike this from the bodily thing through whose motions the agent makes its mark in objective reality, we surely prevent ourselves from making real sense of agency.

This in stigo for the speech behaviour of the singled out bodily thing as much as any other. If that range of activity is likewise accessible to all parties only through observation and substitutes for it, what we have described is a repertoire of activity that is not undertaken, gone in for, by anyone, it would make no difference if we enriched the repertoire with "reports on actions" that are exercises of the reportoire itself, so long as the sole basis for these "reports on actions" was observation and substitutes for it

If I try to imagine myself looking at the world through the eyes of a participant in the "A" practice I find no one with whom I can identify myself no one for me to be I hear utterances that are intelligable in their way with "A" in subject position, coming from the mouth of the singled out bodily thing. But not knowing these utterances through intention. I cannot find myself speaking in them. I can conceive them at best as results of my agency, not cases of it. In the familiary of an inner I, which utterances get made is under my control, and some of them give expression to the content of experience that I undergo, through A's sense organs. But they attribute that experience not to me but to A' a bodily thing that I have to distinguish from myself, since it is not what acts when I act, but at best an instrument whereby my agency makes its mark in outer readily.

At least the final stage in my expansion of Anscombe's thought experiment now comes into doubt. If the "A" practice is from the start a repertoire for things that are not agents, and so not a language anyone could speak in a sense or which speaking is an excresse of agenty, then we cannot assume that an elaboration of the practice yields a way of giving expression to a mode of thought. This undermotes the prefext on which I introduced the quasi Cartesian "A" speaking philosopher. But the thought experiment, however shaky can still serve my purpose which is to point to the basic importance of agency for making self-consciousness intelligible.

A potential for reflectiveness belongs to thought as such. "I" encaps dates that potential into a way individual things can be presented in the contents of thinkings. It would be wrong to put this by saying that one has oneself tindirect reflexive) presented to one in any bit of "I"-thinking as the thinker as well as the object of this bit of thinking. Of course thinking can be immersed in its ground level concerns, so that the potential for reflectiveness is metery latent, and this goes for "I" thinking too (consider "That rhinoceros is about to charge at nic"). What we can say is this, if a thought presents an object as oneself it presents the object in such a way that no further information is required, besides what is already there in the mode of presentation, to warrant the reflective judgment that the object of this reference is the maker of it.

We can understand how something can figure in that way in her ght if we can understand how something can figure in that way in speech. It might seem that "A" presents its referent in just that way, that the mode of presentation associated with "A" itself contains enough to warrant the

judgment whose materials, then, would have to be a lat least implicit in the mode of presentation—that the referent is also the maker of the reference. But that misses, he point I have been insisting on, that in exercises of the "A"-practice there is no speaker, and so no maker of references. If we allow ourselves the fantasy of the inner propeteer, we have a maker of references in view, at least ai the sense of someone who sees to it that references get made, but now the referent is not the maker, the author or originator-of the reference. Contrast how it would have been if reports on one's actions using "A" had been introduced as expressions of intention. Then we could indeed have said that the warrant, and materia's, for the reflective judgmen, that the object of this reference is its maker are implier in the mode of presentation associated with "4". But in that case "4" would have been, from the start, a first person form, a mere variant on "1". The materials for the reflective judgment are indeed impact already in the very idea of an ascription of action that is an expression of the intent in being actualized

When we try to think marseives into the "4"-practice, a certain singled our bondy, hang appears at best as an instrument for the wall of a self-that can only duboutsly I rid a place in our imaginings, a self-that recedes inward to the point of vanishing. With bodily agency in the picture, that bodily II inglibecomes something one can identify as in eself, now there is something plainty present in the world for oneself to be. And it is not clear that we can understand the specific agency exercised in relerving. The idea of which is implant in the potentially reflective mode of presentation under which one is presented as oneself and rect reflexives—except by beginning with referring as an element in speaking a particular miscle of physical intervention in the world on the part of the bodily agent that one can ideal fy as meself. Surely this cannot be less lundamental in our understanding of self-consciousness, than providing for a distinction between bow things are and how things are experienced as being.

Strawson's reading of Kant is revelatory when the question is I have foreterence can be reference at all bint is is less helpful lowards understanding how self-reference works, what the mode of presental it expressed by someone's use of "I" is Perhaps I can put the point like to is. When it comes to understanding how self-reference works, we are better served by the discission into P predicates and M producates as in *Individuals*. Laan by the Kantian abstract on of a temporally extended point of view on the world from the career of an embodied subject. P predications include from the

start, ascriptions of intentionally undertaken bodily movements. In that context, one's being a bodily agent cannot take on the look of an after-thought a mere frame for something that could sensibly be supposed to be more fundamental to self-consciousness.

⁶ See Individuals, pp. 111-2.

ESSAY 12

Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity

If Richard Rorty is notorious among philosophers for his campaign against epistemology practised in the manner of the Cartesian and British-empiric stitradition. But putting it like that underplays how drastic Rorty's thinking about epistemology is For Rorty, an activity in that vein is simply what the label "opistemology" means. He has not time for a different, and perhaps useful kind of reflection that might still deserve to count as epistemological. My main almost this essay its to urge that what I take to be Rorty's basic convictions, with which I sympathize do not require so completely discussive a stance towards the very idea of epistemology. Indeed I want to a rige that Rorty's basic project positively requires a more his pitable attit de to something that may as well be counted as epistemological reflection.

An themstating context for Rorty's campaign against epistemology is a Deweyan narrative of Western culture's coming to maturity. For Dewey's own growing up at was important to disburden himself of the oppressive sense of son inculcated into him by his mother, and this feature of his own if e shaped his picture of what it would be for humanity as large to come of age.

In simple outline, the story goes like this. The sense of sin from which Dewey freed himself was a reflection of a religious outlook according to which human beings were called on to humble themselves before a non-thinan authority. Such a posture is infantile in its submissiveness to

Enaborating this context was a certifal theme in the some at higher times Rorty delighted under the overal offic "Anti-Authoria anism in Epistemology and Ethics" in Grona, Catalonia, during his 1996 tenure of the Ferrater Mora Chair in Contemporary Thought. My formulation of the Dewesan narrative is a simplified version of the way Rorty presented it in those fectures. See also ing. "Sobdarity or Objectivity."

205

something other than ourselves. If human beings are to achieve maturity they need to follow Dewey in liberating themselves from this sort of religion, a religion of abasement before the divine Other. But a humanism that goes no further than that is still incomplete. We need a counterpart secular emancipation as well. In the period in the development of Western culture during which the God who figures in that sort of religion was stricken, so to speak, with his mortal illness, the illness that was going to lead to the demise famously announced by Nietzsche, some European intellectuals found themselves conceiving the secular world, the putative object of everyday and scientific knowledge, in ways that parallelled that humanly immature concept on of the divine. This is a secular analogue to a religion of abasement, and human maturity requires that we aberate ourselves from it as well as from its religious counterpart.

What Rorty takes to parallel authoritarian religion is the very idea that in everyday and scientific investigation we submit to standards constituted by the things themselves, the reality that is supposed to be the topic of the investigation. Accepting that idea. Rorty suggests is casting the world in the role of the non-human Other before which we are to humble ourselves. Pull human maturity would require us to acknowledge authority only if the acknowledgement does not involve abasing ourselves before so nething non-human. The ordy authority that meets this requirement is that of human consensus. If we conceive inquiry and judgment in terms of making curselves answerable to the world, as opposed to being answerable to cur fellows, we are merely postponing the completion of the human sm whose achievement begins with discarding author tanan religion.

The idea of answerability to the world is central to the discourse of objectivity. So Rorty's call is to abandon the discourse, the vocabulary of objectivity, and work instead towards expanding human solidarity. Viewed in the context I have just sketched, this invitation has a world instorical character. As Rorty sees things, participating in the discourse of objectivity merely prolongs a cultural and intellectual infant him, and persuading people to renounce the vocabulary of objectivity should facilitate the achievement of full human maturity. This would be a contribution to world history that is, perhaps surprisingly, within the power of mere intellect, a s.

- 2. This phase of the story invotes a Freighan foriontation, which Rurty gave or tils. Gifona tectures. There are also obvious resonances with Nietzsche
- 3. Notice that this is not the same as liberating ourselves from resignor tout court as: Dewey's own example makes clear

206

2. I share Rorty's conviction that we ought to try to get out from under the secraing problems of epistemology in the Cartesian and British empiricist vein, rather than taking them at face value and attempting to solve them. (It was largely from him that I learned to think like that) I think too it, at there may be I um nation to be had from a parallel between the conception of the world that figures in epistemology in that vein, on the one land, and a certain conception of the divine on the other. But it is possible to go that far with Rorty and still dissert from his suggestion that in order to avoid entanglement in that far that far that miprof table epistemological activity, we need to discard the very idea of being answerable to something other than ourselves.

What gives the sections problems of mainstream modern epistemology their sections urgency is not the sheer idea that inquiry is answerable to the world. The culprit rather is a frame of rund in which the world to which we want to conceive our thinking as answerable threatens to withdraw out of reach of anything we can this kilof as our means of access to it. A gap threatens to ope i between as and what we would like to conceive ourse ves as knowing about and it then seems to be a task for philosophy to show as ways to bridge the gulf. It is this threat of maccessibility on the part of the world that we need to dislodge in order to intotask as 40 isory the seeming compilise these chimalisticam epistemology. And the direct of maccessibility is not part of the very idea of the world as something other than ourselves, o which can investigalise accessibility as not part of the very idea of the world as something other than ourselves, o which can investigalise accessible.

This allows is to make the parallel between epistemology and reigion more posited. The world as a figures in manistream epistemology is a counterpart, not so is stains also of the divine as non-bianan and author, alive but to the contept or of deas absending. God as with frawn into a cryste mous inaccessionaty. A telling Dewevan profest against episteriology, as pray sed in the Cartesian and British empiricist style, can be east as a protest against the idea of philosophy as priesterall, supposedly needed to mediate between this nanidus absorbito and ordinary himait beings who aspire to knowledge of it.

The dea that inquiry is answerable to the world does not by itself commit us to believing that there is a need for plu osoghy as priesterafi. We can accept that incurry is answerable to the things themselves and still suppose correctly, that the resources of ordinary investigative activity can suffice to put as in touch with the subject matter of investigation, wasout need of special pullosophical mediation. That is, we can follow Dewey in rejecting

putlosophy as priesteraft, without needing to abandon the very vocabulary of objectivity. What we need to dislodge is the idea of the world as with drawn into maccessibility, and that is quite another matter.

3 If we separate the idea of objectivity from the threat of withdrawa, on the part of the world, we can make better sense of the position of Cartesian and British-empiricist epistemology in the history of philosophy.

For one thing, this makes it easier to ensure that a Dewcyan profest against an epistemology with priestly pretensions is aimed in an appropriate historical direction. The idea of being answerable to the subject matter of inquiry is surely not new with modern philosophy. Rorty so net mes cries Plato's manipulation of the contrasts between knowledge and opinion, and between readity and appearance, as a paradigm of what gues wrong in the metaphysics of objectivity. But the familiar supposed probabilist of modern epistemology are not, ust more of something we already find in Plato. That would make it a invitery that two more millennia had to pass before pulosophy began to be obsessed with the anxieties of Cartesian epistemology. It took something further and more specific to make what people wanted to think of as the target of their nivest gations threaten to withdraw out of reach of what they wanted to think of as their means of access to it

What figures in Plato as a distance between mere appearance and reality is not the distance that generates the characteristic anxiety of modern epistemology. Perhaps both the Platonic and the Cartestan conceptions can be captured in terms of an image of penetrating a veil of appearance and putting ourselves in fouch with reality, but the image works differently in the two contexts. In the Platonic context, appearance does not ligure as something that after all constitutes access to knowable reality, a though, it takes philosophy to show us how it can do so. Philosophy in Plato does not show how to bridge a gulf between appearance and an empirically knowable reality it does not picture appearance as an avenue to knowledge at all. Correspondingly, the acknowledged and embraced remoteness of the knowable in Plato is quite public the threatened, but to be overcome remoteness of the knowable in modern, philosophy. Plato is nothing like a Cartesian sceptic or a British empiricist.

Attacking the vocabulary of objectivity as such as Rorty does, ratiler than the concept on of the world as withdrawn, distracts after tion from a necessity

⁴ Sec. e.g., "Soudarity or Objectivity" p. 22

208

sary task. If we are to achieve a satisfactory exorcism of the problematic of mainstream modern epistemology, we need to uncover and understand the specific historical influences—which has I have been insisting, are much more recent than the vocabulary of objectivity use f—that led to a seeming withdrawa, on the part of what we wanted to see as the empirically knowable world, and thus to philosophy shooming to centre on epistemology in the sense of the attempt to bridge the supposed god? Freeing the vocabulary of objectivity from contamination by the threat of withdrawa, can be the project of epistemology in a different sense. This is an activity whose very point would converge with the point Rorry is making, when he rejects the idea that philosophy holds the secret to the possibility of empirical knowledge.

If we for a on the threat of withdrawal, we not only enable parse ves to raise diagnostic questions at the right point in history, the beginning of modern philosophy, we also make room, perhaps usefully, for a conception, of Kant that differs from Rerty's. Rorty finds figures congenial to his worldhistorical conception of what philosophers ought to be doing only quite recently in the history of philosophy, with the emergence of self-conscious y subversive thinkers such as Nietzsche. The ordy significance Rorty finds mi Rant is that Kant's enormous prestige enabled the professionalization of philosophy in the sense of the activity Rorty depiores as merely proteinging human implacurity? But Kauf precisely aims to combat the threat of a withdrawal on the part of the world we aspire to know. Kapt undermites the idea that appearance screens us off from knowable reality, he offers justgada way of thicking in which-to put it paradoxically from the point of view or the style of epistemotogy he aims to supersede—appearance just is the real ty we aspite to know conless things have gone wrong in mundane ways). It is a fundamentally Kantian thought that the troth about the worldis within the reach of those who live in the reality of appearance. To use a Platon citum of phrase that is now rendered sale, deprived of any tell dency. to encourage the idea that we need philosophical gap-endging. This is fully in the spirit of a Dewcyan protest against the idea that epistemology is

⁵ In Philosophicana the Mirror of Nature Rorty did concern it miself with the Instorical question campounding to here tibroigh a do not think he got the answer right. In respect of responsiveness to this historical question, more recent withings the "Solidar your Objectivity" seem to represent a backward step.

^{6.} See chapter 3 of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

209

needed for a priestly mediation between us and a world that has withdrawn from us. 750 if we reconceive Rorty's world-historical project so as to direct it specifically against the epistemological problematic of withdrawal rather than the vocabulary of objectivity, we can see Kant as an ally not an enemy. For what it is worth, this version of the crusade might do better at engaging professors of philosophy.

4 One aspect of the immaturity that Rorty finds in putting objectivity rather than soudarity at the focus of philosophical discourse is a wishful denial of a certain sort of argumentative or deliberative predicament. On the face of itcertain substantive questions are such that we can be confident of answers. to them, on the basis of thinking the matter through with whatever resources we have for dealing with questions of the relevant kind (for instance, ethical questions), there is no need for a sideways grance at philosophy. But even after we have done our best at marshalling considerations in favour of an answer to such a question, we have no guarantee that just anyone with whom we can communicate will find our answer compe laig. That fact—perhaps brought forcibly home by our fating to persuade. someone. kan then induce the sideways glance, and undermine the in halconfidence. Rorty's suggestion is that the vocabulary of objectivity reflects a philosophical attempt to shore up the confidence so threatened, by wishfully denying the predicament. The wishful idea is that an principle reality. Itself files this gap in our persuasive resources, any rational subject who does not see thangs aright must be failing to make proper use of humanly and versal capacities to be in tune with the world. If we fall into this way of thinking, we are trying to exploit the image of an ideal position in which we are in touch with something greater than ourselves—a secular counterpart to the idea of being at one with the divine-in order to avoid acknowledging the inchminable hardness of bard questions, or in order to avoid facing up to the sheer contingency that attaches to our being at a historically evolved cultural position that enables us to find compelling is stitle considerations we do find compelling."

⁷ See e.g. Experience and Nature p. 410° the profuseness of alrestations to supreme devotion to the hom the part of photosophy is matter to arouse suspiction. For it has its ally been a preliminary to the claim of being a peculiar organ of access to highest and unmate truth. Such it is not "See the opening remarks in Donato Davidson. "The Structure and Content of Truth" from which I have borrowed this quotation.

^{8.} This theme is central in Rorty's commission in row and Solidarite

2.0 Reference, Objectivity, and Knowledge

Here too we can make a separation. This wishful concept in of anti-rement with how things really are as a means of avoiding an uncomfortable acknowledgment of the amitations of reason and the contangency of car capacities to from as we believe we should can be detached from his very dea of making ourselves answerable to how things are. We can join Rorty in deporting the former without needing to join him in abandoning the very idea of aspining to get things right.

I can bring out how these are two different things by boking at a feature of Rorty's reading of Plato.

Rorty follows Nietzsche in suggesting that Platomic conceptions in ethics reflect an inabdov to face up to the kind of bard choices that are the stuff of an ethically complex ale—as if the idea were that getting in teach with the Form's would carry one through life without need for the effort of desperation. "But I thank this reading pusses the point of Paronic ethics. Being in touch with the Forms's not aleant to be a substitute for bard thinking and, it wast to do. On the contrary the Forms are an image to enable us to sustain the doa to at there is such a thing as getting things right precisely in the absence of ways to make answers to ethical questions universally compelling. It is not a Plateric thought that putting someone in touch with the Forms is imprinciple a way to compel assent, on disputed questions about how to two from anybody as all who is rational enough to engage to discussion of the questions.

I think this is brought out by the treatment of Cadic estin the Gergias and Tl rasymachus to the Republic places where on Rotty's reading, one would expect to Lod Plato wheeting in a reality larger to an inerchamary beings, as if it could fill gaps in the arguments that we can come up with apart from resorting to it. That is not what happens in those dialog less Fach of those opponents of ethical orthodoxy is reduced to a sink before a tything specifically Platonic even appears on the scene by arguments whose cuality is quite interest which are at the worst transparently sophistical so that one can easily sympathize with the sulkarge. Thrasymach is introduces the question whether one should live in accord with what Socrates would recognize as virtue bill to eithed driven into an alogry scene in the first book of the Republic. Thereafter Plato turns to something that does not look like even a promissory note for a way of rendering an allitmative answer to the question universally compelling even to people like Thrasymest on universally compelling even to people like Thrasymesters.

machus. Instead, with Thrasymachus himsell conspicuously taking no part in the conversation. Plato has Socrates characterize the knowledge that matters for knowing how to live as what results from a proper education. And education here is not, as Rorty's reading might lead one to expect a honing of purely intellectual capacities, to put them in tune with a reality one might conceive as accessible independently of contingencies of cultural position. Plato ansists that a proper education is an education of the sentiments no less than the intellect (to put it in eighteenth-century terms, There is a similar structure in the Gorgias, with Callicles figuring in the conversation as a patently unconvinced "yea" sayer -remarkably enough in view of the fass Plato has Socrates make learlier in the dialogue labour now. important it is to him to secure the sincere assent of his interlocutors (compare 472b with 501c). I think the moral in both dialogues, must be meant. to be something on these lines, people who raise such grestions are dangerous, and should be forced into silence, or acquiescence, by whatever means are available, people whose character is in good order will have confidence in right answers to the questions, a confidence that should not be threatened by the lact that questioners such as Callicles or Thrasymachus cannot be won over by persuasive argument 16

It is true of course that Plato gives a cognitive slant to his picture of what it is to have one s character in good order, he sees it as a capacity to arrive at the truth about a certain subject matter. But there is no implication that this capacity to arrive at the truth somehow insures one against tragic predicaments, or bypasses the need for bard thinking about difficult questions.

One would not expect Plato to have had the sort of concern Rorty has with contingency. But it is one thing to lack that concern, and quite another to have a metaphysical picture that excludes it. Plato's metaphysical picture can perfectly well accommodate the thought that it is a contingency that certain people can get things right, this formulation smooth y combines an acknowledgement of contingency with an employment of the vocabulary of objectivity, in a way that ought to be incoherent if Rorty were right about the vocabulary of objectivity. There is nothing alien to Plato in supplying.

¹⁰ Rorty says of Orwell's O Brieff: "Orwell did not invent O Briefs to serve as a dialectical for as a modern counterpart to Thrasymachus. He invented him to warn us against birth, as one might warn against a typhoon or a rogue elephant." (Contingency Irony and Soudarity p. 176. I think that makes O Brief pretts much exactly a modern counterpart to Thrasymachus as Plato actually uses him.

say. Glaucon and Adeimantus in the *Republic* with a thought on these lines. "How fort mate we are to have been born Greeks, not barbarians, and thus to have had an appringing that made us capable of seeing things aright on hese matters."

Of course it would be absurd to suggest that one can set aside Rorry's reading of Plata on the strength of a less quick sentences. But a do not need to carry conviction on the alternative I have sketched at is enough for my purposes here that it should be so much as intelligible. This shows that the very idea of aspiring to get things right of making ourselves answerable to how things are has no necessary connection with what Rorry deplores, an inability to face up to contingency, and the fantasy of transferring the burden of hard thinking to the world itself.

5 So far I have been taking issue at a general level, with Rorty's suggestion that the very vocabulary of objectivity commits us to a wish! I denial of contingency and that it saddles us with the idea that phi osophy is needed, in order to supply a guarantee for the capacity of inquiry to make contact with its subject matter. Eagree with Rorty that we should be open-eyed about cort ingency, and hostile to philosophy's claim to be a necessary auderpinning for other sorts of intellectual activity, but I have urged that this does not warrant his dismissive attitude to the very idea of making our solves answerable to the world.

I want now to point to a flaw in the way Rorty freats the vocabiliary of objectivity when he goes into analytical detail about it

Heavy Putnam has argued, to put it in Rotty's words. that "notions had reference "semantical notions which relate language to romanguage"—are internal to our overall view of the world". Rorty rites Primari's argument with approval. He writes, giving more examples of the notions to which the argument applies. "From the standpoint of the representationalist, the fact that notions like representation, reference, and truth are

[&]quot;Far lasy" is not the way Roriv would put this, he ib tiks such terms of criticism concede too touch as the ineraphysics of objectivity, and he would supply say that such conseptions have not proved ascar. This seems to me to be pragmatism go to ever the top depriving used the useful critical notion. But this depends on something can about the argue, that it is only by way of a conflamor that Roriv comes to think resisting the kinds of pipeling hybridges as appropriative requires resistance to the very vocabularly of objectivity.

^{2.} Observeing Relativism and Truth p. 6. See, e.g., Put sam's Meaning and the Moral Samies.

deployed in ways that are internal to a language or a theory is no reason to drop them." The figure here labelled "the representational st" is someone who refuses to give up the vocabulary of objectivity in favour of the vocabulary of solidarity. Of course Rorty is not suggesting we should drop the uses of these semantical notions to which Putnam's argument applies, uses that are internal to a world view. But he thinks "the representational st" these to use the notions in a way that is not internal to a world view. It is this supposed external use, according to Rorty, that is in question in the discourse of objectivity. So his view is that we need to distinguish the discourse of objectivity from the innocent internal use of the semantical notions that Putnam discusses.

One could define the discourse of objectivity as involving a certain supposed external use of the semantical notions, and in that case I would have no problem with Rorty's attitude to at But Rorty suggests that rejecting these supposed external uses requires rejecting any form of the idea that it quiry is answerable to the world. I think this deprives us of something that is not anextricably implicated with what Putnam unmasks as thusion, and in depriving us of something we can innocently want the move is damaging to Rorty's own philosophical project.

Rorty's picture is on these bines. If we use an expression bke "accurate representation" in the innocent internal way it can fonct on only as a picans of paying "empty compliments" to claims that pass muster within our entrept practice of claims making. Now "the representationalist" finds a restriction to this sort of assessment anaecceptably parochial. Recording from that "the representationalist" tries to make expressions like "true" or "accerate representation" signify a mode of normative relatedness—conformaty—to sorresthing more independent of as than the world as it figures in our world view. This aspiration is well captured by Thomas Nagel's image of "trying to c'amb outside of our own mands". The image has a conception or supposed conception of reality that threatens to put it outside our reach since the norms according to which we conduct our investigations cannot of course he any thing but our circrent norms. Recoiling from the idea that we are restricted to paying "empty compliments" to bits of our world view. "the representationalist" tries to conceive the relation between what we want to see as our

^{3.} Objectivity Relativism, and Troth, p. 6.

^{4.} For the phrase "empty compliment", see Philosophi and the Mirror of Nature, 5, 10.

The View from Nowhere p. 9: see Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p.

to thought at all

world view and its subject matter from sideways in trainer than from the variage point of the world view—now only problematically so called—itself. This way it comes to seem that referential relations—to focus on the case that enginally figured in Putnam's argument—would have to be it telligible in the "Augustiman" way Wittgenstein considers at the beginning of *Phytosophica Investigations* not that is, from the midst of an understanding of anguistic practice as a going concern, but as if they could be prior building blocks in an ex-

planation, from first principles, of how language enables us to give expression.

This conception is naturally reflected in just the seris of philosophical wonderment at for instance, the meaningfulness of lang tage, or the fact that we so much as have an "overall view of the world", that Rorty tellingly deplores. In this concept on, being genin nels in touch with reality would in a radical way transcend whatever we can do within our practices of arriving at answers to our questions. Thus a familiar guil seems to open between us and what we would like to be able to think of ourselves as able to get to know about. And the only alternative as Rorty sees things is to take our inquiry not to be subject to anything but the norms of current practice. This picture of the options makes at look as if the very deal of inquiry as normally vely beholden not just to current practice but to its subject matter is they they beholden not just to current practice but to its subject matter is they they do not own minds. But a piece of more sability goes missing bord.

6. It will help to locas or gost one of the notions that figure in this line of thought, the notion of truth

Rorty thinks there are three petentially relevant "uses" of "true", a commending in normal veluse, a "disquotational" use, and a "cautionary" use, "

The "cautionary" use is employed when we say, of some claim that we are so far not managed to find anything wrong with that it may even so, not be true. Rorty thinks such a remark is a remander that even though the claim's credentials have passed muster in the eves of all qualified and ences to whom we have so far exposed it we may in the future encounter an audience who binds fault with it in a way that as we shall acknowledge reflects the fact that the future audience is better qualified.

So far Rotty thinks, so good. The trouble comes if we take this "cautionary" use to be expressive of a norm. That way, we persuade ourse ves that we understand compellingness to any audience as a norm for our activities of inquiry and for the claum making that gives expression to their results. And now we are habie to picture this universal compellingness in terms of a conformity to reality that would need to be contemplated from outside any local practice of investigation.

No doubt it is a good thing to aspire to overcome parochiality in the persuasiveness of the warrants we can offer for what we believe that is part of the content of Rorty's own praise of soudarity. But this does not make aniversal compel inguess ante ligible as a norm. Rorty writes, "to say something." like "we hope to just fy our belief to as many and as large audænces as posis to offer only an ever retreating goal, one which fades for everand for ever when we move this not even what common sense would cala goal. For it is not even something to which we night get closer, much less. something we ringht realize we had finally reached "." Trying to iden ify this "ever-retreating goal", only dubiously concervable as a goal at all, with truth as a norm tor inquiry and judgment is a way into a pict, reliable obagations of inquirers that has nothing to do with devising arguments in order to convince particular groups of human beings-a picture in which aiming at being geruinesy in touch with reality seems appropriately captured by the image of trying to climb outside our own punds. The aspirationto overcome parochiality, then is all very well, but the only norm, at this level of generality, that intelligibly governs impairs is that of coming apwith claims that our peers, competent in the norms of our current practices. of claim, making, will let us get away with. "If we try to make sense of a further norm, involving responsibility to the subject matter of argumy, we laid ourselves in the "Augustituan" or sideways-on picture of our relation to that subject matter.

Now to begin with, there is something unsatisfactory about the way Rorty separates the first two of these three uses of "time"—he normalize use and the "disquotational" use. Rorty claims that the "disquotational" use of "time" is "descriptive" and as such not merely to be distinguished from but incapable of being combined in a unified discourse with any use of "true" that treats truth as a norm for inquiry and claim-making." But thus makes

^{17 &}quot;Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry? Davidson vs. Wright" at p. 298.

B. Rotty writes. "I view wa hant as a sociological matter." It be ascertained by observing the reception of 5's statement by her peers." (Pumarriano be Relativist Menace. p. 449. At a different level, we would have a specify the norms of the current practices themselves.

¹⁹ See "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth".

2.6 Reference, Objectivity, and Knowledge

up room for such trusms as the lollowing what makes it correct among speakers of English to make a claim with the words "Snow is white to stay with a well worm example, is that snow is undeeds white.

The idea of discuotation, literally interpreted, bits the "Tise, tences" character to be provable in a Tarskian theory of truth for a language, formulated in a metalanguage that expands the object language only by adding serian ic viscabulary. But we can extend the idea of disquotation to fit the case of a Tarswan theory whose object language is not contained in the meta angi-age. in which the theory is stated to theory that might be put to the Dayatson and p rpose of capturing an interpretation of one language in another 8 Here. what I gares, rot quoted on the right hand side of a T sentence is no imperto every same sentence that appears between quotation marks, or otherwise designated, before his true if and only if on the left hand side. But it is a senence that if the theory is a good one has the same effect its use there cancels be semantic iscent effected by the quotation marks or other method of designation, and so disquotes in an extended sense. A sentence that is true in the sease of "trile" whose conditions of application to the sentences of this or that language Tarsk ish need how to prodown in a theory (provided that we call find a suitable logical form in or impose a suitable logical form on the se tences of the language) is—we can naturally say—disquotable. And this idea of disquestability is not separate as Rorty suggests. from anything cormative. For a given sentence to be true, sto be disquittable say for it to be soreaby. sable to make a claim past because. where in the gap we usert not q ned as taised the sentence that figures on the ng t hand side of the T so itence provided for the sentence in question by a good Tarsk an theory for is language i he sentence itself in the case in which we can exploit the anextended recard disquotation). Truth in the sense of disquotability is un-, roblemat cally normative for sentences uttered at order to make claims ╴

20 See Cavidson's writings in union concern all in instrugation and triplicand in sensetation. For the extended notion of discapital in cancebation of sensetic ascents, see W. V. Quine. Philosophy of Legic pp. 10-13.

2. Roots thinks he is innerseing Davidson in goosing disquotation in terms of a car saferefavor between bits of language and things that are not bits of language and concluding the the gloss that it his protection is so of title is so fat from being normal we self-calm a even be each remain combined with normal vell a littling this premy hardy mosses the point of davidson's writings about interpretation of inged this at optiffs, 3 of Mind and Bersa's a think this feature of Rorts's in along descends directly from the frequential networks among exercise to trace the fine of descent in detail.

Now let us reconsider Rorry's treatment of the "captionary" use. In a passage in which he is explicitly wondering whether he suffers from a bindspot, Rorty writes that, apparently unlike Davidson, he sees 'no significance, in the fact that we use the same word to designate what is preserved by valid inference as we use to caution people that beliefs justified to us may not be justified to other better audiences". But what is preserved by yand inference, which is presumably truth as expressed by a commending or nor. mative use of "true" is samply disquotability. That disquotability is normative for conclusions of inference, and bence that disquotability must be preserved by good patterns of inference is just part of what it means for disquotability to be normative in the approblematic way it is, for claim. making. Moreover, disquotability yields a straightforward gloss on the cautionary use of "true" as well. One can express the cautionary point not only with an explicit use of "true", but also with a kind of augmented disquotation, that is, by making a claim in which one modifies a non-quoting use of the words that figure in the original claim, or the words that appear on the right-hand side of a non-homophonic T sentence for the sentence differed in making it, by adding a modal operator and a negation sign. Rorty's cautionary use is exemplified in a form of words such as " All life forms are carbon-based may not (after all) be true*, but one could achieve exactly the same effect by saying "There may (after all) be ble forms that are not carbon based. What one warms oneself or others that a claim may not have in spite of its passing mister so lar is just disquerability. I think this shows that the bund spot Rorty wonders about is indeed there. That we use the same word supply reflects the fact that it is the same status, disquotabiaty, that is, on the one hand, preserved by valid inference and, on the other possibly lacked by behels, or claims, on which there is present consensus among qualified judges.

The same band spot is operative in a thesis Rorty puts by saving "just fication is relative to an audience". Taken one way indeed the thesis is obvaously correct, whenever one carries conviction by giving reasons, it is some particular audience that one persuades. Now Rorty thinks that is the only way to take the thesis, he thinks the only hygienically available conception

^{22 &}quot;Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry?" p. 286. For the belief, has the "cautionary" use of "true" "is captured neither by a common sensital account of hy approbative force nor by a disquirtational account." see also "Pritnam and the Relativistic Menage... p. 460.

^{23. &}quot;Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry." p. 283. See a so the passage guoted time. 18 above.

of what it is for say a claim to be usufied (or warranted, or rationally acceptable) must be relative to some particular audience, on page of our purporting to have an idea of justification that is implicated with the sinewaysca picture and the aspiration to climb outside our own minds. Fatting the sideways-on picture, he suggests. The terms warranted a rationally acceptable, e.e. will always myne the question to whom? "A This idea is what anderwrites the argument I rehearsed a lew paragraphs back, that, a tabughpersuasiveness to audiences other than our peers is a worthy aspiration, the only way justification (or warrant) or rational acceptability) can constitute a norm for claim-making is in the gibse of ability to pass muster with our peers. But here the norm constituted by disquotability goes pussing. An interance, of "Cood fusion has not been achieved so lar in the laboratory" has of I am right about the physics) a warrant, a justifiedness, that consists not in one's being able to get away with it among certain conversational partners, but m—now I d squote, and impactly make a claim—cold fusion's not having been achieved so far in the laboratory. Here the terms "warranted" "rationally acceptable? left have collected an obvious answer not to the question "to whom?", but to the ignestion "in the aight of what?", and the question "to whom?" need not be in the offing at all.

Notice that in order to issist on these lines that we can make sense of a notion of just fixation for which the relevant question is "in the light or what?" all I need is any trather rudomentary) abolity to make claims about whether or not cold fusion has occurred. Rorty thanks any purported notic is of warrant or justifiedness that is not relative to an audience would have to be impacated with the sort of philosophy that involves trying to climb outside one slown mand. I one gives expression, as I just did, to the norm constituted by disquality. One formulates the relevant normative condition on a given as sertoric utterance by disquoting (possibly in the extended sense) the words whose assertoric atterance is governed by the norm one is invoking, that is, by using words, for instance. "Cold linson has not been achieved") that would figure on the right hand side of the relevant T sentence, words in whose norm governed employment one is (more or less) competent.

It is true that we have only whatever lights are at our disposal to go on the bringing such a norm to bear—which involves deciding what to say about for instance, whether or not cold fusion has occurred. We understand what

the norm of disquotability comes to, potential utterance by potential afterance, from the midst of a current practice of claim-making, we understand it by the lights constituted by being a (more or less) competent party to the practice. But it does not follow that nothing can be normal ve for moves. within the practice except ensuring that one's peers will left one get away. with them. There is a norm for making Gaims with the words "Load fusion." has not occurred" that is constituted by whether or not cold fusion has occurred, and whether or not cold fusion has occurred is not the same as whether or not saying it has occurred will pass nuister in the current practice. On topics on which there is no dispute, it will always seem from within a practice of investigation that the answers to such pairs of questions comcide that that should not prevent us from seeing that the questions differ-Moreover, anyone who can be recognized as self-consciously partic pating in a practice of Gam-making must be able to see that the questions differ-Without this difference, there would be no ground for conceiving one's acthy by as making Gairns about say, whether or not cold fusion has occurred. as opposed to ach eving unison with one's fellows in some perhaps purely decorative activity on a level with a kind of damping. The dista guishability of the questions amounts to the availability of the notion of a claim's being justified in the light of how things stand with its subject matter. And the questions are distinguishable from within our practice of claim-making, insisting on the distinction is not an expression of the fantasy that one can conceive the practice's conformity to reality from sideways on

Seeing flow the questions differ, we can see how the thought that some claim is true is not—as in Rorty's "empty compliment" idea—the thought that it would pass muster in the relevant claim making practice as presently constituted. It is the thought that things really are a certain way for instance, that cold fusion really has not occurred. To insist on this distinction is not to try to think and speak from octside our practices, it is somply to take seriously the idea that we can really mean what we think and say from within them. It is not just "the representationalist", someone who thinks we need to climb outside our own atomds in order to understand how thought and speech relate to reality, who can be expected to recoil from a denial of this.

There are two different things that might be meant by saying as Rorty applicads Putnam for saying, that norms expressible with notions like that of truth are internal to our world view. Putnam's insight is that we must not succumb to the illusion that we need to climb ourside our own minds. The

220 Reference, Objectivity, and Knowledge

illusion that though we aim our thought and speech at the world from a standpoint constituted by our present practices and competences, we must be able to conceive the conformity of our thought and speech to the worldfrom outside any such standpoint. But to animask that as an allesion is not to say with Rorty, that the norms that govern coaim making can only be norms. of consensus, a prims that would be fully met by earning the endorsement of our peers for our claims. We offist indeed ayoud the illusion of transcendence. that Putnam's ir sight rejects, but we do not put our capacity to do so at risk. if we insist that in claim-making we make ourselves answerable not just to the verdicis of our fellows but in the facts themselves. That is, if you like to say that norms of inquiry transcend consensus. But this transcendence is quite distinct from the transcender ce Putham unmasks as an illusory aspiratio i. These norms are internal to our world view, just as Putnam arged that the relevant norms in (st be. It is just that the world view to which they are internal has the world in view otherwise than as constituted by what his gaistic performances will pass master in our present practice. But that is merely a requirement for us to have the world in view at a l-for moves. within the resevant practices to be expressive of a world view, as opposed to merely aspiring to vocalize in step with one another. Taking this transcendence in stride requires no more than confidence in our capacity to direct. our meaning at say, whether or not cold fision has occurred 45

7. What I have been arging is that it it it as disquorability is a mode of jost fieldness that is not relative to some particular audience, the question that this mode of justifiedness is not "to whom?" But "in the light of what?" This mode of justifiedness is immocatoasly normative for inquiry and the judgments and claims it aims at . For all the efforts of philosophers

25. Rorty makes a helpful for neuron between relativistic and ethnocencism, and cisave we relativistic (See "Somethis of Objectivistic") between rosm is the insistence that we speak much the meets of historically and culturally local practices is amount to a respection of the misory transcendence involved in the image of trying to climb outside of the own minds. But in refuseig to allow the in fact purfectly in locent thought that to speaking from the midst of the practices of our ethnos, we make ourselves answerable to the world inself dor instance to how lings stand with respect to cold fusion). Borty makes a move whose effect is to compase his own helpful distinction. The thesis that his tiltuation is relative to an ancience" is, as explicitly stated relativistic not pist ethnocentric. This is at least some excuse for what Rorty complains of leights. "Putham and the Relativist Menace" in namely Putham a continuing to count Rorty as a relativist even in the face of Rorty's disclaimer.

to put it in doubt, something we can conceive in terms of satisfaction of such a norm is unproblematically achievable from the local standpoints that are the only standpoints we can occupy in intellectual activity.

Contrast Rorry's picture, in which there is nothing for truth, as a mode of justifiedness that is not relative to a particular audience, to be except the Tever retreating goal" of being convincing to ever more and larger audiences. Of course the "ever-retreating goal" cannot be achieved, and Rorry says as much. But his blind spot about disquotability leads him to think this correct point can be put by saying something to this effect of we chacetve truth as a mode of justifiedness that transcends convensus, we are conceiving something that would not be achievable. This rejects the imnoclosis transcendence along with the illusory one. And the effect is to make lingent just the sorts of question that Rorry wants to discourage.

As I said, taking the innoctious transcendence in stride requires no more than confidence in our capacity to direct our meaning at say, whether or not cold fusion has occurred. Philosophers have contrived to shake this confidence, to make such a capacity look mysterious, by moves whose effect is to make it seem that comprehension of how inquiry yidgment and camimaking are related to real ty syon direquire the other kind of transcendence. the kind that is an illusory aspiration. Rorty's own ret, sal to countenance. norms for claim making that go beyond consensus is of course metivated by his well placed hostility to this idea, the idea that we need to clubb outside our own minds in order to occupy a point of view from which to conceive the relation of thought to reality. But throwing out the innocaous transcendence along with the diusory aspiration has exactly the effect he depiores, it makes a mystery of how we manage to direct our thought and speech as it were past the endorsement of our fellows and to the facts themselves. Rorts is committed to taking imagery on those lines as irredeemably expressive of the hankering after claribung outside our own minds. But the an agery comes to nothing more than an insistence that we speak and think-of course from the midst of our practices—about say, whether or not cold fusion has accurred. And Rorty's own move makes a mystery of how we manage to dothat in just the sort of way in which he rightly wants not to let pay asophy make a mystery of such things

If one has a steadfast understanding of truth as disquotability one can be immune to phi osophically induced anxiety about how thought and speech undertaken from the inidst of our local practices, can make contact with reality. But consider someone who has a merely inchoate, indepstanding of

truth as disquotability, a norm for inquiry concerning which the relevant question is not "to whom?" but "in the light of what?" Supplied such a person is confronted with Rorty's pronouncement that there is no attaining truth except at the guise of convincingness to one's peers. The pronouncement plus in question the achievability of a kind of conformity of thought and speech to the world that has such a person realizes, though exint policy only matura, to reconding as the kind of gap bridging philosophical activity that Rorty deplores.

8. Rorry dains to discourage a certain genre of philosophy, and I have been arging that his reatment of truth is counter productive by his own lights, It s a connected pelial that this treatment of treth is Thelesse, fundamentally an Deweyan, Pt. Josophers seduce people into the kind of anxiety Ruray lobows Dewey in deploring, they induce ansiety by mampo atting the Hought. that we have enly our own lights to go on an any aiguity. The thought is actainly innocer to but a can be made to secur that having only our own lights Digo Calis a confinement, something that would threaten to cut us off from reality uself. This makes it seem that we need a special ph Esophica, viewpoint, one that contemp ares inquery's relation to reality from sideways onso that we can be reassured that ordinary impurry makes contact with its inended subject marter. On this land of conception, it is only by the grace of ph losophy that truth is attainable in 1rd nary investigative activity. Rerty lof lows Dewey in his hostalty towards this fond of prefension on the part of phaosopaly and as a have indicated. I have no problem with that Biff Dewey plat the pelint by saving such things as this "Trich is a collection of truths, and these construent trains are in the keeping of the besi available. methods of inquiry and testing as to matters of fact, methods which are when collected ancer a single name science 1. As Davidson comments. "Dewey's arm was to bring truth, and with it the prefersions of prifeses phers, down to earth 1. Dewey mested that truth is within the reach of ordinary mg firy. Borty, gode differently, thinks he can achieve the deviced etics, enting down the prefens insoft photosophy dry cheer adviatfirming that truth in the relevant sense is not within reach at all. That is just

²⁶ Experience and Nature is soled by Davidson. The Structure and Content of Trues. p. 279

^{27 &}quot;The Structure and Content of Truth" p. 279

the sort of pronouncement that triggers the kind of philosophy Dewey and Rorty deplore and it is not an effective consolation or deterrent to add "not even within the reach of philosophy". 16

What about the idea that the vocabulary of objectivity reflects an intelectual and cultural immaturity? I have been urging that disquotability is unproblematically normative and that a proper orderstanding of the point yields a good gloss on the idea that inquiry is answerable to the world. It seems to me that it would be about to equate accepting this slope enhought with abasing ourselves before the world, so as to laid to live up to our capacity for human maturity. Indeed, I am inclined to suggest that the boot is on the other foot. If there is a metaphysical counterpart to infamilism anywhere in this vicinity, it is in Rorty's phobia of objectivity, and the suggestion that we should replace talk of our being answerable to the world with talk of ways of thinking and speaking that are conducive to our purposes. In this has a truly infamile attitude, one for which things other than the subject show up only as they impange on its will. Acknowledging a non-human external authority over our thinking, so far from being a betrayal of our humanity, is mereby a condition of growing up. To

I appland Rorty's hostility to the sort of philosophy that sets use for as providing necessary foundations for intellectual activity in genera. But I think he is wrong in supposing that the way to care people of the inpulse

28 Rorty whiles "To tex to make truth approachable and reachable is a do what Davidson deplores a humanize truth it is Truth a Gost of Engines?" in 298. Think this is a misreading of Davidson's opposition to an expisation," conseption of rath Davidson opposes he idea that an account of what it is for a claim to be true needs—incorporate a reference to, for instance, burnan powers of resognition. That is not a all to say that it is all right to conceive truth as out of reach of human powers of recognition.

The following passage — my preferred partative is a story of himan beings as having recently gotten out from under the though of and the need on auditorial fixed sames stag gestion, hat we carry unbitation sin over from morals into epistemology as gradial to this anti-authoritarianism of the spirit, for fames shows us how to see Truth not as something we have to respect, but as a pointless normal ration of the useful adjective we apply to beliefs that are getting as what we want. Crashing to see Truth as the name of an authority and coming to see the search for stable and oseful beliefs as simply one more part of the pursuit of happiness are essential if we are to have the experimental and ide toward social existence that Dewey commended and the experimental and ide toward ordination existence that Romanucism commended." "Response in Bethisten." p. 71.3

30. This thought too could be put in Freudian terms.

224 Reference, Objectivity, and Knowledge

towards that sort of philosophy is to proscribe, or at least try to persuade. people to drop, the vocabulary of objectivity, and centrally the image of the world as authoritative over our investigations. I think this poacy of Rorty's tave yes a misconception of an innocuous notion of truth. Once we under stand that, we can see why Rorty's attempt to dislodge people from the vogabulary tends to have an effect that is exactly opposite to the one lie was ts-The way to care ourselves of unwarranted expectations for philosophy is not to drop the vocabulary of objectivity, but to work at understanding the sources of the deformations to which the vocabulary of on ectivity has his orically been prone. If we could do that it would enable us to unde the deformations, and see our way clear of the seemingly compilisory phy asophical problematic that Rorty wants as to get out from under. This would be an epistemological achievement in a perfectly intelligible sense of "epistemologica." If at does not restrict epistemology to accepting the traditional. preparematic little the deformations to which Rorty's discussions of right reveal him to be a party, and not the vocabulary risely. That lead to plin isophcal trouble

The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument

1. In Individuals and The Bounds of Some P. F. Strawson envisaged transcendental arguments as responses to certain sorts of scepticism. An argument of the sort Strawson proposed was to establish a general Gaint about the world a Gaint supposedly brought into doubt by sceptical reflections. Such an argument was to work by showing that unless trangs were as they were said to be in the claim that the argument purported to establish it would not be possible for our thought or experience to have certain characteristics, not regarded as questamable even by someone who urges sceptical doubts. So the argument's conclusion was to be displayed as the answer to a "How possible?" quest on. That has a Kamian ring, and the feature of such arguments that the form, latano his is the warrant for calling them "transcendental"

Barry Strond responded to Strawson on the Johnwing Lines. Perhaps we can see our way to suppose githat if our thought or experience is to have certain characteristics at does have (for instance that experience purports to be of a world of objects independent of ast, we must concave the world in certain ways, for instance as containing objects that commit e to exist even while we are not perceiving them). But it is quate another matter to suggest that by reflecting about bow it is possible that our thought and experience are as they are, we could establish concusions not just about how we must conceive the world but about how we must

Even if we allow that we can come to see how our thinking it certain ways necessarily requires that we also think in certain other ways, and so perhaps in certain further ways as well——how can cruths about the world which ap-

See 'Transcendental Arguments' Severa other essays in Strong's indevisabling Human Knowledge are very helpful in clarifying the picture.

226 Reference, Objectivity, and Knowledge

pear ic say or imply nothing about human thought or experience be scown to be genumely necessary conditions of such psychologica, facis as that we think as diexperience things in certain ways, from which the proofs begin? It would seem that we must find, and cross, a bridge of necessity from the one to the other. That would be a truly remarkable feat, and some convincing explanation would surely be needed of how the whole thing is possible.

According to Stroud. Kant's explanation is transcendental ideal sm. As Stroud reads it, transcendental idealism explains flow that "bridge of necessity" can be crossed by saying that the world of which the transcendentally established Gaims are true is "only the phenomenal world which is somehow constituted" by the possibility of our thought and expenence of a"."

Perhaps this might be better put by saying there is no bridge to cross. But then how satisfying a response to scepticism can be provided by such arguments? On this reading transcendental idealism does not so much respond to sceptical worrses as brisis them as de. Or perhaps it amounts to a concession; that they are well placed. As Stroud puts it

IT here is the challenge of saying in what ways idealism is superior to or even inferent from the sceptical documes it was meant to avoid. How it a flets, for example, from Hume's view that we simply cannot avoid be lieving that every event has a cause, and cannot acip acting for all the world as it is more as did were true, but that it is not ready true of the world as it is independently of us.⁴

And even if Stroud does not succeed in raising our suspicions of trai scendental idea is to Strawson is anyway suspictors of it. In The Bounds of Sense Strawson claims to preserve fundamental Kantian imaghts, but outs do the idealist frame in which Kant formulated them, so Strawsonian transcenden all arguments are expressly not equipped with what Stroud dentifies as the Kant an apparatus for explaining how that "bridge of necessity" can be crossed. Stroud suggests, accordingly, that the Strawsonian arguments can yield only conclusions on the near side of the bridge. They ancover structural connect ins without our thought or experience, enabling us to argue that our thought or experience must be a certain way as a condition for the possibility of their being a certain other way.

- Kan nan Argument Concept ta: Capacities and Invulnerability* pp. 158-9.
- 3 "Kantian Argument" p. 159
- 4. "Kantian Argument" pp 159-60.

That need not deprive the arguments of all force against scepticism. Suppose that whether things are a certain way comes within the scope of sceptical doubts. If we can establish that we must conceive things as being that way for it to be possible that our thought or experience has some character is not that a sceptic would not or could not dony that it has then we will have made some headway against that sceptical worry. This fails short of claiming to have shown that things must be that way for oir the ght and experience to be as they are. But with an argument of this more modest kind, we will have shown that given the characteristic of our thought or experience that is the unquestioned starting point of the argument, there is no possibility of our being rationally required to discard the conviction that the sceptical argument was supposed to undernine.

Strawson has come to share Strond's doubts about crossing that "bridge of necessity". It is not that he has given up the Kantian project, an inquiry into how it is possible that our thought and experience are as they are. But he has come to approach the project in something like the way Strond recommends, as tracing connectains within how we conceive and experience things, rather than between how we conceive and experience things and how things must be. The aim of the investigation, as Strawson more recently sees it as to establish to certain sort of interdependence of conceptual capacities and beaefs, e.g.——that in order for self-consciens thought and experience to be possible, we must take it for Pebeve, that we have knowledge of external physical objects or other numds."

2. This territory has been much worked over "I am not going to work over it any more: I have sketched this picture of the state of play, in a certain region of recent discussion of transcendental argoments, only to bring out a contrast. I am not going to consider transcendental argoments of either of the two kinds that have come into view so far ineither the amb tious kaid, in which the aim is to establish the truth of general Jaims about the world. For the modest kind, in which the aim is to establish only that we cannot consistently go on taking it that our thought and experience are as they are in the relevant respects while withholding acceptance of the relevant claims about the world.

⁵ Skepticism and Naturalism Same Varieties, p. 21.

⁶ For a helpf il survey see Robert Stern. Transcendental Arauments and Scepticism Answering the Question of Justification

Instead I want to consider a different approach to one sort of scepticism. I want to suggest that this different approach can be pursued through a kind of transcendental argument that be ongs to neither or those two types.

The sceptioism is question is scepticism about perceptually acquired knowledge of the external world. And the approach in guestion is diagnosiu. The diagnosis is that this scepticism expresses as anability to make sense of the idea of direct perceptual access to objective facts about the environ, tent. What shapes this scepticism is the thought that even in the best possible case, the most that perceptual experience can yield tails short of a subject's having an environmental state of allairs directly available to ber-Consider situations in which a subject secons to see that say, there is a redgive in from collact. The idea is that even if we focus in the best pessible case her experience con dibertist as it is in all respects leven. It lierc were n) re - c die in frent of her. This seems to reveal that perceptual experience. provides at best inconcessive warrants for clasmy about the environment. And hat seems recompatible with supposing we ever strictly speaking knew anything about our objective surroundings. The familiar sceptical semanos. Deseartes's demon, the seemtst with our brains in its valities suggest on that all our apparent experience might be a dream —are cally ways to make this supposed predicament vivid-

Suppose scepheism about our knowledge of the external weights recentioned on these lines. In that case it constitutes a response it we can find a way to resist it at we can make sense of the idea of firect perceptual access to objective facts about the environment. That contradicts the claim that we as perceptual experiencely exist even in the best possible case must be something less than laying a new tronggental fact directly available to an ellipse that thought this scepticism loses its supposed hasis a lifter to the ground.

It is importing that that is the right description of what this response achieves. We need not pretend to have an argument that would prove

^{7.} Strond regularly depicts sceparism about the external world as ansarg like this. See Eq. Equiversidogical Reflections at knowledge at the Froemia. World in 131. "This phospip." I chooses a situation to winch any one of its woold emproblematically say or think for example, that we know that there is a free in the inteplace right before its animal ways. It is there because we see that it is there. But when we ask what it is seeing feathy of our offs to various considerations are introduced to lead as on incode that the while she exactly what we see now even if no fire was there a all on if we didn is instituted there was one there. See also the summittee of the seeing a seeing a summittee.

that we are not, say, at the mercy of Descartes's demon, using premises we can affirm, and inferential steps we can exploit, without begging questions. against someone who arges sceptical doubts. As I said, the point of invoking the demon scenario and its like is only to give vivid expression to the predicament supposedly constituted by its not making sense to think we can have environmental facts directly available to us. But I it does make sense to think we can have environmental facts directly available to us, there is no such predicament. And now someone who proposes those scenarios can no longer seem to be simply emphasizing a discouraging fact about our epistema possibilities. When we reject the scenarios of we choose to bother with them at all—we need no longer be namstrung by a conception of argamentative legininacy controlled by that inderstanding of heir status. Att accusation of question-begging need no longer carry. any weight. We can invertible order in which scepticism insists we should proceed, and say -as common sense would if it undertook to consider the sceptical scenarios at al -that our knowledge that those supposed possor thes do not obtain is sustained by the fact that we know a great dear about our environment, which would not be the case, I we were not perceptually in touch with the world in just about the way we ordinardy suppose we are

Similarly there is no need to establish without begging questions against scept cism, that in any particular case of perceptual experience we actually are in the favourable epistemic position that sceptional suggests we could never be in That would similarly be to accept tendentions ground rules or satisfying ourselves in given cases that we have knowardge of the environment. If we can recapture the idea that it is so much as possible to have environmental states of allairs directly presented to us in perceptual experience, we can recognize that such ground rules reflect a miscenception of our cognitive predicantes. And then our practice of making and assessing claims to environmental knowledge on particular occasions can proceed as it ordinarily does, without contamination by philosophy. There need no longer seem to be any reason to discovert the fact that in real life the assessment is often positive.

3 Perhaps most people will find it obvious that relistating the sheer possibility of directly taking in objective reality in perception would underline a scepticism based on claiming that perceptual experience can never amount to that (I shall consider an exception later.)

But what does this have to do with transcendental arguments? Well It depends on how the undermining move is defended. And it can be defended by an argument that is broadly Kantian, in the sense in which the arguments I was considering at the beginning are broadly Kantian. The argument aims to establish that the idea of environmental facts making themselves available to us in perception must be intelligible, because that is a necessary condition for it to be intelligible that experience has a characteristic that is, for purposes of this argument, not in doubt

The relevant characteristic is that experience purports to be of objective reality. When one undergoes perceptual experience, it at least appears to one as if things in one s'environment are a certain way.

Consider Wilfrid Sellars's discussion of "looks" statements in "Empir cism and the Philosophy of Mind". Sellars urges something on the following lines. In order to understand the very idea of the objective purport of visual experience (to single out one sensory modality), we need to appreciate that the concept of experiences in which, say, it looks to one as if there is a red cube in front of one divides into the concept of cases in which one sees that there is a red cube in front of one and the concept of cases in which it merely looks to one as if there is a red cube in front of one (either because there is nothing there at all or because although there is something there it is not a red cube).

At least implicit here is a thought that can be put as follows. In order to find at intelligible that experience has objective purport at all, we must be able to make sense of an epistemically distinguished class of experiences, those in which istaying with the visual case) one sees how things are—t ose in which how things are makes itself visually available to one Experiences in which it merely looks to one as if things are thus and so are experiences that muslcadingly present themselves as belonging to that epistemically distinguished class if we are to comprehend the idea that experiences have objective purport. If one acknowledges that experiences have objective purport one cannot consistently refuse to make sonse of the idea of experiences in which objective facts are directly available to perception.

The scepticism I am considering purports to acknowledge that expert ences have objective purport, but nevertheless supposes that appearances as such are mere appearances, in the sense that any experience leaves it an open possibility that things are not as they appear. That is to conceive the

epistemic significance of experience as a highest common factor of what we have in cases in which, as common sense would put it we perceive that things are thus and so and what we have in cases in which that merely seems to be so-so never higher than what we have in the second kind of case * The conception I have found in Seliars can be put in opposition to that as a disjunctive conception of perceptual appearance, perceptual appearances are either objective states of allairs making themselves manifest to subjects, or situations in which it is as if an objective state of affairs is making itself manifest to a subject, a though that is not how things are " Fxperiences of the first kind have an epistemic sign ficance that experiences of the second kind do not have. They allord opportunities for knowledge of objective states of affairs. According to the highest common factor concepbon, appearances can never yield more in the way of warrant for belief, than do those appearances in which it merely seems that one say sees that things are thus and so. But according to the Sel arsian transcendental argument, that thought undermines its own entitlement to the very idea of appearattees.

The highest common factor conception is supposedly grounded in a claim that seems unquestionable, the claim that from a subject's point of view a misleading appearance can be indistinguishable from a case in which things are as they appear. That might be taken as a self-standing claim about the phenomenology of misleading appearance, available to be cited in explaining the fact that subjects can be misled by appearances. So taken, the claim is open to dispute. "But the right way to take it is as simply registering the fact that on that interpretation, it is supposed to explain, the undeniable fact that our capacity to get to know things through perception is fallable."

The claim of indistinguishability is supposed to warrant the the ght that even in the best case in which a subject say has it visually appear to her that there is a red cube in from of her her experience could be just as it is even if there were no red cube at front of her. But we need a distriction

^{8.} On the idea of the highest common factor, see, e.g., nav. Usina and Werld, p. 113.

⁹ On the disjunctive conception, see 1. M. Hinton, I systems. Paul Snowdon, "Perception, Vision, and Causation," my Mondand Band Too, cit., and my "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space" and "Concria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge."

^{10.} See J. L. Austin. Sense and Sensibi ta-

^{11.} I have revised what Ufirst wrote in this connection, partly in response to an objection Costas Pagondious. I have been influenced here by Sebastian Rod.

bere. When we say her experience could be just as it is even if there were no red cabe in fro it of her, we might be just registering that there could be a misleading experience that from the standpoint of her experience she could not disting ish from her actually veridical experience. In that case what we say is just a way of acknowledging that our capacity to acquire knowledge. through perceptual experience is fallible. It does not follow that even inthe best case, the enistemic position constituted by undergoing an experierice can be no better than the epistemic position constituted by undergoing a misleading experience, even one that would admittedly be indistinguish. able. The acknowledgment of safith hty cannot detract from the excebence of an epistem's position, with regard to the obtaining of an objective state of affairs, that consists in having the state of affairs present itself to one in one's perceptual experience. This is where the disjunctive conception does its epistemological work. It blocks the interence from the sulfactive indistinguis addity of experiences to the highest common factor conception, according to which neither of the admit edly indistinguishable experiences could have higher episterioc worth than that of the inferior case. And the transcendental argument shows that the dispurctive concept on is required. in pain of our losing our grip on the very idea that in experience we have it appear to us that things are a certain way 13

3. This transcendental argianemi starts from the fact that percept, all expensive as leastly, rports to be of objective reality, and yields the conclusion that we must be able to make sense of the idea of perceptual experience that is actually of objective reality. I have orgod that that is enough to undergone a familiar sort of sceptainsmabout knowledge of the external world.

Now there may be a temptation to or cet that this argument assumes too much. Should it be left and sestioned that percept is experience purports to be of objective teality?

There is plenty of room to argue that it is proper to start there. The seeptical arguments Descartes considers, for instance, do not question, he fact

¹² The essential thing is that the two sides of the disputation differ in conserve significance whereas on the highest common factor conception the good distinct can allow no bette wart in the perception causes than the bad district. This difference is epistemic significance is or course consistent with all sorts of commonabilities between the oils, ands for instance in both sides of the disputation in appears to me that say there is a ted cube of front if one. In (Ann. Sceptics Simple and Subile G. F. Moore and John McDowell' at p. 341-1. 12 and associated (ex. Crispie W. etc. makes needlessly heavy weather of this

that perceptual experience yields appearances that things are objectively the case. Descartes's arguments question only our entitlement to be ieve that things are as they appear to be. The highest common factor conception owes its attractiveness to the subjective indistinguishability of experiences all of which can be described in terms of the appearance that things are objectively that and so. This supposed basis for scepticism does not need a more minimal picture of experience.

But what if we do decide that we ought to confront a more whole-hearted scepticism, a scepticism withing to doubt that percepts all experience purports to be of objective teably? Well then, the transcendental argument. I have been considering cannot do all the work. But it can still do some of the work. If this is the target, we need a prior transcendental argument, one that reveals the fact that consciousness includes states or episodes that purport to be of objective reality as a necessary condition for some more basic feature of consciousness, perhaps that its states and episodes are potentially self-conscious. Strawson's reading of the Transcendental Deduction in Kant's first *Critique* might serve or perhaps the Transcendental Deduction itself it would take the too far afield to go into this here. The point's just that we cannot distins an argument that pivots on the disjunctive conception of perceptual appearance on the ground that it does not useff establish the characteristic of perceptual experience that it begins from

5. In a recent paper. Crispin Wright argues that as a response to scept c sinreplacing the highest common factor conception of perceptial experience with a disjunctive conception is "dialectically quite ineffectual".

Wright starts from a be-pful account of why G. F. Moore's "proof of an external world"—at least if taken at lace value—is as unumpressive as nearly everyone finds it. ⁴ Moore moves from the premise "Here is a hand" to the conclusion, which is indeed entailed by that premise that there is an external world. Wright takes Moore to suppose that his premise is itself grounded on something yet more basic something Moore could express by saying "My experience is in all respects as of a hand held up in front of my face." And Wright's diagnosis of what goes wrong in Moore's argument is that the warrant this ground supplies cannot be transmitted across the ac-

¹³ And Sceptics Simple and Subtle G. E. Moore and John McDowe, "The phrase quoted is at p. 331.

^{14.} Moore may oriend something more subtle. But I shall not consider this possibility.

4 24

knowledged entailment from "Here is a hand" to "There is an external world". The warrant that "My experience is as of a hand" provides for "Here is a hand" is defeasible, and it is defeated if the sceptic is right and we are, for instance at the mercy of Descartes's demon. We can allow it to warrant the premise of Moore's entailment only if we already take ourselves to be entitled to accept the conclusion of the entailment. So the whole argument is question begging.

Wright now turns to the disjunctive conception. He sums up his verdict on it as follows (pp. 346-7).

In brief, whether our perceptual laculties engage the inaterial world directly [the thesis that the disjunctive conception is aimed at protecting, is one issue and whether the canonical justification of perceptual caums proceeds through a defeasible inferential base is another. One is so far at liberty to take a positive view of both issues. And when we do, the Hill III pattern [the pattern of Majore's argument, augmented with a formulation of the ground for the premise of Moore's entailment) re-emerges along these lines.

* Fither Lam perceiving a hand in front of my face or Lamin Some kind of de assonal state.

II Here is a band

Therefore:

III There is a material world

It is clear that this is a more variation on Moore's argument as Wright reconstructs it. In this version too, the support I provides for II is defeasible. That we take I not to be defeated depends on our already taking ourselves to be entitled to accept III. So it would be question begging to suppose the argument provides any support for III.

But what does this have to do with the disjunctive conception? The point of the disjunctive conception is that if one undergoes an experience that belongs on the "good" side of the disjunction, that warrants one in believing. Indeed presents one with an opportunity to know. That things are as the experience reveals things to be. When one's perceptual faculties "engage the material world directly" as Wright puts it, the result—a case of having an environmental state of affairs directly present to one in experience—constitutes one's being justified in making the associated perceptual claim. It is hard to see how any other kind of justification could have a stronger claim to the title "canonical". And this justification is not deleasible. It someone sees that P it cannot fail to be the case that P. So if one accepts the disjunctive conception, one is

not at I berty to go on supposing that "the canonical just fication of perceptual claims proceeds through a deleasible inferential base"

In arging the contrary. Wright constructs an argument whose startingpoint is the whole disjunction. Of course he is right that the whole disjunction could provide at best deleasible support for a perceptual claim. But what he has done is in effect to cast the whole disjunction in the role at which the supposed case for scepticism casts the highest common factor. And the point of the disjunctive conception is precisely to reject the highest common factor picture of the justification for perceptual claims.

I do not mean to suggest that a LII III argument starting from the "good" disjunct would be any more impressive as an augmentation of Moore's "proof" than the LII-III argument Wright considers starting from the whole disjunction. I shall come to that in a moment. The point for now is that Wright is wrong to calm that the disjunctive conception leaves one free to think perceptual claims rest on deleasible inferential support.

What has gone wrong here?

Wright apparently assumes that a dialectically effective response to seeptic sm womeneed to be what Moore- again if we take his performance at
face value—thes to produce that is, an argument that directly responds to
the sceptics questioning whether there is an external world. Such an argument would need to start from a premise available without begging a question against the sceptic and it would need to transmit warrant leg timately
from that premise to the conclusion that there is indeed an external world.

And only the whose distinction is non-question beggingly available as a
premise for such an argument.

But the point of the disjunctive conception is not to improve our resources for such arguments.

At one point (p. 341) Wright acknowledges, in a way, that when Lappeal to the disjunctive conception I do not claim to be directly answering sceptical questions. The acknowledgment is backhanded, since Wright describes my disclaimer as "an official refusal to take scepticism seriously." It is worth padsing over this description. The wording would be appropriate if it in order to take scepticism seriously one had to attempt direct answers to sceptical questions. But that seems simply wrong. Surely no one takes scepticism more seriously than Stroud. And Stroud thinks "the worst thing one can do with the traditional question about our knowledge of the world is to try to answer at "

^{15. &}quot;Reasonable Claims, Cavell and the Tradition", p. 56.

Wright notes my suggestion that the disjunctive conception "has the advantage of removing a prop on which sceptical doubt—depends" as he puts it. But he treats this as a mere lapse from the "official refusal" as if removing a prop could only be offering an answer to a sceptical question. Only on that assumption could noting the mellicacy of the re-emergent I II III argument, the argument that starts from the whole disjunction, seem relevant to the anti-sceptical credentials of the disjunctive conception.

The distinctive conception cannot improve on Moore in the project of proving that there is an external world. Wright is correct about that

This is not as Wright has a because the disjunctive conception allows us to go on holding that "the canonical justification of perceptial claims proceeds through a defeasible inferential base". As I have insisted, the disjunctive conception is halfy inconsistent with that thesis. The canonical justification for a perceptual claim is that one perceives that things are as it claims they are and that is not a defeasible inferential base.

The point is rather that if one lets the sceptic count as having par indoubt whether there is an external world in which things are pretty much as we take them to be at becomes question begging to take oneself, on any particular occasion, to have the indefensible warrant, for a saam such as "Here is a hand" constituted by for instance, seeing that there is a hand infrom of one. In the dialectical context of an attempt to show that the scepneal scenarios do not obtain, the indefeasible warrant for "Bere, s a hand" constituted by seeing that there is a hand in front of one can no more betransmitted across the entailment to "There is a material world" than can the defeasible warrant Wright considers in his diagnosis of Moore. In-Moure's argument as Wright reconstructs it. the fact that the warrant's suppurt for "Here, is a hand" is not defeated depends on our already taking ourselves to have grounds for the conclusion supposedly reached by entailment. from there. In the argument I am considering now our consiction that we have the warrant at all depends on our already taking ourselves to have grounds for the conclusion. This, incidentally suggests a different account. which seems not essipiat sible than Wright's of the implicit warrant for the premise Moore actually starts from In any case, whether or not it is what Moore has in mind, an argument that starts from one's seeing a hand itt front of one would be just as useless for Moore's purpose- if again, we identify his purpose by taking his performance at face value.

But all this is treaevant to the anti-sceptical power of the disjunctive conception. What the disjunctive conception achieves is indeed to remove a prop on which sceptical doubt depends. That is Wright's wording, but he does not allow it to carry its proper force. The prop is the thought that the warrant for a perceptual claim provided by an experience can never be that the experience reveals how things are. The disjunctive conception dislodges that thought, and a sceptical doubt that depends on it falls to the ground. There is no need to do more than remove the prop. In particular, as I explained before, there is no need to try to establish theses like the conclusion of Moore's argument, with the ground rules for doing so set by scepticism. The idea that such theses are open to doubt now tacks the cachet of simply emphasizing an epistemic predicament constituted by its being impossible for experience to reveal to us how things are. There is no such predicament, and now it is perfectly proper to appeal to cases of indinary perceptual knowledge in ruling out the sceptical scenarios or—better—in justifying a common-sense refusal to bother with them.

Wright hight be tempted to seize on what I have just said as vind cating his talk of my "official reliasal to take scepticism scriously". But like Strond I hold that the way to take scepticism scriously is not to try to disprove the sceptical scenarios. We take scepticism scriously by removing the properhereby entitling ourselves to join common sense in refusing to bother with the sceptical scenarios.¹⁹

Considering the form "Edher Lam perceiving thus and-such or Lam in some kind of delusional state". Wright offers this reconstruction of the sceptical reasoning that according to him survives the disjunctive conception (p. 346).

In this case, this our practice to treat one in particular of the disjuncts as just fled—the left hand one—whenever the dosimetion as a whole is justified and there is, merely interndence for the other disjunct. That is a manifest fallacy timess the case is one where we have a standing reason to regard the lack of any salient just fication for a disjunct of the second type as a reason to discount at And—the second thought will be aims hard to see what

16 In writing litere of a common sense relusal to bother with the sceptical scenarios. I am ethoting a remark at *Mind and Wend*, p. 113 in the passage Wright dies to document the fofficial refusal"). The aim here is not to answer sceptical questions and to begin to see how it might be miellectually respectable to ignore them, to real their as unreal, in the way that common sense has always wanted to "Of course a takes work to teach such a position. This attitude can look like a "refusal to take scepticism sensoisly" or a given the picture of what it is to take scepticism seriously. On a Strond rejects

238

could count as a standing reason except a prior entitlement to the benefithal dealsions are rate. But that sinst tantamount to the belief that there is a material world which has least on the surfaces of things, is preny much revealed for what it is at what we take to be tromal waking experience. So the Sceptic will contend that broad conception once again emerges as a rational precondition of our practice, even after the disjunctive adjustment to the concept of perception, and on its warrantedness depends whatever warrant can be given for our proceeding in the way we do. Since it cannot be warranted by appeal to the warrant for specific perceptial claims—Moore's proof being no better in this setting than before—the Sceptic may now focus on the apparent impossibility of any kind of direct warrant for it and the dialectic can proceed essentially as before.

It is clearly correct that our practice of assessing the credent als of percepthat claims could not be ranonal if we were not entitled to the "broad conception" according to which the external world is preffy much the way we take ourselves to experience it as being. But it is tendentions to suppose it to less that the rational ty-of-our practice is in jeopardy unless the "Croadconception" can be warranted in advance of the practice without begging sixes-Consugativit scepticism. And it is wrong to suppose the disjunctive concepto it, leaves unchadenged the idea Wright here exploits, that the justification for a perceptual claim must go through the whole dispinction, exploiting some supposed standing reason for discounting the "bad" disjunct. The p.s-Utication for a perceptual claim is an entitlement to the "good" distinct What ento es one to that is not that one's experience warrants the whole disjunction, plus some supposed ground for discounting the "bad" disjunct. That would commit as to trying to reconstruct the epistemic standing constituted by perceiving something to be the case in terms of the highest common factor conception of experience, plus whatever ground we can thank of for discounting the "bad" disjunct. I think Wright is correct that that is hopeless, if we see thangs this way, the sceptic wins. But the disjunctive concept on e-munates the apparent need for any such project, because it contradicts the highest common factor conception.

What does entitle one to claim that one is perceiving that things are thus and so when one is so entitled? The fact that one is perceiving that things are tous and so. That is a kind of fact whose obtaining our se f-consciously possessed perceptual capacities enable us to recognize on suitable occasions, just as they enable us to recognize such facts as that there are red cubes in

front of us, and all the more complex types of environmental facts that our powers to perceive things put at our disposal.

Of course we are fallible about the obtaining of such facts, just as we are fail ble about the facts we perceive to obtain. I can tell a zebra when I see one—to take up an example Wright botrows from Fred Dretske (pp. 342-4). If what I believe to be a zebra is actually a cunningly painted mule, then of contse I do not recognize it as a zebra, as I suppose, and I do not have the warrant I think I have for believing it is a zebra, namely that I see it to be a zebra. My ability to recognize zebras is fallible, and it follows that my ability. to know when I am seeing a zebra is fallible. It does not follow: 4has is the crucial point -that I cannot ever have the warrant for be leving that an an mal in front of me is a zebra constituted by seeing that it is a zebra. If the an mal in front of me is a zebra, and conditions are suitable for exercising my ability to recognize zebras when I see them (for instance, the animal is In full view , then that ability, fall-ble though it is, enables me to see that it is a zebra, and to know that I do. My warrant is not limited to the dispinetion "Either Lisee that it is a zebra or my visual experience is misleading in some way". That is the highest common factor conception, and fa libility in our cognitive capacities cannot force it on as

6 Transcendental arg aments of Strong's ambitious, type aim to establish large scale features the world must have for it to be possible that thought and experience are as they are. Those of his modest type aim to establish large scale features we most conceive the world to have for it to be possible that thought and experience are as they are.

The argument I have considered belongs to neither of these types. It does not offer to establish anything about how things are let alone in stible in the world apart from us, so it is not subjectable to Stroud's deabts about arguments of the ambitious type. But the way it makes itself immune to those doubts is not by weakening its conclusion to one about structural features we must conceive the world to have. The conclusion is rather one about how we must conceive the epistemic positions that are within our reach, it is to be possible that our experience is as it is in having objective purport.

^{17.} A misconception of the significance of fallibility on these lines is the topic of the passage in my Mind and World top: 112–3) that Wright comments on at p. 34. (i) 3. His remarks there seem in the to miss, or ignore, the dialoctical context of the passage, it is contmenting an

That frees us to pursue our ordinary ways of finding out how things are in the world apart from us. The specifies of what we go on to had out are not within the scope of what the argument aims to vindicate

That might seem to distance this argument from much in Kant, who is presumably the patron saint of transcendental arguments. In sketching the argument. I have not needed to connect it with the question "How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?" or with an investigation of the principles of the pure understanding. But there is still the fact that the argument. displays its conclusion as a necessary element in the answer to a "How possible?" guest on about expenence. Moreover, Selars's account of how experience has its objective purport, which the argument exploits, is strikingly. Kantian, in the way it represents the content of an experience as the content of a claim. Sollars links the fact that experience is of objective reality. with the fact that to make a claim is to commit oneself to things being objectively thus and so. This talk of claims is Selfars's counterpart, after the "Inguistic turn" to Kam's invocation of judgment. So perhaps the argument I have been considering can be seen as belonging to a nun mal Kanttanism. In the argument's background is an explanation of the objective. purport of experience in terms of the fact that experience exemplates forms. that belong to the understanding. But in the argument as I have considered. it so far, we exploit that Kantian thought without needing to concern ourserves either with how the world must be or with how we must conceive the world to be. Of course this is not the place to try to take this any firther.

PART V

Themes from Mind and World Revisited

ESSAY 14

Experiencing the World¹

1. Larr going to begin by saying something about the frame to which I want to place a conception of experience as taking in the world.

Such an idea has obvious attractions from an epistemological point of view, and that is not arresevant to my interest may, But the many purpose to which I want to put the idea is not to reassure ourselves that we can achieve empirical knowledge, but rather to ensure that we are not beset by a dilliculty about the capacity of our mental activity to be about reality at alwhether knowledgeably or not 4 suggest that we can understand some cf. the central preoccupations of modern philosophy by making sense of a wishto ask "How is empirical content so much as possible ?" That would give expression to an arreiety about how our intellectual acrosity can make as answerable to reality for whether we are thinking correctly or not-something that is surely required if the activity is to be recogn zable as thinking at all. The question whether some of our thinking pars as in possession of knowledge cannot even arise unless this prior condition. Last our thinking can have empirical content at all, is met. I use the word "transcendental" in what I hope is sufficiently close to a Kannan way, to characterize this sort of concern with the very possibility of thought's being directed at the objective. world. And it is in this context of transcendental amorety that I am primar ly concerned with the question how we should conceive experience.

It is part of my point that people who are in the grip of the anx ety I am interested in typically do not clearly comprehend what is bothering them. One shape this unclarity can take is that one sproblem strikes one as episte.

I This was written as a fectore to introduce the conception of expendence that I recommended in *Mord and World*. I have also crawn on thoughts from "Having the World in View"

mological rather than transcendenta. An unfocused sense of what is in fact a transcendental difficulty need take no more definite a form than a vague niking that thought's hold on reality is coming into question. And the mage of thought's hold on reality can easily seem to fit knowledge, as contrasted with say guesswork or plausible conjecture. This yields a misunder standing of the difficulty one feels oneself talking into lihough exhiptothesionly inchoately. In the misunderstanding, it seems that one needs a secure loundation for knowledge—as if one could take the contentfalness of one's empirical thanking for granted, and merely had to reassure oneself as to its credentials. This what would be revealed as a transcendental anxiety if it came into clearer focus, can through an intelligible unclamby attaching to a merely incipient form of it undertie the concern with so to speak mere scepticism that shapes much modern philosophy. So I suggest that making sense of a transcendental anxiety can cast light on more of modern philosophy than one might at first suppose

The anxiety in its focused, explicitly transcendental form is perhaps coser to the surface in what Richard Rorty calls "impure philosophy of language" in chapter 6 of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. There he depicts a concern with how language books on to reality as a late coming counterpart to an anxiety about how thought books on to reality, which according to Rorty has been a major deforming force in modern philosophy. Rorty himself however, sees the deforming anxiety as primarily epistemological rather than epistemological only in the gaise of a defectively understood difficulty that is really transcendental, and that is just what I am resisting

I understand the wish to ask the transcendental question. "How is empirical content possible?" as expressing an attraction to a pair of thoughts whose pupilication if taken together is that empirical content is impossible. The thoughts impose a requirement for there to be empirical content, but ensure that it cannot be met.

The requirement is that empirical thinking must be subject to what W. V. Quine (in a strikingly Kantian phrase) calls "the inbunal of experience" if The idea is that we can make sense of intellectual activity's being correct or incorrect in the light of how things are in the world only if we can see it as, at least in part, answerable to impressions the world makes on us, as possessors of sensibility. But this felt requirement can easily seem, impossible to satisfy. The notion of the world's making an impression on a possessor of

sensibility is on the face of it the notion of a kind of natural happening. As such it can seem to be excluded, on pain of naturalistic fallacy from the special logical space—what Wilfrid Sellars calls "the logical space of reasons" — that we would have to be moving in when we take things to be related as tribunal and respondent. Sellars introduces this image of the logical space of reasons to a context in which he is precisely warning against a naturalistic fatacy, which he suggests one falls into if one takes it that merely natural happenings can constitute a tribunal. Quine himself seems to succumb to just this pitfals, in trying to conceive experience as a tribunal even while he understands experience in terms of irritations of sensory nerve-endings.

It can thus come to appear that thought's being answerable to impressions is a condition for there to be empirical content at all, which, however, cannot be met because the idea of an impression does not fit in the logical. space of reasons. And this leads to the incredible conclus in that there samply cannot be empirical content. This is not a perhaps surmountable difficulty about how there can be empirical content—as if the glassion "Row" is empirical content possible?" could receive a response that started like this *Good guestion, let me tell you how * "How is empirical content possible?" uttered from the frame of shind I am describing, expresses a temptation to believe the premises of an argument whose conclusion is that empirical content is not possible. Given that empirical content, a possible, if ere must be something wrong with the premises. And once we identify a culprit and discodge it we shall be freezing nurselves from the frame of mind that seemed to hod appropriate expression in the "How possible?" question. The result well be not an answer to the question, but a liberation from the apparent need to ask it

However, it is easy to suppose that the "How possible" question even if one s wish to ask it has the kind of background t are considering, expresses a difficulty rather than an impossibility. In this misunderstanding, one thinks one can leave one s background assumptions in place but still take on an obligation to try to force empirical content into one's picture, as it were against some resistance. Here we encounter a deeper sense in which, as I said people who are in the grip of the anxiety t am considering do not command a clear view of what ails them. Not only do such people often mistake a transcendental anxiety for an epistemological one. The deeper misconcep-

^{3. &}quot;Empericism and the Philosophy of Mind" §36.

tion is to mistake an impossible conceptual bind for a tractable intellectual problem, something one might set out to solve without shifting one's back ground assumptions. The predicament is beautifully captured by a remark in Wittgenstein's Nuchlass. "You are under the impression that the problem is difficult, when it's impossible. I want you to realize that you are under a spell."

2. Thave yiggested the specilis cast by the attractions of a pair of it oughts first that empirical content depends on auswerability to in pressions, and second that impressions could not be the kind of thing to which something could be answerable because the idea of an impression is the idea of a natical phenomenon. Disodgaig either of these two thoughts would in principle lift the specilibroid Davidson, for instance, in effect retains the second be agh, that impress ons could not constitute a tribinal, and discards the first, that curp rical content depends on answerability to impressions. That is to say the discards empiricism, in one obvious sense. One migration has of bavidson as offering an implicit argument by reduction in which the ringos-solution accepting that there cannot be empirical content is turned against the transcendental empiricism that is one of the premises from which that impossible conclusion can be derived in a way that pixins or retaining the other premise.

But I prefer to try to explain away the attractions of supposting that impressions could be accounted to the too kind of thing to which so not ting could be answerance. This makes it possible to hold on to the trining it that empirical content depends on answerability to impressions.

The idea of an impression is indeed the idea of a kind of occurrence in nature. But only a conflation makes it seem to follow that impressions cannot constitute a tribional. The idea of intellectual activity being answerable to a arbunal beings in the logical space of reasons, to stay with Sellars is make. And Sellars is right to depict the logical space of reasons as special by comparison with a logical space in which we make a quite different kind of move. I think the best way to understand this contrast of logical spaces is in terms of a distinction between two ways of finding things intelligible on the one hand, placing things in a comexit of rapional considerations for and

⁴ MS 158 p. 37 quoted by Baker and Hacker. 48 4mo: to communion on temperation v. Philosophical Investigations, vol. 1 p. 228

See Davidson's essay (14) Coherence Theory of Fruith and Knowledge.

against them othe sort of thing we do when for instance, we make sense of behaviour as rational agency), and, on the other hand, finding things intelligible in the ways in which the natural sciences do for instance by subsuming them under lawkke generalizations. On this view, then Sellars is right to set the logical space of reasons in opposition to a contrasting logical space, and, given that we can gesture towards an identification of the contrasting logical space, as I have just done, by involving the natural sciences, it can be almost irresistible to entitle it "the logical space of nature". This chimes with Sellars is warring against a naturalistic fall acy, and this is how it comes to seem that the idea of an impression, as the idea of a natural occur tence, has to be foreign to the logical space of reasons. But we can avoid the appearance by refusing to let the logical space that Sellars rightly contrasts with the logical space of reasons be identified as the logical space of nature.

It is intelligible that this identification should be hard to resist, given that one can mark the contrast of logical spaces, as I just did, by invoking the natural sciences. But in spite of the label, those disciplines need not be conceded ownership of the very idea of natural phenomena. The idea of an impression can be both the idea of a kind of natural happening and an idea that belongs in the logical space of reasons.

Impressions can fit in the logical space of reasons because impressions can be actualizations of conceptual capacities. Selfars glosses the space of reasons as the logical space for justifying and being able to justify what one says". The implication is that one comes to inhabit the logical space of reasons—to have conceptual capacities in the relevant sense. by acquiring command of a language. We can acknowledge that this enables our lives to contain goings-on warranting characterization in terms that are special injust the way. So lars aims to capture with the image of the logical space of reasons. But this need not seem to remove those goings on from the realm. of natural phenomena. Acquiring command of a language, which is comingto inhabit the logical space of reasons is acquiring a second nature. Given that the space of reasons is special in the way Seliars urges aleas of phenomena that are manifestations of a second nature acquired in acquiring command of a language do not as such them the logical space of natural. scientific understanding. But there is no reason why that should rule outseeing those phenomena as manifestations of nature, since the nature inquestion can be a second nature. Actualizations of conceptual capacities.

^{6 *}Empiridsm and the Philosophy of Mirad*, §36.

which as such belong in the logical space of reasons, can be natural in a different sense from the one that figures in the admittedly well drawn contrast with the logical space of reasons.

On these lines, we can acknowledge a correctness in the contrast of logcal spaces that seems to make it impossible for impressions to constitute a tribunal, but take that appearance to be after all a mere appearance. There is no need to follow Davidson in discarding the other of the two thoughts that together generate the seeming impossibility of empirical content. We do not after all, have materials for a reductio of transcendental empiricism as Davidson implicitly suggests.

It may seem that Davidson's way of avoiding transcendental arxiety is symmetrical with the way of avoiding it that I have begon to sketch. He discards one premise of the inchoate argument that empirical content is impossible, whereas I discard the other. So why should anyone prefer my way, to Davidson's? Wel., there is, I believe an intuitive appeal in the idea that empirical thinking must be answerable to impressions if it is to be contentful at all, and Davidsop's approach does nothing towards explaining that away. In effect Davidson claims that since transcendental empiricism will not cohere with the status of impressions as patural phenomenal transsees dental emp recom must be svrong. He does not offer a suggestion as to why it should nevertheless seem right, so that as attractiveness could stand revealed as an arrelagable diusion. Suppose someone is really tempted to think both that empirical thinking must be answerable to impress ons and that it can let be. Davidson does nothing to help such a person. It is not helpfu of someone is really enmeshed in this bind, to say "Since impress s ups are natural phenomenal and the members of a tribunal would have to belong in the contrasting togical space of reasons, the transcendental empine sm that you I rid appealing must latter all, be wrong " Suppose a viet in of the bind became clear about its shape. She would know that something must be wrong in her thinking. Helping her would require showing her how some of her thanking could be wrong, not just ordering her, as it were ex authoria to repress this rather than that bit of it. Whereas on my side. I offer a story whose point is to acknowledge, but explain away, the attractiveness of the other of the two sources of the anxiety, the thought that incpressions cannot constitute a tribuna. So there is after all an asymmetry. I explain away the attractiveness of the premise I discard, whereas Davidson. merely diseards the other premise, as at were by force, without saying any thing to help someone who is captivated by it.

3. So much for a general frame now let me say something about the specifics of the conception of experience, as taking in the world, that my framing move is meant to make room for

In an experience of the relevant kind. If things go well, some case of how things are impresses itself on a perceiving subject thanks to her possession. of some suitable sensibility. Experience is receptivity in operation. To invoke the Kantian idea of receptivity like this is samply to began elaborating the idea of an impression, in a way that is guided by the etymology of the word "impression". Any concept whose explication begans on these lines. would have to be the concept of a kind of state or occurrence in nature. And this brings our sharpey the apparent difficulty in conceiving impressions as constituting a tribunal while respecting Sellars's point about the special character of the logical space of reasons. It can seem that if we try to confera position in the order of justification on experience conceived as receptivity. in operation, we must be falling into what Sellars anacks as the Myth of the Given. What Solars attacks under that label extends more wide vitsan this. but the main form of the Myth he discusses is precisely the attempt to give merely natural phenomena a position in the order of histocacing. It is community read Sel ars as holding precisely that as soon as o concerns explicating a concept of experience by avoking something on the lines of receptivity, car is documed to fall fool of the Myth of the Given.

Bracketing, for the moment, the question whether this is indeed Schars's position. I can say that at any rate the thesis strikes me as simply wrong. Starting an expocation of the idea of a perceptual experience by invoking sensory recept vity leaves us able, quite coherently, to go on to bring conceptual capacities into the story. Remembering that nature can be second nature, we can animulate ourselves against the idea that the naturalness implied by the idea of sensory receptions would have to stand in tension with the placement in the space of reasons rapplied by the talk of conceptual capacities. This allows as a conception of perceptual experience as sometiming we can place in the order of justification, while respecting the point Sedars makes by insisting that the space of reasons is special.

What we need and can have is the idea of a case of receptivity in operation that, even while being that is an actualization together of conceptual capacities whose active exercise with the same togetherness, would be the making of a judgment. This is the idea of a case of receptivity in operation, an impression, that itself has conceptual content, the conceptual content that would be the content of the counterpart judgment—the judgment one would be making if one actively exercised the same conceptual capacities with the same togetheritess. There is no more difficulty about placing such a state or occurrence in the order of justification than there would be about placing the counterpart judgment in the order of justification. In particular there is no question of the hopeless attempt that characterizes the Myth of the Given to credit something with supplying rational or warranting force into the realm of the conceptually contentful from outside. The warranting tem—the experience conceived in these terms—itself already has content that is just as himly conceptual as the content of a sudgment in fact if just is the content of the possible judgment that I have been calling "the counterpart judgment."

For the dea of judgment as an act in which several conceptual capacities are exercised with a suitable togetherness—the model for this idea of experience. I would cite in the first instance a bulgant treatment of judgment offered by P.T. Geach in his book. Mema. Acts. Geach there exploits an analogy between or the one hand, the combination—the junt exercise—of conceptual capacities in acts of judgment and on the other, the concatenation of subset tential expressions in a declarative utterance. Conceptual capacities exercised in a single act of judgment have a semantical in logical togetherness that is, on Geach's picture to be understood on analogy with the semantical or logical togetherness of the corresponding words, in a grain matically structured form of words that would give expression to the judgment. What I am suggesting is that we can ampuly Geach's conception of judgment, and a decistand experience through a second use of analogy. Geach shows how to model acts of judgment on declarative unerances, and we can model experiences on acts of judgment.

In making judgment pivotal. I hope I secure that the conception of concepts that is in play here is palpably Kantian. Our way into the very idea of a concept is through the thought that the paradigmant actualization of concept a capacities is their exercise in acts of judgment. Geach shows how we can domesticate this Kantian way of thinking of conceptual capacities within the post-Kantian lerin of philosophy characterized by what has been called "the inguistic turn". But one might suggest that this much of a Finguistic turn is implicit in the already Kantian idea that conceptual capacities are exercised with a logical togetherness in acts of judgment, which are of course not necessarily expressed in language.

Making judgment fundamental to our conception of concepts brings out at least part of the point of saying, with Kani, that conceptual capacities

belong to a faculty of spontaneity. Judging is making up one's mind about how things are as forming an intention is making up one's mind about what to do. Judging is like forming an intention in being an exercise of responsible freedom. But I formulated the Kantian anchoring of the very dear of a concept by saying that acts of judging are the paradigmatic kind of occurrence in which conceptual capacities are actualized. This leaves room for conceptual capacities, in the very same sense to be actualized in non-paradigmatic ways, in kinds of occurrence other than acts of judging

There are straightforward cases of this possibility. Consider, for instance entertaining suppositions. This is perhaps not far removed from what I am describing as the paradigmatic case. For one thing, we should understand the capacity to entertain mere suppositions in the first instance, in the context of thinking aimed at making up one similar, and work our from there to the capacity for, say, idle fantasy. And in any case, even in idle fantasy conceptual capacities are exercised. To say that some act vity is irresponsible, as one might about daydreaming, is exactly not to remove it from the scope of responsible freedom, but to criticize it as an irresponsible use of one's freedom to exercise one's conceptual capacities.

But with experience conceived as I recommend, we have a more radical departure from the paradigmanic case of conceptual capacities being actualized. An actualization of a conceptual capacity need not be an exercise of the capacity so it need not be itself within the scope of responsible freedom as even the exercise of conceptual capacities in day dreaming is. The point of talking of paradigmatic cases is that the kind of actualization of a concept ia. capacity we need to focus on first in order to understand what kind of capacity a conceptual capacity is, is indeed an exercise an ingredient in an instance of the complex kind of act that judgments are. But once we have thus identified the relevant kind of capacity, we can countenance cases in which capacities of that very kind are not exercised, but are nevertheless actualized, outside the control of their possessor, by the world's impacts on her sensibility. That is just how I recommend conceiving experience.

I hope it is clear that it matters to keep the terms "actualization" and "exercise" apart. Conceptual capacities are capacities of spontaneity, but in one obvious sense there is no spontaneity in perceiving. It is not up to one how things, for instance, look to one. How things look to one does not come within the scope of one's responsibility to make up one's own mind. But this is consistent with understanding experience as actualizing capacities that belong to spontaneity. In the sense that to understand what capacities

they are we have to focus on their being excrosable in ji dgment. It is just that that is not the kind of actualization that is involved in experience

I introduced impressions, in the relevant sense, as occurrences in which how things are impresses itself on a perceiving subject. The resources I have introduced enable as to give this wording fall force. We can see the relevant case of how things are as encapsulated into the circumstance of being impressed in the way the subject is. Without these resources, we could conceive the subject's being impressed only as something on the lines of recerving a deat in the mind's wax table), ift would make no difference if we replaced that, mage with some sophisticated physiology a Perhaps a theorist could receiver an aethology for a dent from its configuration, but it would only be in some such sense that an impression could contain (agire evantcase of how things are, and such a sense would not make impressions suitable for a transcender tal empiricism. This is just Sellars's point, the Myth of the Given in the relevant form, is the hopeless attempt to make a mereden in the tablet of the minds not a fact about the dent by to be dentitself, a to a rational consideration. But with the conceptual resources a have introduced, an operation of one's receptivity, an use, the having certain conceptual capacities passively drawn into operation by the impact of a faction one visens bibly. So it can be having that things are this and so-the conceptual oritent of the judgment one would be making if one actively exercised the same conceptual capacities in the same con program—horne m on one. But that things are thus and so can be how things are. So recerving an impression can be having how things are borne in on one

There are two points here. First, we see how impressions can be no harder to place in the order of justification than judgments are leven while we filly respect Schars's point about the Myth of the Given. Second, and more specifically, we see how we can take facts themselves to be available to a perceiving subject, as rational considerations relevant to her task of making up her mit d. Thus, in the course of seeing how to a leviate a transcendental difficulty, we equip ourselves with an idea that has a directly epistemological interest.

4. Pracketed the question whether Scillars hunse I to nky sensory impressions would have to be denty in the tablet of the mind. It is distributed Sellars hat way, but I now think that when in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", he elaborates the image of experiences as "contaming" claims, he is best understood to be pointing towards a conception of experience on just

the lines I have been sketching, as episodes of sensory consciousness that are constituted by actual zations of conceptual capacities.

This is not the only respect in which I think I am a better Sellarsian thar some people give me credit for In my book. Mind and World Tallow myse I to say the contents of experience are ultimate in the order of "astalication. It as "Critical Study" of my book. ("Exorcism and Enchantment"). Michael Williams takes that to show that I am a loundationalist. In the sense that I hold a position Schars attacks in passages, the this. "One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is indeed most be a structure of partion at matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be non-inferentially known to be the case, but prosupposes it other knowledge either of part cutar matter of facts or of general truths, and by the non-inferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual chains, particular and general about the world." It may help to clarify my picture of experience if I try to say why this accusation misbres.

Sellars himself has a muanced attitude to the image of foundations. Ledoes not object to the adea of a stratum of knowledge, hat, constitutes the uluma e co arcof appeals for a lifactual claims about the world? The knowledge expressed in reports of observation plays, list that rule to him-Sehars slob ection, in the passage Equated is not to that idea on its own, but to configuring it with something else, the idea that the knowledge teat cosummes the ultimate coast of appeal is knowledge one could have all Uy 1. self, even without having a world view built on it. This Sclars says "the metaphor of foundation is misleading to that a keeps us from seeding that if there is a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest out observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former. ** This is not to object to the idea of a "logical dimension". in which reports of observation are the support for everything eise, but only to warn that a natural image for expressing that idea the image of 6 anda. tions, tends to make us forget the other dimension of dependence to which reports of observation depend on the world view that resis on them as a building rests on its foundations. When I say experiences are ultimate in the order of justification, als I mean is that they are ultimate in the "logical oimension" in which Sellars allows that reports of observation are ultimate. It

^{7 &}quot;Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" §32

^{8. &}quot;Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" §38.

simply put experiences in the epistemological position in which Sellars puts reports of observation. Experiences, in my picture, have conceptual content and that means I have just the mach nery Sellars does—a ho ism about the conceptual—to ensure that the other damension of dependence is not lost. So I am not a foundationalist in Williams's sense.

5. I want to end by making a beginning on a large topic. Philosophers are prone to assume that mental occurrences are as such or in themselves internal to the person in whose mental are they take place either quasi laterally internal cas in Descartes, for whom this spanial talk cannot be areral) or even iterally internal as in mainy contemporaries, who take themselves to be emancipated from Cartesian ways of thinking). Perceptual experiences are mental occurrences, so they come within the scope of such an assumption. The effect is to obliterate the conception of experience lifeconomical.

The assumption is operative in this expression of puzzlement by Robert Brandom about why I find my conception of experience so compelling "Sense impressions are 'behand' [padgments of observation] in a causal sense and facts are behind them in a normative sense as well as, in the tayored cases in a causal sense. What is the source of the insistence that there must also be some *onernal thing*, the experience, that plays both these roles at once?" By "sense impressions" here Brandom means something on the lines of Quinc's concept an aritations of sensors herve endings, the sort of thing go tollower of Sellars would try to conce we as constituting a tribunal

One might claborate what Brandom is suggesting on the following lines. If experiences as I want them in the picture are not simply what Davidson calls "perceptually acquired benefit" under another name (so that their just ficatory force is allowed for in Davidson's slogan "nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another beheft. Then placing them justificationly "behind" perceptual judgments or perceptually acquired beliefs can only be a case of a lam har epistemological syndrome in which we interpose something internal between perceivers and the facts they perceive to hold. On this view, my appeal to experiences is a case of what Davidson calls "the Myth of the Subjective". The hopeless idea that we can start with what is in nerve (here we need a gesture of pointing with both hards into one's nead).

^{9 &}quot;Perception and Rational Constraint", at p. 257

^{10 &}quot;A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge" p. 144

¹¹ See "The Myth of the Subjective".

and entitle ourselves, on the basis of that to beliefs about what is out there there we need a gesture at the world about us). I protest that receiving an impression, on my account is for at least can be a case of having an environmental state of affairs borne in on one. It is already an entitlement to be liefs about what is "out there" not some inner occurrence from which one might hope to move to an outward entitlement. But the assumption that mental occurrences are internal risks making this profest inaudible. If experiencing, as a mental occurrence is in itself "in here", then even supposing we can make sense of describing an episode of experiencing in terms of an environmental state of affairs, as having that state of affairs borne in on one, this mode of description cannot get at what the episode is in itself. We seem to be back with the idea of a dent in the mind's table!

My talk of impressions secures that we can see observational judgments as rationally responsive to the states of affairs they judge to obtain. This enables observation to occupy not only the epistemological role of which Sellars gives his manifed picture, but also the transcendenta, role I have been concerned to protect, as the point to locus our attention on in order to find it unproblematic that our intellectual activity is answerable to the world. It is exactly not the case that impressions, as I conceive them, intervene be tween perceiving subjects and the states of affairs they observe to obtain Rather, at their best impressions constitute an availability, to a judging subject, of facts themselves, which she may incorporate into her world view—perhaps by way of explicit judgment, or perhaps less reflectively, on the basis of the impressions.

I think the real vibaniliere is the assumption that experiences as mental occurrences, must be in themselves internal to their subjects. Davidson's protest against what he calls "the Myth of the Subjective" is directed against a symptom, the tendency to postulate intermediantes, rather than against the underlying malady, which infects Davidson himself, even though he contrives to free his thinking from the symptom. The fundamental mistake is the thought that a person's mental life takes place in a part of her. Descartes thought it would have to be an immaterial part, and it is an improvement on that at least in some respects, to make the seat of mental, ife a material part of the person (so that "in here", with the pointing gesture, can be meant literally. But this modification does not fix the teal problem. In Davidson's case, the monistricture is part of his anomalous monism 4 implies a correctness.

¹² See "Mental Events"

for the "in here" gesture taken literally. But I think we need a way of thinking about the mental in which involvement with worldly facts is not just a point about describability in (roughly speaking) relational terms (like someone's being an unker) but gets at the essence of the mental. The lin here" location, with its accompanying gesture is all right in some contexts, but it needs to be taken symbolically in the same spirit in which one takes the naturalness of saying things, like "In my heart I know it", which can similarly be accompanied by an appropriate gesture. If annihalous monsim disalows this, then so much the worse for anomalous monism.

If we conceive experience as Erecommend, our picture of subjects who are in a position to make observational judgments can take an attractive. shape. We can see the facts in question as available to the subjects, as rational constraints on their activity of making up their numbs. That is, we can see the facts as behind observational judgments in a normative sense, as Brandom pars at a tine passage Equoted Brandom's puzzlement is this why do I want to place something else-something internal informatively behind the judgments, over and above the facts? This leads into the idea of intermedianes, the target of Davidson's protest, but it misses the point. To make sense of how it is that the facts are normatively behind the judgmen's we need the facts to be available to the subjects who make the ladge ments, as the rational constraints on judgment that they are. On my conception, to er joy an experience in which all goes well is simply to have a last available to one, so that it can be normalisely behind a judgment one pright make. Davidson thinks the subjective as such is a myth, and Brandon, in effect follows him, because they cannot see anything for the subjective to be except the internal items that threaten to interpose themselves as intermediaties between subjects and the world. But in experience on my conception we have not only something that is necessary for haking sense of the normative connection between facts and observational. judgments that Brandom agrees we need, but also a paradigm of a kind of subjective state that is immore to the objections against intermediaries. So without defending what Davidson attacks, we can use the idea of expenence to start on recapturing a hygienic idea of subjectivity. The benefits of conceiving experience as I recommend are not restricted to pre-empting transcendental anxiety and opening up a satisfactory epistemology for perception, but extend also into general concerns in the philosophy of nund-

Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind

I Modern epistemology is beset by distinctive any eries. We can base an understanding of them on a remark of Willit & Sellars. The cliaracterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state, we are placing it in the logical space of reasons of justifying and being able to justify what one says."

Self ars implies that to say how an episode or state is placed it the space of reasons is not to give an empirical description of all and I taink that is allelicitous. A better way to put the thought might be to say as Schars almost does elsewhere that epistemology is vulnerable to a naturalistic falsacy. On a lamiliar modern understanding of trature a contrast opens between saying how something is placed in the space of reasons—a logical space that is organized by justificatory relations between its inhabitants—and saying how something is placed in nature. The contrast is such as to suggest that the content of concepts that belong in the space of reasons, such as the concept of knowledge, caunot be captured in terms of concepts that belong in the contrast ng logical space, the space of placement in nature.

The conception of nature that yields this contrast is one whose origins lie in the development of modern science. The contrast Selfars implicitly appeals to was not available before modern times. This can help us understand why modernity brings with it a new tone, distinctively panicky and obsessive, for phi osophical reflection about knowledge.

Consider how Aristotle or a medieval Aristotchan would have conceived the relation between the idea of knowledge and the idea of the natural. For

^{*}Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 1936 R. hard Borty quotes the remark.

Nelse in Philosophy and the Micros of Nature pp. 141–389

² Sec §5 of "I impuresses and the Philosophy of M red" for a forms are no on, hese lines.

258

such a thunker, the capacities that equip human beings to acquire knowledge could be as such, natural powers, and the results of their exercise could be natural states of affairs. Not that those pre-modern thinkers were innocent of the connection Selfairs insists on between the idea of knowing and ideas of pastification—as if pre-modern people could not emertain the thought that becomes so pregnant in modern epistemology, that knowledge is a normative status. But they did not feel a tension between the idea that knowledge is a normative status and the idea of an exercise of natural powers. Before the modern era, it would not have been intologible to fear a naturalistic fallacy in epistemology.

But the rise of modern science has made available a conception of nature that makes the warring intelligible. The natural sciences, as we new conceive them, do not look for an organization for their subject matter in which one item is displayed as say justified in the light of another term. (This is one interpretation of the stogan that natural science is value free.) It is tempting to identify nature with the subject matter of the natural sciences so conceived. And now the contrast Scillars draws can set an agenda for plulosophy.

Some to lowers of Scalars notably Richard Rorty, put the contrast as one between the space of reasons and the space of causes. But I think it is better to set the space of reasons not against the space of causes but against the space of subsamption under as we say material saw. Unlike Rorty's construal of the contrast, this version does not pre-empt the possibility that reasons might be causes. We need not see the idea of causal inkages as the excusive property of natural-scientific thinking.

If we conceive nature in such a way that defineating something's natural character contrasts with placing something in the space of reasons, we can no longer take in stride the idea that powers to acquire knowledge are part of our natural endowment. Knowing, as a case of occupying a normative

A Sec Phoneps, and the Marcol of Nature [p. 57] where Roury sharply separates "what Scharts calls" be logical space of reasons. Iron: that of causal relations to objects"

It contrast Selicits to sists on even white we trace that the contrast is essentially modern card not thereby though a the lace of the plain fact that the concept of a law of nature pressures modernity just as the concept of nature does. The phrase itself obviously traces back to a time when the idea of away of nature did not stand in contrast with the idea of a nor that we organization of a subject matter. This does not undertaine the point 1 exploit, which is one about what the idea of a law of nature has become

status, can no longer be seen as a natural phenomenon. And now it is casy for knowing to seem mysterious. It is no use expanding our conception of what is read beyond what is natural, if the effect is to make it seem that acquiring knowledge must be a supernatural feat. So with the new conception of nature, the knowing subject threatens to withdraw from the natural world. That is one way in which it comes to look as if philosophical epistemology needs to reconnect the knowing subject with the rest of real ty

2. I began with epistemology but parallel considerations extend into the philosophy of mind in general. It is not just knowing that threatens to be extruded from nature on the basis of the contrast between lature and the space of reasons.

Sel ars says characterizing something as a case of knowledge is placing it in the logical space of reasons. Compare Donald Davidson's claim that our talk of propositional attitudes is tatelligible only in the context of Tibe collist traive ideal of ranonabity? We could reformulate Davidson's thesis in Sel arsian erms, the concepts of be reving desiring, and so forth are unders one only in the framework of the space of reasons.

And Davidson's thesis is not idiosyncratic. It has for instance, an about a saffinity with Daniel Deutiett's claim that intentionality is not gw only from the intentional stance, which organizes its subject matter with it a frame work put in place by a postulate of rationality. We could reform large Deutiett's position using Schars's phrase "the togocal space of reasons" or Davidson's phrase "the constitutive ideal of rationality". There is an evident resonance with the tradition in which versidients disting ished from Erklaren.

So Se lars's thought about knowledge generalizes into a thought about propositional additions for that case, we can expect the epistemological implications of Se lars's contrast between nature and the space of reasons to be mirrored in implications for our thinking about all of sapicint mental life not just knowledge. Modern epistemology sees itself as under an oldigation to reconnect the knowing subject with a natural world from which it seems

⁵ See especially "Mentas Events" The phrase I have quined is "rom" is 223.

^{6.} See The Intentional Stance

² See the discovered of "the Normal ve Principle" at pp. 342-3 o. The Incommunity Manne.

⁸ Some people think sentence is quite another matter but ido not believe that is right though I cannot discuss the matter here.) For some firsts size my limit Scrano in the Prisate Language Argument." In any case, sapience is enough for impression propose.

to have withdrawn. Much modern philosophy of mind sees itself as under a para lel obligation to reintegrate the thinking subject into a natural world from which it has come to seem alien.

Rorty famously urges that the supposed gull bridging obligation of episte motogy reflects an diusion. Anyone sympathetic to this conviction of Rorty's should have a similar suspicion of much modern philosophy of mind.

3. I have suggested that knowledge and intentionably can be in view only in the framework of the space of reasons. When Sellars warms of a naturalistic fallacy, he is implying that the structure of the space of reasons, is suggesters, by comparison with the kind of structure that the natural sciences find in nature. It is intelligible that the resulting sense that knowledge and thought are suggesters, by comparison with what can present itself as a compeding conception of the natural should generate metaphysical anxieties about them, which crystablize in a felt threat of supernaturalism.

Now we can avoid those anxieties if we can contrive an entitlement to unit thinking and knowing as natural phenomena after all, even though Solars's suggest of irases a question about how they can be I want to distinguish two ways of andertaking such a project.

The first gaves unchallenged the equation of nature with the realm of law. The idea is that the organization of the space of reasons is not as Schars suggests, alleb to the kind of structure natural science discovers in the world. No doubt relations of svarrant or justification are not visibly present as such in nature as the paradigmatic natural sciences depict it. But according to this approach, we can display the concepts of warrant or just fivation as not after all foreign to the natural on that conception. So thinking and knowing can after all be revealed as natural phenomenal even on that concept on of what it is for a phenomenon to be natural.

On one version of this approach, the idea is that the structure of the space of reasons can be reduced to something else, which is a ready unproblematically

9 I have exploited a suggestoric parallel between Sella visitals of the logical space of teasons" and Davidson's talk of the constitutive ideal of ranonauty. But we should note a difference between Sellars's point about knowledge and its generalization. A state or episode counts as one of knowing on viril it comes up to seratch in the light of norms if astitication. If we extrapolate mechanically from that, we shall suppose quite wrongly that "space of reasons" understanding of thought and action is imagainable where rationally is less than perfect.

natural on the modern conception. On another version, one might aim to reveal concepts that work in the space of reasons as themselves, after all directly serving to place things in the realm of law. The details do not matter. The essential point is that this approach, whether ceductively undertaken or not takes Sellars's starting point to be a mistake. Sellars contrasts the logical space within which the concept of knowledge operates. This is a contrast between the realm of law and the realm of freedom, to put it in a way that makes Sellars's Kantian roots explicit. Against that this first kind of naturalism holds that we can continue to equate nature with the realm of law but reject the Sc larsian suggestion that nature so conceived cannot be a home for knowing and thinking subjects.

This kind of naturalism would be well motivated if it were the only way to avoid supernaturalism about knowing and thinking. But there is an alternative still within the project of representing knowing and thinking as natural phenomena. In a Kannan spirit, we can reluse to accept that the structure of the realm of freedom can be naturalized in the sense of the first approach—that is, itsist that Sellars's contrast is well taken—but disown a commitment to stipernaturalism by holding that what the modern scientific revolution yie ded was clarify about the realm of law, and that is not the same as clarify about nature. Sellars's contrast is between the space of reasons and the realm of law, and it need not imply that the space of reasons is altern to the natural.

To avoid conceiving thanking and knowing as supernatural we should stress that thinking and knowing are aspects of our lives. The concept of a life is the concept of the career of a aving thing, and hence obviously the concept of something natural. But there are aspects of our lives whose description requires concepts that function in the space of reasons. We are rational animals. Our lives are patterned in ways that are recognizable only in an inquiry framed within the space of reasons. On these lines, we can see thinking and knowing as belonging to our mode of bying leven though we conceive them as phenomena that can come into view only within a stagenesis space of reasons. Thicking and knowing are part of our way of being animals. Thus the fact that we are knowers and thinkers does not reveal as as strangely biturcated, with a foothold in the animal kingdom. Surely part of nature, and a mysterious separate involvement in an extra natural realm of rational connections.

The lifst approach—a testrictive naturalism—air is to naturalize the concepts of thinking and knowing by forcing the conceptual structure in which

to ey belong into the framework of the realm of law. The second approach—all beral natural isin—does not accept that to reveal thinking and knowing as natural, we need to integrate into the realm of law the frame within which the concepts of thinking and knowing lanction. All we need is to stress that they are concepts of occurrences and states in our lives.

This liberal naturalism enables us like medieval Austotelians, to take in stride the idea that our capacities to acquire knowledge are natural powers. But unlike medieval Aristotelians, we can combine that idea with a clear appreciation of the surgeneric character of the conceptual framework within which the concept of a capacity to acquire knowledge operates. Similarly, when we generalize Sellars's point, for the concepts of propositional artiudes and accurrences. We can acknowledge a genuine aconevement of the mixtern scientific revolutions in firmly separating natural scient its understanding from the sort of understanding achieved by situating what is understood in the space of reasons. We call accept that concepts that subserve. the latter kind of understanding such as the concepts of knowledge and the propositional array des capitule de captured in terms that belong in the logical space of natural scient he understanding. So Selfars is right that there is: a risk of allacy. But when he suggests that what we risk is a naturalistic fallacy be impres that the logical space of natural scientific understanding can be equated with the logical space of nature. And we can avert the threat of supernaturalism by rejecting that equation.

For a peral natural site, the significance of getting the idea of the realiti of law into clear focus is simply to so ate the associated mode of mtelligibility. There is no implication that concepts of the natural are restricted to concepts that subserve that mode of intelligibility. Rejecting that implication exists as in sec the phinosophical arcsiebes I have over considering as groundless somewhat as Rorty urges. But this expansion of philosophy is conbined with acknowledging the singularity character of the concepts of thinking and knowing. If we see how easy it is to suppose that getting the idea of the realim of law into clear focus is getting the idea of nature into clear focus, we can have a livery appreciation of now those philosophical ansecties arise, even combined with an infinitely to them.

4. Both restrictive and aperal naturalism aim to avoid supernaturalism by finding a way to see knowing and thinking as natural phenomena. That sets their apart from a different style of response to Seliars's contrast, exemple fied by Rorty's attitude to epistemology.

263

Rorty's reading of traditional epistemology pivots on Sellars's Contrast. The concept of knowledge works only in the space of reasons, and the space of reasons is *sui generis* in comparison with nature on the restrictive conception. So a restrictive natoralism about knowledge is ruled out. But for Rorty the natural is what figures on the other side of Sellars's contrast, and that obliterates, for him, the very possibility of a liberal naturalism about knowledge.

With both types of naturalism unavariable. Rorty has no option by the deny that knowing is a natural phenomenon. As Rorty sees, they trig to cast knowing as a natural phenomenon is, precisely the pervasive defect of traditional epistemology. The result of the attempt is that philosophiers try to make the quite different sorts of relation that organize the subject matter of natural-scientific investigation do duty for the relations of justification or warrant that alone provide the proper context for talk of knowledge. Traditional epistemology thus commits exactly the fallacy Sellars warms against It conceives knowing as a syndrome in the physiology of the understanding. To avoid this Rorty suggests that we should not conceive knowledge as a natural phenomenon. Of course that is not to say we should conceive at as a supernatural phenomenon. Instead, Rorty urges that we stop thinking of knowledge as a phenomenon—a feature of actual ty—at all, and shift to talking about the social role of attributions of knowledge.

Thave urged a parallel between Schars's thought about knowledge and a thought about intentionality expressed in different ways by Davidson and Dennett. So there is room for a view about intentionality like Rorty's view about knowledge—a demal that talk of intentionality deals with natural phenomena. Curiously enough. Rorty lamself does not occupy this position. For Rorty, thoughts and even meanings are if anything, posits in a naturalistic psychology, where "naturalistic" marks a contrast with the nor mativity imported by talk of the space of reasons. To esitate to identify an

¹⁰ This is connected with a fact that I noted earner. Borty has car serior just as such an the opposite side of the Selfansian divide from the considerations about just seat its or warrant that are the proper environment for classifying states or episodes as cases of knowledge. That means that Borty lacks a resource shall would surely be needed if we tried to but detail into the thought that capacities to acquire knowledge are natural powers.

^{4.1.} Compare Kartis remark about Tocke. Fir que el Pure Resion Ais, circo by Ratis. Pholosophy and the Mirror of Nature. p. 126

^{12.} See chapter 5 of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature

occupant of the position that mirrors Roms's view of knowledge with a denial that there are natural phenomena of intentionality. Perhaps there is a whiff of it in the aspect of Dennett's thinking that attracts the accusation of instrumentalism. 44

I think Rorty's reading of traditional epistemology has much to be said for it. Rorty is very convincing on how useless it is to try to make relations of the sort that organize the realin of law do duty for relations of warrant Given that, he makes it took compulsory not to think of knowledge as a natural prienomenon. But this merely reflects the fact that he does not consider a liberal naturalism. Liberal naturalism is immune to Rorty's actack on the contastens of traditional epistemology. And the same failure of compulsoriness would infect a structural analogue of Rorty's line of thought if anyone wanted to produce one yielding the analogous conclusion that intentionality is not a natural phenomenon.

5. I have stressed that a clear conception of the realm of law was a modern tell-evenient. What underlies a lamiliar philosophical anciety about knowing and thrinking is the ease with which this conception can be equated with a conception of the natural. That threatens to extrude knowing and thinking from nature, given that the concepts of knowing and thinking beiong an allogical space that contrasts with the space of subsamption under law.

Consider now an early stage in the development of modern science language a dawning sense that the concepts of knowing and thinking are special by comparison with the concepts that figure in the emerging natural sciences. Such a sense will have begun to influence reflection about the mental before there was a clear appreciation of what it is about the concepts of the mental that makes them special—before there was a clear appreciation of what comes into focus in Schars as the contrast between the space of reasons and the space of natural scientific understanding

This intuition of specialness reflects a conception putatively of the natural, that when fully in locus, works to exclude the mental But the meal tion will have been operative before that fact was clear. And before that

¹³ Kripke's Witgenstein would be a case, see Wittennien on Rules and Private Language. But I was looking for an actual occupant. If the position, not a fictional character.

¹⁴ Consider e.g. such claims as that "beliefs"—are attributed in statements that are to only if we exempt them from a certain familiar standard of "retably" (The Intrinsonal Stance p. 72. Compare the suggestion that the subject to whom things are said to seem this and so is just a theorist's liction." (Answerings Explained, p. 128.)

fact was clear it would be intelligible that one might try to respond by conceiving the mental as a specially marked out part of nature, with nature anderstood according to a rudimentary form of the very conception that infact excludes the mental

This yields a way of inderstanding Cartesian philosophy of mind, at least on the Rylean reading ander which Descartes figures in a common contemporary picture of how modern philosophy of mind developed. 5 On this reading. Descartes wanted the relations that organize the mental to be special cases of the sorts of relations that organize the subject matter of ()e natural sciences. But the specialness of the mental, to which no this reading Descartes was responding without a proper comprehension of its basis, requires these relations, supposedly suitable for natural-scientific treatment. to do duty for the relations that constitute the space of reasons. That is why Cartesian thinking takes a form to which Ryle's term of criticism "paramechanical" is appropriate. Cartesian immaterialism is intelligible within the framework Lam describing, no part of material nature could be special enough to serve the essent adviconfused purposes of this way of tunking. If one track to make connections of the sort that figure in descript ons of law. governed processes do duty for relations of psychication or warrant, one will movitably rapse into an appeal to magic, masquerading as the science of a peculiar subject matter, what one intends to postmate as mechan sins of a special kind will degenerate afto what Ryle lampoons as para mechanisms.

On the reading, Cartesian philosophy of mind is a confused version of the first of the two kinds of naturalism I distinguished, an attempt to integrate thinking and knowling into nature or the modern conception that the second kind of naturalism rejects.

What I have said about para-mechanisms coincides with an element in Rorty's reading of modern epistemicogy. But Rorty depicts a train of thought that starts from an obsession with the fragility of certainty, and apses into para mechanism because of a wish to disciain the burden of responsibility for one's pictative knowledge which shows by as a wish to represent one's putative knowledge as the resint of the wor'd forcing itself in one. I find this reading less satisfactory than the one I have sketched for at least two reasons. First, the oriset of the obsession with certainty—which is rely does come to characterize epistemology with Descartes—still seems

^{15.} The qualification masters. I make no claims about the instorical Descartes in this essay. The reading is that given currency by Calburt Ryle. Physicistry 4 stand.

266

to need explanation. In my reading, the obsession with certainty can fall into place not as a starting-point for a train of thought that issues in the characteristically Cartesian conception of the mental but as maintesting an explicable anxiety over the felt threat that the knowing subject withdraws from the rest of the world. Second, the peculiarnies of the Cartesian subject are not restricted to its role as knower, this is the point about the generalize ability of Sellars's contrast, which I have already noted that Rorty misses. *

6. In the perspective I am urging, the fundamental mistake of Cartesian philosophy of rund is its lailure to take the point of Sellars's contrast. What is special about concepts of the mental is that they make sense only in the framework of the space of reasons. Cartesian thinking intuits a specialness about concepts of the mental, but misunderstands it taking it to reflect a peculiar mode of belonging to nature, with nature understood according to a conception that, when it comes into clear focus, actually stands opposed to the logical space within which alone concepts of the mental are intelligible.

The idea of para-mechanisms, realized in an immaterial substance figures in this reading as a mere result of trying to force the specialness of the mental into that unsuitable model. The fundamental inistake is not the notion of a ghostly mechanism, but the idea that the mental can be an view from a standpoint that organizes its subject matter in the manner of the natural sciences.

But this idea is still widespread in contemporary philosophy of mind. In a common view, at least part of the truth about the mental is the truth about a demarcated region of nature, conceived as the realm of law, specifically, the truth about the internal machinery that controls behaviour in response to impacts from the environment. This is not the whole of the truth about the mental, according to this style of thurking, because on its own this body of truth cannot incorporate the bearing of mental states on objective reality. But it is the whole of part of the truth about the mental.

I want to suggest that this conception of the mind as internal machinery is, in one respect, no advance over the Cartesian conception. Of course this

⁴⁶ do not mean to suggest that a wish to dishurden onesels in responsiblely is anything but central to a proper understanding of the genesis of modern philosophy. But I do not be never a supposedly autonomous obsession with certainty is the right context to which to understand such a wish.

¹ For a formulation on these lines, see p. 232 of colin McGinn. "The Structure of Content"

style of thinking has shed the familiar ontological embarrassments of Cartesianism. It does not envisage ammaterial substances, and it has no need for the role Descartes attributes to the pineal gland, as the site of a mysterious interaction between an immaterial substance and the rest of nature. But this style of thinking still makes what I have suggested is the fundamental mistake of Cartesianism. It supposes that truth about the mental call be in view when the subject matter of the inquiry is conceived as framed in the realm of saw and not as framed in a surgeoistic space of reasons. On this score, which is separable from the benefit of discarding those intological embarrassments, looking for regular mechanisms is no better than postulating para-mechanisms.

Indeed in one way the change is for the worse. At least the old Cartesian thinking registers in its confused way, the intuition that thought and talk about the mental are special. The modern version avoids immaterial smand the pineal gland mystery by taking as its subject matter something that is not special at all, but just a more or less ordinary part of nature.

Of course there is nothing wrong with having the internal machinery that controls behaviour as one's subject matter. The warmed over Cartesianism I am describing consists not just in taking an interest in that bit of nature, but in thinking that the truth about its truth about the mental

7. I want to Eustrate this are connection with a common contemporary attatude to a Fregean conception of intentionality. The idea is that "externastic" considerations have demolished Frege's apparatus of sense and reference. Versions of this view have been expressed by many people. *But fain
going to consider a particularly clear expression by Ruth Garrett Millikan
when she directs against. Frege her campaign against what she calls
"meaning rationalism". *I want to suggest that Millikan's argument is vitiated by adherence to the residual Cartesianism I have identified, and that
reflecting on her thinking is a good way to see how small an advance is constituted by discarding Cartesian. Inmaterialism

The fundamental thesis of the "meaning rationalism" Mill kan attacks is that samenesses and differences in elements of thought-content are

¹⁸ Examples include John Perry "Frege on Demonstratives" and McGron, "The Structure of Content"

¹⁹ See in parties at "Perceptical Content and Fregean Misth," and "White Queen Psychology. Ship hat assumptions seem to the to situate pp. 570. Followbert Brandon: Making R Explicit.

transparently available to a rational subject. "A stronger version adds that it is transparently available to a rational subject whether or not a putative content element really is a content element, so we cannot make sense of the idea that a thinking subject might take herself to be entertaining a thought when there is no thought there to be entertained.

Now Frege's netion of sense is fixed by the principle that we must distinguish senses whenever the price of not doing so would be to leave a possibility that a rational subject could, at the same time, take rationally conflicting attitudes—for instance belief and disbelief, to a single thought (where thoughts are the senses expressible perhaps in suitable contexts, by unterances of whole sentences). This is indeed a form of "meaning rational sin". Frege's requirement is that senses must be sufficiently fine grained to see for that we need to it describe rational subjects as, say believing and disbelieving the same thing. And if the difference between the same sense twice over and two different senses is to correspond with the closing of opening to a rational mind of possibilities for combining and describe to the difference aimst be available to the rational mind in question.

This "meaning rationalism" is weaker than Milikan's fundamental thesis, with its general transparency of sameness and difference in content-ciencials (feet alone the further thesis that excludes illusions of existence for content-cienteits.) Frege's principle forces a difference of sense only if ration ally continuing attitudes to what would otherwise have to be conceived as the same thought are present in a rational mind at the same time. Frege says polling to exclude a sobject's losing track of a thought over time which would make room for holding conflicting attitudes to the same thought at different times without the subject's rationality being impegned. Nor does

^{20 &}quot;White Queen Psychology" pp. 286." especially p. 28". Of these — claims the givenness of theating identity is the most central."

^{2.} See Goreth Evans. Understanding Demonstratives. Millikan brurs this poor by a strange reading dishe principle Evans calls. Russe's Principle' see chapter 4 of *The Interies of Reterence* that is the principle that 'no order to be the displaced a logical one of the know which object is made one is broking about the varieties of Reference plots if the assistance that the varieties of Reference plots if the shows flow this order of the trib clote as recognitive and Millikan et Worte Queen Psychology ope 287–8) reads the principle as recognitive that a broker be able to tell when the object figures in her thoughts avery order the same node of presentation. But contrary to what Millikan's chanons imply the require ment that a thinker be able to tell when she is thinking of the same object again is no part of what I valis means by "Russell's Principle. And ever the weaker version, at terms of modes of presentation, goes far beyond Frege's principle, with its last the same time" qualification.

Frege's principle rule out a subject's taking what is in fact a different thought to be the same as one she entertained earlier so that she wrongly supposes she is a ready committed to an attitude to it is But I can ignore this. Millikan's argument against Frege does not depend on crediting him with a stronger "tationalism" than he accepts.²¹

Millikan's argument goes like this. Grasping a sense would need to be an achievement characteristic of the intact mind. But Frege wants grasping a sense of the relevant kind to be having an object—the associated *Bedeu tung*—in mind. For this to be so, the rationality that figures in Frege's at tempt to place the notion of sense would have to be semantic rationality, a matter of, for instance, what can and cannot be true together. So Frege's picture of sense and reference requires "the assumption that the intact mind is, as such, seniant cally rational". Millikan argues that this assumption is substantive, and indefensible

She sees the assumption as substantive because she takes a that or one's rund to be attact is for one to have one's "head" in mach in good mechanical order not diseased not broken." Her thought is that the only sort of

22. It is remarkable how many philosopy exist pionse that Prege has a problem with thoughts such as the rise that Rap Van Winkle might express on was highly bis twenty year sleep, by saying "Today is the day I fell asleep".

23. Transparency is really a red herring. 31 pp. - 21-30 of the Inventorial stance. For nettehearses the usual case against a produce vilregear constroid of propositional approach (Though Frege's Geological de not actually liquid in his catalogue of possible things to mean by "propositions" p. (2). DesireB casts the argument as a problem for the idea of 16 aspring senses"—or as one might say knowing what one thinks poses by he act that one can iose track be deceived by ringers, and so bitt in World, Jerung Langue that ray claim, or Know of a sattable occasion. Plat it is Denner, whom I see before, me is anaerimized. F1 could be deceived by a ringer last surely louid. 1 Why is knowledge of ichar or e.d., also held. 'r a bigoer standard? At p. 129, Jenned writes, "One could side up the case." propositions are not graspable because they can clude us. Are live chickens not graspable? They can surely clude us i in the same spinit at p. 200 Dennet. Hers another strange, reading of Russet's Principle, as expressing the idea "that we, an debue a kind of abounces," that is both a real relation to something in the wone and some boy, to which the believer's access a perfect." Why make the access be perfect (that is, proof agains) ringers, losing track. and the like? This is not Raisset is Proposity as Exclusively it which is social Deviced Games to be talking about. It would be an interesting exercise to work our how, he strikingly traffer man conception of sell-knowledge that Design there losses on Tregeatty is connected with Definett's psychologistic, shough certain by non-dualismic conception of what it would be for something to be otherwise than 'psychologically more op. 130'.

24. "White Queen Psychology" p. 290

25. "Whate Queen Psychology", p. 289.

"rationality" (so called) that is segmmately available for Frege to appeal to as a context for his talk of sense is "mechanical ranonality", the head being in good mechanical order. So the substantive assumption is that in ternal mach nery could be so arranged that its states and changes of state track the requirements of semantic rationality.

And Mill kan seems right that this assumption is indefensible. We cannot engage in the kind of assessment of semantic rationality that Frege wan situ exploit in his account of sense, say in connection with possible and impossible combinations of singular predicative thoughts, until we have secured that the items that are allowed or not allowed to be combined are directed at determinate objects. And there are modes of directedness at determinate objects. And there are modes of directedness at determinate objects—for instance, those expressible by perceptually based demonstratives—that we cannot get into our picture without appealing to environmental circumstances—circumstances external to the intra organism contachinery that Mill ikan illinks would have to be meant by "the Intact mind" ²⁶

8 Mi bican's argument, then is this "the assumption that the mact mind is, as such semantically rational" is substantive, and indefensible, herefore selected reference cannot hang together as Frege supposes. Now the inferent a step here is fine. But surely Frege's Line is to contrapose. Sense and reference do hang logether as be takes them to so much the worse for the thesis that intaciness in a mind, sindependent of semantic rationality. The assumption is not substantive. Mill kan makes it look as if it is by insisting that "the intact mind," aimst be healthy machinery in the head, so much the

^{26.} I have surbed from a focus on the transparency of same resses and differences in sense to a focus on the capacity of a concept of set se to cater for directedness at objects which is part of the semantic as of singular thoughtst at all. Milbkan's basic point open st brego is still form diable in this context grasping senses who dishare to be an exercise of mechanical rational to land sense and telerence could have to be an exercise of mechanical rational to land sense and telerence could have together in Frego's sway only differential at another established for semanticity, which is does not the advantage of the shift is that it obtains any need at set loot in the morass of cases. Its Kripke's Pierre which Minkail exploits. White Queen Psychology in pp. 290-1 is, for the record in the say that Kripke's Pierre poses to problem, of a Fregoric view as Frego's prior ple requires as to say the has two different modes of presentation for wordon. It is a gross insconception to suppose this involves segregating a putative he tion of rationality from directeoness at the objective world that the scalings of rationality modes of parentality mito some other purer safer reason." White Queen Psychology," p. 348)

271

worse for that interpretation of mental intactness. Rather to have an intact mind just is to be semantically rational.27

Frege is famous for railing against psychologism in logic. His point is that the concept of, say ideductive inference is available only within a normalive framework, and an inquiry that restricts uself to transitions minds regularly make without the normative framework of logic properly conceived, does not get as far as bringing deductive inference into view. But the thought is not limited to logic. Frege's attack on psychologism is a way of expressing the generalized version of Selfars's point that I have been working within this essay. (The correspondence is this urprising in view of how important Kant is for both.) Already in the logical case, it is not just the idea of deductive inference that is available only within a normalively framed inquiry the very idea of what deductive inferences start from and issue in beliefs makes sense only within the normalive context that psychologistic logic ansideny themselves.

Now Malitkan's conception of "the intact mind" is psychologistic in the generalized sense at purports to have the mind's states and operator's as its topic even though the topic is not conceived as framed within a sia generic space of reasons. We should not be in sled here by her phrase "mechanical rationality". When the machiners in the head is in good working order, that is not to say that its states and changes of state are related by the sorts of relation that constitute the space of reasons, any more than are the states and changes of state in say, a healthy kidney. This is just a way of putting M I-hkan's own point. "Mechanical ranonality" (so caded) cannot ensure semantic rationality, but it is semantic rationality that structures the space of reasons."

27. This is rational enough to count as a Conker land it would be silly—ass. How rational is that?" Formulations are the one in the text do not imply that he concerns apparatuse and talking about peromes upon adable if a subject shows less than perfect randomatics.

28. The point is the same as the one that Depriest makes by saying that "the brain is just a symach length?" The Intentional Stable plot it is because it is shaw of puriting Milikan's own thought that I can classify her may rathem about "the attachment" as a case of restrictive nature than liberal naturalism. She argues that the biological sciences, in clading physicogy and psychology are disongeoshed from the alternative sources by the nature of naturalism in biological supreper happenings. "We define the psychology" p. 362. But this does not remove the biological as she conceives it from what I not iduced as the reason of law in its institute than induce vely based in what as hally happens. We still have the contrast with the space of reasons.

A psychologistic conception of the mental is not a promising context in which to look for what Prege of all people ringht have wanted from the notion of sense. No wonder his thinking comes out tooking so unsatisfactory. For Prege grasping a (singular) sense should simply be having a Bedeuting in mind (under a mode of presentation). The notion that works only in the framework of semantic rationabity. Milbian takes the introduction of sense to be a tool for characterizing the internal mechanics of naving one's mind on objects. It She rightly concludes that grasping a sense, so construed tarn it be what Prege wants it to be but she does not see that this might tell against the construed.

This is a blind spot. I think it amounts to not seeing the possibility of a liberal naturalism. The proper home of the idea of "grasping senses" is in describing patterns in our lives—our mental lives in this case. That are intelligible only in terms of the relations that structure the space of reasons. This patterning involves genuine rationality not just "mechanical rationality" (so called). It beral naturalism needs no more, to make the idea of "graspting senses" unproblematic, than a perfectly reasonable insistence that such patterns really do shape our lives.

If someone relives to take the nonon of sense as a tool for character zing the internal inechanisms that underlie having one virind on objects. Mid-akan detects a commitment to a spooky dea that as she puts it. Imeanings move the mind directly. The spookiness is that of Cartesian paramechanisms. She records into a neo Cartesian search for regillar inechanisms, and supposes frege must have been after that too, though she finds has attempt inept—rightly, given her construat of Frege's thinking. But frege's thinking is quite different. It involves, if you like the thought that "meanings move the mind directly—but in a form that is not spooky at all The idea of a mind's being noised by meanings anvolves a metaphor from the logical space of mechanical understanding but it is an idea whose functioning needs to be understood in the contrasting space of reasons. Trying to take the metaphor iterally is a form of the basic Cartesian mistake.

29. See a view raordinary passage by "Percept tall Content and Program Model" (p. 442), in which she takes the idea of "grasping senses" to be a case of "possucating latert redicates, with a view to theorizing about the mader only nature of the vehicle of though "...

³⁰ Perhaps expressing scepticism about whicher there must be any such internal methanics. Consider lengt. Wittgenstein's notorious remarks about "the prejudice of psychophysical paradelism" (§611) at §§608 and fl. of Zene?

^{31. &}quot;Perceptual Content and Fregran Myth", p. 442.

9 What ground is there for accepting that it is a mistake? Milikan's position 5 quite suggestive here. Like ordinary Cattesianism in poses a threat to a common sense conception of thinking things.

What is it that thinks? One might suppose it should be what Millikan calls "the intact mind". But the activities of "the intact mind" as Millikan conceives it do not amount to thinking. That is just to affirm her own point that its activities exempl by only "mechanical rationality", and not semantic rationality.

What is it that exercises semantic rationality? Millikan's answer to this question shifts the relevant boundary out from the one around "the intact mind", past the boundary around the animal whose behaviour it controls. to encompass a system that combines "the intact mind" with conditions in the animal's environment. "Rationably is a biological norm effected in an integrated head-world system under biologically ideal conditions. ** But "externalism" is grotesque if it implies that exercising semantic rationality is an activity of a "head-world system"—as if the environment of what we ordinarily conceive as thinkers is partly responsible for doing the thinking that gets done. The environment is partly responsible for there being a possibility. of doing that (binking) But the thinking is done by something that lives in the environment, which includes thinking about it. This piece of meresanity is obscured by Millian's concern with the nuchames of thinking (with how rationality is "effected"). If we conceive the animal as a complex mechanism. What we have in view is not a realization of semantic rationality any more than its internal control machinery is, and new it looks as if nothing less than a "head-world system" will do. If the only respectable in tellectual openiation towards rationality is importy into how it is "effected". in a mechanism, we lose our grip on rationality as something exercised in the activities of an animal

Millikan's "intact mind" is a counterpart to the Cartesian res cognuns. There is a difference. Millikan realizes that her counterpart cannot actually

^{12 &}quot;White Queen Psychology" p. 280.

³³ Is it a difficulty that the "head world vistern is itself in 3 a syntactic engine? M Bhan must hope that if we describe it in a way that is so also organized to terms if biological function we shall be describing it in a way that reveals it as genuinely instantiating rationality—as a semantic engine. This sinkes me as a fabriasy, but I need not substantiate that impression my present point is that even if we allow Millakan what she must hope for it does not yield a satisfactory answer to the question "What I links owhat exertises so manzic rationality)?"

be a restagatans, a though she still calls it "the mind"—perversely one might thank, since it does not do what minds are supposed to do, namely think texercise semantic rationality). This is the result of a familiar trade-off, the price of discarding Cartesian immaterialism, while staying within restrictive na uralism, is that one's singled out part of nature is no longer special enough to be credited with powers of thought. But Milliann's conception for all its freedom from immaterialism, is like the original Cartesian conception in threatening the sane belief that a restagarans is also a residenment a restambulans, and so forth. Millian's "initial numb" does not exercise rationality, and the "head world system", which supposedly does exercise rationality is not the thing that sleeps and walks. The rational animal finds no place in the picture.

Properly anderstood the claim that the operations of the infact ininding dude directing rise flat objects, which Milakan cannot make room for its perfectly acceptable it is a way to say it is the ranonal amoust that hinks. We do not in as slowly denigrate the reality of the mental I we say the word "milat" labels a coldection of capacities and propensines possessed by a minded being. It is a recipe for intellectual disaster to assume that what we mean by "the enrich milit be something more substantial transitiat but less than it erational an inal uself an organ in which the thinking we credit to the animal loosely of derivatively on this view takes place. That is he original sin of Cartes an pholosophy and it is no redempt in to replace the paral organ post lated by Descartes lineself we bia regular organ something a more sophist cared contemporary biology can counternance. Of course

^{44.} John Scarle is ratio according contemporary need carrivators or thinking he can nothing impaterial zeith. Cartesian ross assains and keep as remarkable powers.

^{35.} See my "Putnam on M nd and Meaning"

Proge And consider disc passage from the passage remained (p. 41). It alisms the idea that a brain cannot be a domeing thing so a dinking thing among the a brain, is tempting for a variety of reasons be two most resist temptation. Somethow the brain index the model that a brain time to be a thinking share the as Democt number remarks, the asyntactic enginer. Dualism resides not in the berfect well extraordal that a bita to a not a thinking thing the passage that it is not the raing thing beauty positional agreementing immaterial to be the thinking thing that he brain is not instead of realizing that the fraction must be the first of an extraordal arms all Democt can be comfortable with the thought can the brain must be the first of a combination with his two awareness that the brain is not reason a thinking fring fring northing is the stat is of possessor of inventional vales is conferred by adoption of the tolerational statice.

there is a relevant organ, the brain, and none of what I have said casts doubt on investigating how it works. But on pain of losing our grip on ourselves as thinking things, we must distinguish inquiring into the mechanics of say having one's mind on an object from inquiring into what having one's mind on an object from inquiring into what having one's mind on an object is.

40. My topic in this essay has been a cultural effect of the maturation of modern science. The associated clarification of the relevant mode of intelligibility, which separated it from the mode of intelligibility revealed by placing things in the space of reasons, was in used an anglia ifted intelligibility revealed by placing things in the space of reasons, was in used an anglia ifted intelligibility revealed by placing things in the space of reasons, was in used an anglia ifted intelligibility revealed by placing thing in the particular intelligibility revealed by placing thing in the particular intelligibility revealed by placing thing in the particular intelligibility revealed by placing things in the space of reasons, was in used an angle although in the particular intelligibility revealed by placing things in the particular intelligibility revealed by placing things in the particular intelligibility revealed by placing things in the space of reasons, was in used an angle intelligibility revealed by placing things in the particular intelligibility revealed by placing things in the partic

But this is a gratuatous addition to the real insight embodied as the institution of the asternational stance. Radional admirals genericly are semanticly ignores," all is irricated to this claim, hat the interacorabity of rational anneals is a product of a solution, a causal naticipate of the original stance. The beginsh of part of Monther Nascite compare pp. 287–321 of the international Stance. The beginsh is leachable in righ of the national or say consciousness to planted is dismanating independently of Dermen's new Cartesian thought, and the main minst be the manual makes a contribution to the study of the mechanics of conscious news, in an acceptable sense into parallel to the sense of vehicle Milliam studies a power of at Prege must have been concerned with the neighbories of internation.

PART VI

Responses to Brandom and Dreyfus

Knowledge and the Internal Revisited¹

1 In his "knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons". which is a response to my "Knowledge and the Internal". Robert Brandom claims to agree with everything I say there (and indeed not only there). The fact is that he takes for grapted something that contradicts the main point of my essay. With hindsight in the light of Brandon's subsequent responses to my Mord and World I have come to see his essay as an equisode in an ongoing effort on his part to appropriate my work as a kind of promissory note for his? Braudom writes op 895). "I hope at neitst to clarify some of the keyconcepts and connections that McDowell appeals to, and at best to twist his words into a perverted cancature of their true meaning." I think on this peculiar scale of assessment things are even bener than Brandom hopes. If s representation of the late to achieve even the status of a carbon pre-syluchwould require a recognizable likeness, Instead it sets me up as sketcha g a thought guite alien to what I aimed at which might indeed seem to need Brandom's work for its proper elaboration, I conceive this note in which I shall attempt to explain this, as an analogue to the small explosion emitted by a bombardier beetle to avoid being sival inved by a predator."

2. My main point in "Knowledge and the Internal" is to protest against an interiorization of the just fications available to as for Gainis about the external world. The interiorization threatens to deprive us of the justificatory power of, for instance, the form "I see that in "I I must that statements of such forms."

My thanks to Rob Brandom for many conversations and a joint se minar

² Sec "Perception and Rational Consira in McDowe"'s Vina and world" and "Perception and Rational Constraint"

^{3.} Another image which I borrow from Simon Blackburn in a new stong being cast as the hind legs of a pantorume borse called iPir sburgh neo Hege car sm."

are proper moves in the game of giving reasons, and their truth fully vandicates enuttement to the embedded propositions. This ought to seem sheer common sense, and it would if questionable philosophy did not put it at risk. Someone who can truly make a claim of that form has an enuttement incompatible with any possibility of faisehood, to a claim whose content is given by the embedded proposition. The entitlement consists in the visual availability to her of the fact she would affirm an making that claim.

Compare Brandom's §II (pp. 899-901) where he purports to restate my argument. Brandom ists four positions that he says my argument rules out. About one of them "dogmatism" he writes, supposedly in agreement with me (p. 899). "The dogmatist arrives at the true conclusion that knowledge is possible by comb rung the labe claim that justification must be incompatible with falsehood with the farther labe claim that justification that rules out the possibility of falsehood can be had." But both these supposedly false claims are true by my lights. What I urge in my essay is precisely that justification adequate to reveal a state as one of knowing must be incompatible with falsehood and can be had. "Dogmatism" one of the four positions Brandom says I reject is precisely what I defend.

About the four positions. Brandom says (p. 899). "McDowell rightly does not reheatse at length the difficulties of these views, their unsatisfactoriness a widely acknowledged." But about the fourth- "dogmatism"—I profest at length against a style of thinking that is widely thought to show its unsatisfact inness. I aim to rescue the position from bad philosophy, and to leave it looking perfectly sat sfactory. In particular, though I do not put it like this in my essay. I aim to cast the position in a light in which it should not seem to deserve the label "dogmatism."

Brandom assumes, and amazingly takes me to assume that just fication that rules out lalsehood cannot be had for empirical claims. That is just the acea that I deplore, and diagnose as resulting from an interiorization of the space of reasons. At p. 902, looking back over his purported restatement of my argument. Brandom says: "You may have noticed that although here and there I helped myself to McDowell's imagery of what is conceived as internal or external to the space of reasons, in my exposition of his core arguments I did not find it necessary to say anything at all about interiorizing the space of reasons in this sense. "But it is not just that Brandom's purported exposition leaves out my imagery of interiorizing. In purporting to expound me, he actually makes the interiorizing move I attack, when he assumes that justification must fall short of guaranteeing truth.

Brandom says (p. 903). "If you are standing in a darkened room and seem." to see a candle ten feet in from of you, I may take you to have good reason for believing that there is a candle in front of you, and so take you to be entitled. to your commument. But that may be my artifude even if I know, as you do not, that there is a mirror five leet in front of you, and no candle behind it, so that I am not in a position to endorse or commit myself to what you are committed to " The implication is that the entirlement one can credit to someone who seems to see a candle in front of her, for claiming that there is a candle in front of her is always indifferent to whether or not there is a candle in from of her. The subject's entitlement in the case Brandom describes cannot be such as to guarantee the presence of a candle at the relevant place, since there is no candle there. And the implicit suggestion is that even if things had been as the subject supposes, the subject's entitlement would not have reached any further. That is, the entitlement in both cases is the highest common factor of the two. Even in the best case, the subsect's entitlement does not go beyond the fact that she seems to see a candle ten feet in front of her, which of course does not guarantee that there is a candle there

This is just the move I object to. I insist that in the best case the subject can have an entitlement consisting in the fact that she sees that there is a candle in front of her. Or, to put it another way: for a subject in the best case, the appearance that there is a candle in front of her is the presence of the candle making itself apparent to her. This is not a mere seeming, which would be compatible with there being no candle there. The subject in the marror case does not have an entitlement of this kind, one incompatible with there being no candle there, though she will probably think she does. It is a kind of entitlement that I insist can be had—contrary to what Brandom says I say.

No doubt some notion of entitlement or justification in ght have application in Brandom's mirror case. It might be rational (doxastically blameless) for that subject—who only seems to see a capdie in front of her—to claim that there is a candle in front of her. But this is not the notion of entitlement or justification that should figure in a gloss on the Selfarsian thought that knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons. The right notion for Selfars's point is precisely what Brandom says I reject a notion for which entitlement and truth do not come apart.

3 Of course one does not inherit entitlement to, for instance. "There's a candle in front of me" from a commitment—to which one would have to be.

entitled to "I see that there's a candle in front of me". One could not be entitled to "I see that there's a candle in front of me" while it was still in sils pense whether one was entitled to "There's a candle in front of me" suspense that one would terminate on this impossible picture, by inferring "There's a candle in front of me" from "I see that there's a candle in front of me". But the impossible ty of this picture does not disquality "I see that " from its status as the form of a proper move in the game of giving reasons, a move that if one can make it truly syndicates one's entitlement to a claim with the content of the embedded proposition. The point just brings out the mishibition of a conception of justification that limits itself to inferent as inheritance of enactement (perhaps with a special story about one's entitlement to the premises of the envisaged inferences.)

Brandom writes ip 904). "A fundamental point on which broadly extermaist approaches to epistemology are clearly right is that one can be just fied without being able to justify. That is, one can have the standing of being entitled to a commitment without having to inherit that entitlement from other compilation is inferentially related to it as reasons " If one so st heaor "There's a caudic in Font of me" is that one sees that there is a candle in front of one (that the presence of a candle in front of one makes tself visitably apparent to one come cent tlement is as I have not said, not inherited from a commutment to "I see that there's a capidle is front of itse". But the is not to say in other words—Brandom's "That is", 4hat one can be justified without being able to pastify. It seems so only because of that insidficient conception of astification. The case is one in which one a able to , is-Efy. 10 yind cate or ex-entitlement, precisely by saying "I see that there's a tandle in front clame". Only that insulficient conception of justification. makes. I look as if there is a point here on which externa ist approaches to epistemiology are clearly right

This passage in Bra dom's essay belongs in a series of places we gre be tries to find support for an externalist admixture in epistemology from what is certainly an cosat stactorness in Sellars's treatment of the authority of observation reports "Sedars claims that the authority of an observation report "must in some sense be recognized by the person whose report in 5.15. And he cas less this out in terms of the idea that the reporter must be able to give evidence of their realability in reporting the sort of state of affairs in

⁴ See, in particular, Making It Explicit, pp. 213-21.

^{5. *}Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* §35.

283

question. This is certainly quite implanisible. Brandom concludes that the internalism of Sellars's claim that observational authority must be , "in some sense") recognized by its possessor is a mistake * But the mistake is in Selars s proceeding as if the only available sense for the requirement were that the reporter can derive her reliability as the conclusion of an inference. Like most adults, I know that I can tell a green thing when I see one (in the right) conditions of illumination)—that is 1 conform to 5e lars's internalist requirement. I recognize my own authority as a reporter of greenness. But I would be at a loss if pressed for premises for an argument that would have my reliability about greenness as a conclusion. My reliability about that kind of thing has for me-rather, a sort of status that Wittgenstein considers. in On Certainty. It is held firm for me by my whole conception of the world. with myse fun touch with it, and not as the conclusion of an inference from some of that conception. If we equip Sellars with something on these lines? as a spelling out of his "in some sense". It's intuition that observational authority must be self-consciously possessed can stand. The ansatisfactoriness of his gloss on the intu fron does not constitute a case, in layor of a concession to externalism, as Brandom claims.

- 4 In "Knowledge and the Internal". I argue against views according to which knowledge is only partly constituted by stan longs in the space of reasons, with the requirement that what a knower takes to be so is indeed so conceived as an extra condition, over and above her standing in the space of reasons. Brandom purports to respect my point. In his account, an artributor of knowledge attributes a commitment and an entitlement, and herself undertakes a commitment corresponding to the commitment attributed. This third component of knowledge attribution is Brandom's counterpart to the traditional truth requirement for knowledge. Brandom purports to respect my argument by saying that the distinction of perspectives that matters for his account. Detween the perspective of the one to whom a com-
- 6 Brandom thorks Sellars imposes his internalist requirement with a view in securing that the reporter understands her reports. (See Enowiedge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons" p. 905. But its point is rather to secure, but they have a specific kind of authority.
- 7. This is a the spirit of Sellary's own addition, to trad good empiricism of a second dimension of dependence, in which observation reports depend on knowledge, hat in the dimension to which traditional empiricism resincts useful depends not bein. The princism and the Philosophy of Mand* §38

maintent and an entitlement are attributed and the perspective of the attributor from which the corresponding commitment is undertaken—is "a disfunction of perspectives within the space of reasons, not a distinction be tween what is within at and what is without it" (p. 906). But this appearance of respecting my point is an illusion, generated by an equivocation on the phrase "space of reasons". Brandom's conception of knowledge attributions is squarely in the target area of the argument of mine that he purports to endorse

I derive the idea of knowledge as a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons from Seliars. Sollars writes, "an characterizing an episode or a state as that of *knowing*, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state, we are placing at in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says "* I think it is clear from Seliars's gloss ("justifying air d'heing able to justify") that this talk of placing in the space of reasons is magery for assessing the *anothement* of the putative knower in the episodes or states in question. I might have spoken of standings in the space of entitlements.

What I object to is interiorzing continuents, in the sense of refusing to let the contivance of the world enter into constituting them. Applied to the entitlements that perceptoal for instance visual, experience affords, the interiorizing move restricts them to appearances, conceived as a highest common factor between seeing that such-and such is the case and having it merely look to one as it such-and-such is the case. Largue that it is not sat slactory to leave entitlements thus interiorized but add that what the parative knower takes to be so is in fact so, conceiving this as an extra condition over and above an interiorized entitlement. Now Brandom's socially perspective by oridic inception of knowledge attributions has just that shape. It makes no difference that he can take over my phrase "standing in the space of reasons", and define it so that it includes the satisfaction of the extra condition is still seen as extra to the knower's entitlement, and that is what according to the argument of mine that Brandom purports to endorse, precludes making sense of the status in question as one of growledge.

That the combivance of the world cannot enter into constituting perceptual entitlements—the interiorizing move 1 attack—Brandom takes for granted. His idea that an attributor of knowledge needs to undertake a corresponding commitment, over and above attributing whatever entitlement.

she can attribute reflects the assumption that there can be no entitlement such that to attribute it is already impactify to undertake the communent to which one is saying someone is entitled (to put things in Brandom's social-perspectival terms). So far from its being the case that the social perspectival apparatus yields a richer understanding of the point I was driving at Brandom's employment of it gives expression to a conception of knowledge that has exactly the structure I object to

Let me reformulate the objection in a way that takes note of the possibility of exploiting a difference of perspectives in giving expression to its target What I main yields no satisfactory conception of knowledge is the thought that truth—that is, worthingsy of endorsement, which is expressed by the artributor's andertaking the relevant commutation berself as needed as an extra condition, over and above whatever entitlement can be attributed to the candidate knower. This thought reflects the idea that entitlement incompatible with fa schood in what one is entitled to cannot be had. Thinking on these bijes, one will suppose that if one does no more than attribute whatever. entification one can, one leaves it open that what the obtained knower octatively knows is not even true. In that case she certainly does not know it Given this interiorizing of entitlement, the fact that the putative knower's computment is to something that is in fact true--that the attributor can go infor the undertaking of a commutment that is the third component in Brandom's picture of knowledge-attribution—rooks academia in relation to the putative knower's entitlement. Not completely accidental, as I concedec*Knowledge and the Internal* (p. 403). Given a deleasing entitlement, it is at least likely that things are as the parative knower takes them to be, so if they are that way, they are as the entitlement makes it at least likely that they are "But it is accidental, in relation to the subject's entitlement conceived on these lines, that the case we are considering is not one of the cases in which the supposed y open possibility of falschood 4 actual. How does this add-up to a picture of knowing that things are thus and so as opposed to having good but not conclusive reason to suppose that things are thus and so, in a situafrom an which, as it happens, thongs are thus and so? "As it happens" seems a spropriate given the avowed deleasibility of the entitlement, and this seems to undermine any possibility that it is intelligibly knowledge that we are pie-

⁹ Given a defeasible entitlement in the end, think the argument indicates had we are not ready entitled to talk about entitlement in the framework of the interiorization by toget the argument going we can pretend we are

Z00

turing, it does not help at all with this difficulty to apportion the entitlement and the undertaken commutment between two different perspectives. If anything, it accentuates the difficulty

I do not see why we should be impressed by the possibility of securing a social perspectival analogue to factiveness, in something one labels "a standing in the space of reasons" by including the attributor's undertaking of a commitment in what we count as attributing the standing. Believing truly that — is factive in this sense level if the behef in question is the result of a wild guess. The thrust of the argument of mine that Brandom parports to accept can be captured by saying that this picture does not discriminate in a way we need, between the factiveness of knowing that — and the factiveness of merely believing truly that

5 Brandom (p. 899 in 3) cites conversation with me as an occasion for registering that the Selfarsian conception of standings in the space of reasons does not fit non-linguistic animals or pre linguistic human beings. This point is already explicit in my paper, where I specify my topic as "knowledge" at least as enjoyed by rational animals." (p. 395)

What Brandom makes of the point is that in the case of these other subjects, "it is common to talk about them loosely as though they were capable of some version—of these accomplishments" (centrally for these purposes, knowledge). And about the sort of state thiis "loosely" called "knowledge," he says. "This status has in common with the genume article what the parrot (trained to latter "red" when shown a red thing) has in common with the reporter of red things, reliable differential responsive dispositions." But I see no reason to think the knowledge of animals without conceptual capacities is only loosely so called just because it is not the interesting kind of knowledge that the Sellarsian conception fits. I see no reason to think there is nothing really there but actualizations of responsive dispositions. The implication is that, say, a calls awareness of the prey it stalks is no more genuinely a case of awareness than is an "awareness" of the presence of moisture shown by iron fillings in nisting. "This is the kind of thing nobody

On The parrot case may be confusing here parrots, turnike collections of four fillergs, are alter as complex living beings. But the parrot ability Brandom cites, unlike parrots ability to locate say strable perches at plausibly conceived as a mere case of a reliable differential responsive disposition. The ability to respond to red things with "red" at least as Brandom describes it does not fit into a parrot style purposive like in the way that would differentiate it from the sort of thing iron fillings "do".

287

but a philosopher would suppose (Descaries, perhaps.) I want no truck with it.

The point here is that it need not be part of the role of the image of the space of reasons to secure for us the very idea of being on to things. The knowledge that Sellars's remark distinctively fits comes into view when what are already ways of being on to things—exemplified in the self-moving lives of aritmals, but not in the "doings" of iron filings—are taken up into the ambit of the space of reasons.

Brandom undertakes, in effect, to do what I am saying is unnecessary; to exploit the image of the space of reasons, cashed out in his social perspectival. terms, so as to secure the very idea of being on to things. (This is why he has to hold that being on to things is only loosely auributable to creatures without concepts.) And he tends to suggest that any disbelief manifests a lingering individualism. The fact is that, as I have tried to explain in this note, Brandom's idiosyncratic way of invoking the social so far from making exphot the true direction of my argument in "Knowledge and the Internal", is epistemologically unhelpful in just the way my argument aims to uncover-And insisting on this betokens no individualism, no failure to acknowledge that sociality matters for knowledge as possessed by rational animals, and more generally for the very idea of objective purport. A rational animal could not have acquired the conceptual capacities in the possession of which its rationality consists except by being inmated into a social practice. But as I see things, the capacities transform their possessor into an individual who can achieve standings in the space of entitlements by her own efforts. (The point of my "Knowledge and the Internal" is that "by her own efforts" minst not be understood to imply that the world's kindness cannot enter into constituting the entitlements that are achievable (Which is closer to individualism) a possfrom according to which initiation into a social practice yie ds individuals of a special kind, able to achieve standings in the space of reasons by for instance. opening their eyes, or a position according to which we supposedly accommodate the very idea of such standings by contemplating subjects incividually incapable of achieving them, who somehow nevertheless keep one another under surveillance? At any rate, one can find the second picture unhelpful without denying that sociality is important in understanding our capacities for objective purport

¹¹ There is a hint in this direction in "Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons" p. 902, it is more explicit in the two responses to *Mind and World*.

ESSAY 17

Motivating Inferentialism: Comments on Chapter 2 of Making It Explicit¹

1 One way Brandom tries to motivate interentialism is by parting it in comper non-with representationalism, which he describes as "the traditional order of semantic explanation" (p. 92).

Representationalism takes a concept or concepts of representation as primitive and offers to explain all the features of migaistic, ractice tracial relevant to the fact that express ons are meaningful—for mistance, and centrally proprieties of inference no terms of that concept or those concepts. Brandom has no difficulty in deprecating that order of explanation. On that basis he recomment is an inversion of the order. We are to take the concept of inference as primitive, and explain everything else about the sign for tance of larguage, including ultimately the capacity for regress, tation, in terms of it.

Brandom focuses especially in a version of representationalism that takes designation as its primitive. According to this appreach, we are to start with a supposed yise fishanding understanding of the relation between a vingular term and its referent tailed perhaps also that between a predicate and a thember of whatever kind of things a theorist decides to count as the referents of predicates). Next we are to explain on the basis of that relation or those relations: the semantic significance of stranging words together into statements. And then we are to go on to explain him statements hang together in rationally sequential discourse in particular arguments. Brandom

This essay is a descendant of material in present ed to a point seminar with Bitaladom at 1998. If an igrated distribution for the communing supriales of las work, and for much help at fiscussion.

² See p. 69. Blandom's presentation leaves illunctear whether predicates are wipposed or be independently reated, and I have paraphilased so as a leave to a lopen.

introduces this as a "particularly unhelpful" version of representationalism but as he goes on he tends to take it as representative "

2 A supposedly primuove understanding of relations of reference figures as a target in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, especially the early sections. I think it is helpful to compare Brandom's treatment with what happens there.

"dominant tradition" in philosophical reflection about language. The supposedly self-standing understanding of the name-bearer relation that
Wittgenstein considers is not something he depicts as a bad move in answering a good question, perhaps because it approaches things in the wrong
order so that the trouble is to be fixed by inverting the order. On the contrary, he suggests that the supposedly self-standing understanding of designation that he considers both reflects and encourages a characteristically
philosophical attitude, in which the meaningfulness of language is expertenced as a mystery. And his olimate target is that attitude itself-rather than
a choice of what order to proceed in when one lets it control one's thinking

In the frame of mind Witigenstein is concerned with, one supposes the key to the mystery is that words have the remarkable property of being words for things. This property looks remarkable—in a way that fits with seeing it as the key to a mystery—when one tries to focus on, say the relation between a name and its bearer in abstraction from how cases of the relation figure in buman afe. That makes one prone to fall into a fetishistic supperstition about linguistic expressions, or to think of their possession of meaning as "a hocus-poeus which can be performed only by the scal" tempare *Philosophical Investigations* §454). And when that has happened, at as too late to bring the role linguistic expressions play in human life back anto view. What we do with words takes on the appearance of rags and dust from which one knows that a mouse could not come into being, so there is no point in looking at the details (*Philosophical Investigations* §52). The cure for this trouble is to stop trying to consider the relation between a name and an object in abstraction from its role in human afe. in his period.

³ See e.g. p. 94, on "the contemporary way of working out the representationalist order of explanation" as starting with "an independent action of relations of reference or denotation obtaining between mental or linguistic items and objects and sets of objects in the largely nonmental, nonlinguistic environment."

being able to exploit the idea of the relation in a radical explanation of the very idea of meaning, given from outside the standpoint of our lived familianty with language. We need to take the measure of the fact that it is only in a language game that an object can have a name at all (*Philosophical In vestigations* §49)

So we should not see what people do with language as a topic to be broached on vialter we have catered for the fact that expressions have semantic properties. Rather, bug usue practice is a context within which alone talk of expressions as meaningful makes sense.

That might be described as a kind of pragmatism. But there is no what of Brandom's preposal to invertian order of explanation. Witigenstein does not suggest that we must first describe the needed context in a way that avoids the concept we were puzzling over—the concept of a word for something and then explain the concept we were puzzling over in terms of such supposedly prior concepts of linguistic practice. The idea is not that we need to postpone using the concept we were puzzling over until we have entitled ourselves to it by some such explanation. What made the concept seem mysterious was the attempt to understand it in abstraction from a necessary context. When we put the context back into the picture, there is no need to forswear using the concept of names for objects in the course of describing the area of human file. Thelps to shape. Our problem was not that we were making the wrong choice of primitive, and the cure is not to fix on some other concepts as primitive.

What we find it Wittgenstein, then, is a well placed negative response to a supposedly primitive understanding of relations of reference, and with no tendo by to motivate an inverted order of explanation.

3 As a said. Wittgensteads target is not a tradition in perdosophy. In fact there is ground for scepticism about Brandom's picture of a dominant tradition, to be superseded by inferentialism.

Brandom's surely on the right track when he depicts the priority of the propositional, the centrality of judgment as a Kannau innovation, though one anticipated by strands in Leibniz and Spinoza (pp. 79-80-93-4). Kant here moves towards a conception of logic that comes to maturity in Frege, who insists on abstracting concepts out of judgments rather than building judgments out of concepts (pp. 80-21. Frege definitively supersedes a conception according to which logic starts with terms and works up to judgments.

As Brandom reads this, Kant's move begins to overlite a hitherto dominant representational understanding of "the proper order of semantic explanation" (p. 79). And since Kant situates the idea of judgment in the context of the idea of reasoning. Brandom takes him to be at least incipiently a proponent of the inferentialist order (p. 92).

On this view. Kant points towards the right way to execute a prolescohica, task his precursors were already engaged on though, apart from those anticipations in the rationalists, they approached things in the wrong order. But it seems wrong to suppose Kant's move is a new for nearly new, contribusion to an old project. The attribution of centrality to propositional content, which needs to be understood in the context of reason, belongs with the fact that Kant, s posing a new question. Kant brings into view a new way of bidding pheosephical problems in meaningfulness, or-better, since if is anachronistic to treat Kant as a philosopher of ranguage like lective purport, a puzzlement that could not have excrosed a medieval logician, who might indeed have begon with a logic of terms. The idea of objective purport first comes into focus as a distinctively phoosopingal issue around Kant's time, precisely because of the entanglement with an idea of responsiveness to reason that Kant registers by making padgment central. This entanglement poses new questions in modern phi osophy, because there is an increasing sense that reason resists integration into nature, on a newlysharp conception of nature made available by the maturation of the natural sciences. Perhaps some of the carly modern phrosophers have an meing of this new problem about objective purport, but it does not come properly. into view until Kant. So if some early moderns still begin logic with a logic of terms, like medicival logicians, that does not revical them as accepting a representational strapproach to greshous kant is addressing when he makes judgment central. They are not considering Kapity questions. That is a way of putting a Kantian crit cism, his predecessors do not recognize an obligation he envisages for philosophy. He is precisely not a rging a different. way to perform a task he takes his precursors to be already trying to perform, though they do things in the wrong order

4. At p. 92. Brandom suggests that Hege took the intoner inferentialism Brandom finds in Kanton its ingical conclusion. It remained on flegel however is complete the unversion of the tracitional order of semantic explanation. But it seems off key to read Hege as having any sympathy with an idea of conceptual print lives byterer is sur-shares with representationalism a forcer style of conceptual clarification starting with something supposedly independently independently.

The prezzlement Kant is addressing is not intelligibly felt unless objective properties conceived in the context of reason. As with the context of inguistic practice that Wittgenstein insists on, that does not amply that the concepts that figure in defineating the required context are to be taken as primitive. There is no ground here for seeing Kant as incipiently inferentrainst. And this account of the Kantian innovation makes it problematic whether we can really understand the frame of much that would need to be characteristic of Brandoni's "majority tradition", whose members supposedly pursue a different order in addressing the very question Kant addresses. with the move Brandom reads as proto inferentialist. The idea would need to be that we can begin on alleviating that left puzzlement by invoking concepts of representational meaningfulness that we take to be intelligible independently of the reac of objective purport in reasoning. But this conception of what primitive concepts might be available conflicts with a condition. for even feeling the difficulty about objective purport that Kant addresses. This makes Brandom's "majority tradition" look like a fiction. It is not clear. that his for for inferentialism is anything but a straw man 5

Why does this matter? Well, Brandom pays almost no attention to the question whether semantic explanation should be linear, with some concepts. selected as primitive. As long as he can make diseem that there is a real school. of thought that proceeds in that way, although as choice of primarve concepts is wrong, the assumption that what is called for is the right choice of

3 Permans we should nook for examples in connequencing permasophic Big where? We carried at ribuse a representationalist orientation on the basis of the order in a sormal preseritation of a semantic theory. It is true, for instance, that a Davidsonian semantic theory. of a language would begin with assignments of semantic properties to subservential expressions id in that is perfectly consistent with endersing a Kapitan priority of the propost total. Javidson makes that clear see. In Defence of convention T. And attributing prionto to the propositional reflects the though, which shapes Davidson's thinking about atombelation, that a semantic theory for a natural language would betweetly stand in taaccording to whether a made anona sense of speakers (Among in ich else inference Would Datter for this. Davidson is certainly not a proponent of B andom's frepresentatonalist order of explanation? At p. 337. Brandom describes Davidson as conceiving *representational relations as holding in the bird instance between propositionally contently intentional states and facts or states of allates. This allieast acknowledges had Davidson has the Kanban priority of the propos nonal though a grossly misrepresents Davioson's thinking, which makes no such play with facts or states of affairs. And the pic-

re Brandom gives in this later passage is still that "most representationalists", at like Davidson, thank they can begin with independently antelligible relations between subsenlet to expressions and though in the real order. One wonders whom he has a mind

primitives can look innocent not in need of defence. But if his competition between orders of finear explanation is unreal, the assumption can no longer go unremarked, and it becomes more evident that from the hopelessness of the representationalism he sets up as inferentialism's competitor, he cannot really derive any recommendation for the inverted order."

4 The designational representationalism that Brandom tends to take as representative starts with semantic relations between subsentential expressions and elements of extra linguistic reality. Now Brandom casts his inverted order of explanation as matching that but in the opposite order. His own notion of representation, to be reached at the end of the explanatory procedure mirrors that of a designational representationalist. This shows in the fact that he does not think representation is explicitly on the scene and he has arrived in Chapter 8, at locations for attributions of commitments in which the attributor explicitly relates the attributee to elements of extra linguistic reality (as in "Raiph believes of the man he saw at the beach that he is a spy")

Brandom's designational representationalists thank of representation as a generic relation, species of which hold between names and objects, predicates and (perhaps) properties (or sets), and—derivatively—secuences and states of allairs (pp. 69–70). This conception is quate suspect. It does not become in nocuous just by being reconceived as something we reach at the end of our story rather than something we begin with, with the first two species derivative from the third rather than the other way around. But Brandom seems content to think of the final stage in the inferentialist explanatory procedure—providing for the representational dimension of discursive content—as making explicit just such a conception of representational relations."

6 At p. 669 in 90 Brandom actually acknowledges something like this point. But he relegates the acknowledgment in an endnote whose text indication comes late in the chapter at p. 1351, it makes no ofference to how the main body or the chapter proceeds.

In "Replies of pi 190 of 1 B andom rephrases my suggestion that "snow" and snow are so related that concatenating the former with "to is white shoulds a first just in case snow is white by including a relation between the is white and being white Constant what Brandom impulses that is not an improvement there is no need for a real long our as Sellars might say non-things to stand to "to is white on an analogue to the relation in which show stands to "snow". I conjecture that the reason Brandom thinks it is an improvement to additions between predicates and properties is that he wastis the representational relations that are to be brought on to the scene as the end of his progression to match the representational relations with which his designational representational relations with which his designational representational described as thinking they can begin

This makes a difference to how he conceives what is needed for him to claim a successful completion of the inferentialist project i providing for the representational dimension of meaningfulness in terms of a prior under standing of inference.

To my ear, we have occutions that are explicitly representational as soon as we have "that" clauses, as soon as we have the idea of propositional content. If someone, is said to assert that this gs are thus and so, she is thereby said to represent though as being thus and so. Of course this need not, and should not, be parsed as expressing a relation representing, that holds between the person, or her words, and a state of affairs—the sort of thing someone might purport to understand as a species of a gen, is that also comprises the relation of names to their bearers.

Now one could safely have a concept of inference without mastering the explicitly read social locations that Brandoni reaches at the end of his story. So it is a tive possibility that the concept of inference is primitive with respect to the concepts expressed in those locunities. But it is quite another, matter with the concept of asserting that things are thus and so, and hence representing that things are thus and so in the way one does when one asserts that that go are thus and so. Indeed Brandom himself in chapter 3. seems to concede that the concept of afference is not primitive with respect. to the concept of asserting that things are thus and so, when he says not Iy. Asserting cannot be understood apart from interring" but also "Inferring cannot be understood apart from asserting [4p. 1586] It is only the conception of representation Lam questioning, a mirror mage or the designa-Conditreprese fational st conception, that can make it look as if these remarks do not yet traffic in a concept of representation. But if they do the second one amounts to an admission, contrary to the whole thrust of the recommendation for inferentialisms that the concept of inference is not primitive with respect to the concept of representation 5

5. Perhaps the moral we should extract from Brandom's acknowledgment that inferring is not prior to asserting is that "inferentialism" is, after all, not a good label for the position he means to recommend. What he really wants

⁸ Even lessing representation has observed for the moment I do not see now a pake the second of these remark. From p. 58 consistent with the imprindiction of chapter 7 has the concept of inforcing significant tree with respect to concepts that presuppose the idea of the semantic (see, e.g., p. 89).

us to see as primitive is the idea of a deontic structure of commitments and entitlements with rationally consequential relations between them. A characterization in those terms does not evidently presuppose any prior grasp of semantic or even language-related concepts. And now the claim is that a description of a practice given exclusively in those terms can suffice to reveal that the practice described is discursive—to display the moves made in the practice as assert ons. If the idea of inference is on a level with the idea of assertion, we would become entitled to see the transitions between moves as inferences at the same time. So on this reading of Brandom the idea of inference and the idea of conceptual content are to be understood together. In terms of the prior ideas of commitment, entitlement, and practice-sanctioned consequence.

In his Preface, Brandom says the project of explaining the very dea of discursive highestic performances is executed in chapters 3 and 4 (p. xxii). In fact his Gain, at least sometimes) is that giving sufficient conditions for a practice to be conceptually contentful *uberhaupt* is done before he turns, in chapter 4, to specifically empirical and practical concept a content (pp. 221, 234), so, presumably in chapter 3.

In assessing this caum, it is important not to let the concept of inference in too soon. If transitions between moves in a practice are inferences, then starely some of the moves are assertions. But that does not vindicate the claim, now that we have it in a form in which the idea of inference is on a level with the idea of discursive performances rather than prior to it. If it is open to question whether given only the description of a deontic structure the moves in a practice are displayed as including assertions. It is equally open to question whether the transitions between moves are thereby displayed as inferences. It is the same question, given the acknowledgment that assert on and inference are two sides of a single coin. One cannot justify an answer to one form of the question. "Are these moves recognizably assertions?" by helping oneself to an answer to the other—"Are these transitions recognizably inferences?"

Now as far as I can see the deonite structure—involving commitments, entitlements, and rat maily consequential relations between them—that Brandom puts in place in chapter 3 is consistent with the possibility that a game describable in those terms is just a game, a behavioural repertoire whose moves do not have a significance that points outside the game, so that the moves are not assertions and the transitions are not inferences, it makes no difference to this if we drop the more demanding version of

Brandom's carm, according to which the material of chapter 3 suffices for discursivity, and bring at a role for experiential input and behavioural output the topics of chapter 4. Now we have a game in which players, east themeuts are partly determined by features of the observable environment and some of their commutments are discharged in non-linguistic action. But nothing in the description of the desiruc structure ensures that these pointers outside the game have anything to do with the sort of meaningfuncess that would reveal the practice as linguistic.

To make this vivid consider a thought experiment of a kind Michael Dummett has exploited in a related context." Martians convey informat on to one another in a way extremely unlike ours—so much so that the hypothesis that human vocalizations are among other things our way of doing that does not inonediately suggest, itself to Martian anthropologists. And Marians have a rich repertoire of not necessarily compensive games. rule-governess behaviour with no external point, behaviour they engage in Perhaps the Isia lies in the intellectual challenge of keeping post for fu-Plick of the positions of players. Yow suppose they see human voca behavtour as just such a game. It does not occur to them that the behaviour has meaning except in the sense in which say chess moves have meaning They realize that the buttian practice they are investigating includes inherthing entitlements from other players, and deferring to those others the responsibility for yindicating the inherited entitlements, but the Mart ans donot see inheriting an entitlement as a case of having it altirmed to one that things are tous and so. They see a as just another complexity in how the concept of a position in the game works. They do not see moves in the game. as assertions, and the other side of the comothey do not see transitions between moves as inferences. But they muss northing about lengthst cliebay. wir that is capturable with the concepts of commitment, entitlement, and practice-sanctioned consequence

This connects with a point about the sociality that would be revealed by a description of what is in factoral biguistic practice in those deontic structural terms. In Brandom's depiction of such a practice players keep score on one another and make their moves in awareness that others would witness the incress will be keeping score. One can acquire entitlements from others whose moves one witnesses, and one can defer the responsibility of vindicating the entitlements to those others. But moves need not be

addressed to those who acquire entitlements by witnessing them. It is only inthe scorekeeping context, for instance in challenges to enduements and responses to challenges, that Brandom's game specifically provides for moves. to be addressed by one player to another. The deonite structural description. does not display players as taking an interest in anothing beyond the deonne status of the players (themselves and others). Nothing in the deonticstructural description lies this interest to a concern with how things are outside the game, except in so far as how things are outside the game affects a player's deontic status, specifically her entitlements. A description of the practice in these terms does not reveal the kind of cooperativeness—sociality that shows, itself at a concern to interm others of trungs. And this is not an oversight. Given the character of Brandom's project, the description cannot explicitly provide for informative purposes, or palat of presupposing a concept that arready involves an idea of meaningfulness. If the Martians have only the deontic-structural description of the game mothing in the runder. standing of it requires their to find that kind of cooperativeness in the communal playing of all It they must see the practice as cooperative all you you that players need to care about making available to line another the in ellectual pleasure that the Marnaus take to be the point of playing. This makes it doubtful that the description suffices to display moves as assertons, and (again) the other side of the compilitator begives seeing transitions between moves as inferences.

6. Besides the recommendation for inferentialism— to stay with the official label—that is supposed to us in the unsatisfactoriness of representational sm. Brandom invokes some authorities.

Unsurprisingly one is Sellars. Brandom cites (p. 102) a passage from "Inference and Meaning" p. 265, in which Sellars recommends the strongest of six or ceptants of "the status of material rules of inference, that he considers, "Materia, rules are as essential to meaning (and hence to language and thought) as formal rules, contributing to the architectural detail of its structure within the flying buttresses of logical forms."

Now it is indeed plausible that a behavioural reperiore would not be meaningful at ali—linguistic expressive of thought of it were not characterized by proprieties of non-formal inference. That is a natural reading of Sellars's thesis that material rules of inference are essential to meaning. But it would be quite another matter to claim, with inferentiability that an expression's meaning what it does *consists in* the fact that certain materials inferential.

proprieties govern its correct use so that all semantic concepts, including that of an expression's meaning, can be explained in terms of no more than the concept of such proprieties. One can concede that there would be no meaning without material inferential proprieties, while remaining sceptical that there need in general be any inferesting answer to the question what it consists in that some expression means what it does.

It could not be correct to hear say "smoke" on someone's lips as meaning smoke if her use of it did not conform to some suitable material-inferential proprieties. But no specific proprieties are essential to the word's meaning that. Certainly some may seem more central than others. If she does not think it right to derive an expectation she would express with "smoke" from the presence of line of might take migenizity to interpret her word as nevertheless meaning oneke. But the interpretation in ght still be made to fit, by find ag in her sanabay unorthodox substantive beliefs about smoke. Their unorthodoxs would not by itself show that they could not have smoke as their topic. And similarly with any candidate for being a propriety essential to the word's meaning what it does. There need be no specific proprieties in which it can rightly be said in consist that "smoke" means what it does. The claim Brandom cates from Selfars is plausible, but it is simply wrong to think its plausibility is a recommendat in for a general semantic inferentialism to

7. More surprisingly. Brandom's authorities include the young Fregolipp. 94-7. 107-16. Brandom reads Fregolip Beauthochrift, as an inferent a isturact.

The reading gets off to an unpromising start. Brandom cites a passage from Deminett, which he interprets as deploring a shift in Frege's thinking, from an early semantic inferentialism to a later way of thinking that in

10. Sellars takes himself to have recommended the thesis that intareoal transformation rules first mine the descriptive meaning of the expressions of a language. (Thelerence and Meaning) p. 284 cited by Brandom at p. 103. But he gives no good reason to accept any thing stronge, than that expressions could not mean what they do if they were not craght up in some suitable material interential proprieties. That can be accepted by someone who does not behave that die idea of inference proprieties—on to accommunicate the possibility. It considered in §5 proprieties of transition between communicate and entitlements—is primitive in the order of semantic explanation.

4.1 I shall use "Begriffes/enft" for Frege's book and "conceptual notation" for the "formula language" it proposes.

Brandom's words, "makes truth, rather than inference primary in the order of semantic explanation." ¹² But what Dummett is depioning as retrograde in the passage Brandom appeals to is not a shift from an early inferentialist to a later representationalist period in Frege's thinking about semantic explanation, but a shift from pre-Fregean thinking about logic which, rightly in Dummett's view, conceived logic as the study of logical consequence to Prege's thinking, which—early no less than late—conceives logic as a selence that arrives at a body of truths, of a quite special sort in that truth is not just the goal of this science as of other sciences, but its object of study Brandom can cite Dummett in support of reading the young Frege as a semantic inferentialist only by misreading Dummett.

There is certainly something right about taking the Frege of Begriftschrift to be interested in making inferential proprieties explicit on some in expretation of that idea. As against say. Boole and Schroder, Frege prides himself on devising a netation that does not merely enable a codification of the forms of logical inference, leaving content to be taken care of elsewhere. With Frege's conceptual notation, one is to be equipped to make concentful claims in a way that makes it crear exactly what one is committing oneself to. And of course that is a matter of what follows from one's claims, what inferences to consequential commitments they beense.

But there is something amiss with taking this to signal an anticipation of Brandom's semantic inferentialism. That begins to come out in some remarks Brandom is constrained to make about Frege's conditional. In Brandom's picture, the conditional is a device for making explicit in the form of claims, material inferential proprieties that characterize a linguistic practice anyway independently of the availability of a conditional locusion, and determine the content of the concepts involved in the inferences they become Byt Frege explains his conditional by saying it is to be defined only in the case in which the antecedent is to be affirmed and the consequent is to be defined. Thus It

¹² Making Respirat pp. 96-7 on ng D no neu Frede Ph Irropin of language pp. 432-3.

¹³ in Begriffschrift the conditional overplained on sneed lines, for her than in terms that amount directly to the familiar truth table as in Frege's la er presentations. (What Frege actually says is that the conditional is defined in a difference of someone who never used the consequent denied. But this would be sincily true only of someone who never used the conditional incorrectly. My rewriting in the gerand we form seems appropriate. But done tries to connect the move from the earlier to the later style of explanation with the shift he misteads Durtimetr as complaining of (p. 111). But it is softely clear that the difference of presentation is not significant.

would be correct to affirm the counterpart in Frege's notation, of "If Hegel was Holdern is roommate, then 43 is prime? (Brandom's example p. 113). As Brandom has to acknowledge, this makes Frege's conditional fan alarm. ingly bad choice for making explicit actual proprieties of inference" (p. 113). There would be nothing proper about inferring the consequent of that conditional from its antecedent, but the conditional is fine by Frege's lights 4 Brandom says this tend[s] to obscure the crucial expressive role in expilcitaking inferences (and therefore conceptual contents) that [Frege] assigns of the conditional (p. 1.17). But Frege's conditional is so patently a bad atstrumen, for the purpose Brandom says Frege assigns to a that charity recommends hoding a different purpose for it. Frege is not band to the peculiar feateres of his could tionar. On the contrary, he parades them, It would be ex raordinary if he intended the conditional for Brandom's purpose making material goodnesses of inference explicit in the form of claims, and samply tailed to see that his explanation aboves correct uses of it that do no such thing

The lact Frege's conditional in combination with a sinciation for generality is perfect. At as the explains it for doing what he prides himself on that high the side to do namely giving expression to compile contents in sich a way as to make perspicuous what one is compited to in boing committed to when one says for instance. That a property is hereditary in a series. It such a way that the consequences that follow from the continuing the deriveo in formally valid priofs fearing no gaps heeding to be bridged by into ton—a delect frege famous y complains of in the interential practice of mathematics conducted with the conceptual notation. In

The consequences that matter for Frege here are consequences he displays as to lowing logically from contents expressed in the conceptual notation. At the inferences in *Beariffichintic* are formally valid. Indeed they are all of the same form, and Frege draws attention to that. What his

⁴ B andom suggests the point mens of the familiar that friege's conditional is we waited But a many valued conclusional the streetly all timed only a the absected that a designated value and the consequent are indesignated one would wrety be use as sad billiaredom's lights. Adding more truth values would not ensure an inferentially relevant connection between antecedent and consequent.

¹⁵ For an extended example of such a Jensation see "Boole's Logical Calcal state the Concept Script" at pp. 27–32.

conditional serves to make explicit is not as in Brandom's picture, material proprieties of inference, in the sense of excellences of inference that can be brought within the scope of logic only by the suspect in ive of counting the inferences as enthymematic and supplying an extra premise (See §8 below for more on this.) The explicitation Frege achieves consists in afficulating the premises of certain inferences in such a way that their conclusions can be displayed as following from the premises by logical real soning, needing no leaps of interior or assumed further premises.

Brandom acknowledges, after a fashion, a point in this area, pp. 113-4). What it reflects, according to him, is that in Begriffsolioft Frege citizy partly executes the task he sets hanself. The ultimate aim is "to use logical vocabplary to make explicit the inferential my disements in virtue of which nonlogs al claims have the conceptual contents they do" (b. 113, my emphasis). Frege's amb tions for his conceptual notation extend initiale the territory covered by his august in according to which logic accounts for not only the form but also the content of certain mathematical statements. But in Bearths. schrift Frege only gets as far as spelling out the inferential roles of "the logical concepts themselves, and those mathematical concepts that turn out to be definable from (Fem" (p. 113). According to Brandom's viggest in at Frege had gone beyong this "first stage of his grand project of clarif cation of nonlogical concepts brough the r explicitation in logical terms" (p. 13). and tried to apply his ideas it areas such as geometry and mechanics, where logic accounts only for form and not also-as he thinks it does in arithmetic for content he would have been forced to realize that his conditional is mapy ropriate for the general case of the expressive purpose he assigns to it.

Brandom here in effect admits that his own conception of the conditional, according to which it makes proprieties of material inference explicit in the form of claims is at best off stage in *Begriffs dirit*. But in fact mere is no reason to suppose Bras dom's conditional is even waiting in the wings. It is beside the point that the contents Frege explicitly treats in *Begriffschrift* are aimled to those that come within the scope of his logicism. What Frege achieves with his conceptual notation is, quite generally a way of articulating logical structure in such a way that the consequences in virtue of which claims have the content they do can be forwally derived from the claims as expressed in the new notation. As he says, this is accured by ensuring that "the content is not just indicated but is constructed out of its constitution, the rests by means of the same logical signs as are used in the computation."

that is, in the formal derivation) "It is true that in the cases he considers in Begriffsschrift logic is supposed to account ultimately not only for the structure revealed by such an articulation of the coment of a concept but also for the constituents, to stay with that way of putting things. But the same expressive powers of the logical notation—including the conditional as Frege explains it—would enable him similarly to display the logical structure of contents whose constituents are definitely non-logical, in such a way as to allow formal derivation of communitients consequential on committing one-self to those contents. And that is Frege's claim about the expressive at bity of his conceptual notation, now formulated in a way that allows it to apply in other exact sciences besides those that come within the scope of his logicism. It is still in this general case, a matter of articulating premises so as a crevial consequences as leminally derivable from them, not of making explicit proprieties of inference governing inferences that are not for nally valid at all.

Frege taxes pride in the superiority of his conceptual notation to those of Book and Schröder. They already have resources for laying open to view structure in the content of concepts with certain kinds of logical complexity. To take an obvious case, if we's appose being H is defined as being F or G. Boolean apparat is displays how the concept of being H is inferentially connected to the concept of being F and the concept of being G. But Frege provides resources for making explicit a different kind of concept fermation. engaged in with at best parnal articulateness before his innovation. It mathematics and no doubt other exact sciences. Here the complex concepts do not merely exploit boundaries already drawn by the sampler concepts out. of which they are formted, as in the cases that can be bandled with Bockean. resources. The novedy consists in the fact that Frege's apparatus makes it possible to do in cases of this kind, what Boole and Schröder could already. do an cases of the kind (bey could cope with—to make the coment of logcally complex concepts expact for enabling formal derivations, from premises in which these concepts figure of conclusions anvolving only the simpier concepts from which those complex concepts are formed. As before the only inferences that matter for making sense of Frege's pride in Lasin. novation are formally valid inferences. There is no reason why he should interest himself at a lim the material goodnesses of inference that figure at the foundation of Brandom's construal of semantics. In citing Frege as a

⁴⁶ Posthumous Writings, p. 35

¹⁷ See Pesthamens Writings, pp. 33–5.

precursor of his inferentiatism. Brandom simply misreads the expressive purpose of Frege's conceptual notation.

8 It is a mistake to assimilate material goodness in inference to formal validity by insisting that those who engage in such inferences tacilly supply extra premises. Moves that display inferential rationality need not them selves be cases of logical reasoning. Brandom makes considerable fuss about rejecting this mistake, under the label "formal sm" (pp. 97–102).

Brandom's conception of logical vocabulary definitively precludes any tendency to fad into this mistake. According to Brandom, the point of logical vocabulary centrally the conditional is to make explicit inferential proprieties that characterize a linguistic practice anyway independently of its even containing logical vocabulary. So there could be a practice that was linguistic in the demanding sense of being governed by aprons including norms for inference, but that did not vet contain means for formulating inferences of a specifically logical kind. (See leg. p. 383. "There is nothing in coherent about a language or stage to the development of a language in which the only vocabulativity play is nonlogical.) Participants in Such a practice would show rationality in their inferential behaviour, but they would not yet be able to engage in logical reasoning.

These been arging that Brandom has no basis for his claim that this conception of logical vocabulary is Frege's. In fact nothing in Frege's thinking tells against the thought that a practice could not be in licative of rationality at all, as it would need to be in order to be finguistic in that demanding sense timess it a ready enabled its participants to engage in logical reasoning. On this view there could not be a language without logically icabulary. A position on these lines would not have the firewall against "formalism" that Brandom's thinking supplies. But such a position is nevertheless perfectly compatible with recognizing that "formalism" is a mistake. (So the wrong ness of "formalism" is no ground for rejecting it as Brandom seems to suggest at p. 383.) The idea would be that nothing subjects do can count as inferring, even inferring whose excellence is material rather that formal unless something they do—which can be something else—can be under stood as inferring logically. The idea that there is no rationality without

¹⁸ Be makes the point in laige part by way of a massively inchan able reading if a passage from Dame. C. Dennett, But the point is certainly right, and I shall not quibble with the details of his presentation of it.

logic need not imply that all exercises of ranonality are themselves cases of logical reasoning.

In a stricting phrase. Brandom says "Logic is the organ of semantic self-consciousness" (p. xec). In his book, this slogan expresses an impocation of the thesis I have been considering that logically ocabulary enables prior inferential proprieties that determine the semantic properties of expressions to be made explicit in the form of claims. What connects this with self-consciousness is that only by being thus made explicit can the proprieties become subject to criticism and reasoned modification. Semantic self-consciousness requires the ability to contemplate so to speak as objects the determinants of the semantic properties of the expressions one uses, as opposed to merely living within the normative constraints they impose And this stepping back from one's practice is activelyed by making its norms explicit as claims, about which one can ask whether they are correct

Now if we ascard the idea to at poor inferential proprieties determine the semantic properties of expressions, we can no longer emprace Brandom's slogations he means it. But we can say logic is the organ of rational sent consciousness. We can say that an explicitly conditional location is required if supposed inferential proprieties—features of the supposed topography of the space of reasons is and to be possible objects of contemplation so that the shape of a subject's supposed responsiveness to reasons can be an object for her as to be if her responses to reasons are to be self-conscious. The picture—overges from Brandom's in that these is ferential proprieties, these shapings of rationality, are no leager seen as constituting an independently available foundatio. For a semantic theory of a language.

This caves introuched the thought which is surely congenia, to Brandon's has a outlook—that awareness of imeself as sureet to semantic norms, in self-conscious participation in a discursive practice is awareness of onese Cas subject to rational requirements of a specific kind. Semantic self-consciousness is a case of rational self-consciousness. And now combining that thought with the inought that logic is the organ of rational self-consciousness, we can recover an interpretation for Brandom's slogar even without his semantic foundationalism. In this concept in not less that in Brandom's logic is the organ of semantic self-conscious less.

Let Frege's conditional will serve it this liquits to the extensibility that dithe answer to the question. Its it think a sked about a Fregean conductoral si Not the associated inferential practice is revealed as needing choical accention. Of course we had better not so poise that if the answer is "Yes" that suffices for a supposed inferential proportion to passer user.

Given this reinterpretation of Brandom's slogar, the thought that a practice is not recognizable as auguistic un essit already contains logical vocabmany can be rephrased by saying there is no discursiveness, no genu ne traificking in meanings, without semantic self-consciousness. This stands in contrast with Brandom's picture in which self-consciousness uberhaupt is a late-coming extra the undertakes to provide for n only in C apter 8 not a necessary condition for a practice to be discursive, with its performances expressive of conceptual content. It is, to say the least morobylous that this really respects the intuitive connection, which is fundamental to Brandom's thinking (see le.g., pp. 1-3), between the idea of having or e.s. ife shaped by meaning and the idea of being responsive to reasons. Surely the responsive ness to reasons that figures in this connection should be responsiveness to reasons as such. Can that really be in place in the absence of the capacity to raise questions about whether what one finds onesed inclined to be swayed. by, in forming a be ief or deciding to acti really constitutes a reason for the belief or action one is contemplatizing? And that imports rational selfconsciousness, and hence, by Brandom's own lights, coming id of logical vocabulary. There is something to be said for the view that logic as the organ of rational and hence semantic self-consciousness is more deeply inplicated in the very idea of a distinctively conceptual kind of content than Braudom's story allows

9. When I previously expressed doubts about how he undertakes to monvate inferentialism. Brandom's response was to suggest that in the end it does not matter whether he succeeds in making inferentialism anteceder thy attractive. Even if the inferentialist project highly not have seemed a good idea in advance, the proof is in the pudding.

That can easily sound reasonable. But it is really not clear blink much podding there is if we descount the considerations that are supposed to recommend inferentialism in the first place.

Given the enormous size of Brandom's book, that may seem a crazy remark. But much in the second part of Making It Explicit depends essentially on the first. If we grant that propositional content—the objective purport of atterances of whole sentences—has been provided for in the first part, it is indeed plausible that the semantic properties of subscritchtal expressions their contribution to the semantic properties of whole sentences, can be

isolated by attending to substitutional inferences. (See, in particular, the prototal chapter 6.) But that is not a vindication of inferentialism unless the provision for propositional content that it assumes has itself been generally achieved by inferentialist means. The conception according to which the meanings of subsectiontial expressions are what they contribute to the meanings of whole sentences is in itself neutral, this fundamental to the thinking of the mature Frege.) So a great deal of weight resis on the first part of the book

Now I have already [§5] above) sketched a scepticism about the cia in that a description of a behavioural repertoire in the deonite structural terms. Brandom elaborates would suffice to display its moves as including assertions. To repeat a crucial point, the label inferentialism must not be a lowed to confuse the issue here. If the concept of inference is on a level with the concept of assertion as Brandom seems to say it is (p. 158), we cannot presuppose that the transitions between moves in a practice so described are inferences, on pain of begging the question whether the construction has really provided for a role for the concept of assertion.

In a part of chapter 2.1 have not yet considered. Brandom offers possible ingred ents for an inferentialist pudding taken from the work of a flurd author ty. Dummer: pp. 176–32. Dumineu draws artennom to explanations of ig.val constants in terms of introduction and charmation rules, that is, specifications of canonical forms of inference in which the constants is figure in the conclusions at dipremoses respectively. He proposes to generalize this. He sugges size can explain the meanings of other sorts of expressions at terms of circumstances that I cense using them and consequences of the commitments undertaken in such uses. The star i lostration of this is the case of periorative terms such as "Boche. It is indeed pausible that the expressive work "Boche" does for those who use it can be captured in terms of an inference from someone's being German to that person's being barbarously cruel in something on those lines. Someone who calls Kinn "a Boche" aims to convey that he is German, the circumstances of application—and therefore barbarously cruel—the supposed consequence.

Now the case of logical constants is of course fine, but quite special. It is not a distinctive varieteentialist thought that the very essence of logic lies in certain inferences. Someone who is doubtful about the general credentials of inferentialism can acknowledge that the meanings of the vocabulary that its special to logic can be captured in terms of inferences, and refuse the invitation to generalize

For different reasons, words like "Boche" are special too. Why should we suppose the significance of predicative expressions in general—let alone expressions of other kinds—can be modelled on the expressive role of ethnic or racial sturs? As Lacknowledged before (§6), it is plausible that predicative for any) expressions would not mean what they do if their use were not subject to suitable inferential proprieties. But that is not to say their meaning what they do can be exhaustively explained to inferential terms. It is peculiar to terms like "Boche" that their expressive role can be captured by a paraphrase that includes an occurrence of "therefore".

Interentians in nothing if not a general thesis. That semantic insights can be achieved in this or that particular area by focusing on inferences does not vindicate inferential sm. It is compatible with the view that semantic concepts come in a package each intelligible parity in terms of the others tailier than conforming to the foundational structure that inferentia is nearly sages. Brandom's talk of the proof being in the pudding would be to the point if he had actually given a semantic account of a language in inferentialist terms. But what he has given is ready only an advertisement for such a thing. The question whether his proffered motivation is convincing mat ters more than be acknowledges.

What Myth?

I have arged to g. in Mond and M'rith that our perceptual relation to the world is conceptual, all the way out to the world's impacts on our receptive capacities. The idea of the conceptual that I mean to be invoking is to be inderstood in close connection with the idea of rationality, in the sense that is in play in the traditional separation of mature human beings, as rational animals from the rest of the animal kingdom. Conceptual capacities are capacities, hat being to their subjects rationality. So another way of putting my claim is to say that car perceptual experience is permeated with rationally. I have also suggested, in passing, that something parallel should be said about our agency.

The Jover backwards to avoid one myth, the Myth of the Given, and fall i to another the Myth of the Mental I focus exclusively on "the conceptual upper Foors of the editice of knowledge", and ignore "the embodied copilig going on on the ground floor". Or—worse—I deny the very existence of embodied coping, "an effect declaring that human experience is upper stories at the way down". That lands the in an analogue to what Merleaus Ponty calls "intellectualism holds that "judgment is every where pure sensation is not which is to say everywhere". Just so for me as Dreyfus puls it. "mind is everywhere the pure given is not that is to say all the way out.". That is what Dreyfus sugmanzes as the Myth of the Mental, and diagnoses as overreaction to the Myth of the Given.

^{1 &}quot;Overcoming the Mvtl. of the Men a wow Philosophers Can Profit from the Plw nomenology of Everyday Expertise" p. 47

Phonomoropy of Percention p. 34 cited by Dresfus as "Overcoming the Myth of the Mental" p. 52.

^{3 &}quot;Overcoming the Myth of the Mental" p. 52

But what is mythical about the claim that mind is pervasive in our perceptual experience? Drevfus thinks the sphere of the conceptual in my sense, the sphere of the rational, cannot include embodied coping. He thinks embodied coping skills are just as such non-conceptual. In would lollow that if conceptual rationality is everywhere there is no room any where for embodied coping skills. And our perceptual experience needs to be understood in the context of our embodied coping skills. But why should we accept that embodied coping skills are just as such non-conceptual? If they are not Dreyfus has no ground for his claim that to find mind every where in a distinctively human perceptual engagement with the world is to fall into a myth. I do not have to ignore embodied coping. I have to hold that in mature human beings, embodied coping is permeated with minded ness. And that is exactly what I do hold.

2 Dreylas pictures rationally as detached from particular \$1 attens—as able to relate to particular situations only by substituting them under on ent determinately expressible in abstraction from any situation. He makes a compelling case for the claim that the skills exercised in embodied coping canatot be characterized in such terms. If the outling is essentially satisfaction independent, that feature of embodied coping establishes that it cannot be permeated with rationality. But I think we should reject the picture of the tionality as situation-independent.

This picture of rationality is clearly in play in the way Dreylus handles my exploitation of Aristotic. I myoked Aristotic s view of practical wisdom as an exemplar of how to think about determinate shapings of conceptual rationality. In a passage Dreylus quotes, I wrote:

Imposing a specific shape on the practical intellect is a particular case of a general phenomenon, and alton into conceptual capacities, which include responsiveness to other rational demands besides those of ethics.

Now on the ground that I describe Anstotle's notion in terms of responsiveness to reasons, Dreytos concludes that I read Aristotle in a way that conflicts with the insights of Heidegger's reading. Heidegger depicts Anstoteaan practical wisdom as its Dreyfus's words. 'a kind of understanding

^{4.} See "Overcoming the Myth of the Mental" p. 47.

⁵ Mind and World p. 84 cited by Dreyfus at "Overcoming the Weth of the Mental" p. 50

that makes possible an immediate response to the full concrete sit attom"."

Dreyfus quotes Heidegger saying this:

[The puronanes], — is determined by his situation in the largest sense.

The circumstances, the givens, the times and the people vary. The meaning of the action — varies as well...

It is precisely the achievement of phreness to disclose the findividual as acting now at the field situation within which he acts.

Bit that is just now I understand Aristotehan practical wisdom. Dreyfus's idea that my reading conflicts with Heidesger's reflects his interpreting my talk of responsiveness to reasons in terms of an assumption I dispute the assumption that to involve reason in action could only be to apply to the situation in which one acts some content fully specifiable in detachment from the situation.

In he place in my work that Dreyfus cites from my aim was only to introduce the idea of second nature, and it was not to the point to discuss the
specifics of Aristotle's conception of phreneo. But when elsewhere I consider the specifies. I're get the understanding of Aristotle's conception that
Dreyfus thanks I accept. I reject the idea that the content of practical
wesdom, as Ar so the understands it can be captured in general prescriptions
for corld of determinately expressible independently of the concrete situations in which the phrenings is called on to act. Purporting to set me
straight Dreyfus quotes this from Aristotle. "Phraneos." involves knowledge of the altimate particular thing, which cannot be attained by system
at clknowledge but only by perception. "But my reading of Aristotle
is precisely centred on the thought expressed in that passage."

If was from David Wiggers that I tearned to understand Aristoteaan phroness as concretely situation specific document. But curiously enough, it is conceivable that some of my fortifulations of Aristotle's view as I see it have been infracticed by Heidegger indirectly through Gadanier I first read Gadamer on Charles Taylor's recommendation, he urged me to read Trith and Method because he was struck by an allimity between things he had

Overcoming the Myth of the Mental*, p. 51.

⁷ Phate's Seehin, p. 131, cited by Dreyfus at Overcoming he Myth of the Mem al.", y. 51.

⁸ Accommode an Educa 1/42,025 in cored by Dreed is at "Overcoreing the Moth of the Mental" p. 52

See "Some Issues in Ansaste's Moral Psychology".

beard me saying about *phronesis* and Gadamer's treatment, which is of course quite Heideggerian

In a passage Dreyfus cites I describe acquiring phrenesis in terms of having "habits of thought and action" inculcated into once. This encourages Dreyfus it saddling me with the detached conception of rationality that as I have said. I reject, and in reading such a conception into my understanding of Aristotle. Dreyfus interprets my talk of names in terms of following general reasons. Jeasons that can be expressed in abstraction from particular situations. He says:

One can easily accept that in *learning* to be wise we learn to follow general reasons as guides to acting appropriately. But if does not robow that linee we have gotten past the learning phase, these *reasons* in the form of habits still influence our wise actions. ⁽¹⁾

But that is not my pict are at ad. No doubt the very idea of a babit implies a generality of content. But of nearing phrinois as a habit or a set of liabits is consisted that holding that the only way one can register the generality of phrincists is by a description on these lines. The habit of responding to sit that our as phronois requires. And that leaves what response a part cutar satuation coals for from the phronoiss soft needing to be determined by shuation-specific discernment.

To say what I have just said it did not need to go beyond at ordinary undetstat ding of the word "baba". But it may be worth remarking that the
word comes from the Latin "babins" which is the standard equivalent in
philosophy for the Greek "hous". Philonomy is a virtice—the paramount virtue
of the practical intedect. As such it is certainly in Aristotle's view a brens a
hobiass, a habit. This cannot conduct with anything that could figure in a
correct reading of Aristotle.

Dreyfus quotes musaying this "I construe Anstolle's discussion of deliberation as a mediat the reconstruction of reasons for action not necessarily thought out an advance". He reads this time as giving express in to a conception according to which the actions of a purotimes are guided by reasons

¹⁰ Mind and World p. 84 cited by Drevlay at Overcoming the Method the Method?
p. 50

^{11 &}quot;Overcoming the Myth of the Mental" p. 51

^{12 &}quot;Virtue and Reason" p. 66 cited by Drevius at Overcoming he Myon of the Mental" p. 51

that relate to particular situations only by way of applying situation independent content to them. If such reasons are not expandly adverted to an deciding what to do. Drevlus thinks I think, then they must be retrospecfively postulated as having been implicitly followed by the agent

Here again, the connection Drevius assumes between rationality and si namon independence is alien to my understanding of Aristone. My thoughtwas that the practical rationalny of the phylonomos is displayed in what he does even if he does not decide to do that as a result of reasoning. So the structure of what Aristotte ollers as an account of deliberation should be relevant more wide vathan where act on issues from reasoning. There is no mp leation that the reconstruction I envisage, for displaying actions that do not issue from prior deliberation as nevertheless cases of a properly formed. practical interlect at work, involves rational structures in which the concrete details of the satuation figure only in specifying what some situation in dependent conception of how to act was implicitly applied to. That would be to picture the practical reasoning of a phronimes, and correspondingly the rational by that there is in action that manifests phrenesa even if it does not issue from reasoning, in terms of substituing cases under rules expressible in abstraction from particular's mations. And that picture is exactly what I oppose in my reading of Arisiotle ()

Drevins cites from Heidegger the claim that the "pure perceiving" is at is the characteristic accomposition of the physiones "in) longer falls within the domain of logos - * Dreylus reads this as a formulation of the contrast beassuries, between the situation-specificity of the kind of competence exemplified by phreness on the one hand, and, on the other, conceptual rationality conceived as 5.t ation independent. Conceptual rationality is what language enables us to express, so it belongs with this reading to interpret. "the domain of loges" as the domain of language, and to understand Heidegger to be equating the demain of language with the domain of rationality. conceived as detached and situation independent

But that is a hope ess concept on of the domain of language, and thereby el the domain of the conceptual. A requirement of sit, ations independence,

³ Dreyb, reads me as holding that there must be a maxim behing every action? "Overcoming the Myth of the Mental" p. 52. (Era ionamy is as such situation independem, this is the any possible reading of the claim that rationality permeates action. But it does not fit my thinking as as in my pictore, atropality is at action, and just as situation. dependent as action, s-not behalf action, in the guise of a "maxim".

¹⁴ Plate's Sephiet, p. 112 cited by Drevfusial. Overcoming the Myth of the Mental," p. 51.

would exclude what might be meant by an otterance of say, "This one is beautiful" from the domain of the linguistically expressible and so of the conceptual, since there is no telling what thought such at lutterance expresses it abstraction from the situation in which the thought is expressed.

There is no call to foist such an idea on Heidegger. The word "loges" can accept many different interpretations. Aristotic explains the "perception," of the phronimos part y in terms of a comparison with theoretical intuition which immediately grasps indefinables oldings of which there is no logos. On a more charitable interpretation. Heidegger is picking up on that comparison. The domain of logos in Heidegger's remark is not as Dreyf is thinks, the space of reasons, the domain of conceptual articulation. Contrary to what Dreyfus miphes, the domain of conceptual articulation includes thoughts that are not intelligible in abstraction from particular simultions so that interpretation of "the domain of logos" we and not secure if e-contrast Heidegger wattas with the "pure perceiving" of the phronimis. The domain of logos that is relevant to Heidegger's point is the domain of the definable, which is not the same thing at all

What Heidegger itsists is that in Aristotic's view the pironimos determines act on by situation specific discernment. And as Heidegger of cocrse knows. At stotle has no problem combining that with glossing the practic inknowledge of the phronones in terms of the idea of correct [Sics.] Here, in contrast with what "logos" must mean when Heidegger locates phrenous outside the domain of Lyos. Togos must be situation specific emceptual article after

3. As Drevios emphasizes, we share basic perceptual capacities and can bodied coping skills with other animals. That may seem to yield a quick argument that those capacities and skills, as we have the incommon be permeated with rationality, since other animals are not rational. But the quick argument does not work. The da in that the capacities and skills are shared comes to no more than this ithere are descriptions of things we can do that apply also to things other animals caundo. For instance, any animal—rational or not. With suitable sensory equipment engaged in getting troop

Nicomposition 1986 - 142a25 ** The bassage Dievlovicities at Overesteing the Myds of the Men ai* p. 51)

¹⁶ See e.g. Viciniachean Ethia 1138b20 Such iai'k il correct signi pervades Aristoik viethics.

^{7.} See "Overcoming the Myth of the Mental", p. 47.

the place to another can be expected, other things being equal to respond to the affordance constituted by a sufficiently large opening, in a wall that otherwise blocks its path, by going through the opening But the truth about a human being's exercise of competence as making her way around in a performance that can be described like that need not be exhausted by the match with what can be said about say a cat's correspondingly describable response to a corresponding affordance. The human being's response is if you like indistinguishable from the cat's response qual response to an affordance describable in those terms. But it does not follow that the human being's response cannot be unlike the cat's response in being the human being's rationality at work. If

Dreyfus says that when I talk of perception as openness to the world I seem "to agree with the phenomenologists that perception has a function more basic than justification". "But he thinks this is immasked as mere appearance when one puts my talk of openness in the context of my adherence to the a legedly mythical view that mind is everywhere in our tyes. The most basic function of perception. Dreyfus says, is this.

We directly perceive affordances and respond to them without beliefs and pastifications being involved. Moreover, these affor lances are interrelated and it is surfamiliarity with the whole or niext of affordances that gives as our ability to criterit ourselves and find our way about."

But the suggestion that I cannot accommodate what is right about this is 3 think just a such sticated version of the quick argument, which as I said does not work.

To explain this. I need to consider Heidegger's distriction between being open to a world and merely inhabiting an environment. Drevius relegates a mention of this to an endnote. He says: "This is an important difference between human beings and animals, but since we are focusing on the role of perception in giving us a background on the basis of which we can perceive objects and justify our behels about them, we need not go into it here."

⁸ For a lint at least at the quick argament sec. Over-onling the Myth of the Mental² pi 56 with note 59 (which belongs with note flag 37 in the text, the notes are planty introduced).

^{9. &}quot;Overcoming the Myth of the Mental", p. 58.

^{20. &}quot;Overcoming the Myth of the Mental", p. 39.

Overcoming the Myth of the Menta 1 p. 65 ti. 54. The relevant note flag in the text is 51, at p. 59.)

But the role of perception in giving us a background is its giving us familiarity with that context of interrelated affordances. And what is in question between Dreyfus and me-once we are focusing on that aspect of what perception does for us, is precisely whether our perceptual openness to affordances, which I agree is necessarily bound up with our embodied coping skills, is permeated with rationality. That cannot be set as de as something we need not go into I do not dispute that perceptual responsiveness to all fordances, necessarily bound up with embodied coping, skills, is something we share with other animals. And I can accept that there is a sense in which familiarity with affordances is a background for our openness to objects. But I can still hold that our openness to affordances is part of the way of being that is special to rational animals.

What perception discloses to human beings is not restricted to affordances. That is a way of beginning to spell out the thought that human beings are different from other animals in that they do not just inhabit an environment but are open to a world. What is right about describing openness to affordances as providing a background is this, the fact that perception discloses the world to us is intelligible only in a context that includes the embodied coping competence, the responsiveness to affordances. that we share with other animals. But as I have urged, this sharing comes to no more than that there are descriptions that apply both to car competence and to the competence of other arimals. I can acknowledge that and still carm that there are further descriptions that fit our case only. There is more to our embodied coping than there is to the embodied coping of nonrational animals. Recoming open to the world, not just able to cope with anienvironment, transforms the character of the discosing that perception does for us including the disclosing of affordances that if we had not achieved openness to the world, would have belonged to a merely animal. competence at inhabiting an environment. When familianty with affordances comes to be a background to what there is, over and above openness. to affordances, in being oriented towards the world, which is a distinctive vihuman way of being, a human individual's relation to affordances is no longer what it would have been if she had gone on hving the life of a nonrational animal. Affordances are no longer merely input to a human an malls natural motivational tendencies, now they are data for her rationabity not only her practical rationality but her theoretical rationality as well-(Remember that I have rejected the conception of rational ty as situationundependent..)

Openness to affordances is in a way basic in the picture of rational openness to the world that I am orging and this corresponds to something Drevlus claims. As I said, openness to the world, which is rationality at work as rate ligible only in a context that includes euroodied coping skills. But on the view Lam Grging, the point is not as Dreyfus has it that our embodied coping skills are independent of any openness to which rational tybgures—a ground floor level, supporting a distinct upper story at w. ich openness involves rationality. If that were right it would follow that our embodied coping skills cannot themselves be permeated with concept all pundedness. But that is not the right interpretation for the thought that openness to atfordances is basic. No doubt we acquire embodied coping skel's before we acquire concepts, in the demanding sense that connects with rational ty. But when our embodied coping skills come to constitute a background for our openness to the swerad, the openness to affordances that is an element in what it is for us to have embodied coping skills becomes pare if car openness to the world. Openness to alfordances draws on the rafrom my of subjects who are open to the world just as much as any other. part of openness to the world does.

Lefted a passage in which Drexlus excludes notification from the properaccount of 7the basic function of perception? 3 Nove it is true that Sellars, explains the logical space of reasons as the space for justifying a, d being able to justify what one says? And this talk of just fication needs to be taken with care in connection with the claim that our perceptual openness. to the workers our rationality at work. If we put the claim in terms of the justil cation of behels, that can encourage interpreting it to say that our perceptual experience yields demy-experiences-that justify some of our beiefs in 1 sat forming the beliefs is responding ranonally to those stems. And ben it looks as if a proponent of the claim can be embarrassed will a guestom on these sines, granting that belief formation, on the part of a rational am mal, is an exercise of the animal's rationality, why should we suppose rationality must be operative also in the constitution of that to which percepto a belief formation is rationally responsive? But this construal of what Schars's thought woold have to be as applied to perceptual openness, is anyway out of line with Sollars's insistence that observational knowledge. s non-inferential. Perceptual experiencing, on the part of a rational animal.

^{22 &}quot;Overcoming the Myth of the Memal" p. 59 quoted above

^{23. &}quot;Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" §36.

is not just something that can elicit rational responses in the shape of perceptual beliefs. What Sellars's thought comes to in this context is that the perceptual experiencing of rational animals is itself rational openness to the world—with anciendes openness to affordances, as I have been it issuing. So capacities that belong to a subject's rationality must be operative in the subject's experiencing itself—not just in responses to it.

4 Embodied coping skills are essent all to a satisfactory understanding of our orientation to the world. And we talsify the phenomenology of embodied coping if we describe it in terms of applying situation independent knowledge of how to act. Those claims are central to breyl is slargument against me

What I have been arging is this accepting these claims is perfectly acrisistent with heating that our obeniation towards the world, including ell romentation towards the affordances we respond to when we exercise our embodied coping skills, is permeated with mindedness. Dreyfos dish isses the hesis that mind is pervasive in a district vely haman life as a myth on the ground that the thesis cannot be combined with a proper phenomenology of embodied coping skills and a proper placement of embodied coping skills.

This is nicely illustrated by Gadainer's version of the distinction between being oriented towards the world and merely inhalling an environment. A version that so far as fican see Gadainer does not regard as diverging from Heidegger's. Gadainer says that "man's relation to the world is a solutely and fundamentally verbal or outrier" if it a distinctive to home relation in the world is in the space of linguistically expressible thinght. It is pervasively conceptual. And Gadainer does not confine his thesis to our or entath in towards features of the world other than those we respond to be not embodied coping. For Gadamer, our embodied coping is not expansively by its similarity to the embodied coping of non-tanonal aminars, as in Dreyf as a picture of a non-conceptual background. On the contrary, Gadainer argues that language in troduces a "free distanced orientation" towards what would otherwise have been merely feat resion an environment. This is the thought Lexpressed by

^{24.} Truth and Method. pp. 475-6

^{25.} Truth and Method, p. 445.

3.8 Responses to Brandom and Dreyfus

saying that once allordances are figuring for a subject as features of the world, they are no longer just inputs to a natural motivational makeup; they are available to the subject's rationality.

On this view our relation to the world, including our percept: a relation to it is pervasive vishaped by our conceptual mindedness. An implication of this for percept ial content can be put like this id a perceptual experience is world-disclosing, as opposed to belonging to the land of coping with a mere environment that figures in the layer of creatures lacking crientation to wards the world, any aspect of its content is present in a form in which it is stuffable to constitute the content of a concept all capacity.

Let me explain why I have put it like that

I find a helpful to approach the idea in Kantian terms, if all experience is world disclosing, any aspect of its content hangs together with other aspects of its content in a unity of the sort Kantideot fies as categorial. And Kantideots the categorial unity that provides for world disclosingness with the transcendental anity of appearent on Experiences in which the world is disclosed are appearentive. Perception discloses the world only to a subject capable of the "Uthink" that expresses appearent in

To say that the content of a world disclosing experience is categorially and edisinot to amply that any aspect of that content is already—stas such the content of a conceptual capacity possessed by the subject of the experience. Some aspects of the content of a world disclosing experience are in a typical case, already contents of conceptual capacities that the subject of the experience has, but on a perfectly natural tribustanding of what it is to have a conceptual capacity, some are not. The concept in of conceptual capacities that makes this the right thing to say is the one Dreyhis cites. Robert Brandoni attributing to Sellars, "grasping a concept is mastering the ase of a word".

Now consider an aspect of the content of a world discosing experience that is not arready the content of a conceptual capacity the subject possesses, in that sense if it is to become the content of a conceptual capacity of hers, she needs to determine it to be the content of a conceptual capacity of hers. That requires her to carve it our from the categorially unified but as yet in this respect, unarticulated experiential content of which it is an aspect so that thought can focus on it by itself, it is overwhelmingly natural

^{26.} Articulating Richords. p. 6. cited at "Overcoming the Myth or the Mental in 55. a bave left our Brandom's nalics.

to cash out this image of carving out an aspect of content from a world-disclosing expenence in terms of annexing a bit of language to in . Not necessarily in an overtiperformance of naming, we can work with the idea of an inner analogue to such a performance).

This points to a picture on these lines. Some of what a perceptual experience discloses to as about the world is embraced by conceptual capacities in Brandom's sense, that we already had before we emplyed the experience we already had words for those aspects of what is disclosed. We can equipourselves with new conceptual capacities, in that sense, by isolating and focusing on—autiexing bits of language to—other aspects of the categorially timified content of the experience, aspects that were hit terrolnes with an the scope of our capacities for explicit thought. And surely some aditine content of a typically rich world disclosing experience never makes, its way into constituting part of the content of our repertoire of conceptual capacities, in that sense.

This may make it seem urgent to ask what is the point of hisis argillar the content of a world-discosing experience is conceptua. There is an obvious sense in which content that never becomes the content of a conceptual capacity is not conceptual. So I am acknowledging that at least some of the content of a typical world-disclosing experience is not conceptual in that sense. And it is tempting to argue on these ones, sore y as the content of an experience is present in it in the way in which I am acknowledging that some of its content is—that is not concept table in that set se

But what is important is out whether an aspect of experient all content is, or becomes, the content of a conceptual capacity possessed by the subject of the experience in the sense in which I have been talking about conceptual capacities. What is important is this of an experience is world disclosing, which implies that it is categorially unified all its content is present in a form in which as I put at before it is so table to constitute contents of conceptual capacities. All that would be needed for a bit of it to connect or institute the content of a conceptual capacity if it is not already the content of a conceptual capacity is for it to be locused on and made to be the meaning of a finguistic expression. As I acknowledged, that may not happen. But whether or not a bit of experience content is focused on and prought within the reach of a vocabulary, either given a name for the first time or registered as litting something already in the subjects, inguistic repertorre-

²⁷ Compare Schary's mythrollastics in Empiricism and the Physiophy of Mina".

t is anyway present in the content of a world-disclosing experience in a form in which it already either actually is, of has the potential to be simply appropriated as, the content of a conceptual capacity if That the content of an experience has that form is part of what it is for the experience to be world disclosing, categorially unified apperceptive. And the content's being in the experience in that form is its being conceptually present in the experience in a different sense from the one that figures in the objection.

This makes room for a different use of the idea of conceptual capacities (not competing with Brandom's use just different). Using the idea in this different way, we can say that all the capacines that are operative in enjoying a world disclosing experience, whether or not they are geared to aspects of the experience for which the subject has big astic expressions, are conceptual, since they are capacities to enjoy content that is in the sease I have introduced, conceptual in form

The proposal of mine that Dreylus takes, some with was that distinctively human perceptual experience is actualization of conceptual capacities in sensory to nyciousness. The proposal needs to be understood in terms of the interpretation of the idea of conceptual capacities that I have just introduced. This is clearly not the notion of conceptual capacities that Brandom. credits to Sellars. We do not need to have words for all the content that is conceptually available to us, in the present sense, that is, available to us in the distinctive ferm that belongs with an experience's being such as to disclose the world. The Gadamerian thought is that language enables us to have experience that is categorially unified, apperceptive and worlddisclosing, and hence has content that is concentral in the sense I have introduced, not absordly that we are ready in advance with words for every aspect of the content of our experience, nor that we could equip ourse veswith words for every aspect of the content of our expenence. No aspect is unhameable, but that does not require us to pretend to make sense of an ideal position in which we have a name for every aspect, let alone to be insuch a position.

To repeat, my claim is that when experience is world-disclosing, its content has a distinctive form. This does not imply anything about the matter of the

²⁸ Because of the point about the form in which tots of convent are present in expenence my talk of introducing conceptual capacities by annexing inguistic expressions to bits it such content, does not la l'fou or Wittgenstein an strictures agains the My biof the Private Ostensive Defunction

content that is present in that form—to bring in the other half of the metaphor that this talk of form, involves. Materially identical content can show upelsewhere in a different form. My experience might disclose to me. hat an opening in a wall is big enough for it to go through. A cat might see that an opening in a wall is big enough for it to go through. My experience would be world-disclosing and so conceptual in form in the sense I have introduced. The cat's perceptual intake would not be world-disclosing and so in the relevant sense, not conceptual in form. It is irrelevant to this difference between the cases that there is that match in what the cat and I would be getting to know through the exercise of our perceptual capacities."

5. Lam all for the project of giving air insightful phenomenology of our embodied coping. But a phenomenology of embodiment should be conceived not as a corrective to the thought that our orientation towards the world is permeated with conceptual rationality, but as a supplementation. It has out the details of something that needs to be presupposed by any acceptable version of that thought. Phenomenosogical attention to embodied coping should not be conceived as Dreylus conceives it—as a way to answer the question "how the non-conceptual given is converted into a given with conceptual content." "That question should be rejected in it answered.

I have urged that the claim that conceptual rationality is everywhere at our lives, in so far as our lives are distinctively burnan, cannot be unmasked as a myth on the ground that it commits us to ignoring embodied coping skills. The real myth in this neighbourhood is the thought that makes it look as if affirming the pervasiveness of conceptual rationality will not concept

²⁹ In Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content, at p. 614. Christopher Peacocke writes, "White being reluctant to azinbine concepts of the abover ac mass, many if its would also want to insist that the property of our representing a flat brown seriace as being at a certain distance from one can be common to the perceptions of numans and or lower an mals. If the lower animals do not have states with conceptual or tent but some of their perceptual states have contents in common with human perceptions, nor lows that some Prumani perceptual representational content is not a inceptual. The circ monadity Peac sike appears to is coursely as the level of what I are calling "matter" its argument is not responsive to what I have described as considerations about form. And the argument is utterly involvinging A calliant see that a bole in a wall is big chough for it go through On the principles of Peacocke's argument, this wome implies has fit udge, has I tole in a way is big chough for the logo through, the content of invited green various be conceptual to form.

^{10 &}quot;Overcoming the Myth of the Mental" p. 59

with giving proper weight to the bodily character of our lives. This myth figures in Drevius's argument in the shape of the idea that conceptual rationality is detached from bodily life, characterizable in abstraction from the specifics of the satuations in which endoded coping is called for. This is—to give it a label—the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect

The Myth of the Disembodied Intedest is familiar in philosophy. It is an like the supposed Myth of the Menta, in that almost everyone would agree that it is a myth, when a is set out explicitly in those terms. But it is surprisingly easy to tapse is to it without realizing that one has done so, perhaps using impress anishic gestates to conceal from aneself that cae is making oneself vulnerable to the fain har intractable questions that the Myth poses—questions that reflect the impossibility of bringing the intellect back into satisfactory connection with our embodied life, once we have expelled at from there.

I think Dreyfus falls into the Myth of the Disembodied Inteliert and so at cast occasionally do his phenomenologist heroes. Let me stress that I am not suggesting this happens simply because Dreyfas and his heroes concern themselves with the phenomenology of embodiment. It happens because tacy tack is the phenomenology of embodiment in the context of the as a implicin I have attacked. That the phenomenology of embod ment most be kept free of involvement on the part of conceptual rationality.

I shall end with an instance of this in one of the phenomenologist heroes. In a passage Dreyfus quotes with approval. Merleau Ponty writes

In perception, we do not think the object as I we do not many ourselves thinking it, we are given over to the object and we merge into this body which is better anothered than we are about the world, and about the misstives we have and the means at our disposal. If

Now I thruk talking of oneself as merging into something one could refer to as this body is one of those theforical gestures that serve to conceal a lapse into the Myth of the D sembodied Intellect. Once I have separated me—the thinking thing I aim. From this body in is too late to try to fix things by talking about the former merging into the latter. No one but a phi osopher woold take seriously the thought that in perception, or in action for that matter. I merge into my body. The fact is that there is nothing for me to

Phenometriosp. Proception p. 238 cited at Overcoming the Myth of the Mental." pp. 56-7.

mean by "I" even though what I mean by "I" is correctly specified as the thinking thing I am, except the very thing I would be referring to (a bit strangely of I said "this body" at east if I said it in the sort of correct in which Mericau Ponty says it with the tring in question said to be for instance informed about the world oft might be different if the context were, say medical and I said something like "This body is beg, ming to faitme".) If I give "this body" the reference it must have in Mericau Ponty's context, it is wrong to say I merge into that I simply am that This is mere sainty. To make it available, we need to reject the idea that the anisologiess that marks me out as a thinking thing would have to be absent from an accurate phenomenology of embodiment.

ESSAY 19

Response to Dreyfus!

Dreyfus acknowledges that he was wrong to think practical interligence as I conceive it is situation independent. But he still thinks my view of mindedness can be characterized in terms of idetached conceptual intentionality. Now if you assume that mindedness is, as such, detached from impression in activity it is not surprising that mindedness should seem alien to the unreflective involvement that is characteristic of the exercise of skills. But he idea that mindedness is detached is just what I mean to oppose The supposes Myth of the Mental is the result of reading me through the lens of what Is by invitights a mythological conception of the mental.

In our er work, I have invoked the image of stepping back, with a view to distinguishing rationality in a strong sense—responsiveness to reasons as such—from the kind of responding to reasons that is exemplated by say fleeting from danger, which is something non-rational animals can do. The dea was that in a subject with the ability to step back, the capacities that are operative in ordinary perceptual engagement with the world, and in ordinary bod by action, belong to the subject's rationality in that strong sense they are conceptual in the sense in which I claim that our perceptual and active lives are conceptually shaped. When one is unreflectively immersed, one is exactly that exercising the ability to step back. But even so the capactions are conceptual.

Nothing is discursively explicit in these goings on, so it might seem nat ara. To say as Dicylus does, that my view is that they are implicitly concepts al. But it is easy to hear that as amounting to "only implicitly conceptual".

This is a response to Hubert L. Drevius, "Response to McDowel" which is a response to Essay (8 above).

with an implication that conceptuality would be properly on the scene only after something had been made explicit in discourse or discursive thought that is, only after the subject had exercised the ability to step back. And that is not my view at all. Making things explicit is not a theme of my thinking. I do not recognize a view of mine in the idea that exercises of rationality with the detachment characteristic of explicit commentary con the passing scene or on what one is doing) constitute the proper or fundamental form of human activity.

This supposed connection of rationality with detach neit is particularly damaging in the case of act on. The involvement of rationality in human action in my picture is not a result of adding an "I think" to representations of one's actions. That would fit a detached contemplative stance towards one's actions, but that is not not picture. Self-awareness in action is practical, not theoretical fit is a matter of an "I do" rather than an "I think". And the "I do" is not a representation added to representations, as kant's "I think" is. Conceiving action at terms of the "I do" of a way of registering the essentially first-person character of the realization of practical rational capacities that acting is. The presence of the "I do" of a phi isophical account of action matks the distinctive form of a kind of phenomenon like the presence of the "I think" as at least able to accompany representations, in Kant's account of empirical consciousness.

The practical concepts realized in acting are concepts of things to do. Realizing such a concept is doing the thing in question and thinking about doing it. In the most hat damental kind of case - the case of kinds of things to do that are basic actions for the agents in cuestion in one of the senses of that phrase---there is, by definition, no room for thought about how to do. the thing in question. Such thought would need to traffic in concepts of other things to do by doing which one would do the thing in quest on and that would contradict the hypothesis that the thing in question is, in the re-Jevant sense, a basic action for the agent in question. This means that the sadcase of Cluck Knoblauch is no problem for the Knoblauch had an ability to realize a certain practical concept (the concept of throwing efficiently to first base. But he lost his ability because he started thinking about "the mechanges" about how throwing efficiently to first base is done. The effect was that throwing efficiently to first base stopped being a basic action for bim-The most this case could show is that when mindedness gets detached from immers on in activity of can be the enemy of embodied coping (to echo Dreyfus's wording). It cannot show that mindedness is not in operation.

when the is immersed in embodied coping. When Knoblauth still had the bodily skill that he lost this mindedness was in operation in exercises of his skill. His throwing efficiently to first base was his realizing a concept of a thing to do.

Knoblanch exemplifies a specific way in which practical intelligence can lose as gr.p. in activity. That can happen when someone with a skill wrose exercises belong to a basic action type tries to bring the limb movements that contribute to doing the thing in question within the scope of intention otherwise than under specifications also "whatever is needed to throw elficiently to first base". Before the loss of ability that takes that shape—the attempt to extend the scope of intentional control—the skill itself provided for the movements to be as they needed to be (the skill itself gave specificity to that "whatever is needed"), without the agent's means end rationality being called on to intervene. This kind of loss of skill comes about when the agent's means end rationality tries so to speak to take over control of the cetails of her boothy movements, and it cannot do as good a job at that as the skill itself used to do

Dreyfus likes to put this point by saying, in a Merleau Pontyesque year, that the body knows what movements to make. That may be all right as a metaphorical way of noting that the person, the thinking toing, who is the agen) does not need to determine the specific character of the lab move. ments involved in exercisary a skill. She can acave that determination to her ingrained and, y habits. But the metaphor is dangerous in so far as it sage gests that the body in determining which movements are required for the tring it ignestion to get done, exploits something that is like means end ra-Conality except that state it belongs to the body as opposed to the personif must be non-conceptual. And then when I claim that a rational agent's skilled bod ly coping is permeated with her rationality it looks to Dreytus as: if I must be calaming that the limb movements that figure in exercises of a skel are determined not by a simulaction of means end rationality possessed by the body, but by the full blown means end rationality that beongs to the agent. An attempt on the part of means end rationality to take control of amb movements is just what went wrong in the case of Knoblauch. So Dreyfus thinks I must be committed to the crazy dea that Knoblauch's case, an which a skill is actually lost, illustrates to e-general, form of skilled bodily action.

But this is not my picture at all. The idea of a basic action in the relevant sense is the idea of a kind of thing one just does, not by doing something

327

else in the relevant sense of that phrase. No doubt one does the thing in question—say throwing efficiently to first base—by moving one's in his appropriately. But that is not to say one makes the limb movements as a means to doing the thing in question. It is not to say one does the thing in question by doing something else in a sense that brings one's means erid rationality into operation.

So what difference does it make according to me, for activity to be permeated with rationality -if it is not that I opens the way to a Knoblauch-like loss of appreficetive stable? To answer this question, we need to think about skills that can be acquired by non-rational animals as well as rational animais, throwing efficiently to first base will not do as our example. So consider catching a flying object. When a ranonal agent catches a frisher, she is realizing a concept of a thing to do. In the case of a skilled agent, she does not do that by realizing other concepts of things to do. She does not realize concepts of contributory things to do, in play for her as concepts of what she is to do by virtue of her means end rationally in a context in which her overarching project is to catch the frosbee. But she does realize a concept of say catching this (Think of a case in which as one walks across a park a Irisbee flies towards one, and one catches a on the spor of the moment. When a dog catches a frisbee, lie is not real zing any practical concept, in the relevant sense, he has none. The point of saying that the rational agent. unlike the dog, is realizing a concept in doing what she does is that her doing, under a specification that captures the content of the practical concept that she is realize ge comes within the scope of her practical rationalityeven if only in that it asked why she callight the frisheelishe would answer "No particular reason, I just felt like it"

Dreyfus contrasts my Gadamenan conception of openness to the world with Heidegger's and Merleau Ponty's. He thinks the world to which Gadamer and I provide for openness is a world of Jacts, in a sense that in volves a separation from anything with practical significance. But I do not recognize this conception of the factual as time. The point I want to make here is a ready implact an the example I used in it y essay. If someone is trying to get to the other side of a walf, the fact that a hole in the walf is of a certain size will be a searchation. A subject to whom the world is discused is an agent. In that context the distinction Dreyfus fasts on between affordances and solicitations does not amount to much. To an engaged agent an affordance can be a solicitation. And its being a solicitation does not conflict with its being a fact, something to which a rational animal can be open in

operations of its conceptual capacities. Openness to the world is enjoyed by subjects while are essentially agents. What they are open to is not restricted to objects of disinterested confemplation. When Gadainer talks of a "free distanced" charities on he is not talking about an attitude that is contemplative as opposed to practically engaged.

Dreyfus objects to me from a standpoint at which he takes for granted that mindeaness is actached from engagement in bodily life. This goes with a qualism of embodiment and mindedness that is remaniscent of Descartes. Of course this analism is not exactly Carresian, the body is not conceived as a machine. On the contrary, the body as Merleau Ponty and Dreylus conce ve mas dismicily person like lit is supposed to have practical knowledge. Now I could put what I urge at the end of "What Myth?" are this, I aim the only person like thing, person, actually) that is needed in a description of my bodily activity. If you distinguish me from my body, and give my body. that person like character, you have too many person like things in the picture when you try to describe my boddy doings. And the need Dreyfas. thinks there is for this awkward separation of me from my body reflects a conception of mindedness that I think we should fiscard. We should not start with the assumption that prindedness, the characteristic in virtue of which I are the Danking thing I am is about to apprehensive in mersion in bod by the of we let our conception of mindedness be controlled by the thought II as mindeducts is operative even in our insreflective perceiving and acting, we can regain an integrated conception of ourse ves las arribals. and what comes with that the rigs whose life is pervasively bod by but of a distinctively rational kind.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CREDITS

INDEX

Bibliography

- Allan, D. J. "Aristoide's Account of the Origin of Mora. Principles". Proceedings of the XIth International Interes of Physicsphy, vol. 12 (Amsterdam, North Holland, 1953).
- "The Practical Svinogistis" in Autour J. Arodote (Louvain: Presses University taites de Louvain, 1955).
- Anscombe G. E. M. "The First Person on Samper Gutterplan ed. Mondame Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
- "Thought and Action in Aristode" in Benford Bambi right ed. Acte Finals.
 on Plate and Aristode. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1965.
- Austin, J. L., Sense and Sensibina (Oxford) Carendon Press, 1962).
- Baker G. P. and P. M. S. Backe. An Analytic Communitary on Amgensiem's Philosophical Investigations, vol. 1 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
- Barwise John and John Perty. Sauation and Attendos (Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1983).
- Bel. David, "How Russellian was Frege!" Most 99 (1990).
- 8 tick, R. 5. Plato's Seginst (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1975).
- Brandom, Robert B. Articulating Reasons it ambridge. Mass. Harvard University. Press, 2000).
 - "Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons" Phaisephe and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995).
 - Making Respect Reasoning Representing and Discusses Commitment (201) bridge Mass. Harvard University Press. 1994)
 - "Perception and Rational Constraint" Process ply and Phenemenetonica, Research 58 (1998)
- "Perception and Rational Constraint: McDowe I's Mondand Sould" in Enrique V. Japueva, ed. Perception. Philosophical Issues 7: (A ascaden. Calc. Ridgeview 1996)
 - "Repues" Philosophy and Phenemenological Research 57 (1997)
- Broadie Satah, Fifties with Aristota (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991).
- Burnyeat, M. F. "Ar stotle on Learning to be Good" in Amche Oksenberg Rorty ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethias (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980).

- Car Wolfgang, Erage's Theirs of Sense and Reterence Its Origins and Scope (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1994)
- Cooper John M. Reason and Human Gova in Aristotic (Cambridge Mass. Harvard, University Press, 1975)
 - "Some Remarks in Aristotle's Mora Psychology. Southern tournal of Probsophy 27. Supplement.
- Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Pane 3 decrines, vol. 2 (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963)
- Dayotson Dona d. "Actions Reasons and Causes" in Davidson. Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980)
 - "Afterthe ights" a postscript to "A coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge") in Alan Malachowski, ed. Read of Rosts (Oxford, Blackwell, 1990).
 - A violationer. Theory of Trash and knowledge" in Day dson. Subscence in Lengthering Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 200 s.
- - . "Epistemology Externalized" Dialectica 45 (1991)
 - Figure on Actions and Events (Oxford) Clatendon Press, 1980)
 - "in Defence of convention T" or Davidson. *Inguises me Truth and interpre*tation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)
 - organies and Truth and interpretation (Oxford) Clarendon Press, 1984).
- Meaning, Triatranc Evidence in Robert B. Barren and Roger F. Glose Y.
 Perspective on Quant (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990)
 - "Menta Exerts" in Davidson, Facus on Acts in and Frans, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1980).
- "The Myth of the Subjective" in Michael Krausz, ed. Reathering in terps to those and Communication (Notice Daniel Inc., Notice Daniel University 27cms, 1989).
 - "A Nice betangement of Epitaphy" in Urtics TePore and Truth and therpretation temper is in hePhasisety at tensal that don't not aid. Blackweil 1986)
 - Or the Very Idea of a Conceptual Science on Davidson Ingrenevate.
 Iruth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)
 - "The Social Aspect of Language on B. McGannaess and G. Ohver leds. The Philosophy of Michael Diaminett (Dordrecht, Klower, 1994)
 - The Structure and content of Trath? Internal of Philosophy 87, 1990s.
- Subscine intervalne by Observe (Oxford Oxford University Press, 200-)
- Three Varieties of Knowledge on Davidson. Subscitive Intersubjective Objective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
 - Truth and Meaning" in Davidson, Inquiries into Triath and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)
- Deutiett Daniel C. Consciousiess Experied Boston, Linke Brown, 1991).
- The Intentional Stance (Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1987)
- Dewey John Aspertence and Nature (New York, Dover, 1958)
- Names d. Cora. The Resease Spirit. Widgenstein, Ph. Sopies, and the Mind. arabit fige. Mass., MIT Press, 1991).
- Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expenses (APA Pacific Loyison)

- Presidentia, Address 2005). Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79:2 (November 2005).
- -----, "Response to McDowell" in Inquity 50 (2007)
- Dummett, Michael, Frege, Philippetry of Language (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1973)
 - "A Nice Detangement of Epitaphy Some Comments on Davidson and Hacking" In Ernes, LePore ed. I will and interpretation Perspectives in the Philosophy of Dinatal Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
- Evans, Gareth "Lodgestanding Demonstratives" or Evans, c. liested Papers (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985)
- The Varieties of Rescrence (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982).
- Frede Michael. Praatkation and Existentialisage. Hypermiciniaa. Beb 18) (Gott rigen. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967)
- Frege: Got(lob) Begriffoschrift i inte der arathme vanen machaebodese Forme sprache des reinen Denkens (Halle, Louis Nebert, 1879) reprinted Bodescheile. Georg Oms. 1964)
- "Book & Ligical Calcutus and the Concept Script on Jans Bermes. Friedrich Kambartel, and Friedrich Kaulbach eds. Positioners & range valis. Peter Long and Roger White (Oxford, Blackwell, 1979).
- On Sense and Reference" in Peter Geach and Max Black. Transarion. Joint the Philosophical Writings of Cottob Freq. (Orderd. Biackwell. 1960).
- ——— Posthomous Wee organised. Hanvellermes: Errederich Kammarten and Errederich Kaumach, trans. Peter I. organid Roger White (Oxford, Hackwell., 979).
 - "The Thought a Logical Inquity trans. A. M. and Marcelle Queron in P. F. Strawson and "Phiesophical Logic (Oxford, Oxford, University Press, 1967)
- Friedman, Michael "Exorcising the Philosophical Tradition is omments on John McDowe is Mind and world". The Philosophical Review 105, 1896).
- Furth, Mortgomery: "Two Types of Designation in Na bosas Rescheried". National Logical Phory (American Philosophical Quarters, Milmography Acc., 2, 1968).
- Gadamer Hans Georg, crans, lock Weinsheimer and a mont Mars fall, Truth and Method (New York, Crossroad, 1992)
- Geach, P. T., Menta, Acto London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).
- Goldlarb, Warren Wittgenstein on Understanding* in Peter A. French Theodore E. Dehling at and Howard K. Weitstein eds. Widnes Studies in Philosophy. Vo. XVF: The Wittgemtein Leavey (Notre Danie, Ing., University of Notre Danie Press, 1992).
- Heidegger Martin. Plate's Seption (Bloomington Indiana). Ners is Press, 1997;
 Herman, Barbara. "Making Room for Character" in Stephen Engstron and Jerry Jer.
 Whiting eds. Aristotic Kant and the Steller (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- Hinton, J. M., Experiences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
- Irwin, T. H. Plate's Morai Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
 - "Some Rational Aspects of Incommence" Southern Journal of Philosophy 27
 Supplement (1988)

- Kant Jama are, *critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London Macmilian, 1929)
- Kenny Anthony Armette's enem of he Bill (London Duckworth 1979)
- ---- "The Practical Syllogism and Incommence" Phranesis 1, 1966,
- Kos man, J. mes P., "False Logos and Not Being in Plato's Septima" in J. M. F. Moravesik, ed. Patterns in Prace of Therafit (Bordrecht, Reidel, 1973).
- Kripke, Sa.t. A., Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
- Lee F.Iward N. "Plato. a Negation and Not Being in the Sophist" Philosophical Review 81 (1972).
- Lewis, Frank A. "Plato on Not. on Africa Studies to Council, 400quire 9, 1976).
- McDowell, John "Criteria Deleasibility and Knywedge in McDowe." Meaning Annylogy and Ready (Cambridge Mays, Harvard Chiversity Press, 1998.
 - "Having the World in View" tournay of Phy paying 95 (1998)
- Three roughly and fractionity in Wittgenstein in McDowell Mind value and Ready (Cambridge Mass) Baryard University Press, 1998.
- "Know eage and the Internal" in McJanvell. Meaning. Anoidedge, and Reality. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1998).
 - ---- Mind and 6 red. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press., 994, secondedition, 1996).
 - *One Strand in the Private Language Argument in McDowell Mind value and Rea in it a philipse Mass. Harvard University Press, 1998.
 - "Petriam on Minu and Meaning" on McDow is Meaning Knowledge and Reultry (Cambridge, Mass., Hamard University Press, 1998).
 - "The Rose of Fustamenta in Austone's Ethics in McDowel. Mind value and Resear (Categoridge Mass. Harva d University Press, 1998).
 - "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space". F. McDowe I. Meaning.
 Attoribage and Readty of ambridge. Mass. Harvar I I miversity Press. 1998.
 - "Some Issues at A some's Moral Psychology in McDowe. Moral haliaand Ream (Cambridge Mass. Haisard on versity Press., 998)
 - "Viring and Reason" in McDowel. Mind value and Reado (Cambrilge Mass. Harvard University Press, 1998).
 - "Will genstein on Following a Rule" in McDowe". Mind after and Reality (Cambridge Mass. Harvord University Press, 1998.
- McCinn, Cours. The Structure of Content' in Andrew Woodfield, ed. Thought and Object (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
- Menea) Ponty. Maurice. Phenomenous vol Per vers a (London: Roefledge and Kegan. Pagl. 1981).
- M. Ikan, Rath Garrett. Perceptual Content and Pregran Myth. Mond. 60, 1991; "White Queen Psychology in Milikan. (Vitte Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1993).
- Nagel, Thomas The View from Newhere New York, Oxford University Press, 1986.

 Nussbaum: Martha C. The Fraguaty of Governess: Camoridge Cambridge University Press, 1986).

- Owen, G. E. L. "Plato on Not Being" in Gregory Viasios ed. Plato I. Metaphysics and Epistemology (Garden Ca). N. Y. Doubleday, 1971)
- Peacocke Christopher "Phenomenology and Nonconceptual content" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001)
- Pears, David "Anstotle's Analysis of Courage". Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1978)
- ——. "Courage as a Mean" in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed Essays on Aristone's Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)
- Perry John, "Frege on Den's ustraines. Phiosophical Review 86 (1977)
- Putnam, Hilary, Meanorquand the Meral Sciences Condon, Rincilledge and Kegan Paul 1978)
- Quine W. V. "On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma" in Quine. Theories and Things. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1981).
 - Philosophy at Logic Englewood Cliffs N. J. Prennec Hall, 1970.
- Two Dogmas of Empiric sint on Quine. From a Loquia Point of View (Carribridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1961)
- - Word and Abirel (Cambridge Mass, MIT Press, 1960)
- Rotty Richard, Continuous Iron, and Soudante (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1989)
- "Is Truth a Goal of Enquity? Davidson vs. Avig.bi". Pholosophical quarterly 45
 (1995)
- Philosophy and the March of Nature (Prince) in Princeton University Press. 1979.
 - "Pragmatism Davidson and Truth" on Rorts Observets Regionsm and Truth (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1991)
 - "Putnam and the Relativist Menace". Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993)
- "Response to Bert stem" in Herman I Saatkamp In ed. Rerly and Praymatism. The Philosopher Responds to His cratis. (Sash ville, Tenn). Vande bills, 1 vers ty. Press, 1995.
 - "Socidarity's a Object vity?" on Rorts (Phicatests Regionion and Truth (Ca.): bridge Cambridge University Press, 1991)
- Ross 5 r Day d. The Suomachean Ethio of Arisiche (London Oxford University Press. 1954).
- Russell, Bertrand, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description in Russell Medicine and Logic (London: George Alien and Jnov p. 1917)
- "On Denoting" in Russell. Logic and Knowledge and Riv. Marsh. London. George Allen and Univin. 1956)
- --- The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19-2)
- Ryle Gibert The cancep of Mind (London Butchinson, 1949).
- Satusbury Mark "Russe on Names and Communication in Sainsbury Departing from Frege (London Routledge, 2002)
 - "Names in Free Logical Troth Theory" in Jose Liu's Bermaoez, ed. Thought.

 Reference and Experience. Thomas from the Philosophis of Guzeili I rans (Oxford:

 Clarendon Press, 2005)

Salmon Nathan Frege's Pagele (Cambridge Mass, MIT Press, 1986).

Scarge John R. Internation An Fig. in the Proceeding Mand (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1983).

"Proper Names" Mind 67 (1958)

Seilars, W. Ind. Empiric sociand the Physiosophy at Mand* in Herbert Feiglago Michael Scriveri, eds. Mannewia studies in the Physiophic of Science vol. 1 (Minneapolis University of Mannesota Press. 1956) reprinted (waib some added footnotes). In Sellars, Science Per epiten, and Reasth. Condon. Routledge and Kegar. Paul. 1963. reostoed. Atascadero. Cal.L. R. Igeview. 1991). reprinted as a monograph, with an Introduction by Richard Rotty and a Study Galde by Robert Brandon. Cambridge. Mass. Harvard University Press. 1992).

"Inference and Meaning" in Jeffrey Sieba, ed. Prov Pragmatic, and Positive Worlds. The Euris Chagaint Wilhid Solars, Resenta, Ca. 1, Ridgeview, 1980).

Sotta Refrections on Language Games in Sciars Science Pel zeroo and Realth T. mor. Recideoge and Regan Paul (1963), reissied, Atasca leto. Ca. f. Ridgeview. [991]

Showdon, Paul. Perception Assimiland Causar in ** Proceedings of the Assimilan Society 81 (1980-1).

S et a Robert Transacidental Araumenis and Servicioni Amore in the question of haids cation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000)

Strawson, P.F. The Bounds of Some London Methiden, 9ne

--- Individuals (London: Merlinen, 1959)

Skepticom and Valuenation, Scale varieties, New York, Constitute of very 3-Press, 1985).

Stronel, Barry "Epistemiological Reflection on Knowledge of the External World" in Stronel, enderstanding Human Knowledge (Oxford), Oxford University Press, 2000.

Kan Jan Argunout Conceptuals apacities and Insu-nervolesy in Straudaderstancing Human Knowledge (Oxford, Oxford Cars, 1803, 1803, 1803).

Mind, Mean Eq. and Practice in Strong Meaning index tending, and Pratice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)

*Reasonable Craums: Cavell and the Tradition in 5th aid. Inderstanding Human Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

The Symmeonic of Philosophical Sophicom (Oxered Clatendon Press 984)

 Transcendental Argamients in Strond I inderounding Human Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)

Witgerstein on Meaning, Understanding, and community" in Sirotal Meaning, inderstanding, and Pracae (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2 000).

Vlavios, Cregory, Plate's Protogents, Indianapol's Bobbs Merr II (1956).

Wiggris David "De betation and Practical Reason" in Wiggris Needs varies Triphi (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)

Sentence Meaning Negation and Platers Problem of Non-Being" in Gregory Viastos ed Plate i Metaphysia and Epistemology (Garden C. y. N. S., 200) breday (1971)

Weakness if were Commensurable at land the Objects in Heliberation and Desire" in Wiggins News Land Truth Oxford Blackwell 1987

Williams, Bernard, Fithus and the Limits of Philosophy (London Fontana Collans, 1985)

Withdriff Michael "Exorcism and Enchantment" Philosophical Quartern 46, 1996). Wittgenstein Ludwig, The Bild and Breion Books. Oxford, Blackwell 958).

------ On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969)

Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Blackwell, 1953).

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford: Blackove), 1978.

 Tractation Logical Philosophicial Italia (J. F. Pears and B. F. McGairmess (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961)

Zette: (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967)

Wrigh, Crispin "(Anti /Scept es Simple and Sabra, G. E. Moore and John Mc. Dowell." Philosophy and Phenomenosyna, Regards 65, (2002).

"Wittge istem's Later Philosophy of Mind, Sensation, Privace, and angotion" in Klaus Publiced, Afranian September (Berlin, War et de Greyter, 1991).

Credits

- Essay 1 Originally published in Matcolin Schoheid and Martha crave a Nessbaum, eds. Language and Logis Studies in Ancient Greek Pharsophic Presented to G. 1. 1. Owen "Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 115-34. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.
- Essay 2 Originally published in Robert Hemaman, ed. Armonic and Storal Revision London: LCT Press, 1995. pp. 201-18. Reprinted by per mission of Westview Press, a member of Perseus Books Group.
- Essay 3. Originally published in Stephen Engstrom and Jena for Whi tag. cds. Anstatic Kant and the States (Cambridge Cambridge University Press. 1996).
 pp. 19–35. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.
- Essay 4. Originally or blished in Sabina Locibond and Stephen Wilha os, eds. identity. Truth, and value Joseph for Dated Wiggins (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 95–112.
- Essay 5 Forthcomagon A M. Aluned ed. Fosses in Wingenstein (Cambridge Cambridge Lunyersity Press).
- Essay 6 Originally published in R. Haller and K. Putú, eds. Watgenstein and the Future of Philosophy. 4 Reassessment after fally years (Vienna, obs.): pp. 2002). op. 245–56.
- Pasay 7 Originally published in Lewis E. Habit, ed. The Processity of Denaut Dandson (Chargo Open Court, 1999), pp. 87–104. Copyright © 1999 by The Library of Living Philosophers, reprinted by permission of Open Court Profishing Conpany, a division of Carus Publishing Company, Peru, Ohinois.
- Essay 8 Originally published in Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Attiswaid, and Jens Kertscher, eds. Cadamer's Century, Essays in Henor of Hans George Gadamer (Cantondge Mass., MIT Press, 2002)
- Essay 9: Originally published in Philosophy and Phenemenological Research 67 (2003), pp. 675–8.
- Essay 10: Originally published in lose Lius Bermidez, ed. Though. Reference and Experience Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Foats (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 42-65. By permission of Oxford University Press.
- Essay II. Originally published in Lewis E. Hahn, ed. one Phinsophy of P. J. Strawson. (Chacago: Open Court, 1998). pp. 129—45. Copyright € 1998 by The Library of

- Living Philosophers, reported by permission of Open Court Publishing Company, a division of Carus Publishing Company, Pena Thinois
- Essay 12 Originally published in Robert B. Brandom ed. Rozniand His Critical, Maiden, Mass. Blackwell, 2000), pp. 109–23.
- Listav 13. Origo a. y published in Terrena 25 y (2006) pp. 19=33. www.pinjoyi.es. Teorema)
- Essay 14. Originally published in Marcus Willaschek, ed. John McDewell Reason and Nature Lecture and Calingu um in Manuer, 1999 (Munister, all Verlag, 2000), pp. 3–17.
- Essay 15. Or gena is published in German in Neue Rundsonau 100 (1999) op 48-69.
 Essay 16. Or gena is published in Phaeserin and Phenomenerophia Research 64, 2002) pp 97, 205.
- Essay 17 Originally published in *Prognatis and cognition* 13 (2005), pp. 127-40. White kind permission by John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam Philadelphia (www.benjamins.com).
- Essay 18. Or gina is published in mattery 50 (2007), pp. 138-5. Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Taylor & Francis Ltd.
- Essay 19. Ong naw or blished in *Organy* 50 (2007), pp. 366-70. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. Taylor & Francis Ltd.

Index

Andre App & Louis Autor and	n to the same of the same
Action, 200-1. 368-9, 313-8, 321-1	Deliberation, 41 57, 59-74
124-8	Dennett Daniel, 259, 261, 264, 269h, 271h.
Agency Ser Action	274- 5n, 30 5n
Atraca, 24n, 31, 59-7n	Descartes, René 190 1, 1946, 199-200.
Allan, D. J. 41n, 44n	228, 232, 1, 254, 5, 265, 7, 272, 5, 387
Appenations montests, 254 6	Description theodes of reference. Inc. 7.
Atocombe, G. E. M., 44n, 187-203	21 2, 174 Seculia Russell's Theory of
Arlsone, 185 21, 40, 44-58, 59-76.	Descriptions
217-8 109-11	Dewey John, 214 5, 206-7, 258 9, 222-1
Assun, J. L., 231n	Dummind Cora. 91.4
	Dretske Pred. 219
Baker, G. P., 2460	Dreyfox, Hobert L., <u>Mrs. 23</u> , 324-8
Harwise Jun. 176-8	Dualism of scheme and content, 115, 33
Bell, David, 183n, 184n	Dummett, Michael, 142n, 296, 298, 9, 306
Bermudez, José 163n	
Biackburn, Simon, 279n	Empericism, 118-9, [20-1, [24-1],
B ack, R. S., 158	243.36
Boole, George, 299, 8.2	Ergon, 24-31
Brandom, Robert, 96-111, 148-51, 254-6,	Libital realism, 25-40
2676, <u>279, 67, 288-307,</u> 318	Eudinomia, 23-40, 42, 43-57, 71-4
Broadie Sarah, 43tt. 47-50	Fudamontan, 30-3, See also Eudamonia
Burnyest, M. F., 34n	Evans, Garette, 163-85, 1936, 2686, 2696
Carl, Wolfgang, 177n, 182n, 184n	Falsehoud, 3-22
Cartesian philosophy of mind, 199-1, 255,	Fation 179, 282-4
264-7, 273-5	First personal thought and speech. See '1'
Cooper, John M., 27n. 32n, 3on, 48n.	Frede Michael 10n 15n
50n, 53n	Frege Gottlob. 107 -8, 111, 163-85, 188n,
Crombie L M - 20a	267-72, 290, 298, st 5, 304n, 336
Ser system 176 The state of	Freud, Sigmund, 205n, 223n
Davidson, Donald, 115-33, 134-51, 152-9,	Fredman, Michael 134-6, 138-4.
169n 184n 209n 216n 217, 222 3.	Function See From
246, 248, 254 6, 259, 260n, 263, 292n	Furth, Montgomery, 174n
67% 670, 677 V. 677, DWIII, 203. 27211	a street townstellight the beatt

126

Gadamer Bans-Georg, 134-51, 310-11. Millikan, Roth Gameit, 262-75 3.7 .8. 320 327 Moore, G. B. 233-7 Geach P To 253 Colofarb, Warsen, 79, 80, 82n, 86. Nagel, Thomas, 213 Naturalism, 131-3, 257-75 Habituation. See Upbringing Negation, 3-22 Hacket P.M. S. 246n Neurath, Otto. 34, 5, 37 Hegel, G. W. F., 291n. Nietzsche, Friedrich, 205, 208, 210. Normalivity, 8, 4, 96-111, 150-2, 214-22 Heidegger Martin, 150n, 309-11, 312-13, Nuvelaum, Martha C., 75n, 76n. 3.4. 3.7. 327 Heinaman Robert, 380. Orwell, George, 211p. Herman, Barbara, 57n. Hinton J M. 231n Owen, G. F. L., 3-2 Humboldt, Wilhelm von. 144-5, 146 Home: David, 226 Pagondiotis, Costas, 231 n. Parmenides, <u>5-0.</u> 80. <u>12</u> *IT 186 203 Peacocke, Christopher, 321n. Inconditance, See Akrana Pears, David, 68n 92-5 Inferentialism, 282, 288-107 Perceptual experience, \$24-31, [34, aptengon, 88 🚅 158-41 [57-9, 226-43, 241-56, 368-9, Internation and externation in 114, 17, 3, 8, 21 episyemulogy, 279-82 Perry John, 176-8, 267n frwen, T. H., 26th 48th, 50th, 75th Phronèsis, 24, 28, 39, 42, 58, 66-74. \$199 J. \$ James, William, 188, 2236. Plato 3-22, 586, 2, 3, 75 6, 207 2134-12 Practical reason. See Deliceration Kant, Immunuel, <u>41, 57 d. 96, 98-9, 1136</u> Practical wisdom: See Phranesis Psychologism, 107-8, 169-70, 271-2 LOUI LAND THE 124-5 1260, 112 1.8 (70n. 485, 191 £ 193 5 202-4) Potrum Hilary 212-14, 219-20 268 9, 225-7, 230, 233, 240, 241, 250-1, 261 263n 271 290-2 318 21 325 "Quietism" 97 8, 104-6 Kenny Authory, 62n. Quine W V 112 [180 119-21, 1-2 3, Knoblgach, Chack 325 6 126, 131, 216n, 244-5 Kontman, James P. 40. Rationality 45, 116-17, 124-33, 167-70. Kripke, Saul A. 171-2, 264n, 270m L.R. 185, 259-6d, 309, 13, 124, 328 Languages as shared. <u>141-31</u>, <u>157</u>. Reasons, space of, 135, 245, 246, 8, Lee Edward N. 40, 60, 50, 90, 140 25. 46. 2RO-7 Leibniz, G. W., 290. Releavism. (35-31, 220.) Lewis, Frank A., 6tt. 7tt. 8n. Rodl, Sebastian, 231n. Rorty Richard, 132n, 204 24, 244, 257n. Locke, John, 170n, 263n 258, 260, 262-4, 265-6 McGrin. Cotta, 172a. 266p. 267p. Ross, Sir David, 62n Meatting as a mental state, 79-95. Rule: following, 80-6, 96-1... Merleau Funty Maurice 30g, 122-3, 327. Russell, Bertrand, 163-7, 171-3, 179-80.

183-5

Russell's Theory of Descriptions, 163-7. Strawson, P. F., 190-5, 199, 202-3, 225-7. [71-2, 173. See also Description theories. 233 of reference Stroud, Barry, 85n, 225-7, 228n, 235, Ryle, Gilbert, 265 237, 239 Subjectivity, 122-3, 152-7, 254-6 Sainsbury, Mark, 166n, 167n, 170n, 174n. Syntactic and semantic engines, 267-75 179n, 179n, 181n, 183n, 185n Salmon, Nathan, 1782 Tarski, Alfred, 216 Scepticism. 120-4, 125-7, 129-30, 206-9, Taylor, Charles, 310 225 - 40Transcendental arguments, 225-46 Scheme-content dualism. See Dualism of scheme and content Understanding as a mental state, 79-95. Scholz, Heinrich, 160p. Upbringing, 28, 36-7, 39, 41, 46, 50-2, Schröder, Ernyt, 299, 302 53-7 Scientism. 38-9, 8a, 127-9, 275 Searle, John R., 166-7n, 174-5n, Viastos, Gregory, 766 2740 Self-cussclousness, 186-203 Weakness of will. See Aktasia Seilars, Wilfrid, 111n, 216n, 230-1, 240. Wiggins, David, 8n, 14n, 15n, 17n, 20n, 245, 246-8, 249, 252-4, 257-66, 271. 43n. 59-76-310 282-1, 264, 266, 297-8, 316-17, 116. Williams, Bernard, 29ts, 18ts, 52n \$19m Williams, Michael, 251-4 Snowdon, Paul, 231n Whitgenstein, Ludwig, 21, 79-95, 96-111, Socrates, 59, 2446 114, 1466, 157, 186-8, 214, 246, 272n, Spinoza, Baruch, 290 283, 289-90, 320n Stern, Robert, 227n Wright, Crispin, 93n, 232n, 233-9

Praise for other books by John McDowell:

MIND AND WORLD

"McDowell's book is remarkable not only for the insight it shows and the illumination it offers, but also for its deep sensitivity to the history of thought in general and of philosophy in particular, from ancient times to the present. It will be a delight and, it is not too much to say, should be an inspiration to all serious philosophers."

-P. F. STRAWSON, Times Literary Supplement

MIND, VALUE, AND REALITY MEANING, KNOWLEDGE, AND REALITY

"In a characteristic passage . . . [McDowell] is discussing knowledge, but the passage could stand at the head of almost any of the immensely influential essays collected in these two volumes. Reading them together, one is struck by how much they have in common, despite the breadth of issues they address, ranging from ethics to metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, mind, and language."

-RICHARD HOLTON, Times Literary Supplement

